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Introduction 
The abbreviation "Nazi," the acronym "Gestapo," and the initials "55" 
have become resonant elements of our vocabulary. Less known is "SO," 
and hardly anyone recognizes the combination "Sipo and SO." Although 
Sipo and SO formed the heart of the National Socialist police state, the 
phrase carries none of the ominous impact that it should. 
Sipo and SO was a conglomerate, formed in the summer of 1936 
when Heinrich Himmler, Reichfuehrer 55, became chief of the German 
Police. He fused the Criminal Investigative Police (Kripo) and the Ge-
stapo (the political police) to form the Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei 
or Sipo) under the command of 55 General Reinhard Heydrich. Since 
Heydrich was also chief of the SO, the Security Service of the 55, his 
joint command over Sipo and SO and the exchange of personnel between 
the two produced an amalgam of party and state agencies that became 
central to the execution of most of the terror and mass murder of the 
Third Reich. Sipo and SO demands to be better known. 
Since Sipo and SO amalgamated agencies of the state with those of 
the NS Movement, its origins lie in the separate histories of the police 
and of Nazism. By way of introduction, the first chapters of this book 
fill in the backgrounds of all participating organizations. From the con-
spiratorial environment of the NS Movement emerged the 55, the SO, 
and their leaders. The contest into which they entered focused first on 
control of the police. 
Although no single organization carries full responsibility for the 
evils of the Third Reich, the 55-police system was the executor of ter-
rorism and "population policy" in the same way that the military carried 
out the Reich's imperialistic aggression. Within the police state, even 
the concentration camps could not rival the impact of Sipo and SO. It 
was the source not only of the "desk murderers" who administered 
terror and genocide by assigning victims to the camps, but also of the 
police executives for identification and arrest, and of the command and 
staff for a major instrument of execution, the Einsatzgruppen. Despite 
its power, no serious study has been devoted to the Sipo and SO con-
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glomperate-how it came to be and why its particular components were 
drawn together. 
A study of Sipo and SO in the existing literature leads into a labyrinth 
of both popular and scholarly misconceptions. The reliable literature 
provides only enough descriptive narrative and substantive analysis to 
piece together an organizational history of the Gestapo or the SO for 
certain limited periods. Since there is little that deals with Kripo or with 
Sipo and SO as an entity, l construction of a political-organizational nar-
rative is an indispensable first step. This study provides that narrative, 
along with an analysis of the power struggles that created the conglom-
erate and of the participants' competing and complementary goals, 
which shaped the final product. While there is some repetition of ac-
counts found elsewhere, these accounts are tested against available evi-
dence and woven together with new interpretations to produce a more 
accurate history of Sipo and SO. Unraveling the complexities of organi-
zation and development should contribute to our understanding of the 
Nazi regime and lay the foundations for even more significant insights. 
Since Sipo and SO was so central to many of the more controversial 
developments in the Third Reich-the totalitarian efforts to achieve con-
formity and to end opposition, the race and resettlement programs, the 
development and implementation of imperialistic expansion-its evo-
lution is a case study relevant to the major debates among scholars over 
the nature of the Nazi regime.2 
Central to all these debates is a controversy that divides most schol-
ars into two broad camps: the traditionalist interpretation, also known 
as Hitlercentrist, monocratic, totalitarian, intentionalist, or program-
matic, versus the "revisionist" theories, sometimes labeled polycentrist, 
structuralist, functionalist, or evolutionist. 3 
The 0lder4 and more broadly influential Hitlercentrist-intentionalist 
schools generally agree that most aspects of the Nazi experience were 
products of a consensus of intentions among the NS leadership, fully 
dominated by Hitler, who orchestrated all major developments of the 
Third Reich and turned his ideological fixations into government policy. 5 
In contrast, the polycentrist-functionalist schools, while not denying the 
major importance of either Hitler or the ideological consensus, argue 
that Hitler's style of leadership, which avoided decision making, pro-
duced an administrative chaos of competitive power centers. These in 
turn often made policy that Hitler sometimes accepted, sometimes modi-
fied, and only in extreme cases overruled. Furthermore, in contrast to 
extreme ideal images of totalitarian autocracy, the Fuehrer had to respect 
significant social and economic pressures and power centers, even out-
side his Movement, not just temporarily, but for all or most of his 
thirteen-year reign. In such chaos, functional pressures helped shape 
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policy, while the ideology, rather than offering clear objectives, func-
tioned instead to bring forward those more negative, often self-defeating 
goals that demanded increasingly extreme solutions. 6 
This study of Sipo and SD generally supports that polycentric-
functionalist interpretation. My perspective grew from many years of 
immersion in the primary sources, was constantly reinforced by the 
emerging scholarship of the past two decades, and serves as the context 
in which I now read the sources. Focusing as it does on developments 
usually below Hitler's level of interest, yet occasionally requiring his 
attention and ultimately some decisions by him, the story of the for-
mation of Sipo and SD affords many bases of dissatisfaction with most 
Hitlercentric, intentionalist analyses. 
Much of the debate over monocraty versus polycraty centers on the 
question of whether or not Hitler's famous "divide and rule" strategy 
was as Machiavellian as traditionally believed, or more the result of his 
procrastinating character and his need to skirt decisions, to place himself 
above factional politics and association with mistakes and unpopular 
policies. Unfortunately, from the perspective of this study little light can 
be shed directly on this debate, but the latter analysis seems more con-
sistent with his observable behavior vis-a-vis the evolution of Sipo and 
SD. 
More concrete support for the polycratic view emerges from the great 
number of developments in the evolution of Sipo and SD that occurred 
without any evidence of Hitler's involvement or concern. Even the de-
cisions that he did make were often ignored or so diluted or deflected 
in implementation that they did not hinder the participants in pursuing 
their own versions of the ideological consensus. When his decisions did 
have an effect on Sipo and SD-especially the ultimate acceptance of 
Himmler's consolidation of SS and police-the decisions were deter-
mined less by any long-range intentions about a police state than by 
pressures unleashed in pursuit of other major ideological goals. The 
entire process of decision making was inconsistent with intentionalist-
monocratic models. 
Particularly in the evolution of the Final Solution, however, func-
tional analysis allegedly has failed to convince that the system did any-
thing more than modify "the speed or dynamic of the intentionalist 
program."7 If this were true, functionalists would have to admit that 
the intentionalist argument was the more powerful model. Conse-
quently, this study and its sequel, in particular, must confront the ques-
tion of intentionalism and the Final Solution. The creation of a totalitarian 
police state as an essential step toward the Final Solution provides one 
specific perspective for this study. The self-actuating machinery of de-
struction described so vividly by Raul Hilberg begs for an explanation 
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of its origins. 8 How and why the machine was actually built is central 
to the intentionalist-vs.-functionalist debate. 
On the other hand, this book and its sequel will add little to the 
debate over foreign policy, another field where intentionalism has pre-
vailed, for a significant role for Sipo and SD in NS foreign policy post-
dates 1936. Here, however, early developments indicate clearly a 
synthesis of intentions and functional forces. 
This potential synthesis encourages my hope to rise above any one-
sided contribution to the ongoing debate. All of the truly significant 
representatives of either monocratic-intentionalism or polycratic-func-
tionalism already present sophisticated syntheses of the other side's 
arguments. The monocratic-intentionalists have even added to the image 
of administrative anarachy in the NS regime. The polycratic-functional-
ists concede Hitler's central role and the ideological consensus among 
not only key NS leaders but non-NS allies as well. Despite their closeness 
to a synthesis, however, when intentionalists charge functionalists with 
trivializing the Nazi experience and obscuring moral issues, whole func-
tionalists contend that intentionalists devise alibis that obscure the 
broader questions of responsibility, they refute the hope that either side 
has achieved higher-order synthesis. The moral tone of attack indicates 
an unabridged ideological gap. 9 
The polycratic-functionalist approach is not as "revisionist" as its 
detractors would argue. It seeks merely to revise the extreme implica-
tions of attributing all major developments ultimately to Hitler, or to the 
control of a few. Such a view gets in the way of discovering how a 
modern industrial society of such cultural prestige as Germany could be 
twisted to Hitler's ends, how so many thou&ands of functionaries-more 
ordinary Germans than Nazi extremists or sadists-could be found to 
execute Hitler's will. When the Nazi experience becomes a product of 
the will of the Fuehrer-an aberration of German history, a unique phe-
nomenon in modern Western history-the result is both an alibi that 
deflects further probing and a smokescreen that obscures insights into 
how similarly extreme developments might reoccur, perhaps without a 
Hitler or a Nazi ideology or a German Sonderweg. 
The polycratic-functionalist analysis appeals to me because it prom-
ises to cut through such smokescreens as those the Nazis themselves 
threw up via their propaganda about a triumph of the will. If the analyst 
can avoid becoming lost among the trees of Nazi infighting and the 
diffusion of responsibility in institutional labyrinths, and lead his reader 
out to view the forest of ideological conjunction, then he avoids the 
potential of either school to obscure moral issues. On this note, I hope 
to pursue a transcendent synthesis that neither minimizes the impor~ 
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tance of Hitler or his ideology (or of other leaders such as Himmler or 
Heydrich) nor elevates these leaders to levels that put them in total 
control or that raise their intentions to the level of unchanging elements 
powerful enough to predetermine developments over decades. Perhaps 
no one can express the problem with more dialectical sophistication than 
did Ian Kershaw in his analysis of reactions to the debate: 
They point ... to the need to look for a synthesis of "intention" and "structure," 
rather than seeing them as polarized opposites. It seems, indeed, clear that 
Hitler's intentions and the socio-economic "structural determinants" of Nazi rule 
were not antagonistic poles, pushing in opposite directions, but acted in a dia-
lectical relationship which pushed in the same direction. Consequently, it is as 
good as impossible to separate as a causal factor "intention" from the impersonal 
conditions which shape the framework within which intentions can become 
"operational." At the same time, it seems important to recognize that an "in-
tention" is not an autonomous force, but is affected in its implementation by 
circumstances which it may itself have been instrumental in creating, but which 
have developed a momentum of their own. 10 
Accordingly, one must avoid portraying Hitler or his ideas, or any 
major subordinate or ally or their ideas, or any member of 5ipo and 50 
or the component agencies themselves, as monads (unchanging beings 
or elements) interacting with other monads. They must instead emerge 
as individuals and ideas involved in an ongoing process of change and / 
or becoming. Through interaction, each constantly modified itself and 
the others. To the extent that an individual mind like Hitler's suffered 
from an immunity to reality (a tendency to deflect cognitive dissonance), 
it could lock onto rigid ideas. 50meone like Hitler or Himmler could 
thus be a more rigid component in the interactions, but his efforts to 
implement his ideas could not escape that reality of interaction.ll 
In such a way, this book and its sequel strive to contribute insights 
into how such a respectable, modern society as Germany produced the 
monstrous crimes of the N5 regime. 5ipo and 50 as a case study offers 
an ideal perspective. As indicated, this book will explore the creation of 
the 55-police system without assuming that it was simply created (or 
ordered up) by Hitler with its ultimate role in mind. Yet it is hard to 
imagine the extremes of Hitler's racial policies being pursued success-
fully without an instrument like Himmler's system. This book will show 
that many other authoritarian and/or Nazi-dominated police systems 
might have triumphed instead, with significant differences in what 
might have been. Any course of development other than Himmler's 
triumph in the struggle for police power could have altered Hitler's 
ability to execute genocide and might therefore have reduced the scope 
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of his racial destruction to more conventional forms of persecution. In 
support of Kershaw's previously quoted appeal for a synthesis, most 
psychologists argue that no matter what our inclinations, our actions 
are also shaped by opportunities or the lack of opportunities to act on 
those inclinations. No leader can execute his programs without suitable 
instruments. 
In this light, even subtle differences in the plans and goals of Himm-
ler's competitors, like Frick and Goering, become significant. Schol-
ars have rightly argued that since all competitors (even many non-Nazi 
collaborators) sought an authoritarian police state, thay all contributed 
to the ultimate system; this book certainly confirms that interpretation. 
However, those who argue that this commonality of goal negates any 
significance in the variations12 obscure a significant component of the 
puzzle. 
From the point of view of preserving civil liberties, all police states 
pose the same evil potential, no matter what they propose to achieve 
or defend us against. History, however, offers many examples of dif-
ferences among police states in action. They have served different ends, 
and they have indulged in various degrees of repression and inhuman-
ity. From that viewpoint, police states are not all the same. One must 
consider the possibility that, regardless of the inclinations of the regime, 
some police state machinery does not offer its leaders the same op-
portunities or degree of oppportunity as do others. In some police states, 
the opportunities are widely at variance from what their leaders might 
ever have anticipated, shaping the histories of the police states as much 
as have the inclinations of the leaders. A Frick, or even a Goering, as 
police chief might not have made it possible for Hitler to do what he 
did, certainly not to the extent that he did it. One need look only at the 
failure of the Luftwaffe to see the seriousness of this possibility. 
In such a light, the differences among Frick, Goering, and Himmler 
become most significant, demanding not only an exploration of the 
struggle among the contenders and the alternatives they offered, but 
also an attempt to determine how their struggle shaped the ultimate 
Himmlerian system. 
Historians have long agreed that a key element of Himmler's system 
was the fusion of the SS, a "revolutionary" instrument of force from the 
NS Movement, with the legitimate police force of the state. Himmler 
intended an eventual, complete fusion of SS and police and, therefore, 
of Sipo and SD. Although this never happened de jure, it was clearly a 
de facto reality by the 1939 creation of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. 
From its inception in 1936, Sipo and SD was a de facto entity for shaping 
the attitudes and actions of its members, police and SS alike. I intend 
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to develop further in a sequel the role of Sipo and SO in moving its 
members toward their ultimate roles in police terror and genocide. That 
should, in turn, contribute to later studies of the role of Sipo and SO in 
converting general ideological conjunctions into a more dear consensus, 
then into intentions, and finally into plans and actions. 
The reader of this book may feel dissatisfied because there is little 
or no coverage of the internal structure, operations, or personnel of the 
Gestapo, Kripo, or SO. Obviously, however, the narrative and analysis 
of the "external" struggle that created Sipo and SO needs an entire book 
to itself. The "internal developments" -the evolution of each organi-
zation and its operations and ethos, relations and tensions among the 
different branches, the personnel and how they came to play their roles 
in NS terror-deserve their own narrative and analysis. But such an 
undertaking would be risky without the context of this study. This book, 
in short, is offered as a preface to other work intended by me, in the 
hope that it will focus critical, scholarly attention on Sipo and SO. 
Terminology and Style 
Both the SS and the state bureaucracy employed elaborate titles and 
designations. This study makes constant use of such terms, which can 
become confusing to anyone but the specialist. Whenever possible, Ger-
man titles and official designations have been translated into English for 
darity, except for commonly used, anglicized German words like fueh-
rer. When first used, the translated title is followed in parentheses by 
the German original. Since translation may cause some confusion or 
inconvenience for the specialist, who must pursue the titles into original 
sources, the notes employ German language designations and spellings. 
German designations, especially under the Nazis, were often 
lengthy. Consequently, standardized German abbreviations for offices, 
titles, archives, and such are employed in the notes and occasionally in 
the text. Frequently used, lengthy journal titles are treated in the same 
manner. The reader will find a list of abbreviations on pages 252-54. 
As noted, Sipo and SO formed an amalgam, so it is referred to in 
the singular throughout the text wherever the entire organization is 
intended. Although Sipo and SO never formed a singular corporation 
like Sears and Roebuc;k, commonly referred to in the singular, it must 
be seen as a singular entity if its role is to be understood. 
Throughout the text, capitalization is used consistently for words 
like Party and Movement when they stand for the Nazi or NS Party or 
Movement. In this way frequent reference to these groups can be made 
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without repetitive use of full titles, yet they are clearly distinguished 
from other parties or movements and from the generic concepts. On a 
similar note, proper nouns like Party Leadership are translations of titles 
like Partei Reichsleitung, a branch of the Party structure, and are not 
generic references. 
1 ________________ __ 
Factionalism in Pursuit 
of Power 
The Nazi Movement to 1931 
The struggle for police power at the higher levels of the Nazi Party 
culminated in 1936 with Himmler's triumph: the addition of the title 
chief of the German Police to his National Socialist power base as Reichs-
fuehrer of the SS. It was in June 1936 that he created Sipo-the German 
Reichs Security Police-and added it to Reinhard Heydrich's command 
over the SO, the SS Security Service of the NS Movement. At that point, 
the foundations of the Nazi police state were firmly laid, and the agencies 
for controlled police terror, and ultimately genocide, were in place. Until 
then, however, neither Himmler's triumph nor the nature and structure 
of the Nazi police state were foregone conclusions. Its ultimate missions 
of totalitarian terror and genocide exceeded the imaginations of even its 
creators. The developments that culminated in Himmler's triumph be-
gan several years before Hitler became chancellor in 1933. 
The early National Socialist Movement was neither monolithic nor 
disciplined. By 1930, when the Nazis first became a significant political 
party, the Movement contained diverse, competitive, contradictory 
groups with one thing in common: a bond of powerful loyalty to their 
Fuehrer, Adolf Hitler. Each member and each faction of the Movement 
adhered to some variant of the Nazi Idea, or Weltanschauung, and each 
thought his version most closely followed Hitler's. No one ever knew 
for sure, however, for, unlike an ideology, his Weltanschauung was 
almost deliberately vague, with only one ideological certainty: the ex-
istence of the Fuehrer, the one leader who embodied the Weltan-
schauung and the true will of the people. 1 
To exert the widest popular appeal and to maintain his personal 
power, Hitler kept the Nazi Idea vague and all-encompassing, allowing 
each faction some leeway to push its own preferences. As conditions 
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changed, the propaganda themes shifted to attract those groups tem-
porarily more susceptible to the promises of Nazism. Parallel to its clearly 
conservative, anti-communist appeal, National Socialism could be both 
elitist and egalitarian, and ambivalent about private property. But always 
there was the safe appeal to nationalism, usually chauvinistic and xeno-
phobic, interwoven with virulently anti-Semitic theories. Even this anti-
Semitism, however, could vary greatly in both emphasis and intensity. 
In juxtaposition to its vaguely defined socialism, National Socialism 
called for the restoration of selected old values, traditions, and institu-
tions, including the authority of German society. While this was basically 
a reactionary attitude, for many only a radical revolutionary restructuring 
of society could restore those lost values. Thus reactionaries and radicals 
came together in common focus on a strong personal leader as the source 
of authority in society. 
The vague NS Idea fused contradictory factions into a Movement 
that gave Hitler power as the ultimate authority on the Idea, never to 
be clearly defined. Generally, he stood above factional disputes and 
power struggles, committing himself to a position only when absolutely 
forced to-and then adroitly managing to leave all parties with some 
hope, some pittance, preserving his position as the ultimate arbiter. Only 
when a follower inadvertently tried to crystallize the Weltanschauung 
into a reality that would limit Hitler's freedom and authority would he 
bring such a man down. 
Ideological ambiguity as a basis for personal authority related closely 
to Hitler's tactic of divide and conquer. Just as he avoided identification 
with the position of anyone faction, he also restricted the development 
of any clear chains of command or order of rank within the Movement, 
never favoring anyone leader or faction without counterbalance. Fre-
quently he created overlapping or conflicting responsibilities and refused 
to delineate spheres of influence. How much of this was a calculated 
tactic and how much merely a product of his reluctance to make decisions 
remains unclear, but the effect was the same. Each in his command vied 
with the other for the favor and support of a man who always stood 
above, withholding the ultimate favor and thus rarely having to fear an 
alliance of subordinates against him. Because each lieutenant, with his 
own interpretation of what Hitler had said, built agencies and organi-
zations that he thought would best fulfill the goals of the Movement, 
Hitler always had a wide variety of instruments to use and courses to 
pursue, usually maintaining several alternatives simultaneously.2 
The pecking order within the Movement resulted from whatever 
personal power a lieutenant might be able to muster, and his momentary 
suitability or indispensability to Hitler's quest. Consequently power re-
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lationships among the Nazis have been aptly compared to feudalism, 3 
being based on individual strengths and complex interpersonal rela-
tionships. Because most of Hitler's vassals were lords or little fuehrers 
in their own domains, each having his own personal following, the 
Movement and the Third Reich were neither rational nor monolithic, 
but became instead confusing webs of personal power and loyalty sys-
tems. Unlike the feudal lord, however, Hitler always maintained the 
right to interfere if he saw fit. 
Although such intraparty relationships were nurtured by Hitler's 
character and methods, they also reflected the coalescent growth of the 
Movement. Even after July 1921, when he had become the almost un-
disputed leader of the National Socialist German Workers' Party, or 
NSDAP, Hitler's supporters remained indistinct from the amorphous, 
voelkisch right wing of Bavarian politics. Also part of this right wing were 
the ubiquitous paramilitary groups, some of which fused into the Storm 
Troopers, or Brown Shirts (Sturmabteilung, known as the SA). 
The SA, born in the summer of 1921 as the paramilitary wing of the 
Party, would become one of Hitler's first factional problems. Its alle-
giances were unclear, and many of its members-former soldiers and 
their youthful followers-visualized the creation of a military society 
based on a new national army that would replace the decadent Prussian 
traditions with the spirit of trench camaraderie. Since a new order built 
by the SA would simply bring Hitler along with it rather than vice versa, 
he insisted that his new order must be built before the national army 
could emerge. Until then, the paramilitary wing had to remain an in-
strument of the political mission and subordinate to the Party, that is, 
to Hitler. 
In addition to the SA, other factions emerged as problems. After the 
1923 putsch, the outlawed Nazi Party had fragmented into groups op-
erating under camouflaged names, becoming a national force in north-
eastern and western Germany, where Nazism had previously been 
weak. One offspring was the so-called Northern Faction, a group cen-
tered around the Strasser brothers, Otto and Gregor, Joseph Goebbels, 
and others. Most of them leaned much more toward anticapitalism than 
did the more conservative Bavarian-centered branch. 4 
Such divisiveness face Hitler in 1925 when he left Landsburg Prison 
and began to reorganize the NSDAP. His efforts were twofold. First, he 
reestablished his personal contacts and power, welding the Movement 
together by emphasizing the common themes of nationalism, anti-
Semitism, and the beloved but absolute Fuehrer. Second, he mandated 
a complete reorganization and centralization of the Party from its Munich 
headquarters down to the local Pary organizations. In his major thrust 
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against divided loyalties, he terminated all overlapping links with other 
voelkisch and paramilitary groups. 
By dividing and conquering and by wooing many recalcitrants with 
a mixture of overwhelming showmanship, flattery, and unyielding in-
sistence on his preeminence, Hitler adroitly patched over the cracks 
while denying the radicals a hard-line position. Nevertheless, he did 
not deny the specific ideological views of the Northern Faction, and left 
the future so vague that the faction and its leaders remained almost 
intact. Anything could still be read between the lines of the Party pro-
gram and Hitler's statements. 
Meanwhile, the SA reemerged as a rebel. During the reorganization, 
local Party leaders had established their own SA units. The numerous 
independent SA leaders and local units tended to act autonomously, 
and the SA attracted an increasingly rowdy and uncontrollable element. 
To centralize command, Hitler appointed Franz von Pfeffer Supreme SA 
Fuehrer in October 1926. Although Pfeffer developed a national com-
mand structure for the SA, provincial leadership prevailed over efforts 
to establish a military hierarchy. The SA remained diverse in member-
ship and perhaps more untrustworthy than any of the other factions, 
often becoming synonymous with the more radically anitcapitalist, anti-
establishment elements in the Movement. Aggravating the situation, 
Pfeffer favored an autonomous military force over subordination to the 
Party. 5 
The result of the evolution was an ever-increasing diversity that was 
essential to building the mass-based party that Hitler would ride to 
power. The central Party bureaucracy sought to impose Party discipline 
for its Fuehrer, but even the bureaucracy was factionalized under lieu-
tenants who built personal structures for executing their own interpre-
tations of the Fuehrer's will. Below them, at every level across Germany, 
local fuehrers emerged, each equally sure that his approach embodied 
the true NS Idea and the Fuehrer's will. Each resented either the bu-
reaucratic inflexibility or the undisciplined willfulness of the other. 
Ironically, this tension did not produce a badly factionalized party, 
but instead a flexible, dynamic Movement, bound together in xenopho-
bic nationalism and a powerful focus on common enemies. An outward 
show of discipline and comradely unity in the face of those enemies 
became the proper NS stance. Above all, Party members united behind 
their Fuehrer, who could convert their tension into political power. This 
capacity made the Movement and Adolf Hitler synonymous, but has 
left open the question of when and how much he controlled the Move-
ment, or it drove him. 
Factionalism in Pursuit of Power 13 
Himmler and the 55 
Into this context of factionalism and questionable reliability of large 
branches of the Movement came the SS. Hitler's chauffeur, Julius 
Schreck, created the first true SS prototype in April 1925, when he 
formed the eight-man Staff Guard for the Fuehrer, who was then un-
certain about his ability to keep the SA as a subordinate wing of the 
Party.6 Hitler, just released from prison and finding the Party in turmoil 
and the SA uncontrolled, needed personal protection and a disciplined, 
absolutely reliable Party police force. The eight-man Staff Guard became 
the model for many such units at local Party offices, soon designated 
Schutzstaffeln (Protection Squadrons), known as the SS. 
From the beginning, the SS units resembled an elite formation: small, 
handpicked teams, not to exceed ten men-allegedly the best and most 
reliable Party members. To guard against disorderly, insubordinate ele-
ments, the screening process required of each SS candidate two sponsors 
and registration with the police as a resident of the local area for at least 
five years. Increasingly stringent physical requirements also added to 
the image of eliteness. 
During its first years, the SS developed its mission as a security 
service, protecting Party leaders and speakers and, beyond that, policing 
within the Movement. To perform this mission, the SS soon developed 
its first intelligence function by requiring its members to forward to SS 
headquarters all newspaper and magazine clippings referring to the 
Movement, as well as information on undesirables and spies in the 
Party. 7 
No sooner had the SS begun to develop, however, than it lost its 
initial preeminence. When Pfeffer reorganized the SA in the fall of 1926, 
the nascent SS had to take a back seat. Not only did the newly designated 
Reichsfuehrer SS become subordinate to the Supreme SA Fuehrer, but 
the local SS units drew increasingly menial assignments as the SA re-
emerged.8 The little SS remained insignificant until it came under the 
command of Heinrich Himmler. 
Himmler had joined the SS in 1925, as member number 168. At that 
time, as secretary and general assistant to Gregor Strasser, head of the 
Party District, or Gau, of Lower Bavaria, his duties included organizing 
and commanding the local protection squadrons. A diligent worker, he 
rose rapidly in the Party, and during the next year, when Strasser became 
propaganda chief at Party central headquarters, Himmler became deputy 
chief. In this position, he developed a closer relationship with the SS, 
which as an intelligence agency collaborated with him in propaganda 
and as a protection force guarded the speakers whom he furnished. In 
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September 1927, Himmler consequently became second in command of 
the SS.9 
Immediately, he strengthened the intelligence functions of the SS 
by requiring that intelligence reports from the local squadrons be for-
warded regularly to his central headquarters. He expanded the scope of 
these reports to include unusual news about (1) opponents, especially 
their leaders; (2) known Freemasons and Jewish leaders; (3) special po-
litical or state events; (4) important clippings, especially any about Na-
tional Socialism; and (5) any orders of the opposition that might be 
acquired. Not to overlook home territory, he ordered the SS to report 
on improprieties in the SA. IO 
By this time, Himmler had already manifested most of the charac-
teristics and preoccupations that would shape his infamous 55. He had 
identified the major "enemies" -Marxists, Jews, and Freemasons. He 
was equally preoccupied with ferreting out the internal or camouflaged 
enemies in German society and in the Movement, focusing his attention 
on the SA. 
Himmler's complexity frustrates efforts to describe him. He cut such 
a contradictory figure that most contemporaries painted discordant pic-
tures of him. He led an exemplary personal life, so rigidly middle-class 
in moralistic standards that he was absolutely priggish. He was not 
simply cold, however, for he often displayed genuine compassion for 
the unfortunate, and he sought to maintain warm personal relations 
with everyone around him. Many knew him as a congenial companion 
with a pleasant sense of humor. On the other hand, this child-loving, 
clerkish man became the veritable executioner of over twelve million 
human beings, including children. As early as 1933, selective killings 
and random terror were the order of the day. By 1941, murder by the 
millions had become a "necessary" although "un-Germanic" thing for 
Himmler. Even so, he reportedly became depressed when the "final 
solution" of the Jewish question was devised, and he was visibly shaken 
when he witnessed a mass execution. Although such descriptions seem 
totally contradictory, recent studies have drawn a more coherent pic-
ture. ll 
For instance, Peter Loewenberg employed the concept of "unsuc-
cessful adolescence" to explain Himmler's character. Although the re-
sultant picture was monochromatic, it laid bare significant aspects of the 
total man. Young Heinrich was the archetype of the good, obedient, 
respectful child. He identified so totally with his father, a pedantic and 
conscientious gymnasium professor who tutored Prince Heinrich of Ba-
varia, that he never developed his own independent character. Rather 
than acquiring an assertive personality of his own, Himmler simply ex-
pressed what he thought he should be. His image of masculine strength, 
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which he was impelled to manifest, was one of extremely repressive 
self-control. Under the direction of his father, he developed many com-
pulsive habits of orderliness and self-discipline, becoming a man who 
craved absolute authority for a guide. He was extremely insecure when-
ever he felt the loss of complete control over himself and his responsi-
bilities. He hid his confused and tortured reactions to real-life relations 
behind a mask of propriety of the sort that he believed bourgeois stan-
dards dictated. 
The bourgeois environment in which young Himmler developed was 
not only rigidly defined in terms of place and propriety, but also rich 
in romantic images of the heroic ancient and medieval Germans. Al-
though he felt destined for a military career, he had been too young to 
be more than a cadet during World War I. Unable to make his way into 
the postwar Reichswehr, and with action in the Free Corps offering no 
career, he turned in frustration to his second love, farming. In the fall 
of 1919, he matriculated in agricultural studies at a Technische Hochschule 
and began a few pleasant years of student life and apprenticeship. 
During his youth, Himmler had displayed few symptoms of his 
ultimately extreme ideas. As a typically conservative nationalist and a 
devout Catholic, he expressed only the sort of nonvirulent anti-Semitism 
then much in vogue. His two most persistent characteristics were the 
pursuit of security by fitting in completely, and the quest for an absolute, 
all-encompassing set of certainties to assure his conformity. 
His intermittent involvement in things military made him a follower 
of Ernst Roehm, a leader in many of the Munich area paramilitary for-
mations. In one of these units, Himmler participated in the November 
1923 putsch. After this taste of dramatic political action, he gravitated 
to the National-Socialist Freedom Movement, one of the post-coup fac-
tions of the then illegal Party. In this way he became involved with 
Gregor Strasser as a propagandist in the Reichstag election of 1924. Car-
ried away by inflammatory attacks on Liberalism, Jews, Freemasonry, 
and bolshevism, Himmler completed his gravitation to a radical rightist 
view that held an interrelated set of enemies responsible for the plight 
of Germany. Even so, the factionalism of the Movement disturbed him, 
because it had no ideological consensus. Only when Hitler emerged from 
prison and rebuilt the Movement around himself did Himmler find the 
absolute certainty to which he would cling: the Fuehrer as interpreter 
of the Nazi Idea with unquestionable authority.12 
Between 1924 and 1929, while he climbed from the regional to the 
central offices of the Party and the 55, Himmler developed his absolutist 
ideology after the Hitlerian model. While fleshing out his own details, 
he fell under the influence of Richard Walter Darre, one of the many 
racist ideologues who argued that everything of greatness in human 
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history had been done by men of Nordic blood. The greatness of Ger-
many hinged upon promotion of its Nordic blood and culture and the 
destruction of anyone who opposed them. Since the chief characteristic 
of Nordic blood was the struggle for dominance, its antitheses were 
international humanitarian ideas. Freemasonry, Christianity brought by 
the Latins, Marxism or any form of international socialism, and "inter-
national Jewish capital" opposed and undermined German greatness. 
All the pieces fell together for Himmler into a monolithic ideology of 
race and blood and a set of equally absolute, abstract enemies: not human 
beings, but the agents of evil forces. 
Well before his exposure to Nazism, Himmler had expressed a desire 
to settle in east-central Europe like the medieval Germans. He saw the 
future of Germany in eastward ~ettlement, as in the romantic past. By 
the time of his Nazi propaganda work, it became obvious to him that 
such an eastward movement meant the displacement of the Slavs, who 
had reversed the process by infiltrating Germany. Slavs thus joined the 
list of enemies. 13 
During his formative years, Himmler had read casually on the sub-
ject of national security agencies, influenced by one book in particular, 
Colonel Walter Nicolai's Geheime MaechteY A comparative study of in-
telligence operations during World War I, the book attributed Germany's 
defeat in large part to shortcomings in that realm. Nicolai argued that 
unlike the consistent approach of the French and Russians, the Germans 
developed intelligence services against their wartime enemies only spo-
radically and never in a coordinated way. They left political intelligence 
in the hands of diplomats, chosen usually for social reasons and guided 
in action by "social points of view." Lacking initiative, foreign office civil 
servants "scrupulously followed the line." The independently operating 
military intelligence lacked guidance from the political leadership , which 
did not understand its needs or support it. What Germany needed was 
statesmen with "a clear-sighted policy of force" to pursue national in-
terests and a central, politically directed espionage service to uphold that 
policy. IS 
Nicolai emphasized that minorities, especially Jews, and interna-
tionally connected churches and their leaders represented threats to na-
tional security. Given this, it should be the province of the intelligence 
service to deal with a nation's immigration and racial problems. As for 
the origins of political action, "the idea of a revolution was not carried 
from the German East front into the homeland but from the homeland 
to the front.,,16 Here lay the seeds of Himmler's later concept of a Reich 
Security Corps and the future roles of Sipo and SO. He may never have 
understood how intelligence and security agencies operated, but his 
objectives for them were firmly set. 
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By the time Himmler acquired control of the 55, he already perceived 
the rudiments of its future missions, including those of the 50. The 55 
would be a racially pure military order of Teutonic warriors who would 
cleanse Germany of its internal enemies, guard against enemy penetra-
tion from abroad, maintain order at home, and conquer and colonize 
the East, ensuring the ties between blood and soil. Himmler's ideas, 
reinforced by those of Darre, soon formed the stringent racial require-
ments for 55 membership and produced the marriage code that subjected 
all 55 fiancees to approval. 
If "racist crackpot" aptly describes one aspect of Himmler's char-
acter, it would be a mistake to discount his abilities. The tendency to 
dismiss Himmler too quickly led to the popular belief, at various levels 
of Party and state, that Himmler was merely a shield, a dupe behind 
whom Heydrich was free to build a great and powerful empire.17 5uch 
an explanation hardly accounts for what Himmler achieved without Hey-
drich. 
Himmler was certainly a man to be reckoned with in the milieu of 
the Third Reich. Felix Kersten, Himmler's masseur and confidant, de-
scribed him as, on the one hand, "a crass rationalist coldly taking account 
of human instincts and using them to his own ends . . . yet at the same 
time a romantic."IS Himmler could indeed behave with cool rationality, 
yet as with Hitler, one often wonders whether he was in control of his 
myths or vice versa. Though he could certainly use the 55 mythology 
with calculated effect, he also believed most of what he said. 
Heinrich Himmler indeed had talents. Although he has been de-
scribed as a clerkish pedant, a plodding worker who is attentive to details 
can be handy in a small, poor political party, where he can gain a position 
of strength. More important, Himmler was a skilled organizer and man-
ager, adroit in developing and exploiting contacts. 19 These qualities, 
along with his racist ideals, gave him a ready-made place in Hitler's 
hierarchy. 
In view of Himmler's considerable skills and many achievements, 
the other extreme is to overestimate him-as did Willie Frischauer in 
his image of an "evil genius." In fact, Himmler cultivated such an image. 
He reveled in the role of manipulator, which he practiced all the more 
viciously because of feelings of insecurity. He loved to pontificate on 
the art of manipulation, and undoubtedly greatly exaggerated the degree 
of preplanning that went into a victory. The art of manipulation as he 
practiced it made use of strict rules and austere standards stringently 
enforced, though counterbalanced in many cases by a free rein for sub-
ordinates and the lavish awarding of prizes, honors, and titles. In emu-
lation of Hitler, he played his underlings against one another. 20 
Himmler had another characteristic that well suited his role-a con-
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spiratorial mentality. Since he firmly believed in looking behind the 
scenes for the "wire-pullers," any new development frustrated him until 
he could "determine" the person or persons who "engineered" it. 21 Such 
a view of reality predictably affected the operations and organizational 
structure of the agencies that developed beneath him, particularly Sipo 
and SD. 
Other qualities in Himmler had their effect as well. For instance, 
among the romantic qualities imbued in young Himmler were sacrifice 
and undying loyalty. Loyalty became the hallmark of his self-image and 
the ideal of the 55. For Himmler the only true proof of ultimate loyalty 
became "the willing execution of orders and the assumption of respon-
sibilities that others find immoral or distasteful.,,22 Such a concept of 
loyalty helps explain the role of Himmler and his ranks in police terrorism 
and crimes against humanity, for neither he nor most of his Sipo and 
SD leaders were sadists. 
The loyalty that Himmler imparted to the 55 determined its future 
bond with Hitler, who needed absolute loyalty. The potential value of 
Himmler's influence on the 55 must have become apparent to Hitler by 
the beginning of 1929, for he made him Reichsfuehrer 55, head of the 
entire 55. Hitler nevertheless manifested ambivalent attitudes toward 
Himmler. At times he displayed an uneasiness about Himmler's ide-
ology, perhaps because he saw its absolutes as potential restrictions on 
his own flexibility.23 The following chapters will describe several occa-
sions when Hitler avoided an expansion of Himmler's power. Hitler saw 
Himmler's 55 as an ideal security force within the Movement, but may 
have foreseen no greater role. 
Meanwhile, however, Himmler's appointment in January 1929 came 
at a crucial time for Nazism. Election results had recently shown that 
the rural population and the lower middle class offered rich prospects. 
Appealing to them required shifting emphasis from "socialism" and the 
street tactics of the SA rowdies to legal tactics, conventional political 
campaigning, and appeals to traditional German values. Although Rabble-
rousing and anti-Semitism still remained for the hard liners, this tactical 
shift increased Party tension. The restraint, legalism, and electoral poli-
tics that bourgeois respectability demanded, and the dealings and com-
promises with reactionaries, repulsed many among the young radicals 
and in the SA. The Party thus needed more than ever a police force to 
ensure adherence to legality and to prevent the sort of incidents that 
would alienate the middle class or result in bans on the Nazis. 
Tensions heightened over the next five years, increasing the need 
for a Party police force. In the spring of 1930, a crisis occurred when 
Party radicals came out in support of strikes in Saxony. In the ensuing 
efforts to impose conformity, Hitler took positions that made an irre-
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parable ideological split obvious to Otto Strasser, who resigned from the 
Party and began a campaign against Hitler. Shortly thereafter, Pfeffer 
resigned as Supreme SA Fuehrer because of conflicts over the role of 
the SA, and in an indirectly related outbreak, the Berlin SA revolted 
under the leadership of SA Fuehrer East, Walter Stennes. The uprising 
began as a strike and escalated into a seizure of Party headquarters that 
could only be brought under control by Hitler's personal attention. 24 
By September 1930, Hitler had assumed the position of Supreme SA 
Fuehrer, turning to his old cohort and one of the creators of the SA, 
Ernst Roehm, as the only man who might keep the SA in line. In January 
1931, he appointed Roehm chief of staff of the SA with orders to weld 
it into a centralized military organization. Roehm's efforts to assert dis-
cipline sparked immediate opposition, most notably another Stennes-
led revolt in Berlin. 25 
In such conflicts and crises, the SS proved itself. In both Berlin re-
volts, outnumbered SS guards had tried, although unsuccessfully, to 
defend Party offices. During the second revolt, SS intelligence helped 
Hitler manipulate the situation. The SS emerged as the obvious police 
force for maintaining order in the Party.26 Although the SS had been a 
subordinate branch of the SA, that subordination came into question 
when Hitler assumed command of the SA in September 1930. In October 
Hitler proclaimed the SS as the Party police force and decided to give it 
independent status, since one of its major missions would be policing 
the SA. On December 1, Himmler asserted this independence, but 
Roehm's arrival in January as SA chief of staff disrupted this move. 
Instead, Himmler became personally subordinate to Roehm, although 
the SS maintained an autonomous command structure.27 This compro-
mise undoubtedly grew from the negotiations surrounding Roehm's ap-
pointment and the efforts to centralize the Party's paramilitary forces. 
The SS had thus emerged as an organization of dual character, both 
a police service and an elite troop. As a police service it was to maintain 
security and order, protecting Party leaders and speakers. But most im-
portant was the job of policing the Movement-that is, keeping Party 
and SA personnel from violating Hitler's claim to legality except when 
he saw fit. In this position, Himmler might be pitted against his nominal 
chief, Ernst Roehm, head of the SA, and he became free to act more 
independently than most subordinates. Meanwhile, Himmler and 
Roehm resumed their close personal relationship, and worked together 
well. Nevertheless, when the SS reserved the Party police force as its 
domain, it established a logical claim to much of its future role. Hitler 
desired an unrestricted police force, under his immediate control and 
with military capabilities, that in the event of war could keep the morale 
of the German homeland and Army free of decay. Such a mission was 
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consistent with Himmler's ideas, but it would take him time to convince 
Hitler that the 55 was that desired police force. 
Meanwhile, the 5D emerged at this point as a predictable product 
of internal strife and rivalry, and of the Movement's conspiratorial drive 
for power. The security aspect of the mission that the 55 had acquired 
involved the activities of Abwehr and Gegnerforschung, counterintelli-
gence, and the investigation of enemy movements. As the 55 grew, a 
specialized branch inevitably appeared to assume these duties. 
Photo Essays 
A. The German Police Besieged: Events and Personalities, 1929-1932 
Above: A posed photograph of the Prussian Schutzpolizei in action in the work-
ing-class neighborhood of Berlin-Neukoelln during the bloody May Day riots of 
1929. Below: Police caught in a fight between the Red Front and Storm Troopers. 
Unless otherwise stated, all photos are from the Bundesarchiv, Koblenz. 
Above: A police display of captured Nazi weapons in 1929, an effort to reveal 
their threats to law and order and the security of the Republic. It is in marked 
contrast to the increasing emphasis on the threat from the left. Below: A police 
raid on NS offices. A Nazi propaganda photograph taken in Berlin during the 
SA prohibition, 13 April 1932. 
The targets of the Papen Putsch (from left in the front rank): The popular 
commander of the Berlin Schutzpolizei, Police Colonel Magnus Heimanns-
berg, leader in the police reform movement and model of "the people's 
police officer," temporarily arrested on 20 July 1932; Berlin Police President 
Albert Greszinski, Severing's appointee, dismissed on 20 July; and Police 
Vice-President Dr. Bernhard Weiss, father of the new Prussian political 
police and modernizer of the detective force while their chief, also tem-
porarily arrested on 20 July 1932. Both Greszinski and "Isidor" Weiss had 
been major targets of Goebbels' campaigns against "marxist-Jewish domi-
nation" of the Prussian police. 
B. Spontaneous Terror: The Nazi Seizure of Power 
in the Spring of 1933 
A press release photograph of the NS party leadership at the time of Hitler's 
appointment as Reich Chancellor, 30 January 1933. Seated is Wilhelm Frick, 
new Reich minister of the interior and the only Nazi member of Hitler's cabinet 
with portfolio. Standing fourth from left is Joseph Goebbels, Reich propa-
ganda leader and gauleiter of Berlin. At rear center, between Hitler and Goer-
ing, is Ernst Roehm, chief of staff of the SA. Hermann Goering is in trench 
coat, the only other NS cabinet member, as minister without portfolio. To 
the right of Goering stand Walter Darre, Himmler's mentor on blood and soil; 
Heinrich Himmler, still only Reichsfuehrer SS; and Rudolf Hess, party sec-
retary. 
Above: The NS Hilfspolizei, SA men acting as Auxiliary Police in Berlin, March 
1933. Below: SS men being sworn in as Auxiliary Police. 
Above: SA Auxiliary Police arrest Communists in Berlin, 6 March 1933, one day 
after the national elections. Below: SS Auxiliary Police ready for action in a police 
raid. 
Right: SA guards outside 
Concentration Camp 
Oranienberg near Berlin. 
Below: A roll call of inter-
nees inside Oranienberg. 
Above: The police raid a Jewish quarter of Berlin in a search for "Communist 
leaflets and undesirable aliens," early April 1933. Below: SS guards at "Protective 
Custody Camp" Dachau near Munich, 24 May 1933. 
2 _____ _ 
The Roots of the SD 
Although no documentary records of Nazi intelligence agencies pre-
dating 1930 have surfaced, ad hoc Party and SA intelligence organizations 
did exist as far back as the early twenties. 1 A few years later, the Reich 
Propaganda Leadership under Gregor Strasser and Himmler were using 
their apparatus to assemble material on political enemies and individual 
Party members, and Himmler used the SS as a source of similar intel-
ligence. Early Reich-level intelligence made no use of specialists, how-
ever, and most operations were purely local, such as several Gau 
intelligence services that existed at least as early as 1930.2 Like much 
else in the Movement, such operations were totally subject to local poli-
tics, and from Himmler's perspective, hopelessly distorted and unreli-
able. 
Others obviously shared Himmler's concern, for by 1930-31 both the 
Reich Propaganda Office, now under Goebbels, and the SA had formed 
centralized intelligence agencies before the SS. Beyond gathering intel-
ligence about the enemy, they felt a growing need for counterintelligence 
and countersabotage. The recent electoral victories had produced a band-
wagon effect for the Movement, and the influx of personnel eroded the 
reliability and controllability of membership, improving the chances for 
spies and agents provocateur. Success had bred a security problem. 
When Otto Strasser resigned from the Party, Hitler saw him as an 
enemy-a police spy and provocateur. Strasser's subsequent anti-Party 
campaign confirmed this belief, and since Strasser had voiced many of 
the SA's discontents, his later alliance with Walter Stennes led to the 
widely held belief that the Party was extensively infiltrated.3 The activi-
ties of Strasser and Stennes, and of turncoat Nazis appearing on Com-
munist platforms, soon created a spy scare.4 
Such a scare was hardly unfounded. When the Party rose to political 
eminence, the Communists intensified their interest in the Nazis. They 
tried to infiltrate the Party and used Nazi defectors for propaganda ad-
vantages. To combat this threat, the SA produced the first truly central 
intelligence agency of the Movement. In the fall of 1930, shortly before 
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Roehm's return, a former captain, Herbert Riester, had established a 
local operation that reported to the regional SA staff in Munich. By the 
winter of 1930-31, perhaps as a result of Roehm's organizational reforms, 
it had grown into a central intelligence and counterintelligence branch 
of the Supreme SA Staff known as the Ic division, the German military 
staff designation for intelligence. 5 
Through a network of SA observers, Riester assembled reports on 
the activities of enemy movements and on the mood and political atti-
tudes of civil servants and police and military personnel. Unfortunately 
for Riester, his very success in penetrating state agencies, especially the 
military, led to his downfall. In February 1931, a police raid on his home 
uncovered the scope of his activities and resulted in a charge of high 
treason. 6 The compromise of Riester's activities led to a temporary hiatus 
for the SA Ie service. Under the pretext of economy measures, Roehm 
dissolved his Ie office, dispersed the compromised personnel, and as-
signed the gathering of information reports to an auxiliary staff under 
his adjutant. 7 
Of course, Roehm's people had no intention of doing without an 
intelligence branch or of leaving one undeveloped, but before they could 
properly reestablish the SA Ie, Goebbels's Reich Propaganda Head-
quarters (RPL) gave birth to an organization that would offer itself as 
the Party Intelligence Service. Ouring 1930-31, the Reich Propaganda 
Headquarters had already created propaganda staff positions at all levels 
of the Party and developed a system of monthly reports from the lower 
levels (Bezirke through Gau) to the RPL. 8 There is no indication that 
Goebbels took any personal interest in an intelligence service, but his 
deputy, one H. Franke, who had replaced Himmler at Munich head-
quarters, apparently felt the same needs for intelligence as Strasser and 
Himmler before him. By May 1931, the significance of intelligence work 
became so obvious that the RPL called for the creation of a Nachrichten-
dienst (NO) to parallel the propaganda staff structure down through the 
Party organization. In June or July, Arthur Schumann, Gau propaganda 
leader in Saxony, was summoned to Munich to take over NO work. In 
his office there, variously titled Oivision of Subdivision NO, Schumann 
labored under serious difficulties, for he had to assert his authority over 
a field structure being built from below and staffed by the appointees 
of regional Party officials, and he had to deal with the Party infighting 
directed against Goebbels and himself. 9 
Meanwhile, within two months after Roehm dissolved the Ie staff 
position following Reister's compromise, he had completely reorganized 
his own staff, and a new Ie office emerged, directly responsible to him. 
Under its chief, Count Karl Leon Ou Moulin-Eckart zu Vertoldsheim, 
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the new SA counterespionage office began producing thorough reports 
on such matters as the espionage organization of the Red Front. 1o 
Despite its potential efficiency, Du Moulin's Ie attracted notoriety. 
In November 1931, the Muenchener Post published a list of victims the 
Nazis allegedly intended to murder. The list, supposedly signed by Du 
Moulin himself, proved to be a hoax. The forger confessed to being an 
agent of Du Moulin who was playing a bizarre double game to destroy 
the credibility of the Social Democratic press and its sources by planting 
and exposing such forgeries. The police ascertained the facts, and the 
subsequent trial totally comprised Du Moulin,u 
Meanwhile, in revenge the Post exposed the whole network of Nazi 
intelligence agencies, ridiculing the organizations of Schumann and Du 
Moulin. It gave special attention to the 55 intelligence service, la:beling 
it the most secret agency, slated to become an NS Cheka if the Nazis 
seized power. The Post identified the real brains behind this organization 
as an ex-naval lieutenant Heydrich.12 
The expose of Heydrich's operation was premature. The 55 intelli-
gence service hardly existed as an organization in the fall of 1931; it 
certainly had no priority among the various intelligence agencies, nor 
any guaranteed role in the future Reich. Nevertheless, the socialist press 
had picked up the special hint of eliteness and destiny that characterized 
the 55 and its organizations. Ironically, the propagation of that aura by 
friend and foe alike would help the 55 and SO assume their future roles. 
During 1930-31, Himmler felt even greater pressures than those that 
induced Franke and Roehm to form their agencies. After his initial 1926 
reading spree on police and intelligence agencies, his interest had lagged 
until the spring of 1930, when he read Spionagezentrale Bruessel, lent to 
him by none other than Hitler. Undoubtedly, as the spy mania mounted, 
the two discussed espionage. Perhaps Hitler encouraged Himmler to 
develop his counterespionage efforts, or perhaps Himmler simply ex-
pressed the intention of doing so. In either case, their feeling that this 
novelistic, spy chase story offered "much to learn" indicates their primi-
tive conceptions of counterespionage.13 
Hitler, Roehm, and Himmler also took specific action that reaffirmed 
the central role of the 55 in security work. Ongoing concern for the 
security of Party leaders led in February 1931 to the formation of another 
55 personal bodyguard. As director of this new Security Service, Himm-
ler coordinated security wherever Hitler appeared. 14 The continued per-
sonal contact with the Fuehrer ensured that Hitler associated Himmler's 
55 with intelligence about the intentions of all enemies. 
If Himmler's memory was reliable, he felt a need for fulltime spe-
cialists to handle such intelligence functions as early as 1929-30, and he 
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began assigning special Ie men in each S5 Sturm to gather and forward 
intelligence. Fearing that the parochialism of local units threatened such 
work, he experimented with posts at higher levels in the organizational 
structure. Although Himmler recalled establishing a centralized system 
as early as 1930, the first surviving document of such dates from May 
1931. By that time, he had set up an Ie section on his staff, but not until 
June 9 did he order an 55-wide duplication of the Ie staff structure at 
the divisional and regimental levels. 15 
As Himmler's staff chief, Prince Josias Waldeck-Pyrmont headed the 
Ie section, responsible for collecting the reports of the Ie men in the field. 
Without any consideration of suitability or special knowledge, Himmler 
decided that divisional and regional adjutants would also head their Ie 
divisions. Nevertheless, he realized that he needed a suitably trained 
officer on his own staff to distill the field reports into coherent intelli-
gence. Having heard of the ex-naval "intelligence" officer who was of-
fering his service to the Movement, he appointed Reinhard Heydrich 
after a brief interview. 
Reinhard Heydrich Takes Command 
Heydrich's was a character at least as complex and enigmatic as Himm-
ler's. A short study of his background reveals the evolution of a per-
sonality consistent with both the image of a cold, calculating, evil genius 
and a very real man of many weaknesses. 16 
Reinhard Tristan Eugen Heydrich was born in 1904, the son of the 
securely established head of a music conservatory in Halle. His sharply 
contrasting parents may have contributed to his contradictory person-
ality, for witnesses describe his father as an easy-going, self-made man, 
and his mother as the arrogant, harsh daughter of a court tutor. As a 
child, Heydrich apparently identified more with his mother's strength 
and consistency. He developed her arrogant, biting manners, yet si-
multaneously demanded love and recognition. From an early age, he 
was extremely competitive, pushing himself in a variety of sports. 
As he grew older, a gnawing sense of being unwanted manifested 
itself in increasing aggressiveness and demands for love and attention. 
Toward "social inferiors" he was described as being cruel or disdainful, 
yet in his love for romance and music he displayed tenderness and 
sentimentality. One strikingly consistent characteristic emerged, how-
ever-extreme self-doubt. Self-doubts are inevitably exaggerated by the 
trauma of adolescence, a stage in Heydrich's life that coincided with the 
trauma of the German experience. The politically conservative Heydrich 
family had imbued its children with middle-class values, including re-
The Roots of the SD 25 
spect for the authority of the state and loyalty to the nation, but the 
young Heydrich also acquired a special attitude toward Jews. 
The hard times that befell the family fortunes paralleled the fate of 
the German nation, and the juxtaposition of personal and national loss 
produced a marked transition from nationalistic conservatism to reaction 
against threatening forces of change, specifically the "Red menace." For 
the young Heydrich, such evolutions in political attitudes mixed with a 
powerful patriotism fired by the romantic nationalism of the war. In the 
environment in which he matured, the emphasis on national traitors, 
the vigilante of Feme murders, and the bloody suppression of Communist 
revolts became almost an accepted way of life. He joined the Free Corps 
movement and voelkisch organizations, but nothing indicates any direct, 
brutalizing experience. In tune with the mood of his time, his nationalism 
became mixed with an ostentatious anti-Semitism. Perhaps in this dis-
play Heydrich sought to free himself of his alleged "Jewish stigma." 
Throughout the Third Reich and down to the present, rumors have 
persisted that Heydrich was of Jewish ancestry. Of course, his ancestry 
is irrelevant, but the "stigma" was not. Reinhard's father, the subject 
of the rumors, often bore the epithet of "Isidor Suess"; the father's 
stepfather had in fact been named Suess, but there was no Jewish an-
cestry, although no one knows when young Reinhard learned that truth. 
Playmates often cruelly teased and badgered him because of his "Jew-
ishness," and as a child he created fables about his father's past to 
convince his friends that he really was a "pure German." Genealogical 
uncertainty may have been a major source of Heydrich's self-doubts and 
growing sense of persecution, driving him to act out anti-Semitism to 
prove himself. After the war, while his father's convictions led him to 
the National Voelkisch Party, other family members, perhaps including 
young Heydrich, kept themselves informed about Hitler's new move-
ment. 17 
Although it would not do to overstate his intelligence, Heydrich's 
career proves that he possessed a certain sharpness or cleverness. Never-
theless, he often behaved impetuously and frequently bluffed or bullied 
his way through problems, and although certainly diligent, he was not 
personally thorough. He had a phenomenal memory for details and used 
it to impress people, yet later he would profess to avoid the distraction 
of details. This was a man who often acted impulsively and instinctively, 
in contrast to the more cautious, procrastinating Himmler. Rash action 
got Heydrich into more than one difficulty, however, and, as Hitler 
lamented, contributed to his death. 18 
It was apparently his brashness that led to the end of Heydrich's 
first chosen career-that of a Navy officer-and set his future in line 
with that of the Nazi Movement. In 1922 he won an appointment as a 
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naval cadet, and by the end of 1928 had achieved the final rank of 
lieutenant. During his nine-year naval career, Heydrich established a 
secure and respectable position for himself, although he did not gain 
the social acceptance of his fellow officers. He developed no close re-
lationships with his peers, and he came to feel that everyone was against 
him, for the "Jewish stigma" had followed him into the Navy. Several 
incidents, some related to the supposed stigma, led many of his fellows 
to assume that he lacked officer qualities. Then came an incident in which 
he allegedly "compromised" a young woman of prominent and powerful 
family. By all modern standards, the relationship was innocent enough, 
and Heydrich refused to marry her because he was already engaged, to 
the woman who would become his wife. In a court of honor, his firm, 
"arrogant" refusal to bend under pressure led to the end of his naval 
career. 19 
A few months short of eligibility for a pension, denied the essential 
prestige of his uniform and humiliated before his family, Heydrich 
emerged a crushed and desperate man. Despondent, he fished about 
for a position suitable to his status. At this point he turned to the National 
Socialist Movement, a resurrection of adolescent associations, which his 
fiancee, a follower of Hitler, convinced him was his best alternative. On 
June 1, 1931, he joined the Party, writing to a friend of the family, Baron 
Karl von Eberstein, an SA major then prominent in the Party, requesting 
a "major leadership position.,,2o 
According to his wife, Heydrich had no prior ideological or political 
commitments; his nationalism was traditional, and he had even made 
fun of the Nazis. Perhaps he had done so, but right~wing nationalistic, 
anti-Republican sentiments pervaded in the military and social circles 
that Heydrich frequented,21 despite the military's technically nonpar-
tisan political posture. Whatever attitudes he might have publicly ex-
pressed, his lifetime experience had made him susceptible to the Nazi 
Weltanschauung and to the image of elitism. Like many other men en-
countered in this study, Heydrich was well prepared for the Movement 
and needed it, along with the SS and the organization he himself would 
build. In his later public statements, he led in developing the more 
extreme forms of the Weltanschauung. In private, according to his wife, 
he expressed cynicism about Nazi beliefs, especially Himmlerian ideas. 
Since arrogant disdain for what other Nazis believed would not be un-
common among his SD men, cynical comments hardly meant a rejection 
of the basic NS Weltanschauung. Such comments represented instead 
a typically individualistic and selective commitment to certain specific 
aspects while rejecting others. 
When Heydrich's letter of application, which had passed through 
Roehm's office, arrived on Himmler's desk, the ex-naval officer became 
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a candidate for the Ie position. When Himmler saw in his photograph 
the "Aryan" prototype, Heydrich's stock rose still more, but Himmler 
procrastinated. As if to set the pattern for their future relations, Heydrich 
settled the issue. He went straight to Himmler and engineered an in-
terview.22 
The story of this meeting unfortunately derives from secondhand 
sources. Himmler allegedly asked about experience in counterintelli-
gence, and Heydrich bluffed his way through. Trying to present the 
image of a decisive commander, Himmler told Heydrich that he needed 
an Ie man and gave him twenty minutes to draft the proper orders and 
job description for the position. Heydrich easily set down the require-
ments in military format and jargon, and he got the job.23 
On August 10, 1931, the newly commissioned SS Lieutenant Hey-
drich was ordered to assume the direction of the Ie Division of Himmler's 
staff.24 As soon as he arrived in Munich, he found his raison d' etre, 
making himself indispensable. On August 26, the new Ie officer ad-
dressed an assembly of SS commanders in the Brown House, Party 
headquarters. Based upon the sort of reports the spy mania had inevi-
tably fostered, and playing to a mood anyone could sense, Heydrich 
painted a picture of the Movement as being thoroughly infiltrated by 
police and enemy spies and agents. They leaked information embar-
rassing to the Movement and created incidents and unrest in the ranks. 
He claimed that his knowledge was backed by solid research, and he 
cautioned the commanders to be on guard against traitors. 25 
From this time onward, Heydrich built his authority upon an ability 
to paint two pictures convincingly. He depicted first the Movement, 
then the national community, as surrounded and penetrated by enemies, 
successfully camouflaging themselves as loyalists. By wooing the un-
witting to their own purposes, they could hamstring even the greatest 
of forces in all history. It was necessary not only to confront the obvious 
enemy and destroy him in open combat, but also to ferret out and elimi-
nate the camouflaged villain and identify and reeducate his thoughtless 
accomplices. Such a campaign obviously required an extraordinary and 
unhindered counterespionage strike force, and Heydrich capped these 
images by depicting himself as the master of the necessary mysteries. 
Growing Amid Competitors 
Shortly thereafter, on September 4, SS Order No. 43 outlined the for-
mation of the new intelligence service. The work would be done openly 
by Ie staff personnel to be named at the divisional level by at least October 
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1, and at the regimental level later.26 Henceforth, rather than adjutants, 
specialists would fill the Ie position. 
Every effort was made to avoid the impression that SS-men would 
be spying on each other. Specifically, Ie work was to be entirely legal: 
no meddling in state organizations. Obviously, the very nature of coun-
terespionage made such precepts impossible to observe, for by definition 
the camouflaged enemy was everywhere, including the SS and state 
offices. But such restrictive orders were necessary for the outward ap-
pearance of comradeship that Nazis had to maintain, and they typified 
Nazi legality. The working personnel could not be allowed to create 
f>roblems that might result in compromise or charges of treason-the 
fate Riester's Ie had recently met. Of course, such directives could be 
violated on orders from above. 
Meanwhile, Heydrich worked alone as the sole member of Himm-
ler's Ie staff at Munich, his empire consisting of half an office in the 
Brown House. He had no control over the other Ie personnel on the 
field staffs, for their reports came to him through Prince Waldeck.27 In 
other words, Heydrich did not yet head an intelligence service; he was 
merely a staff officer. 
According to his wife, he complained as early as November 1931 of 
the counterproductive competition between NS intelligence agencies 
and wanted them absorbed into the SS.28 But for the time being, he had 
his hands full with his own mission and needed all the help he could 
get from Schumann and Du Moulin. Although he undoubtedly had 
conflicts, and petty jealousies strained his relations with his rivals, much 
of what has been seen as his calculated maneuvers against them probably 
grew spontaneously from the confusion and lack of coordination in the 
Movement. 
When friction occurred, Heydrich's organization may have been a 
major offender, but the evidence allows only for vague impressions. For 
instance, on November 26, 1931, the Reichsleitung issued a joint letter 
signed by Roehm, Himmler, and Franke, Goebbels's deputy, stating that 
each of their intelligence services would cooperate in a spirit of cama-
raderie, and report friction to the proper offices so it could be alleviated. 29 
Although the directive denied that the three duplicated each other's 
missions, they obviously did so. Throughout the history of the SD there 
are documents of this nature, always issued in times of friction with 
other organizations. Sometimes Himmler and Heydrich merely sub-
scribed to such statements as outward forms of propriety; more often, 
however, they desired to pull together with rivals toward common goals. 
Most often, both motives prevailed. 
In any case, Party Leadership by November 1931 had recognized 
each of the three agencies as a Party intelligence service. As the largest 
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and most significant branches, the SA Ie and the Gau NOs under Schu-
mann's office seemed to have developed a symbiotic relationship, hold-
ing many personnel in common. 30 The alignment had undoubtedly 
grown from the crisis developing around Gregor Strasser, whose shifting 
stance and increased administrative power had pitted him against ele-
ments like Goebbels, Goering, and Roehm's SA.31 In a temporary Goeb-
bels-Roehm alliance, Himmler must have stood as an ambivalent 
subordinate; unfortunately the shifts in his relationship with Strasser 
remain uncharted. Beyond this consideration, the SS Ie, as the smallest 
component, was the least essential to joint work, and as a newcomer to 
the Movement, Heydrich may have found close cooperation difficult or 
uncomfortable. 
In any event, while his competitors grew apace, Heydrich merely 
inched forward. Although this may have bothered him, he had com-
pensations. By the end of 1931 he had married, been promoted to SS 
major, and replaced Waldeck as exclusively responsible for Ie, as well 
as acquiring a two-room apartment, separate from the Brown House, as 
an office for himself and two or three assistants. Although Himmler 
sought finances from the Party treasurer, Heydrich had no budget. 
Himmler met expenses with special appropriations, and Heydrich re-
cruited his helpers from unemployed volunteers. 32 
The Bavarian police knew of Heydrich's office as an Ie branch of 
Himmler's staff; however, it went by the innocuous title of Information 
and Press Desk. As a Reichstag deputy, Himmler was legally entitled 
to a press service, which gave the small Ie legal immunity and a cover 
of propriety. Compared with Du Moulin's service, quite clearly labeled 
Counterespionage, Heydrich's tiny office appeared to be a more or less 
inoffensive branch of the "Nazi Intelligence Service." The police viewed 
the various NS agencies as parts of a whole under the command of Du 
Moulin, and interpreted all information they received in that context. 33 
They had evidence, however, that should have altered their view of the 
SS Ie. 
In the winter of 1932, the police in Oldenburg, a small state on the 
North Sea coast, stumbled on an SS spy net that had penetrated a fortress 
garrison. They captured Franz Nawroth of the garrison, who revealed 
the identity of Herbert Weichardt, who in turn admitted that he collected 
reports from agents like Nawroth and forwarded them to a Herr Ko-
belinski in Brunswick (Braunschweig), a small inland state. Although 
the police identified both Nawroth and Weichert as SS men, they con-
fined their interrogation to questions about the "Nazi Intelligence Ser-
vice." Ironically, catching this little SS Ie cell at military espionage merely 
served to heighten Du Moulin's bad reputation; the police made nothing 
of the SS Ie service.34 Why the police remained indifferent to the SS Ie 
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relates closely to the problem of how Heydrich's SD went on to edge 
out its competitors. Aronson has suggested that Heydrich threw the 
police off his own scent by deflecting their attention to Du Moulin's 
people. 
At some undetermined time, Heydrich acquired agents with whom 
he had direct contact. Tradition has it that one was an agent of the 
Bavarian police who had penetrated the Movement. Heydrich unmasked 
him and forced him to become a double agent in his service, feeding 
false information to the police and facilitating Nazi penetration into Ba-
varian police ranks. 35 Aronson places the date of this coup around No-
vember 1931, basing his argument on the fact that from that time on, 
little information exists in the police file on Heydrich's Ie work. 36 
Circumstantial evidence supports this view. In February 1932, the 
Bavarian police were in possession of Himmler's September 1931 order 
creating his Ie and delimiting its mission. They noted especially the 
injunctions for legality, but most significant was their belief that Himmler 
had entrusted this intelligence service to none other than Du Moulin. 37 
Even if such interpretations were the work of Heydrich's agent, Du 
Moulin might in fact have approved such a decoy. Since the police al-
ready knew his own organization, he might have allowed its use as a 
screen for the SS Ie. 
But even if Heydrich was running a double agent, that hardly ex-
plains the failures of the police. One double agent could not have com-
pletely paralyzed the police intelligence office in Munich, which 
controlled more than one agent and which had clearly directed a number 
of highly successful feelers into branches of the NS Movement that it 
considered dangerous. A single agent in the Bavarian police could not 
have misled the Intelligence Assembly Office in Berlin, where he would 
have had no direct contacts. The police undoubtedly failed to concentrate 
on Heydrich's office because, compared with the SA threat, it still ap-
peared insignificant, and because Himmler-and perhaps Heydrich-
had been so insistent on maintaining the appearance of legality. 
Heydrich's service did not triumph by sabotaging the opposition and 
outmaneuvering the police. Rather, it won because of opportune political· 
developments inside the Movement, and because at this crucial time it 
remained relatively harmless, too small to draw much negative attention 
from the police. 
Roehm's SA and Du Moulin's service discredited themselves. Since 
the summer of 1931, the Social Democratic press had had a field day at 
Roehm's expense, for they had acquired some of his personal letters 
revealing his homosexuality. The press freely associated the entire SA 
command structure with this stigma. 38 Scandalized, some elements in 
the Party resolved to eliminate the source and assembled assassins from 
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the fringes of the Movement to murder Roehm and others. Although 
one of the would-be assassins defected to Du Moulin, who uncovered 
the plot and saved the intended victims, the whole circus became a public 
spectacle during 1932.39 
The ultimate blow soon befell Du Moulin. The increasing attention 
drawn to the SA and to his office led to a series of police raids in the 
spring, exposing the subversive activities and plans of the SA and its Ie 
service, which had concentrated its penetration on the police, public 
transportation, and communications, obviously important targets for 
any power seizure.4o Despite Du Moulin's rapid success, this exposure 
destroyed his organization. On April 1, Roehm quietly transferred Du 
Moulin to Berlin, and in the following weeks the federal government 
banned all NS paramilitary organizations. Although the SA would re-
emerge in June, after the ban was lifted, and although it would continue 
to keep an Ie slot on its staffs,41 the SA Ie was too discredited as a central 
intelligence agency of the Movement to regain its former hegemony. 
More important, given Roehm's position in the Movement, many other 
leaders preferred any alternative to his dominance of Party intelligence. 
Since many of the bureaucrats of the Party organization saw Roehm 
as a threat, those who had Hitler's ear capitalized on every SA embar-
rassment. By the same token, the worse the SA looked, the better the 
SS appeared to some of those close to Hitler. The ambitious Martin 
Bormann passed such observations on to Rudolf Hess, Hitler's personal 
secretary and a contender for second position in the Party. The SS thus 
emerged as a badly needed source of security and order within the Party, 
and Heydrich's agency assumed a concomitantly dominant position. 
Bormann's and Hess's backing would prove crucial to the advancement 
of the SD. Nevertheless, it would oversimplify the complex relationships 
to describe the SD as an anti-SA arm of the Movement. According to 
Heydrich's wife, Roehm, as head of both SA and SS, also funded the 
early SD, especially after his own Ie collapsed. The Himmler-Roehm 
relationship remained warm, and Roehm became godfather to the Hey-
drichs' son.42 
Even if the SA Ie ceased to be a major competitor for Heydrich, there 
still remained Schumann's service. By this time, Schumann had man-
aged to erect an impressive-looking ND. By at least mid 1932, his office 
had acquired the title of Main Division III of the Reich Propaganda Head-
quarters (RPL), with ND leaders present in most Gau down to at least 
the Kreis level. His office issued regular mimeographed reports, "Infor-
mation on the Enemy," seemingly thorough, detailed analyses of op-
position forces. A February report on the "System" (the establishment) 
contained stolen police studies, including reports on the Communist 
Party. A July report dealt with "Propaganda Work of the Jews against 
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the NSOAP," and an August study covered the right-wing Tannen-
bergbund.43 
It is difficult to evaluate the quality of this work or of the organization 
itself. Regardless of quality, Schumann's NO reports may not have 
pleased Hitler and other users. The Muenchener Post expose pictured 
Schumann as pedantic a.nd inept, deluging NS leaders with voluminous 
reports. Although the reports were no more voluminous and detailed 
than good intelligence studies should be, the opinion of the Socialist 
press may have been close to a fundamental reality. According to some 
who worked with Hitler on intelligence, Werner Best for instance, Hitler 
was unimpressed by detailed, thorough reports and preferred intu-
ition.44 
Schumann's NO may also have become a victim of the sharp rivalry 
between Goebbels and Gregor Strasser during the latter part of 1932. 
For whatever reason, Schumann's service suffered in some way, for 
surviving records on the NO during the fall of 1932 are rare, and by the 
time it reappeared in the documents of 1933, it had been split in two. 
Schumann then headed a branch of Alfred Rosenberg's Foreign Political 
Office, focusing primarily on foreign intelligence; the rest of the Party 
NO remained active only at Gau and lower levels, no longer a central 
intelligence agency of the Movement. 45 
Schumann's NO probably lost in the competition primarily because 
it was not high among Goebbels's priorities, and it suffered the same 
problem as the SA Ie. They both lacked real central control over their 
field structure, the quality of which depended on the local functionaries. 
Throughout 1932, for instance, Schumann continued to complain that 
some of the Gau failed to make their monthly reports. Furthermore, 
local Party leaders undoubtedly censored both the NO and the Ie. 
First Strasser, then the circle around Hess desired more control over 
the Party from above, through the Party machinery, putting them in 
conflict with independent and powerful local Party leaders. Any intel-
ligence service dependent upon reports forwarded through local leaders 
offered few advantages to Party leadership. What the leadership needed 
was a centralized intelligence service with a field net independent of 
local Party powers, able to inform against them if necessary. Although 
Hitler generally stood above such struggles, Hess and Party Treasurer 
Franz Xavier Schwarz had the authority to grant the title of Party intel-
ligence agency and to provide finances. Unlike Roehm and Goebbels, 
Himmler did not rival or threaten Hess, so when Himmler supplied the 
necessary service, Hess would accept it. Nothing better explains why 
the SO prevailed. 46 
Although the field of domestic political intelligence lay open to Hey-
drich, there were other entrants to contest the way. Furthermore, his 
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newly important service might well have become the target of police 
exposure but for the change of political atmosphere during the summer 
of 1932. The political police had ceased to harass the Nazis and even 
sought their cooperation against the left, a shift that was extremely well-
timed for the. future of the SO. 
Meanwhile, Heydrich and those in his service ceased being merely 
staff officers. The lack of control revealed by the Weichardt incident, the 
collapse of Ou Moulin's service, and the disastrous ban on the SA and 
SS apparently goaded Himmler into forming a highly centralized, au-
tonomous intelligence service and giving Heydrich direct command at 
all levels. Ouring the ban, Heydrich's office in Munich dropped its "Ie" 
designation and hid its connection with the SS. His office fell back on 
the old, safe camouflage of Reichstag Representative Himmler's Press 
and Information Service (PI). At the same time, Heydrich acquired cen-
tral command over a true intelligence service. After the lifting of the ban 
in June 1932, the Sicherheitsdienst-SS-the SO-emerged, with Hey-
drich as its head.47 The service that would win Hess's support had come 
into being. 
Heydrich devoted the rest of 1932 to the recruiting of SO personnel 
and the establishment of an intelligence network that was to spread over 
the entire Reich. The most important region in this growing SO network 
was centered on the Reich capital, Berlin. In SS-Group East, thirty-two-
year-old SS Captain Hans Kobelinski, Heydrich's highest-ranking Ie of-
ficer, had been serving on the staff under Kurt Oaluege since July. There 
Kobelinski created the new SO-Group East, which became official on 
September 15.48 
The creation of SO-Group East under Kobelinski was undoubtedly 
a Munich-based effort to extend influence into the domain of the in-
dependent SS General Oaluege, who since his role in the suppression 
of the Stennes putsch had rivaled Himmler in Hitler's confidence. Never-
theless, nothing indicates that Kobelinski and Oaluege had anything less 
than smooth relations until well into 1933. By then a rift had developed 
between Heydrich and Oaluege that complicated things. 
While Heydrich built the SO, Himmler turned his attention to the 
police of Germany. He intended for the SS to playa special police role 
after the Nazis seized power. Even before 1933, he apparently had plans 
to fuse his SS with the police of the future Reich to create a suitable 
institution for guaranteeing order and security: a state protection corps 
(Staatsschutzkorps). SS members were to imbue the police with suitable 
discipline, attitudes, and values and to provide the necessary "racial 
stock" for a corps of men attuned to the needs of the Volk and their 
state.49 
Before the power seizure, Heydrich had no preordained role in this 
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55 police mission. Although members of Sipo and SO often stated in 
later years that Heydrich fathered the whole idea of controlling the police 
through 55 and SO penetration, Aronson, Heydrich's most scholarly 
biographer, considers this unlikely. Indeed, subsequent events indicate 
that Heydrich developed an appreciation for Himmler's scheme only 
gradually. 50 Even so, he undoubtedly played a significant role in its 
refinement and application. 
Other than SD traditions, no significant evidence supports an ar-
gument that either Himmler or Heydrich preconceived the role that the 
SO would play vis-a.-vis the personnel of the political police-the later 
Gestapo. Nevertheless, Himmler did choose Heydrich as head of the 
political police agencies that soon fell under his command, probably 
more because of the working relationship between the two than for any 
other reason. Heydrich's position as head of both political police and 
SO eventually tied the two together more securely and inevitably than 
any preconceived blueprint. 
In January 1933, when Hitler became chancellor, neither the 55 nor 
the SO guaranteed Himmler or Heydrich his future power, as the two 
organizations were relatively weak and poorly developed. Their eventual 
victory was difficult, for it was won from rivals with similar objectives 
who were initially more powerful, and it met with resistance among the 
police forces whose attitudes and values shaped the course of events as 
much as any other factor. 
3 _____ _ 
The Weimar Police 
The detectives who became an element of Sipo and SD were but one 
part of the larger German police establishment, which requires a brief 
description to clarify the process of its absorption. Since Germany was 
a federation of states with decentralized police forces, each state, or Land, 
had its own police establishment, as did many municipalities, and the 
Weimar constitution left most police authority to the states. Conse-
quently, aside from small special forces, no true Reich police force existed 
before the Nazis. The Reich Minister of the Interior had relatively little 
police authority, not even command over a Reich bureau for the inves-
tigation of crimes, nor a Reich border patrol. 1 
To counterbalance decentralization, the Reich government did have 
some leverage. It defrayed part of each state's police budget with an 
annual subsidy, which served as a direct lever for Reich pressure. This 
subsidy justified federal legislation that required some degree of orga-
nizational uniformity among the state forces, in a attempt to keep them 
free of partisan politics. Consequently, the Reich Minister of the Interior 
could count on more than the goodwill of the states in implementing 
his guidelines; however, even the threat of withdrawing the subsidy had 
its limitations. 
The decentralization of the German police resulted primarily from 
traditional state and regional particularism that blocked centralization 
or coordination. State governments, generally suspicious of the federal 
government, jealously guarded their police powers. The Allies, having 
their own suspicions that the Germans would use a centrally com-
manded, militarized police to circumvent restrictions on the German 
Army, imposed decentralizing restrictions on Germany's police. The 
matter was of concern also to the bitterly divided parties of left and right, 
each fearing that the other would capitalize on a centralization of police 
power. 
Nevertheless, German law enforcement was not chaotic, for sheer 
necessity produced voluntary cooperation. Although the Reich Ministry 
of Interior had little police authority, it did at least maintain offices for 
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coordinating the exchange of information. Furthermore, the problem of 
coordination was not as great as those faced in the contemporary United 
States, for instance. Among the seventeen states having separate police 
forces, a single large state, Prussia, had authority over two-thirds of the 
territory of the Republic and approximately sixty percent of all police. 
With the exception of Bavaria's, no other state force was equal in size 
to the metropolitan force of either contemporary New York City or Chi-
cago.2 
Each state police force had a complex structure, however, producing 
further decentralization. The bulk of the uniformed police in Prussia, 
called Schutzpolizei or Schupo, found their counterpart in most other 
states and free cities under the same or a similar name, like State Police 
(Landespolizei) or Order Police (Ordnungspolizei). Under normal con-
ditions, units of these police assigned to major urban centers came under 
the command of state-appointed civilian officials, usually called police 
presidents or police directors. In addition to the Landespolizei, some 
states, like Bavaria, had a separate state municipal police force. Assigned 
to major cities to do the more usual police work, such forces came under 
state-appointed commanders rather than the city government that com-
manded regular municipal police. For the countryside and rural com-
munities, the state provided a Gendarmerie, or Landjaegerei. Scattered 
over rural areas, they fell under the authority of regional administrators, 
subject to regulation and supervision by central state offices. 
Thus, even as a collective force, the centrally administered, uni-
formed police of a state had a decentralized command. In matters of 
training, personnel policy, equipment, and the like, these police came 
directly under central authority-the state ministry of interior or a com-
parable agency-but command fell to state authorities with regional and 
local jurisdictions. Although these authorities were in many respects 
subordinate to the state ministers, thus creating an indirect central com-
mand, the realities of politics could disrupt that control significantly.3 
At the heart of the state police establishments lay paramilitary strike 
forces, organized and trained along military lines, housed in barracks, 
and instantly deployable in full unit strength. They existed to maintain 
internal order and security as the army or a national guard might in 
other countries.4 
The Versailles Treaty restricted the size of all these police forces. 
Article 162 limited increases in state and local police forces beyond their 
1913 strength by tying such increases to population changes. The In-
terallied Military Commission set more precise details, originally de-
creeing a maximum of 92,000 men, but gradually raising it to 157,000. 
Of this total, the maximum was 105,000 for state police, of whom a limit 
of 35,000 could be housed in barracks. German authorities kept state 
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forces near the allotted maximums, while the municipal police fell below 
them.s 
By no means did these limitations restrict Germany to a small police 
establishment. The final limit set by the Interallied Commission was a 
ratio of approximately one policeman to every four hundred inhabitants. 
Berlin had the largest local police force: seventeen thousand policemen 
in the late twenties, or a ratio of roughly one to every 240 inhabitants. 
A significant change from the prewar ratio of 1:324, it reflected the in-
creased tension in that urban center. Overall, the increased police force 
was probably justified by the lack of military forces to support them, 
which becomes apparent from the figure for 1935, when the Army ab-
sorbed the armed police and the ratio changed to 1:536.6 
These ratios become more meaningful when compared to those of 
other countries. In the United States during the 1920s, the national ratio 
of police to inhabitants changed from 1:1,000 to 1:800. Of course, any 
direct comparison is invalid because of the significant differences in 
population density, internal order, and the ready availability of the U.s. 
National Guard as a supplemental force. For a more meaningful com-
parison, France in the twenties had a ratio of roughly 1:500, but France 
also had a much larger army to support its police. In the more law 
enforcement-conscious United States of today, the ratio of police to 
population is 1:550, despite the same considerations of population prob-
lems, internal order, and National Guard availability. In France in the 
late 1960s, the ratio was the same as Weimar Germany's 1:400. As for 
the urban figures of the 1920s, Berlin's ratio of 1:240 compared strikingly 
with Chicago'S 1:500 and Washington, D.C.'s 1:350. However, today an 
American city with over a half million population might have a more 
comparable ratio of 1:250.7 
Of more relevance to this study are the German plainclothes detec-
tives of the twenties, especially the political police. Except for a few in 
the municipal forces, the criminal and the political police were plain-
clothes detective branches of the state police. As such, the criminal police 
in most states had support and were well organized and coordinated. 
There was no Reich criminal police, however, not even an investigative 
bureau nor an official structure for coordinating interstate crime fighting. 
The political police occupied an even weaker position. Political inves-
tigative offices existed in most states, but with perhaps the exception of 
Bavaria, there were no centralized state political police forces. Despite 
their reasonably efficient service, they represented small, peripheral 
units compared with the forces maintained by many modern states. 
In the historical development of the political and criminal police, 
Germany had not assumed the lead. As a matter of fact, the German 
police derived largely from foreign models, especially French units. Cer-
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tainly, the political police did not have as deeply rooted a tradition in 
Germany as in many other European states.8 In the old Reich, the crimi-
nal police had been limited to the municipal forces, low in efficiency, 
especially against mobile criminals and organized crime. In 1897, Land 
representatives met in Berlin to increase coordination among the states 
and free cities for identifying criminals, but controversy over methods 
hindered fully satisfactory solutions until 1912. Then the war frustrated 
plans for a Reich information center on crime. 
Since these problems continued in the Weimar Republic, the Reich 
government had sought to pass legislation creating a Reich Criminal 
Police Office. The heightened rate of crime in the postwar years, topped 
off by the assassination of prominent political leaders like Walter Rath-
enau, provided special impetus. In 1922, the Reichstag passed a law to 
create a criminal police office under the Reich Ministry of Interior to 
combat interstate crime and to provide for coordination among the state 
police. Particularism prevailed, however, and with Prussia and Bavaria 
in the lead, several states blocked implementation. The Reich Ministry 
of Finance also created obstacles. Since the Reich government could not 
effectively press its case, it had to emasculate its Law for the Protection 
of the Reich and abandon the Reich Criminal Police Office. 9 
In compliance with the move to establish a Reich Criminal Police 
Office, however, the states did at least rationalize their own criminal 
police forces. In 1921, Saxony went the furthest by bringing all municipal 
criminal police into its state police system, and by 1925 all states had 
state criminal police forces coordinated by a central office. In the case 
of Prussia, this office, opened in the summer of 1925, came under the 
Police Presidium of Berlin. It coordinated the work of similarly consti-
tuted detective offices responsible for the provinces or districts. to 
Meanwhile the state criminal police offices set about collectively to 
solve problems of Reich-wide coordination in their own way. In the 
summer of 1925, a police conference at Karlsruhe created a German 
Criminal Police Commission of police technicians who made recom-
mendations to state governments, an informal but fairly efficient form 
of cooperation. Intelligence centers, laboratories and technical facilities 
in the various states for combating specialized aspects of crime became 
responsible for interstate coordination in their specialties. For instance, 
Dresden became the central office for missing persons and for identifying 
unknown bodies, while Munich assumed the specialty of "Gypsy ex-
cesses." The extensive Berlin office became a veritable Reich criminal 
police office because of the wide range of offenses it coordinated: forgery, 
pickpocketing, bank and train robberies, white slavery and pornogra-
phy, and a central fingerprint fileY Criminal police work in Germany 
thus became more coordinated than any other sort, but largely because 
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joint effort was essential to its success. The coordination remained a 
purely voluntary effort between the states, however, with no equivalent 
of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
In the case of the political police, the Germans did even less to 
pioneer in their development. In this area, even Prussia lagged well 
behind Austria, not to mention Russia and France. 12 Although there had 
been an Office for Political Affairs in the Berlin Police Presidency since 
1850, the advent of a significant political police came only with Bis-
marck's Reich, when, after 1878, his war on socialism produced an in-
dependent political police office. Nevertheless, the political police office 
in Berlin at no time exceeded two hundred civil servants, because of the 
low incidence of political crime in Imperial Germany.13 
According to most accounts, the Revolution of 1918 brought a brief 
interruption in the "tradition" of political police in Germany-such an 
institution of oppression being incompatible with a democratic govern-
ment. In fact, any real disruption resulted mostly from temporary dis-
organization, and the climate of violence and conspiracy then called even 
more political police into being. All factions sought to create or preserve 
the means to know their enemies. Political police offices were maintained 
or quickly reestablished in several police presidencies and state interior 
ministries. As tension subsided, however, unremitting public suspicion 
forced this particular branch to justify its very existence, unlike other 
sectors of police. 14 The publications that sought to gain the mere ac-
ceptance of a political police clearly reveal that there was no strong 
German tradition for a secret police, with its network of spies and in-
formers. 
Nevertheless, political crime most persistently demanded the atten-
tion of the Reich government, which continually groped for ways to 
centralize or coordinate its control. From the Spartacists and the Kapp 
Putsch to the Munich Putsch of 1923, revolution and civil war posed 
real threats, and the Reich needed its own defenses, including central-
ized political intelligence. In this respect, a lack of consensus in political 
attitudes exaggerated the stubborn coolness of the states toward Reich 
interference in police affairs. Conservative parties, which dominated 
states like Bavaria, perceived the Social Democrats (SPD) as veritably 
Red and distrusted the federal government, even when the SPD was 
not involved. SPD leaders, more firmly in control in states like Prussia, 
not only distrusted the right but opposed increased Reich control and, 
therefore, more conservative influence over their political police. Such 
concerns lay behind the sabotage of efforts to create a Reich Criminal 
Police Office. 
Until the spring of 1920, the Reich government depended largely on 
the Prussian State Commissioner for Public Order to inform it of hostile 
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political intentions. The Commissioner's office sought to coordinate with 
political intelligence agencies in the other states, but neither the Reich 
nor the other state governments did much to facilitate teamwork through 
this Prussian agency until the Kapp Putsch increased anxieties. When 
it became obvious that the Reich Criminal Police Office would not ma-
terialize soon, the federal legislature sought to fill the gap with the cre-
ation of a Reich Commissioner for the Supervision of Public Order, 
naming as commissioner a Major Kuenzer, former commander of the 
Baden Gendarmerie. 15 
The Reich commissioner, commanding nothing more than a central 
political information-gathering office, depended totally on the coopera-
tion of the state political intelligence agencies. Nevertheless, he facili-
tated improvement in each state through joint effort. Until 1923, 
meanwhile, efforts continued toward the creation of the Reich Criminal 
Police Office, which would have incorporated the commissioner's func-
tions as well as combating treason, espionage, and sabotage. But by the 
spring of 1923, the Reich Ministry of Interior had to abandon this cam-
paign. The Reich commissioner remained the extent of Reich coordi-
nation until the renewed political turmoil after 1928.16 
During the intervening years, most states and free cities developed 
political police agencies as part of the state police systems. Except in 
Bremen, with its fusion of separate branches of the uniformed and de-
tective forces, these political police formed a branch of the plainclothes 
administrative and detective police. As such, they belonged to the de-
centralized state criminal police that prevailed everywhere except in cen-
tralized Saxony. 
Inevitably, the largest and most important of these forces was that 
in Prussia. In the police administrative offices for every province and 
district after 1928, Division I, Political Police, served as the link between 
the government and the working political police offices. The Division I 
in the police presidium of each provincial capital and in Berlin (originally 
lA) matched an office under the Prussian Ministry of Interior, but the 
real working political police offices were branches of the State Criminal 
Police, designated Division lAd (Aussendienst). These police performed 
the investigative functions and compiled the reports used by Division 
I. Division lAd under each State Criminal Police Post, located in major 
cities, served the provinces, while a central Division lAd existed in the 
State Criminal Police Office of the Police Presidium in Berlin. The field 
posts reported regularly to the Berlin Division I which served as a po-
litical information office for Prussia, providing technical services and 
advisors for the entire state, although it had no command authority. 
Above it, even the Political Subdivision of the Ministry of Interior could 
impart directives to the local political police only through the police 
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presidents and regional administrators-it had no direct command au-
thority.17 
In contrast, Bavaria came the closest to having a centralized political 
police. There, Division VI of the Munich Police Directorate, by working 
closely with the Ministry of the Interior, short-circuited many of the 
regular government channels and became a veritable state political police 
office. Although it had no real central administrative authority, it co-
ordinated a centralized political intelligence system for reporting to state 
and Reich authorities, coordinated counterespionage work throughout 
the state, and, unlike its Prussian counterpart, had the executive au-
thority to order searches and arrests. 18 
The tumultuous Weimar period had thus produced political police 
forces more numerous and pervasive than those of the quiescent imperial 
era. Albert Grzesinski, twice police president of Berlin, estimated that 
his city alone had a force of three hundred. The rest of the state estab-
lishments scaled down in size to that of tiny Schaumburg-Lippe, where 
two detectives doubled for both criminal and political work. Since po-
litical and criminal investigation overlapped so greatly, often involving 
the same support personnel, the size of the political police establishment 
in Germany prior to NS reforms cannot be determined. Nevertheless, a 
1935 police report estimated that as of January 1933, approximately 2,500 
of a total of 10,000 detectives did political work, with an annual budget 
of 10,860,000 RM.19 
After 1928 this loosely coordinated system of decentralized state 
political police forces again became embroiled in political turmoil. Given 
their general agreement that a real threat came from the Communist 
Party of Germany, which had recently returned to more active tactics, 
German officials agreed to strengthen cooperation. On July 1, 1929, they 
replaced the old office of the Reich commissioner with an Intelligence 
Assembly Office (Nachrichtensammelstelle) in the Reich Ministry of the 
Interior. This new office sought to tighten and rationalize the various 
internal intelligence reporting systems.20 
Meanwhile, for those who could see the problem objectively, the 
Nazis also began to pose a significant threat to the Republic, and the 
efforts of both the right and the left to subvert the military and the police 
had achieved alarming proportions. Carl Severing, then Prussian interior 
minister, proceeded to beef up the appropriate section of the Prussian 
State Criminal Police Office for dealing with such activities. In conjunc-
tion with the Reich ministers of the military and the interior, he con-
verted it into a de facto Reich central office to collect information and 
coordinate the prosecution of offenders. This special office, designated 
14, was overwhelmed from the beginning. Because of manpower prob-
lems, it began functioning in January 1932 with a staff of only nine, and 
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as late as the fall of 1932 it still had difficulties in coordinating with other 
state offices.21 
Despite its efficiency and its capacity to deal with the paramilitary 
forces of either left or right in an open confrontation, the police were 
ill-equipped to save the Republic from the forces that in the end over-
whelmed it. They were unprepared even to defend themselves against 
subversion. 
4 ________________ __ 
Plans, Preparations, 
Penetrations: 1931-1932 
At the same time that the NS intelligence agencies were forming, pre-
liminary NS maneuvers for police power took place with little concern 
for the embryonic SO. For his part, Himmler clearly planned a link 
between SS and police, and every component of the SS therefore in-
volved itself in efforts toward that end. The SO was no exception, but 
its work contributed only incidentally to the initial penetration of the 
police. Furthermore, although Himmler and his SS entered early into 
the NS contest for police power, they faced powerful competition. 
Since 1928, both the KPO (Communist Party) and the Nazis had 
increased their militant activities and thereby their confrontation with 
the police. Simultaneously, both movements had intensified their efforts 
to infiltrate and subvert the police. After their 1930 electoral victories, 
the Nazis smelled success and began to make more concrete plans for 
their Third Reich-plans that included the police. 1 
Unlike the Marxist-Leninist analysis of the police as an instrument 
of the capitalists-with its imperative to replace them with a people's 
militia-National Socialist guidelines in this area were lacking. The gen-
eral conception of the NS revolution was nothing more concrete than a 
seizure of power that would employ the instruments of state to serve 
properly the interests of the racial community. It remained unclear 
whether this meant completely sweeping away the old police establish-
ments and replacing them with something new, or merely taking them 
over from above and purging them. As usual, Hitler failed to provide 
his lieutenants with any definite, limited line of action. His pronounce-
ments contained only a vague mixture of Machiavellian attitudes about 
the exercises of the state's police powers and an authoritarian-racist view 
of police responsibilities toward citizens.2 Without limiting guidelines, 
Hitler's lieutenants went off in many directions. 
Among Nazi leaders, one major question affected attitudes and strate-
gy: Did the road to power lie through a putsch or through legal action? 
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The more activist or putsch-inclined groups (like the SA) contained radi-
cal and uncontrollable elements who often showed little respect or sym-
pathy for the police. Given their many street confrontations, SA-men 
often thought of themselves as locked in a state of combat with the police. 
Since the police represented an obstacle to revolutionary victory, SA 
leaders remained ambivalent about whether the police should be swept 
away completely or whether most of them could join in brotherhood 
with the Movement. In general, the SA inclined toward replacing them 
with a version of the people's militia. The SA approach thus mixed 
wooing trained policemen into their ranks, on the one hand, and, on the 
other, subversion designed to weaken the police for the eventual COUp. 3 
In contrast to hostility against the police, those who followed Hitler's 
path of legal power seizure shaped the "official" position on the police: 
gaining control of them from above, then remaking the police into the 
appropriate instrument of the NS state. Some purging, reorganization, 
reorientation, and reeducation would follow, but how much remained 
unclear. As Dietrich Orlow has observed, their intended means and the 
extent to which they would "partify" institutions like the police would 
determine decisively the relative success of those men who competed 
for the role of Hitler's agent. Those who had the most ambitious plans 
for imposing NS values on society and those who had the best-developed 
organizations for executing those plans would be the winners.4 
One contender for control of the police in the forthcoming Reich, 
Wilhelm Frick, headed the Party Legal Division and definitely belonged 
to the legal power seizure school. As an Old Fighter and a rankirig 
administrator in the Munich police, Frick had had a role in the 1923 
putsch and was slated to become Police President of Munich. From that 
time on, in Hitler's mind, Frick had a claim to control of the police.5 
Frick also directed the first major experiment in the Nazi absorption 
of police power. Following the 1930 electoral gains in the Land Thuringia, 
Hitler engineered Frick's appointment as Land minister of the interior. 
From this ministry he controlled the state police and prepared to carry 
out a purging and appointment policy designed to clean out the "Red 
revolutionaries" and to "National-Socialize" the police and other civil 
service posts. In the context of the time, he provided a shocking example 
of Nazi extremism, and the Reich Ministry of the Interior could only 
slightly moderate his efforts in Thuringia. Hitler described Frick's pro-
gress as a sound experiment in the tactics that would accompany vic-
tory. 6 
In approving this experiment, Hitler indicated his predilection for 
the legal acquisition of police power from above and a nazification of 
the existing police forces. Clearly the police, like the Army, had indis-
pensable skills and organization, not to be destroyed but absorbed. He 
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saw in Frick the man for the job, a thorough, loyal National Socialist, 
skilled in law and civil service machinery. 7 For several years, Frick re-
mained a likely agent for the nazification of the police. 
Frick planned simply to convert the state and municipal forces into 
a centralized system under reliable Nazi command, purged of question-
able elements. He would give the resultant police force a properly au-
thoritarian concept of mission, in tune with the values of the new nation; 
however, he wanted it to remain a "professional" force, with much of 
what that word implies. Its "partification" should not involve extreme 
measures. Components of the Movement could propagate NS values 
among policemen, but the Movement would not command the police; 
the NS State and bureaucrats like Frick would run the police as a proper 
instrument of the state.8 
One example of these notions was published by an NS police group 
in Hamburg in October 1932. Carefully phrased to maintain legality and 
avoid conflict with civil service principles, it claimed a Nazi policeman 
would suffer no conflict of interest. His professional responsibilities 
would always come before Party obligations. As a matter of fact, the 
publication professed opposition to partisan political influences in the 
police (that is, the SPD Marxists), and sought a police that represented 
and served all the people objectively. Although the statement was ob-
viously made for effect, it was no less sincere in its convictions. 9 
This line of attack had the merit of appealing to more respectable 
Party members and civil servants, in and out of the Movement. Unfor-
tunately for Frick, the plan was neither an ambitious "partification," 
comparatively speaking, nor did its supporters constitute an organiza-
tion Frick could mobilize. Instead he sought to woo an existing, non-
NS, state organization-the police and the administration above it. 
Regional leaders of the Party, especially the powerful Gauleiter 
(Party district leaders), constituted another element in the struggle for 
police power. In their own regions, they fostered penetration of the 
police and made direct appointments to police commands whenever the 
Party participated in local and Land government coalitions prior to the 
final NS takeover. Few of these men had either coherent plans for "par-
tification" or any special organization for accomplishing it. Regardless 
of their attitudes toward the police and how they visualized a future 
police force, local police power would be part of their base of personal 
power, and that determined the roles they played. Although they would 
ardently impose NS values, their ambitions were inseparable from per-
sonal power, and their organizational force was largely local. 
The NS organization strong enough to fully "partify" the police was 
the SA. But its primary focus on the military and its ambivalence about 
the police as an institution stood in the way. Nevertheless, whenever 
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an opportunity arose, its leaders would assume police offices and Storm 
Troopers would gleefully exercise police power. The most dedicated of 
all competitors, however, was Heinrich Himmler, with big plans for an 
SS-dominated police force for inner security. Seen from the outside, his 
SS seemed a logical heir to police power in a Third Reich; consequently, 
some Nazi-inclined policemen and police organizations sought contact 
with him as insurance against the future. lO 
The SS in fact recruited most effectively among the organizations of 
former policemen. Because not all retired policemen parlayed their re-
tirement benefits into a secure position, and some had been discharged 
or had resigned because of incompatibility with the institution, there 
were many disgruntled ex-policemen.11 From them the SS acquired a 
trained cadre without violating the laws against active policemen holding 
membership in NS organizations. In July 1931, Himmler got an especially 
intriguing invitation to tap these resources. One Pauls, writing in the 
name of the Local Group Gross-Essen of the Former Prussian Policemen, 
told how members of his organization, dissatisfied with the Weimar 
system, were willing to serve as policemen in the Third Reich. He es-
timated that forty thousand former policemen could be brought together 
in that way, but most significantly he asked whether the SS would be 
the police of the Third Reich, and if his group would be able to join the 
SS. Himmler quickly reacted to Paul's letter, immediately traveling to 
the Ruhr and Berlin to establish contacts.12 
Perhaps it was on this trip to Berlin that Himmler met Paul Scharfe, 
who soon became Himmler's staff expert on police affairs. Born in 1876 
in Danzig, the son of a school principal, he pursued proper channels 
through gymnasium and War School to become a lieutenant in the Army 
by 1897. After six years in rank, in 1903 he married and retired into the 
reserves in order to take up a police career. After a short interruption 
for active duty on the Polish front in 1914-15, he returned to police 
service, and from 1921 to 1931 served as major and finally lieutenant 
colonel in the Prussian Schupo. During 1931, as he approached retire-
ment age, he began to display pro-Nazi sentiments, forming clandestine 
NS cells in the Berlin Schupo. Immediately upon retirement, he turned 
up in Munich as an SS lieutenant on Himmler's staff, joining the Party 
shortly thereafter. 13 
On October 27 he assumed direction of Division Ig of Himmler's 
staff, the old Security Service which was now redesignated Police Affairs. 
Apparently these developments related to growing SS interest in the 
police, for Scharfe's office now had a double mission: on the one hand, 
the Party police function of protecting leaders and, on the other, pro-
viding insights into the professional police. Although nothing indicates 
that Ig played any direct role in infiltrating the police or recruiting them 
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into the SS, it screened at least some police candidates for SS member-
ship. Regular recruitment continued through the normal channels of the 
SS.14 
For intelligence work in the police, Scharfe's office shared respon-
sibilities with Heydrich's Ie, and the parallel growth of these two or-
ganizations indicates the very limited mission reserved for the SD in its 
initial stages. Well after he had established the Ie, Himmler created Ig 
to fill a role vis-a.-vis the police that he did not associate with the future 
SD. Until 1933 the organizational history of the Ie and Ig was similar, 
and until that same year Heydrich and Scharfe advanced in rank at the 
same pace. On July 19, 1932, when Heydrich became head of the newly 
named SD, Scharfe also emerged as head of the equally new Police 
Division (Abteilung) of Himmler's SS Office (Amt). Not until June 1933 
did Scharfe become chief of the SS Court and abandon the field of police 
affairs to Heydrich and Kurt Daluege. Thus he may have originally been 
the contender for SS police command, raising further questions about 
any alleged future police role for the SD. Even if it is argued that the 
political police represented a logical exception preserved for the SD, the 
evidence does not support this. Although Heydrich may have had an 
agent in the Munich political police, other SS contacts with the political 
police were rarely affiliated with his SD until later. Available information 
contradicts the conventional thinking that from the beginning Heydrich 
was to be the political police chief. IS 
Throughout 1931-32, Scharfe's office advised Himmler on how to 
appeal to policemen, and they apparently played a decisive role in the 
development of his propaganda line. For instance, under Ig guidance, 
Himmler sought to dispel rumors that NS leaders would fire younger 
policemen, replacing them with SA- and SS-men. Instead, he assured 
them that in the Third Reich the police would have increased esteem 
and respect and that NS leaders would support them more decisively.16 
The impact of this NS propaganda and of their subversive efforts 
against the police has yet to be documented. More clear is the extent to 
which the majority of these policemen became effective components of 
the NS police state during the following years. The question of what, if 
any, shifts in ideological orientation this required among these police-
men warrants serious study. 
Until recently, students of the Weimar police generally agreed that 
they dutifully served the Republic to the end. Scholars also agreed, 
however, that powerful authoritarian traditions and the problems facing 
the police had prevented a successful introduction of liberal democratic 
principles into the police ethos.17 They should thus have been less re-
sistant to the right-wing arguments and more resistent to those of a 
government that would "democratize" them. Their loyalty was not so 
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much to the democratic constitutional Republic as to the mission of "law 
and order," which included defending the state against lawless forces. 
More recent studies emphasize a severe problem in police attitudes. 18 
Generalizations about such attitudes are difficult because "the police" 
were not homogeneous. Nevertheless, server hostility toward the Reds 
was almost unanimous, while attitudes toward the Nazis covered the 
complete range from hostility through ambivalence to sympathy and 
support. Although policemen may have begun with a general disdain 
for the Nazis, two factors made some of them increasingly less hostile, 
even amenable, to growing Nazi power: their preoccupation with the 
threat of Communism and, after 1929, the growing strength of the forces 
of the conservative counterrevolution. The two worked well together to 
fan police dissatisfaction with the Weimar system and to heighten dis-
trust of anyone who stood left of a conservative center. These two factors 
more than Nazi efforts probably best explain the availability of the Ger-
man police for their later NS role. 
For instance, statesmen who clearly perceived the NS threat and 
political specialists among those detectives who would support them 
ran into a wall of frustration. Given Hitler's "legal" tactics, they could 
not easily depict the Nazis as a subversive threat unless they could show 
that the Nazis plotted a putsch. Since the political policemen who studied 
them often failed to analyze their threat in any other terms, the Nazis 
appeared to many to be less subversive than the Communists. With the 
creation of 14 in the Berlin Police Presidium to combat subversion in the 
police and military, most army and police officials treated it as a counter 
primarily to the Communist threat, despite Prussian Interior Minister 
Severing's efforts to have reports on right-wing subversion forwarded 
to it also. The majority of politicians, military officers, and police preoc-
cupied themselves with the Red menace. Even before July 1932, their 
reports of "right-radical" subversive activities were infrequent compared 
with reports of Communist efforts: from January of that year, only 7, 
contrasted with 491. Their efforts to prosecute these offenses were 
equally disproportionate and revealed a stepped-up countereffort only 
against the KPD. 19 
Ambivalence about the NS threat characterized the gradual shift to 
the right in the police, and after Papen's Prussian coup in July 1932, the 
implications of that shift became especially obvious to career-conscious 
policemen who wanted to ensure their jobs and advancement. Federal 
Chancellor Franz von Papen achieved a major goal of the political right 
when he removed the Social Democrats from power in Prussia and 
brought the Land and its police under his authority. Using the worsening 
political violence as his pretext, he charged that the Prussian government 
had failed to maintain law and order, and he appointed Reich commis-
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sioners to run the Land government. What followed was a complete 
purge of Prussian officials, especially police officials with SPD appoint-
ments. Thereby, the SPD was branded as an organization to be viewed 
with suspicion by those responsible for national security.2o 
Papen's coup capped the trend to the right in Weimar politics and 
opened the police to NS penetration. The new mood created by the coup 
lifted the shadow of subversion from the Nazis and proclaimed them 
allies of the police in the fight against Communism. All over Germany, 
laws against police membership in the NSDAP were dissolved or un-
dermined, and in Prussia punishments for Nazi membership were cor-
rected retroactively. 14 simply ceased to record reports of "right radical" 
subversion, if indeed any came in. Most significant, the political police 
began to cooperate at least unofficially with Nazi intelligence agencies 
against the KPD and the SPD, who now came under official suspicion. 
Specifically, in the Berlin political police office, Dr. Heinrich Schnitzler, 
the official assigned the new task of observing the SPD, established 
contact with the Nachrichtendienst of the SA and initiated a close co-
operation that carried over into Goering's Gestapo. Although he did this 
on his own initiative, his actions conformed to the new mood. 21 
While this "subversion" of the police transpired, the society they 
would guard, the law and order they would maintain, deteriorated de-
spite their valiant efforts. Between 1930 and 1933, the four-way struggle 
among the Red Front, the Reichsbanner of the SPD, the Stahlhelm of 
the nationalist right, and the SA brought Germany to the verge of open 
civil war. Several thousand times a year, the police had to intervene in 
political combat in the streets and at rallies. The master of this "para-
military politics" was Hitler, who campaigned on the promise of law 
and order while orchestrating disorder. Rather than test the solidity of 
the Army and police in an open civil war, key military and political 
leaders turned to an alliance with Hitler to win his SA and the Stahlhelm 
for the forces of order. 22 
By January 1933, the way had been well paved for an NS takeover 
of all branches of the police. Since legally constituted government offi-
cials never called upon the police to block the Nazis, there was no ul-
timate test of police attitudes. Although some policemen still resisted 
passively, and although many still looked askance at the Nazis, they 
had little initiative for any serious opposition. To have displayed any 
would have been professional suicide and an assault on the "legitimate" 
state they were sworn to defend. In the end, they found it easiest to 
cooperate against their common enemies, the Reds. 
5 _____ _ 
Prussian Beginnings 
When Hitler became chancellor on January 30, 1933, Franz von Pap en, 
his vice chancellor and the man who had largely engineered the new 
government, intended to restrict the powers of the Nazi leader and his 
Movement. Papen and the other nationalist leaders with whom Hitler 
had ostensibly agreed to share power hoped to control Hitler and use 
him for their purposes. He seemed in check because, at the Reich lev-
el, the Nazis held only two ministerial seats, Wilhelm Frick's less-
than-powerful Reich Ministry of the Interior and Hermann Goering's 
position of minister without portfolio. Hitler's access to the presidential 
powers of Paul von Hindenburg lay through von Papen, who had the 
old man's ear. Although Nazi power at the state and local levels varied 
from little to fairly extensive, even at their strongest they were usually 
hedged in by coalition arrangements. 
Against these checks the NS takeover was a poorly disciplined and 
loosely coordinated process, in some ways as "spontaneous" as the 
Nazis claimed. Around Hitler, competitive followers struggled for power 
in every sphere of German life, and police authority became an early 
and bitterly contested battleground. During the first months of 1933, 
various Nazis established control over police agencies at every level all 
over the Reich. Each federal state was a different story, but the most 
decisive early developments occurred in the two largest, Prussia and 
Bavaria. 
In Prussia, the largest single police force carne quickly under Nazi 
command. Here too, Papen had hoped to limit Nazi power, for as part 
of his deal with Hitler, he resumed control of the Prussian government 
as Reich commissioner. In this arrangement, however, the key post of 
provisional minister of the interior went to Hermann Goering, giving 
him extensive authority over the Prussian police. Goering and the other 
Nazi leaders quickly showed themselves beyond Papen's control. l Goer-
ing was to play the role of a unique version of the regional Party leader. 
The extent of his "region," the Land of Prussia, combined with his grow-
ing Reich-level offices made him extraordinary. His intentions of im-
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posing NS values were ambitious, but lacking any real NS organizational 
power base, he had to search for a base in the form of allies.2 
The real contest for the Prussian police developed not between the 
Nazis and those who would block their way, but within the Movement 
itself. Goering and the SA became the first major contenders, but other 
elements joined in-Frick trying to assert himself as Reich minister of 
the interior and Himmler adding what began as a weak fourth. The 
various contenders did not fully anticipate this power struggle, however, 
for the first two months (February and March) were a honeymoon period 
for the "revolutionaries," joined in an enthusiastic struggle to nazify 
Germany and defeat their mutual enemies. At first, they also shared a 
common sense of emergency, believing a Communist counterstroke to 
be imminent. As long as this threat remained real in their minds, their 
common goals eclipsed their personal power rivalries. Only in light of 
their ideological bonds is it possible to understand the enigma of Nazi 
rivals alternately sharing and vying for power, a paradox that extended 
throughout the history of the Third Reich. 
During February and March, Goering initiated several crucial aspects 
of the future Nazi police state.3 Some students of these developments 
argue that he did not anticipate a radically totalitarian Third Reich, rather 
a relatively more conventional authoritarian dictatorship that would 
eliminate all divisive opposition. The state would have unlimited police 
powers and would resort to terror for striking down its enemies, but 
would not necessarily force itself into the lives of most good Germans. 
The eventual relationship between the leaders and their people would 
be harmonious rather than based on terrorism. Above all, Goering had 
no desire to see Himmler's elite guard or any other NS organization 
penetrate and control his police. Consequently, despite his rhetoric, 
police measures in Prussia were more conventionally authoritarian than 
revolutionary.4 In terms of police state ambitions, although Goering 
knew no limits that prevented his trying to please Hitler, he had less 
imagination than Himmler. 
Nevertheless, Goering established two major precedents for the fu-
ture 55 and police. First, he created an unfettered police force for main-
taining law and order and for protecting the community from its 
"antisocial elements." Second, he established an independent political 
police for ferreting out political enemies, both open and clandestine. As 
he put it, "For the consolidation of power the first prerequisite was to 
create along new lines that instrument which at all times and in all 
nations is always the inner political instrument of power, namely, the 
police."s 
To provide this instrument with new directions of inner political 
power, he ensured that its leaders would make it perform according to 
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the. standards of the national Movement-that is, free from concern for 
constitutional limitations and due process. The Prussian administration 
thus underwent its second purge in a year's time, completing the job 
begun by Papen. In the police offices of the Ministry of Interior and in 
the Berlin Police Presidium, th~ thoroughness of the Papen purges had 
left little to be done but to transfer the most significant positions to even 
more trustworthy NS sympathizers and to the few Party members with 
appropriate credentials. Outside Berlin, all twelve provincial governors 
(Oberpraesidenten) were replaced, mostly by Nazi Gauleiter and locally 
pdWerful Old Fighters. Among those more directly involved in the com-
mand of the police, the positions of thirty-one of the thirty-four district 
governors (Regierungspraesidenten), all of the police chiefs (Polizeipraesi-
denten), and a majority of the mayors and county prefects (Landraete) fell 
to Nazis.6 Local SA and SS commanders usually got the police offices. 
It is misleading to describe what happened as "Goering's purges," 
as though he were directing changes from the center. Usually the de-
cisions reflected the realities of power in the Movement, with haste, 
individual initiative, and the spirit of Nazi comradeship often determin-
ing appointments. 7 Consequently, most officeholders were caught in 
webs of complex interpersonal relationships. The resultant feudalization 
of the Prussian field administration repeated itself across the Reich. Left 
to its own devices, such an administration was anything but an efficient 
machine for directing "the inner political instrument of power." Tile 
spontaneous Nazi terrorism may have seemed efficient, but it made 
subtle or routine police actions more difficult. The initial power seizure 
hardly promoted either the efficient police power desired by Goering or 
the eventual totalitarian police state. 
From the upper levels, as seen by Frick and Goering, the chaotic 
police power structures had to be coordinated and streamlined. This 
would have to be done, however, at the expense of local Party, SA, and 
SS leaders who directly controlled the Nazis' mass base of power. Such 
a direct confrontation of the problem would have been suicidal for either 
Frick or Goering, who had little influence over either the local leaders 
or the NS masses. Only Hitler had their ears (or hearts), but he needed 
their "spontaneous" action and support to entrench his power. Con-
sequently, Frick or Goering could succeed only through skillful maneu-
ver and gradual reorganization of the machinery they would control. 
Goering's maneuvers were indeed masterful. In the spirit of the 
coalition and of administrative propriety, he assigned the Police Division 
(Abteilung II) of the Ministry of Interior to Dr. Ludwig Grauert, a po-
litically unaffiliated nationalist with connections to industry. To offset 
Grauert's establishment image, he created a commissioner for special 
duty (Kommissare z.b. V.), naming the commander of SS Group East, Kurt 
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Daluege. Although the special commissioner was supposed to have lim-
ited authority (merely to oversee the work of the ministers and to co-
ordinate between the administration and the Movement), in reality 
Daluege became Goering's major executive in police affairs.8 
The choice of Daluege was crucial for the subsequent power struggle. 
As the independently powerful SS leader of eastern Prussia, he had won 
Hitler's personal esteem. His Berlin SS had worked against the SA re-
bellions, earning the SS its reputation for stability, loyalty, and obedi-
ence. Entrenched in the Reich capital, he established important 
connections with national Party leaders and other potential allies. As 
his appointment showed, he had rapport with Goering, and after Hitler 
moved into the Chancellery, Daluege's connections extended to others 
who had left Himmler behind in Munich. 
In appointing Daluege as his personal lieutenant in the Prussian 
police, Goering won a man who could coordinate Party and police, a 
man who commanded the SS in eastern Prussia but represented none 
of the disadvantages of alliance with Himmler. Since Himmler had no 
legal influence over Daluege's growing police responsibilities, which 
were not SS appointments, Daluege could be a powerful ally in Goering's 
struggle with the SA, Himmler, and other troublesome elements of the 
Party. 
To develop the police state as he saw it, Goering had to reverse 
former liberal trends toward protecting the citizen from the police pow-
ers of the state while tolerating open, extreme opposition to the state. 
Between early February and early March, his orders, in conjunction with 
Reich-wide developments, struck down significant constitutional guar-
antees and freed the police from many procedural limitations. With this 
came perversion of the concept of "protective custody" into a major 
device of police power. 
Legitimate protective custody for the protection of the individual 
had long been standard in Germany. Like many of the state's powers, 
however, during World War I it was considerably stretched to justify 
detaining suspects under the rubric of national security. The beleaguered 
Republic permitted similar police custody, but with proper due process 
and a 24-hour limit before a hearing by a court. By 1933, however, the 
growing reaction had set the stage for Hindenburg's February 4 Decree 
for the Protection of the German People, which made possible preventive 
police custody for up to three months in cases involving suspicion of 
planned criminal activities. Despite provision for appeal to a judge, the 
Nazis now had legal means for harassing political enemies. 9 
After the Reichstag fire of February 28, Hindenburg consented to 
the more extreme Ordinance for the Protection of the People and the 
State, suspending the basic rights of the constitution and imposing capi-
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tal punishment for a wide range of offenses against public order. Goer-
ing's order for the execution of this ordinance freed the police from 
further administrative limitations on their authority. It made them re-
sponsible for regulating reductions in freedom of the press, personal 
freedom, the rights of assembly and privacy, and for monitoring private 
communications through the mails, telegraph, and telephone. The or-
dinance also facilitated the further development of "protective custody" 
arrests. Henceforth, police arrest powers no longer depended on the 
authority of the public prosecutor nor were they limited to punishable 
offenses. The police could combat "subversive activities" through pre-
ventive custody, by arresting any suspected "subversive elements." The 
right of court appeal was generally denied. to The Nazis now had legal 
means for destroying their political enemies. 
No matter how powerful the police had become nor how willing 
they were to do the bidding of their Nazi commanders, the events of 
the Nazi revolution threatened to leave them behind. By March, the SA 
seemed ready to take over their function. On February 22, in anticipation 
of a showdown with the Communists, Goering had ordered that police 
auxiliaries (Hi1fspolizei) be drawn from units of the SA, the SS, and their 
allied paramilitary forces, the Stahlhelm and the German Nationalist 
Kampfring. They were to supplement the police, still weak by Nazi 
standards. The SA and SS soon appeared all over Germany as auxiliary 
police, and, in the explosion of activity following the Reichstag fire, 
threatened to become uncontrolled police forces, often more locally au-
tonomous than responsive to Roehm or Himmler. 
Goering's maneuver had backfired. He originally intended for the 
auxiliaries to be called only for emergencies, to be limited in number by 
the police authorities, and to operate under police command, subject to 
the summons and dismissal. of police officials. These restrictions might 
have harnessed the growing rowdiness of the SA. As a matter of fact, 
Roehm apparently feared such a loss of control and cautioned his com-
manders against weakening their units through loss of strength to the 
auxiliary policeY 
Thus the auxiliary police became an SA challenge to Goering's police 
authority. They freely violated his intended limitations and by April 
outnumbered the regular police severalfold. Entire units of Storm Troop-
ers went into action while the police officers supposedly commanding 
them had to stand back and watch. Worse yet, both the SA and SS 
assumed their own arrest authority, rounding up thousands and herding 
them into abandoned factories, warehouses, and basements, where they 
initiated the most sensational horrors of the concentration camps. Party 
leaders like Goering had initially needed and called for SA and SS in-
volvement and the creation of their camps to handle the vast numbers 
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of "enemies./I However, the open, lawless brutality that resulted and 
the clear challenge to authority soon created intolerable disruptions of 
their revolution from above.12 
The Birth of the Gestapo 
Amid this internal competition and uncoordinated power seizure, Goer-
ing had proceeded with his second major police achievement, the crea-
tion of an independent political police. They became for him not only a 
sharp instrument for striking down the enemy, but also a legitimate 
force that belied the need for extraordinary police powers demanded by 
the SA and 55. In this respect, the Gestapo was born, not as a revo-
lutionary component of the totalitarian police state, but as Goering's 
personal organization of more conventional state power13 and as a mani-
festation of fear of the left. When the new political police officers became 
separate and independent from conventional police agencies and gained 
more freedom of action, it was to defend the society and preserve the 
order favored by those who did not treasure the individual rights of 
liberalism. This agency posed a threat to conservative interests only after 
SS-police-state tendencies prevailed. 
The man who reorganized Goering's political police and became the 
first head of the Gestapo was a thirty-two-year-old civil servant from 
the Ministry of Interior. Rudolf Diels had entered administrative service 
in 1921 while pursuing a typical preparatory education in law and eco-
nomics for higher civil service ranks. Before this, he had experienced 
the war on the western front, then joined the fight against Communism 
in the Free Corps. Despite his conservative, nationalist inclinations, he 
did well under the SPD-dominated Prussian administration, ultimately 
moving into the work he believed Germany so badly needed. In 1931 
he became a government counselor in the Political Police Section of the 
Police Division of the Ministry of the Interior, assuming responsibility 
for combating the Communist movement.14 
Diels was never a party man-as a matter of fact, the Nazi Party 
denied him membership until 1937. Nevertheless, his desire to save 
Germany from the left led him to play political roles. He provided reports 
that encouraged Papen to proceed with his seizure of the Prussian gov-
ernment from the SPD in July 1932. Thereafter, antisubversive police 
work focused entirely on the left, and as political police officers began 
working with the Nazis, Diels established his own contacts. He became 
a contributing member of the SA, a type of affiliated membership for 
financial supporters who could not or would not join or who might not 
be granted membership. Such affiliations with either the SA or the 55 
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were safe for civil servants for whom full membership might be illegal 
or professionally damaging. 
Diehls also developed a personal liaison with Goering and evidently 
with Daluege. The relationship apparently began when Diels in his of-
ficial capacity had to work with Goering as president of the Reichstag. 
Their common concern with the Red menace drew them together ini-
tially, and later Diels allegedly provided Goering with information useful 
against Party rivals. 15 When Goering took over the ministry, he extended 
Diels's authority in the Political Group (Abteilung I) of the Police Division 
under Grauert in the Ministry of Interior. Diels immediately cooperated 
with Goering and Daluege on personnel decisions, and, more important, 
he soon received the task of building a newly organized political police 
force directly subordinate to Goering. Diels's lack of political standing 
made him Goering's client, independent of the SA and SS. Equally im-
portant, as an established civil servant, Diels knew the ropes and had 
contacts throughout the administration. He could keep the machinery 
running while simultaneously reorganizing it and cleaning out unreliable 
elements, for he best knew who could be trusted. 16 
Diels began work in early February 1933 and during subsequent 
weeks expanded beyond the Ministry of the Interior. He absorbed the 
former Section IA of the Berlin Police Office, the coordinating center for 
the political police in Prussia. The State Criminal Police Posts were or-
dered to forward through the regional governors reports of political 
significance, and his Berlin office had the power to make direct inquiries 
of any local or state police authority. 17 To go beyond mere intelligence 
gathering, however, a true political police force had to order and conduct 
searches and arrests or perform "executive" functions, as the German 
police called them. A prerequisite was to establish direct control over 
the political police officers in the field, who were still under the command 
of regional officials. 
Meanwhile, although in reality Diels worked directly under Goering 
and Daluege, the process of separating his political police from the au-
thority of other administrative offices took time. "Secret" police must 
be physically removed from the prying of regular bureaucrats who could 
interfere. Toward this end, Diels got new quarters for his offices. The 
first such move came on March 8 when his Special Section for Combating 
Bolshevism, the key office of his new force, got separate rooms in the 
Horst Wessel House (formerly the Karl Liebknecht House), recently 
seized from the KPD. The physical separation process was completed 
in mid-April, when Diels's entire political police organization took up 
residence at 8 Prinz-Albrecht Strasse, soon to become notorious as Ge-
stapo headquarters. The new building was conveniently near the offices 
Goering had just assumed as prime minister of Prussia.18 Following the 
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electoral victory of March, Hitler had removed Papen as a check on NS 
power in Prussia, so Goering now reigned free, responsible directly to 
Hitler. 
By this time, Diels's office already had its own executive section 
under Police Counselor Arthur Nebe. Nebe had entered the Berlin de-
tective force in 1920 and made a prominent career for himself. Like Diels 
a conservative nationalist, he became more comfortable during the shift 
to the right in the 1930s, but he went further than Diels, entering the 
Nazi Movement as it rose in prestige in 1931. Nebe became a contact 
man inside the Criminal Police for one of the many early Nazi intelligence 
branches, perhaps Daluege's personal Nachrichtendienst in Berlin, for 
in June he became a contributing member of the SS. A month later, he 
joined the Party and in November, the SA. In early 1932, Nebe and like-
minded detectives formed the NS Civil Service Society of the Berlin 
Police, and he simultaneously became liaison man for Daluege. He was 
obviously Daluege's man, probably placed in the political police to keep 
an eye on Diels. 19 
Nebe represented the cutting edge of a small but significant NS 
presence in Diels's early political police. Although Goering called for a 
thorough purge of the political police throughout Prussia as an alleged 
SPD instrument, and although he boasted to his last days of having 
purged this office most thoroughly, in reality he relied heavily on Diels's 
judgment. As a result, relatively few significant changes were made in 
political police personnel, at least in the Berlin offices. Much shuffling 
of personnel and the gradual influx of new people initially brought few 
Nazi gains. Most of the men came from Diels's old office and the IA or 
were drawn from the Ministry of the Interior and the detective force, 
all administrative or police civil servants. The small core of new Party 
enlistees among the professional detectives also belonged mostly to 
Diels's personal circle20 and generated little trust in established NS ranks. 
After Diels had gathered the proper personnel and von Papen had 
lost his last vestige of control in Prussia, the Gestapo could emerge 
officially. On April 26, legislation establishing a Secret State Police Office 
created the Gestapo and gave it the legal powers it had already as-
sumed. 21 The name Gestapo, which has become a label for uncontrolled 
or terroristic police, was born innocently enough. The official title of 
Secret-or perhaps more accurately, Privy-State Police (Geheime Staat-
spolzei), had been fairly traditional in the German states and was a logical 
choice. According to Diels, the first abbreviated form, GeStapa (Geheime 
Staats-Polizei-Amt), was an invention of postal officials. Goering had 
rejected GP A because the initials sounded too much like the Russian 
GPU.22 
Officially, the Gestapo Office at 8 Prinz-Albrecht Strasse achieved 
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the standing of a state police authority, assuming the former political 
police duties of the State Criminal Police under the police president of 
Berlin. Beyond this, it gained executive powers, meaning arrest au-
thority. The political police who had formerly worked in the field under 
local police authority were reorganized into Gestapo regional offices 
(Staatspolizeistelle). Although these regional offices remained part of 
the regular state police, in political police affairs they took their orders 
through Gestapo channels. Most important, Goering removed the Ge-
stapo from normal channels within the administration and placed it 
directly under himself as Prussian minister of the interior. 
Officially, the reasons given for these actions were "the interests of 
uniform higher direction of the political police." Toward that end, he 
proclaimed that: "In order to secure the effective combating of all of 
those efforts directed against the stability and security of the state, the 
state government had decided to fashion more tightly than before the 
organization of the political police and to create the necessary prereq-
uisites for a quick and successful work. ,,23 
One should not dismiss these phrases as mere Machiavellian cam-
ouflage for the first deliberate step toward the eventual totalitarian police 
state. They simply expressed the general concern for creating adequate 
means to defend Germany against its "internal enemies." Goering had 
hardly cut through all the red tape developed to protect citizens against 
arbitrary police actions. Appeal against Gestapo measures was still pos-
sible through the administrative courts, although with diminished ef-
fectiveness amid the atmosphere of cooperation generated at most levels 
by the fear of bolshevism. 
A significant hindrance to centralized control of the political police 
action resided in the Gestapo regional offices formed during the spring 
and summer. Although a direct command authority now existed be-
tween the Berlin central political police office and these regional offices, 
they remained organs of the regional police authorities as well. These 
authorities-the highly independent Party and SA leaders-interfered 
considerably with efficient, centralized command. In places like Altona, 
Kassel, Koenigsberg, Potsdam, and Stettin, local SA and SS leaders, as 
police presidents, took direct command of their Gestapo regional offices. 
Even in other locations with offices headed by Nazis with appropriate 
civil service qualifications, such men often responded more readily to 
local power than to Berlin. Any Gestapo leaders actually chosen for their 
qualifications, regardless of Party affiliations, existed tenuously in the 
tug-of-war between local power and Berlin. To complicate matters fur-
ther, Himmler intruded tentatively into Prussia. At Frankfurt and 
Aachen, the Gestapo leaders joined the SS. In Breslau, the local SA leader 
and police president, Edmund Heines, relied on Detective Inspector Dr. 
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Emanuel Schaefer to head the Gestapo office. But his deputy, Govern-
ment Counselor and SS Lieutenant Guenther Patschowski, was an SD 
member, making another key point for Himmler's penetration.24 Ob-
viously, real power relations in the early Gestapo field structure were 
extremely complex, sometimes to the detriment of central authority. 
Nevertheless, when the Gestapo or the Auxiliaries struck, their victims, 
who never knew the source of the arrest order, experienced only an 
"efficient" NS police terror machine. 
During the first three months, meanwhile, Diels played a role that 
must be understood in terms of efforts to increase "legitimate" police 
power and authority, while limiting the excesses of those revolutionary 
elements threatening the professional police. Unfortunately for Diels, 
given existing conditions, these were not compatible goals, as the SA 
excesses of March soon revealed. 
Diels's bond with the Nazis stemmed from a common cause against 
the Communists. That common cause was his only hope for building 
Nazi dependence upon and trust in his police. For years, political po-
licemen had based their existence and advancement on exposing and 
combating the Communist threat. Accustomed to selling their case to 
more resistant liberals and Socialists, men like Diels continued to present 
agitating evidence to the new Nazi bosses, who hardly needed it. Goer-
ing seemed to thrive on every piece of evidence for a Communist up-
rising, and both he and Diels- eagerly sought a pretext for a decisive 
move against their enemies. Diels and his men joined in the campaign 
to heighten public fear and justify action. They staged sensational raids, 
but if they went so far as to plant forged evidence, as alleged, they never 
released that evidence to the press, for nothing could live up to Goering's 
exaggerated press releases. Then came the Reichstag fire. Regardless of 
who started it, police and Nazi alike seized upon it as the long-awaited 
pretext for open war on the KPD, whom they accused of initiating an 
uprising for which the fire was the alleged signal. Although such agi-
tation helped Diels build the extraordinary political agencies he desired, 
it was probably unnecessary, for that goal was a foregone conclusion. 
Instead, he probably exaggerated the chances of independent SA action 
from below that threatened him and his legitimate police. He claimed 
to have realized this danger after the Reichstag fire, and to have reversed 
this tactic, playing down Communist threats to security thereafter. 25 
In the ensuing roundup of Communists and other enemies, Diels 
worked closely with Special Commissioner Daluege, who provided some 
modicum of coordination between police and Party. Their victims could 
be arrested at three different levels of action. Those taken by the police 
through more traditional arrest channels came immediately under Min-
istry of Justice jurisdiction, where due process might result in their re-
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lease. Since these subjects had to be charged with a specific crime, few 
political enemies came under this process. Those arrested under the 
evolving concept of protective custody encountered increasing durations 
of confinement without recourse. At least twenty-five thousand fell into 
this protective custody category for varying periods during March and 
April. At the third level of "arrest" action, the independent SA and SS 
spirited away the victims, often without official record and with no hope 
or protection under the law. Daluege and Diels naturally wanted to 
concentrate all political arrests under their control, while extending their 
own independence as arresting authorities. Consequently, they tried to 
operate their own concentration camps with more reliable auxiliary po-
lice personnel. Such maneuvers produced a multiple tug-of-war over 
the evolving concentration camps. Diels and Daluege asserted Gestapo 
interests, the Ministry of Justice and more legalistic elements in the 
Ministry of Interior insisted on their jurisdiction, while the SA main-
tained its own autonomy. The SS, which in Prussia spread well beyond 
Daluege's control, complicated matters as a fourth autonomous holder 
of prisoners in concentration camps and bunkers. Since they needed the 
SA and SS camps for the indefinite future, both the Reich and the Prus-
sian interior ministries provided financial support, and Diels's Gestapo 
sent its arrestees to the camps and maintained liaison officers in them. 
Adding to the frictions, Diels and Daluege did not always work together 
well. 26 
In all of this, Goering, Daluege, and Diels cannot be understood as 
bloodthirsty sadists playing a preconceived role in building a terroristic 
police state. They firmly believed they were locked in a life-and-death 
struggle requiring action against enemies on whom they had projected 
the worst imaginable characteristics. Finally free to move against a foe 
who supposedly had always enjoyed the upper hand, they considered 
terror a justifiable weapon-in fact, the only adequate weapon against 
such evil. Their struggle required cunning to combat the sort of 
"underhanded methods" that the enemy employed. They could not see 
themselves as destructively inhumane, nor were they totally indifferent 
to the possibility, regardless of their tough rhetoric. Although selective 
murder was the order of the day, it would take years to dull their con-
scious restraints to the point where they could give orders for mass 
murder. As a head of state, Goering had to carefully marshal human 
resources, not squander them. Not only did he seek to win over the 
unaligned, he even spoke of the need to reeducate as many misguided 
Germans as he could possibly salvage. 27 
At this point, Goering's actions offer another example of how he 
combined combating the enemy with his own empire building. To con-
trol its enemies, the authoritarian state must be able to monitor secretly 
all public and private communication. Toward this end, he officially 
Prussian Beginnings 61 
established a special facility, ostensibly as part of his Air Ministry, that 
absorbed and expanded on the Cipher and Monitoring Office of the 
Ministry of Defense. His so-called Investigation Office (Forschungsamt) 
was primarily concerned with military and foreign intelligence, moni-
toring radio communications outside Germany, and intercepting tele-
phone and telegraph messages between foreign agencies in Germany 
and their outside connections. It compiled regular reports rivaling those 
of the Foreign Ministry, another competitor in intelligence work. Al-
though Diels may have been instrumental in its development and op-
erations, the major functions of the Investigation Office were not internal 
police spying. Nevertheless, it worked closely with the Gestapo. While 
Diels's office monitored the mails with post office cooperation, the In-
vestigation Office facilitated internal telephone tapping for police pur-
poses.28 
Since the Investigation Office existed in a maze of official entangle-
ments-financed by the Reich, administered as part of the Prussian 
government, but answerable only to Goering in his various Reich and 
Prussian offices-its establishment, ostensibly under his Air Ministry, 
became decisive in future power plays. In the ministry, it was free from 
the prying of the police and bureaucrats, and, therefore, from the later 
55-police system under Himmler. It became one more competing/ 
cooperating agency with which Sipo and SD had to deal. Goering may 
not necessarily have contrived all of these complexities, however, for 
financing and allotments of personnel came from wherever they could 
be gotten, and the Reich Air Ministry was a much more appropriate 
location than his state offices in Prussia for international and military 
intelligence operations. The Air Ministry location also facilitated coop-
eration with the military Abwehr, which will be described later. 
Although the Investigation Office did not grow from his fear of 
rivals, throughout 1933 Goering had reasons for concern in that area. 
By April, more than SA lawlessness threatened his control of the police, 
for the early ambiguous relations between the 55 and the Gestapo also 
produced their share of problems. At that moment, however, Daluege 
still commanded the local 55 around Berlin, and his desires to command 
the police in his own right apparently outweighed his loyalty to Himm-
ler, a situation that usually, but not always, worked to Goering's ad-
vantage-at least as long as he could offer Daluege the most in the form 
of the Prussian police. In May, he made Daluege's police authority of-
ficial, naming him to replace Grauert as head of the Police Division of 
the ministry. 
The extent of Himmler's influence inside Daluege's fief is impossible 
to calculate, but Himmler was not about to let Daluege and his divisions 
simply slip away. Heydrich's SD group in Berlin had become enmeshed 
in the local power struggle; the local SD leader, Hans Kobelinski, main-
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tained close relations with Daluege's camp. To convert the Berlin SO 
into a sharper wedge for penetration, Heydrich later replaced Kobelinski 
for, among other reasons, suspicion of conspiring with Diels.29 Mean-
while, Daluege had carefully built his own independent intelligence ser-
vice in his section of the Ministry of Interior-modestly titled Special 
Division Daluege.3O During these early months, tension developed be-
tween Daluege and Heydrich. Since January, Heydrich, subordinate in 
rank to Daluege, had been assigned to Himmler's staff for special mis-
sions. For an indefinite period before the power seizure, Berlin had been 
his center of operations, where he served as one of Himmler's repre-
sentatives. While he built his own SO base in the capital, he cooperated 
with Daluege in intelligence operations. Regardless of any early collab-
oration, however, by the first days of March Daluege had cut Heydrich 
off. After trying unsuccessfully to get through Daluege's "protective 
screen" of receptionists for a personal meeting, Heydrich returned to 
Munich on March 5, bitter over the rebuff.31 
Meanwhile, Daluege's command of the local SS created a relation-
ship between Gestapo and SS upon which Himmler and Heydrich later 
capitalized. During the early months, while trying to form his yet un-
official Gestapo and assume executive authority for it, Diels had trouble 
dealing with leaders in the Party and the SA, especially those entrenched 
in police offices. Most viewed civil servants and policemen like Diels 
with contempt, and they ignored or impeded his executive and inves-
tigative efforts. For executive field work, Diels needed men who carried 
some weight with the Nazis, thus Nebe's appointment as head of the 
executive section. In any case, by summer the problem led Diels to tum 
to Daluege's SS for men who had influence among Nazis to do Diels's 
executive work. 
This growing bond between SS and Gestapo was part of an increas-
ing tendency among Nazis to identify the SS with political police work. 
On April 21, Grauert, as Goering's head of the Police Division in the 
ministry, issued a decree designed to help bring SA and SS excesses into 
line. Most important, this decree divided the Auxiliary Police into two 
categories: regular police work fell to SA auxiliaries, while the SS aux-
iliaries were to work with the political police.32 
By June, this relationship became more specific when Himmler, as 
Reichsfuehrer SS, was made Prussian ministerial commission for aux-
iliary police personnel of the Gestapo Office.33 Henceforth, not only 
Daluege's SS but also Himmler's established a foothold in the Gestapo. 
However, this gets ahead of the narrative. By mid-1933, Himmler had 
done much on his own to enhance the association of the SS with political 
police work. 
6 ________________ __ 
Himmler in Bavaria 
After Heydrich left Berlin for Munich on March 5, 1933, events soon 
presented Himmler with opportunities more exploitable than those in 
Berlin. Bavarian developments had lagged approximately one month 
behind those in Prussia; ironically, the home of the Movement was 
among the last German states the Nazis "coordinated." Prime Minister 
Heinrich Held and his Bavarian Peoples' Party retained enough strength 
to shape any coalition government as long as Hitler's Reich government 
refrained from intervention. Since Bavaria, with its strong traditions of 
suspicious independence from Berlin, represented a touchy situation, 
any seizure based on power from Berlin might well backfire. The Nazis 
preferred to let developments in Bavaria "take their own course" -or 
so it had to appear-so that Papen and Hindenburg would not be forced 
to defend Held's independence. 1 
Both Roehm and Himmler had had to remain behind in Bavaria, 
with no place in the Reich coalition. Along with the local Gauleiter, they 
waited impatiently for an active role in seizing power. Since at least mid-
February, the political police in Bavaria had been tapping rumors of a 
pending SA coup,2 and on March 9, it happened. While the SA and SS 
seized key government buildings, Roehm, Himmler, and Gauleiter Adolf 
Wagner presented Held with an ultimatum for the appointment of Franz 
Ritter von Epp as general state commissar. Held's protests to Berlin fell 
on deaf ears, Epp became Reich commissioner, and Nazi control began 
in Bavaria. Under Epp, Gauleiter Wagner became provisional minister 
of the interior, and he, as highest police authority, made Himmler his 
provisional police chief over the Munich Metropolitan Police (Polizei-
direktion Muenchen), while Roehm became a state commissioner for 
special duties. How and why Wagner allotted these posts in this manner 
remains unexplained. 
Himmler and Roehm got minimal offices considering the key role 
they played in this local power seizure. Roehm's vague position was 
especially minor in view of his prospects during the previous weeks, 
when he had allegedly proposed himself as either a general commis-
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sioner for public security for the entire Reich or, at least, a Reich com-
missioner for all non-Prussian states. As such, he would have consoli-
dated control over all the police forces of the states and the Party (SA 
and 55).3 If such an ambitious bid was in fact rebuffed, it revealed the 
strength of Roehm's opposition. Undoubtedly Hitler had second 
thoughts about putting such control in Roehm's hands and may have 
welcomed the need to placate conservative allies as an excuse. 
At this point Himmler may have pinned his aspirations on Roehm's 
dreams, for their cooperation and division of labor in Bavarian police 
work during the following months indicates a harmonious working al-
liance. Why Himmler got his initial police position remains a key unan-
swered question. Apparently Party leaders identified him with police 
and security work. In all probability, Wagner saw in the relatively in-
significant HimmIer a controllable subordinate through whom he could 
direct key police forces. Himmler, however, may also have been a Trojan 
horse in Roehm's scheme. In the same vein, Hitler may have encouraged 
such appointments as sops that would keep his two potentially trou-
blesome paramilitary leaders on the shelf in Bavaria. 
The Bavarian Political Police 
More than "a minor appointment," or the "degrading job of Munich 
police chief," Himmler's new office was a necessary first step from which 
to build state police power, for the Munich police chief held a key po-
sition. Although Bavaria supposedly had a decentralized command over 
its police, in fact the Munich Metropolitan Police worked directly with 
the Ministry of Interior, bypassing normal channels, and served in many 
respects as a central police authority for Bavaria, especially for political 
police affairs. The Political Division, Department VI of the Munich Met-
ropolitan Police, coordinated political police work for the entire state.4 
Munich Department VI and the comparable department in the Nu-
remberg Metropolitan Police served as intelligence centers for South and 
North Bavaria, respectively, compiling regional reports from the political 
situation reports forwarded from the provincial and county political po-
lice. Munich in turn assumed therole of the central state office by as-
sembling a consolidated state report and forwarding it to state offices 
and the Reich intelligence center in Berlin. For counterespionage work, 
the Munich office coordinated with the military and Reich Railway au-
thorities, and could order arrests for political offenses anywhere in the 
state. Thus, when HimmIer also became provisional police chief for Nu-
remberg-Fuerth on March 26, 1933, he apparently had approval to con-
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solidate still further the central control of police work against the 
"enemies" of the Reich and the NS Movement.5 
The conversion from a de facto to a de jure Bavarian Political Police, 
with almost unlimited, independent executive authority and a closely 
related system of 55 concentration camps, came rapidly. Himmler's ac-
quisition of such rank power can be understood only in terms of the 
period of the revolutionary honeymoon, and the fact that Wagner saw 
him as an ally rather than a rival. When Himmler took over his new 
office, he sent Heydrich in as head of Political Department VI. Heydrich 
may not have fully appreciated his slated mission, however, for accord-
ing to his wife, he disdained the political police, saw this assignment as 
temporary, and preferred to build the future Reich through the 55. Ac-
cordingly, he moved his SO headquarters and his family to Berlin, and 
initially performed his Bavarian police duties as a commuting com-
mander.6 Either Heydrich did not foresee the significance of the Bavarian 
position as the stepping-stone to Himmler's control of the German po- . 
lice, or he did not understand how carefully such steps had to be taken. 
Meanwhile, however, Himmler could not extend his control over all 
the Bavarian police. He and his 55 remained subordinate to Roehm, 
with whom he cooperated closely. Apparently, Himmler's authority re-
mained limited to the political police as part of prior arrangements, while 
the SA generally infiltrated the regular police. The seizure of local police 
authority by SA leaders followed the pattern set in the rest of the Reich, 
as did the appearance of SA-dominated auxiliary police. Roehm estab-
lished a system of special commissioners to coordinate the police with 
the new NS ministers and with the organizations of the Movement. 
These commissioners called forth auxiliary police from the SA, 55, and 
Stahlhelm, who proceeded to their predictable excesses. 7 
During mid-March, the heads of all elements of the Movement 
worked together reasonably well in trying to maintain some semblance 
of order and to regularize police authority. On March 27, Wagner issued 
another decree clarifying the new relationships and setting some limits 
on auxiliaries. Most significant, he proclaimed a division of iabor be-
tween SA and 55 that soon repeated itself across Germany. He created 
two branches of auxiliary police: the Political Auxiliary Police and the 
Auxiliary Security Police (Sicherheitshilfspolizei). He named Himmler, 
as Reichsfuehrer 55, leader of the Political Auxiliary Police with power 
to appoint regional and local commissioners (Beauftragten) of the 55 to 
exercise command over the political auxiliaries. Roehm had a similar 
position in commanding the Auxiliary Security Police-the nonpolitical 
forces. s 
Through these appointments Wagner sought to limit the auxiliary 
police as to who and how many could serve. The decree also emphasized 
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that auxiliaries were a temporary expediency for the emergency situa-
tion, financed by limited funds that the administration could withdraw. 
Furthermore, the appointment of heads of auxiliary police within the 
administrative chain of command brought their auxiliaries under ad-
ministrative control, or at least so the new NS ministers tried to make 
it appear. In reality, Roehm and Himmler, as heads of NS organizations, 
had their own independent power and authority, derived from their 
direct subordination to Hitler, producing a confusing web of interlocking 
NS and state chains of command and authority. 
Roehm knew how to use real power; however, in the long run he 
failed to exploit his fully. He suffered from the true rebel's distaste for 
administrative structures, bureaucratic red tape, and due process, with-
drawing from bureaucratic entanglements for fear of contamination, 
thereby reducing his effectiveness. In contrast, Himmler gradually de-
veloped the plan to mesh his 55 thoroughly with the existing police and 
administrative machinery. Although he shared Roehm's distaste for bu-
reaucrats and their milieu, he reveled in his own versions of their game. 
He freely involved himself and his 55 in the establishment. As Aronson 
has argued: "From this point of view, Himmler was more 'revolutionary' 
than Roehm. Himmler was apparently prepared to work within the ex-
isting state machinery, but only in order to adapt it, in the course of 
time, to his own ideas,"9 
Although Himmler's methods in building the Bavarian Political Po-
lice revealed a rapidly evolving distinction between his plans and tech-
niques and those of his competitors, the SA and the Prussian Gestapo, 
in some respects he merely expanded the Bavarian pattern of an efficient, 
centralized political police. On March 15, Minister of the Interior Wagner 
named him his political section chief (Referent) within the ministry. Wag-
ner subordinated all the political police of Bavaria to Himmler, and the 
Bavarian Political Police (BPP) now became an official reality. As direct 
subordinate to the Minister of Interior, to Himmler theoretically had cen-
tral command over the state's political police. 
When, however, the March 27 order on the auxiliary police supple-
mented Himmler's appointments, the first real indications of his new 
course emerged. The Political Auxiliary Police not only gave Himmler a 
considerably enlarged force for executive actions, they were also 55-men 
whom he commanded as Reichsfuehrer 55. Himmler's direct command 
over 55 men, serving as auxiliaries of the state, confused normal lines 
of authority. Whenever a local police official sought to restrict the aux-
iliaries, the 55 could ignore him, claiming authority directly from the 
ministry through Himmler. When challenged by his government su-
perior, Wagner or Epp, Himmler could find recourse to his authority as 
Reichsfuehrer. Here lay the significance of any government position to 
which he was appointed in his capacity as Reichsfuehrer 55. 
Himmler in Bavaria 67 
On April 1, long before such relations became apparent to him, 
Wagner made "the Reichsfuehrer 5S, Heinrich Himmler," the political 
police commander of Bavaria. Apparently Wagner saw such appoint-
ments for Roehm and Himmler as the only hope of controlling the "wild 
police" actions of the SA and SS, respectively. The continued inclusion 
of Himmler's 5S title in his assignments to state offices inevitably soli-
dified the association of SS and political police. In most respects, the 
enactment of April 1 also completed the process of establishing a cen-
tralized political police. Himmler's office as commander directly within 
the Ministry of the Interior removed the Bavarian Political Police from 
the local entanglements of the Munich Metropolitan jurisdiction. In ad-
dition, Wagner gave Himmler command over all remaining local political 
police in Bavaria (such as those in metropolitan forces or the political 
section chiefs attached to offices of the regional and local administration). 
Not only did the Auxiliary Political Police remain under his authority, 
but now he could overcome their inherent limitations. Only extraordi-
nary circumstances justified the SS auxiliaries, and budgetary realities 
prohibited their free use. Himmler's new office found two ways around 
these limitations: He could order local uniformed or regular police to 
perform executive missions for his political police, providing a reservoir 
of manpower for large arrest actions, and, more important, he could 
draw SS personnel to his political police legitimately. There they could 
continue their double role of 5S and policemen, but with legality and a 
greater degree of permanence. ll 
The April 1 enactment placed one more significant tool in the hands 
of the commander of the BPP: concentration camps-those already ex-
isting and those yet to be created. In contrast to the chaotic status of 
the autonomous, "wild" SA and SS camps in Prussia, the Bavarian 
camps technically came under the authority of the state administration 
through Himmler as their commander. The intention was to bring them 
under proper administrative control, but that goal soon paled in light 
of the advantages Himmler derived from official sanctioning of his 
camps. He got state funding for his camps and therefore for his SS 
guards, and they got a facade of propriety and legality. A side benefit 
was that his system of partially covering expenses through camp labor 
appealed to local leaders, whose dependence on Reich supplemental 
financing increased the threat of Reich controls by bureaucrats in the 
Reich Ministries of Finance and the Interior. Above all, this system cre-
ated the triangle of SS, political police, and concentration camps bound 
together with interlocking personnel under one commander, the Reichs-
fuehrer SS, Himmler. 12 
For the time being, 5S command in the police extended only to the 
political branch. Shortly after becoming commander of the BPP, Himmler 
relinquished his positions as police chief in Munich and Nuremberg. In 
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April, the Munich post fell immediately into 5A hands. In Nuremberg 
Himmler managed to keep an 55 man in office only until 5eptember. 
These developments impeded slightly the 55 monopoly over political 
police affairs, for 5A auxiliaries dominated N5 work with the Nuremberg 
Political Police until spring 1934.13 Despite such temporary obstacles, 
however, Heydrich successfully conducted the more immediate task of 
55 penetration of the political police. 
Dachau and Opposition 
In direct proportion to Himmler's growing power and prominence, op-
position to his system developed, first locally and then nationally. For 
instance, his acquisition of command over concentration camps, which 
grew out of opposition to excessive arrests, in turn produced stronger 
and ever-widening opposition. The process began with the wave of ar-
rests following the coup of March 9, 1933, which had filled the prisons 
and jails of Bavaria to overflowing. By April 1 they would hold five 
thousand internees. Consequently, Himmler announced to the press on 
March 21 that an abandoned munitions plant near Dachau had been 
converted into a facility for holding the overflow of political internees. 
When the Landespolizei officer whom he had put in charge objected to 
the inadequacy of these facilities and questioned the legality of the ar-
rests, Himmler took over as head of the political auxiliaries (55), who 
would henceforth provide the staff and guards, displacing the usual 
police personnel.14 
To deflect the civil service protests about lack of due process, Interior 
Minister Wagner self-righteously dismissed any need for excessive con-
cern over the internees, reminding his fellow ministers that when Party 
members had been subject to such mass arrests, "they shut them up in 
any empty ruin and did not worry if they suffered the inclemency of 
the weather. illS He then recommended establishing special facilities, 
separate from the standard prisons under Ministry of Justice authority. 
After the April 1 announcement of Himmler's authority over the camps, 
Dachau evolved as Himmler's solution to the problem, increasingly free 
from the control of regular state authorities. Like every other component 
of his 55-police state system, the Dachau model grew quickly as a prod-
uct of a vague NS ideological consensus adapted to rapidly evolving 
functional pressures by Himmler, always ready to insert his SS as the 
appropriate vehicle. 
With Wagner's April 1 order making Himmler commander of the 
BPP and all concentration camps, Himmler achieved an unrivaled police 
power. He controlled not only the police but also penal facilities normally 
Himmler in Bavaria 69 
under the Ministry of Justice. 5ince he was a devout Nazi, in contrast 
to his Prussian competitor, Rudolf Diels, his N5 comrades trusted him 
to handle their enemies "properly." Completing the picture, he had 
Roehm's support in curbing local 5A competition of the sort encountered 
elsewhere. 16 
Not all Nazis trusted Himmler's propriety, however. Many already 
worried about growing excesses. In April, Hans Frank, the provisional 
minister of justice, had expressed concern about excessive and ill-
founded protective custody arrests, and he succeeded in getting Epp 
and the other ministers to pressure Wagner for reform. 17 This, however, 
merely encouraged Himmler to ensure an 55-controlled system of 
camps, free of administrative interference. 
Nevertheless, Frank intended to prove that no matter how far things 
had already gone, Himmler's organization could not literally get away 
with murder. He made his point on June 1 by charging Dachau Camp 
Commandant Hilmar Waeckerle and his staff with aiding and abetting 
murder. Under Himmler's orders, Waeckerle had issued camp regula-
tions providing for the execution of internees "who made trouble." From 
the 55 takeover in mid-April to late May, at least eleven men had either 
been shot "while fleeing or attacking guards," or had "committed sui-
cide." All were Jews and/or KPD officials except for one alleged spy 
within the N5DAP. These were early cases of "special handling," al-
though it is unclear where the decision for execution had originated. 
Four cases were so flagrant that the prosecutor's office pressed charges 
against Waeckerle and his staff, and Frank felt compelled to bring the 
problem to his fellow minister. Responding to the attack in a typically 
"constructive" manner, Himmler dismissed Waeckerle, but the inde-
pendence of the camp administration remained untouched. 18 
For new commandant, Himmler chose Theodor Eicke. This forty-
one-year-old had suffered the usual ups and downs of postwar em-
ployment. Along the way, he became a dedicated Nazi and entered the 
55 in 1930. Unemployed by 1932, he became a freebooter available for 
special assignments. An effective leader by 55 standards, he rose rapidly 
to become head of the 55 in the Palatinate. There he had a confrontation 
with Gauleiter Buerckel, who took revenge by committing him to a psy-
chiatric clinic in March 1933. Finally released at Himmler's behest for 
the job at Dachau, Eicke would serve loyally the man who gave him a 
prestigious position.19 
He whipped Dachau into shape, usually controlling excesses that 
might threaten its independent existence under Himmler. This he did 
by eventually welding together his own disciplined command of 55 con-
centration camp guards, the Death's-Head Formations. Although ter-
roristic brutality remained the guiding principle behind the camps, the 
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object was to control this brutality-to use it with calculation for official 
reasons rather than personal, sadistic ends. Understandably, many out-
side Himmler's circle did not appreciate such a fine distinction; the camps 
therefore continued to provide bases for assaults on his position by 
conservative Nazis in the state administration. 
The knowledge that Heydrich never had authority over Dachau or 
any other camp is necessary to understand these struggles. Throughout 
the history of Sipo and SO, the political police (later Gestapo) and con-
centration camps remained separate entities under Himmler. Their crea-
tion as individual institutions left Heydrich with no say in the matter. 
Eicke outranked him, also enjoying direct access to the Reichsfuehrer. 20 
As the official most directly responsible for the protective custody sys-
tem, however, it was Heydrich who made the arrests and determined 
who was committed. To maintain control over the ultimate fate of in-
ternees, as early as April he had established a Political Department to 
provide liaison with Dachau. As the local organ of the BPP, it decided 
questions of release and retention. 21 
The opposition developing against Himmler's system and his emerg-
ing counterarguments and tactics would shape significantly the future 
of Sipo and SO. The rapid growth of Himmler's power in Bavaria, based 
on a centralized, independent political police with almost uncontested 
protective custody arrest powers and on an 55-controlled concentration 
camp, was essentially revolutionary. His success is understandable only 
in the context of the three-sided power struggle among (1) offices of the 
state resisting the Nazi revolution, (2) Nazis who entrenched themselves 
in state offices and based their power on traditional state authority, and 
(3) the irregular "revolutionaries" who threatened normal state struc-
tures. In this struggle, Himmler played all sides against the middle and 
triumphed through "subtly revolutionary" tactics, using the argument 
that extraordinary measures were needed to deal with the extraordinary 
threats to society. 
From the beginning, the Nazi leaders of Bavaria began to take sides. 
A conservative wing dominated state offices with the support of Reichs-
statthalter Epp. Its key movers included Ludwig Siebert, unfortunately 
not a well-established Party man but a high-ranking professional civil 
servant, and the jurist Hans Frank. True to their professions, they per-
ceived the Third Reich as an authoritarian state in which the Nazis ruled 
through administrative and legal channels. They relied on Epp's au-
thority as Hitler's personally appointed governor of Bavaria. 22 
Ranged against the "conservatives" were the more "radical" Gau-
leiter and SA. Although many in their ranks had seized official positions 
or had become commissioners, they nevertheless wanted a real revo-
lution to sweep away the old order. They tended to behave as a law 
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unto themselves. Countering Epp's personal authority, the Gauleiter and 
Roehm were also Hitler's personal appointees and they refused to rec-
ognize Epp's claim to higher authority.23 
As both Gauleiter and Minister of the Interior, Wagner held a more 
ambivalent position. He inclined toward radical changes in the system 
and was largely responsible for Himmler's early gains. However, since 
his ministry was his own personal empire, as soon as others threatened 
his supremacy he showed more concern for the proper machinery of 
state authority.24 As Wagner's ostensible subordinate, Himmler could 
play one of several trumps. He could alternately employ the authority 
of the state and of the revolution, and as an ultimate ploy he too could 
claim final recourse to Hitler, either through Roehm or directly. Al-
though Wagner had originally accepted Roehm's SA police commis-
sioners and auxiliaries, he had immediately moved to limit their power 
over his police, relying on Himmler as a useful tool in the process. When, 
however, the conservatives had begun to attack SA excesses in March, 
Wagner had weakly defended the SA actions as necessary. It was in this 
context that Frank had first succeeded in bringing pressure through Epp 
and the Council of Ministers to make Wagner exercise more control.25 
Unfortunately, as minister of justice in Bavaria, Frank held a poor 
position for limiting police power. The Bavarian system did not duplicate 
the procedures of most other states for administrative appeal against 
political police orders (Verfuegungen). Administrative courts were espe-
cially powerless in this respect. 26 Furthermore, Frank, thoroughly im-
bued with the NS spirit, had himself reduced the judicial proceedings 
still necessary in the early stages of the protective custody system. By 
April, he had lost or relinquished all control over protective custody 
cases that were handled directly by the BPP. Consequently, Frank's 
subsequent assault on Camp Commandant Waeckerle had required re-
course to the Weimar Constitution, a very inappropriate tool for Nazis 
to use against their comrades. 27 
Even before that, however, the protective custody arrest process had 
reached a state of near-anarchy. Every NS organization or official who 
thought it possible to get away with it arrested enemies of the Movement 
and personal enemies as well. Nazis even used the threat on each other. 
The constant lawlessness produced continued pressure on Wagner from 
the Council of Ministers, giving him the encouragement he needed to 
try to curb the SA and keep the BPP under his control. 28 On May 17 
and 22 he issued two orders for the regulation of protective custody. 
Limiting its use to significant suspects only, he required bimonthly re-
ports to his office on the status of all internees. Most significant, he 
limited protective custody powers to police authorities, with Himmler, 
the political police commander, as the ultimate arbiter. To top it off, he 
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repealed an order of March 20, now embarrassing, in which he had 
encouraged the SA commissioners to make unlimited use of protective 
custody powers. 29 He thus set the official chain of authority for protective 
custody in Bavaria as Reichstatthalter Epp, Minister of Interior Wagner, 
Commander of the BPP Himmler, his chief Heydrich, and regional and 
local police officials. Wagner effectively shielded Himmler's police from 
Epp, while believing he was bringing the system under his control. 
The conservatives under Epp used as their slogan Hitler's procla-
mation that "the Revolution is over." Revolutionary measures should 
cease and the authority of the state be restored. The conservatives as-
saulted the position of the SA and SS with the argument that since the 
emergency had passed, the extraordinary organs of the Movement, ex-
cessively expensive, could withdraw from action and police work be 
returned to properly trained personnel. 30 
Against this attack Roehm proved ineffective. For the sake of his 
own authority, he had to exercise control over his men, curbing them 
to some extent. He also believed that the SA should be the force of 
movement in the new order, standing outside the administration as its 
gadfly, its opposition. As such, however, the SA would be denied a 
forceful role as true policemen or administrators. Roehm was thus de-
fenseless against the financial arguments. As early as May, the powers 
and the number of auxiliary police were reduced, and their eventual 
termination became inevitable. Roehm's bases for legitimate action 
shrank. 31 
In contrast, Himmler entrenched himself and key SS men like Hey-
drich as legitimate police officials, using traditional police justifications 
for attacking the problem of finances. In May, while the auxiliaries were 
being reduced, Himmler approached the Reich government for increases 
in supplementary funds for police purposes. He pleaded for his over-
worked civil servants, putting in seven-day weeks of fourteen to sixteen 
hours a day. He warned of the threat of a growing army of spies and 
traitors in the service of foreign powers that feared renewed vigor in 
Germany, and, of course, he warned of the ever-present Red Menace. 
Such threats were guaranteed to worry conservatives, be they Nazis or 
their allies. 32 
Consequently, although Siebert, at a July meeting of the Council of 
Ministers, moved to replace Himmler with "an experienced administra-
tive jurist,,,33 outside his own circle he found little sympathy in the 
Movement for such a reactionary change. As long as Himmler retained 
the necessary staff of police experts and jurists, got them to work dili-
gently for the new order, and succeeded by Nazi standards in defeating 
the enemy, his position remained secure. He won the support of police 
professionals by appealing to them and he satisfied the Movement by 
Himmler in Bavaria 73 
revolutionizing the old system and creating the necessary free, strong 
forces needed by the NS state. 
In the continuing debate over police authority, Himmler argued for 
a tactic that foreboded his "silent revolution" and revealed his emerging 
concept of a state protection corps (Staatsschutzkorps). The SA and 
the SS (still allied in his mind) would infiltrate and gradually take over 
the state. To remove them from their present positions would reverse 
the process and dangerously weaken the revolution. He and Roehm 
insisted that the police and administration were by no means reliable 
National Socialists. Since Catholics, reactionaries, and camouflaged lib-
erals and Marxists still occupied the bureaucracy, the replacement pro-
cess had to continue. 34 
Despite Himmler's gains, he could not overcome all legal limitations 
to the increasingly extraordinary police powers that he exercised, and 
Frank would remain an indefatigable advocate of those limitations. Un-
fortunately, given the mood of the times and the values of the Move-
ment, he occupied a weak position against Himmler. As a police chief, 
Himmler could tap the full potential of "reasons of state" and arguments 
for "national security." The defense of the nation against its enemies 
remained paramount. As long as he painted the threats in sufficiently 
disturbing colors, any criticism of the police, the state's instrument of 
internal defense, could be a threat to the prestige of the state and to 
national security, deserving to be called treasonous. 35 
The ordinary person who dared criticize openly faced charges of 
treason and protective custody. The higher official found his own ar-
guments sounding strangely unpatriotic and his standing in the Move-
ment weakened. When one successfully portrayed the victims of the 
police and the internees in the camps as Communists, traitors, and dan-
gerous antisocial elements best removed from society, they became un-
worthy of the sympathy or concern of good citizens. The cloak of national 
security enveloped the political police, their activities, and the concen-
tration camps. Such definitions of national security and treason kept the 
press in line, making it impossible to mount a public campaign against 
the police or the camps. Since the press dared publish only what the 
police released, Himmler, Heydrich, and amenable policemen had 
ready-made machinery for propagandizing the attitudes they wanted to 
sell. Show trials "exposed" the hidden enemy and played upon public 
attitudes and fears. The SS definition of "the enemy," and its desire for 
freedom to fight them, were implanted in the public consciousness. 
In the fight against the Catholic Church, a good example is the case 
of the three priests-Muhler, Thaler, and Sollacher-who had expressed 
concern over Dachau. In late November, following an investigation, they 
admitted "spreading" such "atrocity stories" and were arrested. 
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Searches of their quarters turned up the inevitable "extensive Marxist 
literature" and other circumstantial evidence associating them with 
Communism, all of which was duly publicized. The Church could not 
defend them against their admitted offense of undermining state au-
thority. Despite the fact that the literature included only what an edu-
cated anti-Communist priest would read, Heydrich could not be forced 
to retract the "facts" he had publicized. 36 He successfully painted a 
picture of a Communist-infiltrated priesthood and the need for a police 
proven capable of fighting such a menace. 
Such developments combined with the constant erosion of the Wei-
mar system of checks and balances to undermine Frank's bases for ac-
tion, and by the end of the year he stood completely stalemated. 
Himmler's system became less vulnerable even to charges of outright 
murder in the concentration camps, as in the cases of Handschuch, 
Frantz, and Katz, who were tortured and beaten to death at Dachau in 
the fall of 1933. Frank's officials investigated and determined the real 
causes of death. But having no desire to destroy the system being built, 
merely wanting to bring it under proper control, Frank simply presented 
the cases to the Ministerial Council, where concern had grown to the 
point of determination to bring the BPP under contro1.37 Yet, Himmler 
could cool Frank's ardor with relative ease and ensure Wagner's support 
before the council, simply by arguing that the investigations threatened 
the prestige of the NS state and should be terminated for reasons of 
state. This was not enough for the Council of Ministers, however, who 
must have realized that illegality constituted the real threat to the pres-
tige of the state, and perhaps also that no one was safe if this course 
continued unabated. At their December 9 meeting, they ordered Frank 
and Wagner to continue proceedings and to use the uniformed police 
against the camps if necessary. 
Himmler turned to Roehm for support, and together they responded 
that, since Dachau was a camp for political prisoners, the affair was a 
political issue and had to be settled by political authorities, not judicial. 
They then played their trump, referring the matter to Hitler, where the 
proceedings ended. With this precedent, other proceedings against 
camp guards had to be dropped. Both Frank and Wagner had to accept 
the fact that for disciplining the 55 as either camp guards or as auxiliary 
political police, Himmler had sole authority. For such Nazis as these, 
this would not be an entirely unpalatable pill, for, unlike the SA, the 55 
did have a reputation for propriety and discipline. Its excesses were not 
as much illegal as they were extralegal"necessities." 
In addition to revealing the tactics that Himmler, Heydrich, and their 
55 and policemen were evolving, these developments shaped still more 
definitively the future of Sipo and SO. The obstructionism of Frank and 
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Sievert and the weak support from Wagner must have reinforced Himm-
ler and Heydrich's hatred of jurists, bureaucrats, and Nazis with a pa-
rochial perspective. Such groups all lacked a clear understanding of the 
problems and had to be replaced by men who could be won over to the 
SS viewpoint and who, in turn, would be succeeded by a fully indoc-
trinated younger generation of SS men. Ironically, the opposition forged 
more firmly in each man's mind the broad outlines of the state protection 
corps. 
Meanwhile, Himmler had succeeded in building a local combination 
of SS, political police, and concentration camps that had a usefully am-
biguous image. For the more conservative elements, the SS had a dis-
tasteful air of evil to be shunned, yet its radicalism and "virile" brutality 
had an appeal. Readily available to do whatever was necessary, includ-
ing what respectable citizens avoided doing, the SS offered the totali-
tarian efficiency that many believed essential to defeat the enemy. Yet 
in contrast to the SA, it appeared less offensive, less crudely radical, 
and increasingly capable of tapping more respectable types for service. 
On another level, the SS represented an alternative to the SA that was, 
nevertheless, thoroughly NS. Although Himmler worked well with 
Roehm against the conservatives, his SS and police had also worked 
well against the SA. Their efficiency made SA illegality unnecessary. In 
place of blatant SA illegality, the SS represented cleverly packaged ex-
tralegality. This image proved invaluable in the pending struggle for 
control of a Reich-wide political police system. 
7 _____ _ 
The Vortex of Intrigue 
By the time Diels's Gestapo and Himmler's BPP had emerged, moves 
to create a centralized Reich police force were well under way, with 
Reich Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick taking the lead. In his newly 
acquired role, Frick had attempted to assert his authority even before 
the imposition of the Reichsstatthalter had given local Nazis control over 
the police of the various states. He became a natural rallying point for 
those who shared his objectives-the creation of a Reich police force 
purged of the enemy and obedient to a central command under the 
Fuehrer, but at the same time a professional force not extensively "par-
tified."l 
Unfortunately for Frick and those who supported him, they had 
neither the ruthless determination nor the means to accomplish their 
goals. They usually avoided the open confrontations necessary to bring 
Goering or Himmler into line. To be successful, such confrontations had 
to elicit clear definitions of the limits to which the Nazi Weltanschauung 
could be carried in violation of law and tradition, and experience showed 
that Hitler accepted such limitations only under great pressure from the 
powerful institutions of German society, specifically finance, industry, 
and the military. In trying to orchestrate a coalition of pressure, the Frick 
faction moved too cautiously. For their part, the conservative Nazis and 
non-Nazis who might have supported Frick were less aware than they 
should have been of the need to set clear limits. Their own reactionary, 
nationalistic, imperialistic aspirations blinded them to the full extent of 
the threat. They were also ambivalent about Frick as an ally. 2 
Perhaps the major obstacle to Frick's success in the struggle for police 
power, though, lay in the scope of his objectives, for the police were 
merely a part of his overall plan to centralize an administrative structure 
for the entire Reich and to refurbish the civil service for a leadership 
role. In this, he not only sought to block all revolutionary elements of 
the Movement who would replace the state, but he also ran afoul of all 
the particularist elements of the bureaucracy who had no desire to be 
centralized under his leadership. The overwhelming scope of his plan 
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often held his attention at levels above the more specific problems of 
building a police state-the step-by-step process in which the Goering-
Diels-Daleuge and Himmler-Heydrich combinations involved them-
selves. Frick thus had to find and rely on allies who could concentrate 
on the police. 
As a further weakness in vying for Hitler's support, Frick lacked the 
necessary radicalism. He purged the Reich civil service only minimally, 
and appealed to the conservative bureaucracy by proclaiming it an in-
dispensable pillar of the Reich. In his view, turning the bureaucrats into 
an efficient instrument of an authoritarian dictatorship did not require 
extensive "partification." Of course, Frick would have the Party Lead-
ership set political policy, but the Party itself should be merely the ma-
chinery for propaganda to imbue the nation with the new spirit. It would 
not penetrate and interfere with the machinery of state for the execution 
of policy. In contrast, Hitler thoroughly distrusted bureaucrats. For him, 
the revolution required a total change of attitudes and values on the part 
of the men who operated the machinery of state. 
Frick's inability to consider tactics that violated his sense of propriety 
handicapped him against less conservative opponents whom he could 
not force into line without Hitler's support. However, Frick's plans for 
centralizing the police offered Hitler no extensively new base of power 
but would mean a decision against Goering, Himmler, Roehm, the Gau-
leiter, and innumerable lesser holders of police power. Given this, Hitler 
would not back Frick and instead procrastinated. Meanwhile, however, 
Frick appeared to have the lead. In the backlash against uncontrolled 
and violent power seizure, pressures to regularize the state led in April 
to the Law to Restore a Professional Civil Service and subsequent leg-
islation and decrees that gave apparent force to reform under the Reich 
Ministry of the Interior. For the first two years, Frick maneuvered with 
considerable hope of success.3 
Despite his relatively conservative bent, Frick avidly pursued de-
velopment of a police state. For instance, in April and May he provided 
Reich supplements for the auxiliary police and the concentration camps 
of the federal states. Although this increased his leverage to control 
them, it also assured their availability for NS terror. 4 In his drive for a 
Reich central police, his legislative and administrative changes-even 
those meant to check Himmler-nurtured the police state, for they also 
deliberately undermined concepts of the inalienable rights of the indi-
vidual, as well as constitutional checks and balances on the power of 
the state. 
On May 11, Frick made his first overt move by announcing his in-
tention to centralize the Schupo. On the following day, as a first step 
he approached Goering, who, being responsible for the largest state 
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force, would be indispensable. Goering had already done much toward 
creating a reliable state police, including a more centralized political 
police. He knew of plans for Reich centralization, saw the need for it, 
and supported the idea.5 He might cooperate if it were to his advantage, 
but the more immediate need to tighten control in Prussia took prece-
dence. For instance, through connections with the Prussian ministries, 
Frick knew that Goering and Diels were working toward the indepen-
dence of the Gestapo. He therefore told Goering he wanted a unified 
Reich political police, asking him to take no action until he could make 
appropriate proposals.6 
As a result of subsequent conflicts between Frick and Goering, the 
latter is always depicted as uncooperatively frustrating Frick's every 
move. Indeed, throughout 1933 he and Frick constantly sought to out-
flank one another; however, their relationship was not limited to com-
petition. Nothing indicates that Goering reacted defensively to Frick's 
initial proposal. Instead, he played his cards shrewdly, always holding 
out and working toward an advantageous compromise. Soon Daluege 
and Diels became directly involved in Frick's planning and negotiations. 
Rather than trying to hinder this liaison, Goering probably commis-
sioned it. As a matter of fact, Diels would later complain that Goering 
waited until as late as November to make the Gestapo independent. 7 If 
he delayed becaus.e of Frick's request, that response would indicate that 
Frick's plans for Reich centralization did not seriously threaten Goering 
at this time-that Goering in fact hoped to capitalize on them. 
Before the end of May, Frick presented concrete proposals for Reich 
centralization, concentrating for the moment on the criminal and political 
police. He proposed merely a vague "arrangement between the Reich 
and the states" that would preserve the police sovereignty of the states. 
Goering's Prussian State Criminal Police Office and Prussian Gestapo 
Office were to be the Reich coordinating agencies, while Frick cautiously 
broached an eventual, yet-to-be-defined Reich authority over these of-
fices. Furthermore, Frick promised to settle all matters with Goering 
before approaching the states other than Prussia. Although the details 
of Frick's proposal threatened potential loss of police power to Frick, 
there must have been positive aspects from Goering's point of view. 
Not only was the proposal in line with his desires for a strong, efficient 
police, but it also offered the possibility of bargaining for the best possible 
deal for himself. Toward such an end, his position was strong, for his 
Gestapo had inherited and continued to exercise all of the Reich-wide 
coordination activities of the various former Berlin political police offices. 
He ordered his staff to do everything to accelerate and facilitate nego-
tiations. As late as July, when Frick spoke before a conference of Reichs-
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statthalter advocating a Reich police central command, Goering 
apparently did not oppose and may even have supported him.8 
From May on, Daluege and, to some extent, Diels spent progres-
sively more time with Frick's staff, planning police centralization. In this 
way, Daluege established a closer relationship with the Frick circle, 
where he gradually emerged as the prime candidate for command of a 
Reich police.9 Daluege could thus parlay already extensive police power 
into much higher stakes as he moved into a position to side with whoever 
might win. Meanwhile Goering continued to entrench and extend Dal-
uege's police powers in Prussia. Undoubtedly, the success of the revo-
lution at this stage and the more imminent threat of the SA remained 
Goering's prime concerns. For both Frick and Goering, Daluege's repu-
tation as the powerful 55 leader who hindered SA excesses made him 
a valuable ally. They also hoped to capitalize on his independence from 
Himmler. 
Neither Frick nor Goering had any reason to suspect the full extent 
of Himmler's police aspirations, for, according to Werner Best, he care-
fully restricted his long-range planning to an intimate circle that excluded 
Daluege. lO Consequently, as long as Frick stuck to his promise not to 
contact other states until matters had been settled with Goering, plans 
for a Reich police force developed in circles that did not include the 
future chief, Himmler. 
At this crucial time, Daluege's power was a product of the very 
uncontrollability of the SA and 55 units that Goering wanted him to 
tame. Control of funds for the SA and 55 or their auxiliary police was 
the major leverage that Party and state officials had against these or-
ganizations. Party Treasurer Schwarz had worked hard before 1933 to 
secure such control over all Party finances, and in the early part of 1933 
state and Reich administrations could set some limitations on auxiliary 
police through financing; however, the freewheeling nature of the power 
seizure threatened to undermine such controls. Many local Party and 
organization leaders supplemented their finances through special col-
lections from individuals, businesses, and other organizations. The con-
tributors obviously had mixed motives. Some simply payed protection 
money, or insurance against the future; others contributed to the defense 
of law and order and the reconstruction of the Reich. Contributions 
during the early months also came from industrialists worried about the 
threat of Communist sabotage. ll 
Recourse to financing in the form of special collections gave a freer 
hand to the uncontrolled and extremist elements of the Movement, but 
they hit some firms much harder than others-often to the point of 
overtaxing them. To counter such threats to conservative supporters, 
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Rudolf Hess, Hitler's deputy in the Party, created the Adolf Hitler Fund. 
This centralized the collection of all "special funds" and reensured con-
trol over the purse strings of Pary organizations and local leaders. For 
the industrialists, regular contribution to a single fund was a budgetable 
expense that they paid more willingly to the responsible heads of Party 
and state. They paid for the sort of law and order they wanted-at least 
the Nazis stressed that theme in the patriotic appeals that they made 
for the funds. In return, the industrialists expected the Nazis to control 
the mass base upon which modem society rests. The means were less 
significant than the ends of preserving profit and property. Any qualms 
the businessmen had were suppressed by their fear of the left and the 
SA. 12 
Under Daluege, 55 Group East had gathered its share of special 
contributions. Some surviving correspondence to and from his office in 
June 1933 casts light not only on his power and position at this time and 
on the significance of fusing 55 with state police offices, but also on the 
involvement of leading businessmen in the establishment of the police 
state.13 In early May and again in June, Count Karl 5chimmelmann, 
Daluege's adjutant, contacted among others Dr. Ernst Poensgen, a Dues-
seldorf industrialist on the boards of numerous Ruhr industries. He 
asked Poensgen to arrange for contributions for the 55 Auxiliary Police. 14 
Such money would also finance the 55 concentration camps around 
Berlin. 
Poensgen responded that the newly created Hitler Fund now served 
that purpose and that Daluege should tum to Hess. 5chimmelmann 
persisted, however. He called for a public service donation "in the in-
terest of peace and order and a stabilization of the bases upon which 
the reconstruction could be begun." Law and order was in question in 
no less than the Reich capital. The adjutant also argued that this special 
request exceeded the purview of the Hitler Fund and the organizations 
it covered. Coming from the "Chief of 55 Group East and the Prussian 
Police," Daluege's requests transcended the limitations of either the 
Party or local concerns. 15 
With the Hitler Fund as insurance, Poensgen felt confident enough 
to draw the line. On June 21 he appealed to Grauert to end 5chimmel-
mann's persistent requests and told 5chimmelmann that Daluege would 
have to be satisfied with the Hitler Fund.16 Although they asked few 
questions about means, at this stage such industrial magnates preferred 
to deal with the more traditional and trustworthy bureaucrats and Party 
heads, expecting them to control their tools of police power. Their more 
direct contact and support for Himmler's 55 and police developed later, 
when that agency became the proper machinery of state. 
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This episode illustrates four important points. It paints a general 
picture of powerful vested interests who did not overly concern them-
selves with the moral and political implications of how the state exercised 
its authority, as long as it represented and preserved national strength 
and their apparent interests. Although the pressures of the moment and 
lack of viable alternatives made their behavior understandable, a pow-
erful element of society had thus failed to demand control of the police 
forces. Second, the episode reinforces the argument that a union of the 
SS and the police stood above Party lines of control. Third, it shows the 
extent to which Daluege operated independently. Finally, the Hitler 
Fund stands out as a means for the conservative establishment and many 
Nazi leaders to tame the NS revolution, especially to bring the SA into 
line. Concern about the SA was mutual for Goering and Frick, eventually 
drawing them into alliance with other like-minded elements. Until it 
finally brought Roehm down, this alliance included such unlikely bed-
fellows that it barely held together, especially the Goering-Frick-
Himmler triangle that would soon emerge. 
The SA threat was part of the so-called Second Revolution Move-
ment: radical elements frustrated by the limits of the power seizure. Not 
only did the SA leaders dream of replacing the Army and the police, 
but they and others had their eyes on big business, heavy industry, and 
financial capital. Among small businessmen, workers, and peasants, 
many elements had subscribed to the Party rhetoric against monopolistic 
capitalism, and they wanted that part of the revolution fulfilled. They 
failed to appreciate how essential the "capitalist establishment" was to 
Hitler's position and to their own nationalistic aspirations. Not only did 
this movement threaten establishment conservatives and Nazis like 
Goering and Frick, but its anarchic independence also undermined the 
authority of the Reich Leadership of the Party, notably Hess, Ley, and 
Schwarz. Even many Gauleiter felt threatened, and some began turning 
to the Reich Leadership for support against SA and SS interference in 
political affairs. 17 
Meanwhile, the forces of decentralization in the Party had grown so 
great that Hitler made a move to strengthen the anti-Second Revolution 
forces. On April 21, he appointed Rudolf Hess deputy fuehrer. In typical 
fashion, Hitler made the new office prestigious and powerful, but not 
decisively so. Hess's full authority over the Party organization remained 
indirect, and his relationship to the other Reich leaders and the Gauleiter 
remained unclearly defined. Although Hess's appointment merely main-
tained the balance of indecision, it did enhance the anti-Roehm elements. 
Hess and his ally, Franz Schwarz, Reich treasurer of the Party, used the 
Hitler Fund to tighten the purse strings and to bring the SA more under 
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Central Party and Gauleiter authority. They and the conservatives in 
business who made jobs available to unemployed Brown Shirts did much 
to take the edge off the Second Revolution. 18 
In the same way that the Second Revolution threatened the Party 
Organization, it jeopardized Frick's power base in the existing machinery 
of state. The SA directly threatened him through their assaults on the 
bureaucracy, their seizure of the police, and their excesses that disrupted 
law, order, and proper administrative procedures. Because the SA had 
no regard for his legalistic methods, Frick and his conservative allies 
remained largely impotent against them. For instance, in late April Frick 
persuaded the cabinet to approve a law establishing disciplinary ma-
chinery for SA and SS members. Unfortunately, although Hitler would 
become increasingly concerned about reactions to the April and May 
violence, boycotts against Jews that backfired, pressure on the churches, 
and threats to business, he would not give such a law real teeth.19 He 
left Frick to his own, largely inadequate devices. 
Nevertheless, a growing pressure eventually forced Hitler's hand. 
Big business and the military would remain dissatisfied until they felt 
more secure abouUhe SA. Von Neurath, the foreign minister, gave Frick 
ammunition by promising the French, concerned over SA and SS para-
military forces, that the auxiliary police would be reduced as soon as 
possible. Given the delicate situation at the Geneva disarmament talks, 
this argument carried weight. On May 12, Frick announced that the 
auxiliary police would be dissolved in a few months, and he soon had 
Hitler's support in encouraging the Reichsstatthalter to follow suit. 20 
The Prussian Imbroglio 
While opposition coalesced at the Reich level, Goering moved against 
the SA in Prussia. Their flagrant lawlessness, especially their unofficial 
concentration camps and torture chambers, openly challenged his au-
thority. As April and May wore on and he refashioned his police, he 
could no longer ignore such affronts. He reacted by moving to close the 
illegal camps allover Prussia and ordering the auxiliary police to behave 
more circumspectly.21 According to Diels, however, Goering acted so 
reluctantly that Diels virtually forced the issue. He claimed that he had 
his police break into SA and SS bunkers and camps and expose their 
gross inhumanity. Armed with such shocking evidence, the story went, 
he then moved Hitler to order a housecleaning, even to the point of 
giving Diels army artillery to break up the SS camp at Papenburg in 
April. 22 
Diels undoubtedly ended some excesses of the Brown revolution; 
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however, his version obscures the subtleties involved, especially his 
ambivalent relations with both the 5A and 55. Christoph Graf's study 
of the early Gestapo emphasized the mixed nature of the relationships. 
Gestapo, 5A, and 55 worked together well to terrorize and destroy the 
KPD, 5PD, and other enemies. For every exchange of complaints among 
them, there was an expression of appreciation for successful cooperation. 
For each "curbing of excesses," there was a matching case of Gestapo 
complicity in N5 crimes and extralegal actions.23 In building the police 
state machinery he thought necessary, Diels facilitated or excused many 
N5 excesses, whether he approved or not. 
Meanwhile, Goering was not just dragging his heels; he played a 
cautious game, using his influence in the 5A to play factions against 
each other, for he had enjoyed good rapport with various Berlin units 
since the days of 5tennes. 24 Goering's main concern was that if he moved 
too rapidly, he would show his hand. Instead, in May he merely issued 
a decree excluding policemen from membership in either 5A or 55. He 
used as his pretext Frick's decree making the 5A and 55 self-disciplining 
organs of the Movement, which would subject policemen who were 
members of 5A or 55 to divided loyalties.25 How long or how seriously 
Goering enforced this exclusion or when it lapsed remains undocu-
mented. Apparently it was only a gesture. 
The carefulness of Goering's game is apparent in his orders of April 
21 and June 7, dividing the auxiliary police into 5A teams, on the one 
hand, to support regular police, and 55 teams, on the other, to back up 
the Gestapo. By making Roehm and Himmler special commissioners for 
each of their branches of the auxiliary police,26 he invited the supreme 
leaders of these organizations to discipline their own men. Although 
relatively ineffective with Roehm's 5A, this gesture must have appealed 
to Himmler's sense of order and may have led eventually to the Goering-
Himmler alliance. 
Diels's claim to have brought "the 55" into line is hard to square 
with his relationship with Daluege. Early in April, he and Daluege co-
ordinated the conversion of 50nnenberg into a state camp guarded by 
Police Major Wecke's special police group.27 Despite his "success" 
against the 55 camp at Papenburg, Diels claimed he could not crack the 
55 bunker, Columbia Hou·se, in Berlin.28 Undoubtedly, he skirted that 
thorny problem because it lay directly under Daluege's nose, unlike 
Papenburg, which was in western Prussia, outside Daluege's 55 domain. 
Wedded as Diels was to Daluege's 55, the Columbia House was part of 
his modus vivendi with them. 
Goering still hoped to tame and live with the radicals, while Diels 
continued his own convoluted maneuvers. In late June, Diels notified 
Daluege of his desire to recruit Gestapo executive personnel exclusively 
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from the SS. He would use their weight in the Party to win respect for 
his police, while gaining control over the SS-men through proper train-
ing and the civil service command structure. With such SS-men in the 
police, the less controllable auxiliary police would become superfluous. 29 
Diels obviously believed that by relying on the proper sort of SS-men, 
the regular police could survive in the new order without sacrificing 
their professional identity and integrity. In September, when Daluege 
became lieutenant general of the state police and commander of the 
police in Prussia, Diels's plan seemed secure, for here was an SS com-
mander whom the Party respected and who would preserve the tradi-
tional police force. When Himmler made Diels an honorary SS lieutenant 
colonel in the same month,30 it seemed that the SS had at last officially 
endorsed him as head of the Gestapo and accepted its own role as a 
support force. 
In fact, things seemed to fall into line faster than Diels had hoped. 
On August 2, Goering dissolved the auxiliary police in Prussia with a 
note of finality.31 To end the illegal camps, in late September he decreed 
a system of state-controlled installations under his own director. In ad-
dition to two prisons, there were to be four camps: Papenburg (Osna-
brueck), Sonnenberg (Frankfurt a/O.), Lichtenburg (Merseburg), and 
Brandenburg, all to be staffed by regular Prussian Schupo rather than 
SA and SS auxiliaries. The transfer of internees to these locations began 
in October, so the other camps could be dissolved by the end of the 
year. Review of all protective custody cases would eliminate all but the 
"serious threats to security." As early as July, fewer than fifteen thou-
sand such cases remained in all of Prussia, which compared favorably 
with the total of over four thousand cases in either of the much smaller 
states of Bavaria and Saxony.32 
Roehm also cooperated, for he clearly needed to bring his SA under 
control. He ordered the end of SA involvement in auxiliary police and 
on October 7 created the SA Feldjaeger Corps, his last effort to arrive 
at a workable compromise with Goering. The Feldjaeger, a relatively 
small elite force, was to police the SA. Ordered to work closely with the 
Gestapo, who controlled their finances and helped select their personnel, 
their job was to arrest for the police SA-men suspected of crimes. To 
eliminate clashes between the police and SA, the police were to avoid 
arresting and disciplining SA-men, except to prevent a crime in pro-
gress.33 
According to Diels, once the major points of friction had been settled, 
he reached an understanding with Roehm and Karl Ernst, head of the 
Berlin SA. They shared his concern about the growing threat of Himmler 
and about their need for allies. At first they wanted to draw Diels into 
the SA; then, as an afterthought, Roehm supposedly advised Diels to 
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take the 55 uniform to fool Himmler. How much of Diels's version can 
be accepted is debatable; however, Diels obviously played all ends 
against the middle. 34 
Diels had reason to be pleased with himself, for he now commanded 
a Gestapo that operated throughout Prussia and served as a Reich co-
ordinating office for all countersubversive work in Germany. Where 
police forces were inadequate, he could use 55 men in great numbers. 
Undoubtedly, his offices had accomplished many of the inroads against 
the KPD and other "enemy" organizations, but where they might have 
been inadequate, spontaneous SA terrorism had completed the job. Diels 
probably had some justification for his boast that the Communists and 
other enemies of the Reich had been brought to heel, and that "through 
their union with suitable National Socialists the [police] authorities had 
earned the trust of the national Movement, especially the SA and the 
55.,,35 
Although Diels would make this boast in September, by November 
his neatly arranged order lay in shambles. The SA refused to be tamed, 
and the emerging coalition against them came apart. Throughout the 
Reich, SA-men still behaved as a law unto themselves. The SA assumed 
it had police authority and exercised that power on whim, creating nu-
merous embarrassing incidents for the regime, induding the harassment 
of representatives of foreign governments. In the very same week that 
Roehm had established the Feldjaeger, Frick had instructed the police 
authorities to crack down on SA excesses. In the non-Prussian states, 
he admonished them to rein in the auxiliaries, and Goering ordered that 
Frick's directives be applied firmly to Prussia.36 Consequently, any ef-
forts at Roehm's level to smooth over tensions were undoubtedly lost 
on the SA ranks, whose freedom was being curbed. 
Meanwhile, tension between Goering and SA leaders grew into an 
irreparable breach. According to Hans Gisevius, a conservative plant in 
the Gestapo, Goering at this time was planning a grand spectade in tune 
with his decadent lifestyle. SA leaders protested to Hitler against this 
unsocialistic pomp, and Roehm ordered his SA leaders not to participate. 
To avoid embarrassment, Goering sent formal invitations to Roehm and 
Himmler to be honored guests. Although this ensured SA participation, 
the local leader, Karl Ernst, turned the grand parade into a casual walk-
by, obviously snubbing Goering. Goering's position was dearly unten-
able unless he took decisive action, and he now relished thoughts of 
revenge. 37 
Unfortunately for Goering at this moment of insecurity, Frick made 
new proposals for centralizing the police. He now wanted the political 
police of every state directly responsible to his Reich Ministry of the 
Interior, although they would remain nominal police forces of the states. 
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Toward this end, he drafted a law and, in line with their previous un-
derstanding, submitted it for Goering's consideration. 38 
Goering's reactions to this proposal and his subsequent moves have 
been interpreted as deviously defensive efforts to checkmate Frick and 
preserve his own police powers.39 Although Goering hardly stood above 
such behavior, there is room for another interpretation, since initially 
he reacted ambivalently to the proposal, not yet overly defensive about 
Frick's plans. True, Goering had hastened to see Hitler about police 
centralization, and he let Frick know that the Fuehrer had doubts about 
centralizing the Schupo. It is not clear, however, that he tried to give 
Frick the impression that Hitler opposed a plan to centralize the political 
police. Instead, Goering responded to the proposal in a cooperative tone. 
Nevertheless, he said in effect that Frick's plan was unnecessary-out 
of tune with developments. Goering claimed he intended to dissolve 
the Gestapo and reintegrate political police work into the ordinary police 
machinery. To facilitate this, he would make Diels a vice president in 
the Police Presidium of Berlin to coordinate all detective work, the in-
telligence service, and political observation. 40 
If Goering were to dissolve the extraordinary political police, one of 
the conservatives' main concerns would vanish, derailing Frick's drive 
to assert his command over them. In this light, Goering may well have 
considered "breaking up" the Gestapo. As for Diels, Goering by this 
time had come to distrust him, perhaps to the point of removing him 
from command of a political police executive force and returning him 
to a more harmless position in the Police Presidium. 41 
The basis for Goering's growing distrust of Diels lay in the rats' nest 
of intrigue that the Gestapo Office had become. Diels and Gisevius have 
painted pictures of the early Gestapo as rife with confusion, internal 
strife, and conspiracy. Within his own office, Diels encountered a variety 
of opponents aligned with the factions vying for police power. Caught 
up in a struggle in which opponents were eliminated in any way pos-
sible, even a devout Nazi like Nebe supposedly avoided front entrances, 
crept around the back corridors of the building, and carried a cocked 
pistol for his own protection. 42 
Since the summer, when Diels had turned to Daluege for 55 recruits 
for his "executive" force, the 55 had poured into his service. Most of 
them came from the lower ranks, below any conscious involvement in 
struggles between Daluege and Himmler; however, coming from Dal-
uege's command, they, like Nebe who led them, represented a powerful 
and growing faction. They had begun their Gestapo affiliation through 
the 55 Auxiliary Police, some being drawn rapidly into the Gestapo 
proper. Then, with the dissolution of the auxiliaries, they became the 
55-Kommando Gestapo, officially designated as civil service employees 
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in the Gestapo as of October 1. To facilitate this process, Daluege had 
ordered the bending of employment criteria.43 
Although the vast majority of SS-men were the lowest-ranking func-
tionaries in the Gestapo, by drawing them in in his effort to ensure his 
survival with the Nazis, Diels had laid the foundation for the SS-police 
state. Even if many of the SS had originally been Daluege's men, they 
became levers for Himmler. Since April at least, when Himmler became 
special commissioner for the Gestapo's SS Auxiliary Police, he had sta-
tioned his own liaison man in the Gestapo Office-SS Lieutenant Walter 
Sohst, who remained until Himmler took over. Himmler and Heydrich 
also managed to insert a number of others into the Gestapo who could 
use their positions to manipulate the Gestapo's SS contingent.44 In a 
coup de grace on the very same day that the SS Kommando was taken 
into police service, Himmler relieved Daluege of his command over SS 
Group East and made him a member of his stafffor special duty (z.b.V.). 
Ostensibly, this move followed the pattern of allowing SS men in the 
police to devote themselves fulltime to their work; however, Daluege, 
who seems to have been taken completely by surprise, knew how se-
riously this undermined his power base in the SS.45 Himmler was clearly 
taking over the Prussian SS, and with it the Gestapo contingent. 
In contrast to growing SS influence, a few in the Gestapo sympa-
thized with the SA, some joining in the mistaken belief that the future 
of the police lay there. An even more significant element, best labeled 
conservatives, wanted a return to normalcy after the Left had been bro-
ken. Many old policemen fitted this category, and the conservative ele-
ments in the Party and their allies in government reinforced them with 
carefully placed assignments. One such was Gisevius, who had been 
sent into the Gestapo by Goering's State Secretary, Grauert, to keep an 
eye on Diels, and who took his job seriously. 
Diels had miscalculated the complexity of his opposition, believing 
them united in support of Himmler, for their combined effort did indeed 
undermine his stock with Goering. In their common opposition to Diels, 
Gisevius and Nebe drew together in the Gestapo, and, according to 
Gisevius, Nebe then won Daluege to their way of thinking. Gisevius 
had had a distaste for Diels since school days, and Nebe had gotten 
along poorly with his boss from the beginning. Both men were ambi-
tious, and a hostile Diels blocked their way. Ironically, Nebe decided 
Diels was a crypto-Communist, tolerating the excesses of the Brown 
rabble to discredit the Revolution and undermine law and order, and 
catering to the "National-Bolshevist" wing of the Movement. With such 
arguments, Nebe bent Daluege's receptive ear. 46 
Regardless of whether he believed Nebe's version, Daluege moved 
against Diels. A special SS squad raided Diels's home in October 1933, 
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and when Diels arrested the SS-men, Daluege turned to Goering to get 
them released. To justify his actions, Daluege painted the case against 
Diels very black, and since other powerful forces such as Hess-Bormann 
and Gauleiter Koch were after the hide of this "reactionary traitor," Goer-
ing became concerned enough to put a check on Diels's power, especially 
when he saw Diels's files on himself and other Party leaders.47 
According to Diels, Goering ordered his arrest, and teams of SS and 
Schupo men secured Gestapo headquarters against him, but Diels heard 
of these developments in time to flee to safety in Czechoslovakia for a 
brief time. Neither the alleged arrest order nor the exact dates can be 
verified, however. Diels, extremely nervous-indeed paranoid-amidst 
this intrigue, may have cracked on hearing rumors and fled unneces-
sarily. Goering may merely have "kicked him upstairs." His removal 
seems to date around mid-November, and the duration of his flight 
seems much shorter than he indicated.48 
As Diels's successor, Goering appointed an Old Fighter, Paul Hink-
ler. Although this appointment is usually analyzed in terms of Goering's 
calculations, Hinkler in fact was Daluege's man, further evidence that 
Diels's dismissal was more Daluege's maneuver than Himmler's first 
major thrust. Although an old-timer, Hinkler had little prestige in the 
Movement, and no credit where it really counted. He had once been a 
Gauleiter, but in 1931 Hitler had removed him. A corrupt and inept 
intriguer, he blamed his fate on Gregor Strasser, but Frick apparently 
played a direct role as well. For a while Hinkler had worked in the Lie 
Defense Post (Lugenabwehrstelle) of Goebbel's Propaganda Office, 
where he was liaison with the Intelligence Service of Arthur Schumann, 
who, by the fall of 1933, was directing an intelligence service for Arthur 
Rosenberg's Foreign Political Office. However, this significant list of 
friends and enemies takes second place to Hinkler's ties to Daluege. 
They were intimate friends (Duzbruder), and Hinkler repeatedly turned 
to Daluege to secure positions in the Movement for him. 49 When Daluege 
proposed the inept Hinkler as Diels's replacement, he revealed poor 
judgement in his choice of allies, even if he had wanted a weak and 
pliable Gestapo leader. 
Whatever action Goering may have taken against Diels, in less than 
a week he anxiously sought his return. Hinkler had quickly proved a 
complete failure, and something like chaos ensued. Hitler, who still held 
Hinkler in low regard, was disturbed and apparently favored Diels. Ac-
cording to Diels, Goering had Koerner trace him down by phone and 
tell him that both Goering and Hitler wanted his return. Goering in fact 
became so desperate that he personally telephoned to lodged his plea: 
"Herr Diels, I beg you pressingly to come back. I want to get rid of the 
Dumkopf Hinkler today. I have prepared a decree, which gives you in-
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dependence. I want what you want. I want to have order. When can 
you be here?,,5o 
There were other reasons for Goering's anxiety besides Hinkler's 
ineptitude and the pressure from Hitler; the decree (Verordnung) he men-
tioned to Diels lay at the heart of the matter. Goering, outmaneuvered 
from several sides, must have learned that Roehm was to join him on 
the Reich Cabinet as a minister without portfolio. In NS rivalry, a return 
to the proximity of the Fuehrer threatened Goering's position. This was 
thus no time to tamper with the Gestapo, which on the contrary had to 
be more powerful and reliable than before. Indeed, upon his return, 
Diels launched a renewed cleanup against SA illegalities, in which Goer-
ing called for a show of close cooperation with Himmler's 55, their 
common ally against the SA. Diels complied and the Gestapo began 
cooperating more closely even with Heydrich's 50.51 To set the stage, 
Himmler had already promoted Diels to 55 colonel on November 24, 
about the time Goering began trying for Diels's return.52 
Yet another development favored Diels's recall: Frick's maneuvers, 
which aggravated Goering's insecurity. Abandoning his proposed law 
to centralize the political police, by mid-November Frick moved into a 
more dynamic phase of his plans to set his Reich Ministry of the Interior 
over state governments. Throughout 1933, Goering had successfully 
blocked this tack, but the general idea was central to NS principles, and 
he must have known he could not hold out forever. 53 He had to bargain 
for the best possible deal, and he had a need for conservative support 
against Roehm, which helps explain his apparently cooperative re-
sponses to Frick's earlier proposals. Goering had to maneuver carefully, 
keeping the Gestapo in good order. Hinkler's bungling and a return of 
the Gestapo to the regular police could cost Goering everything when 
Frick increased the authority of his ministry. The "November decree" 
resolved that crisis by letting Goering hold the Gestapo as his high trump 
until the hottest series of bargainings. 
In fact, what Goering had issued was the Law over the Secret State 
Police of November 30, which removed the Gestapo from the control of 
Goering's Prussian Ministry of the Interior and directly subordinated it 
to the prime minister of Prussia-again, Goering. This sleight of hand 
would frustrate Frick's efforts to control the Gestapo through an interior 
ministry chain of command, while allowing Goering to be otherwise 
cooperative with Frick. When Frick later acquired the Prussian Ministry 
of Interior, the Gestapo remained outside his jurisdiction. Goering made 
himself chief of the Gestapo and created for Diels the joint position of 
inspector of the Gestapo and head of the Gestapo Office. 54 Diels thus 
became an independent central state authority, comparatively free from 
interference by the rest of the administration. With enhanced authority 
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vis-a.-vis the Gestapo field posts and local police officials, he could order 
the latter to use their regular police to support the Gestapo. Although 
unable to end Nebe's strong position in the Gestapo, he at least eased 
Gisevius out. 55 
Although the long-range effect of the Gestapo Law of November 
was to keep the Gestapo out of Frick's hands, Goering had aimed pri-
marily at creating a more freewheeling police and strengthening Diels 
against opposition, while at the same time increasing his own personal 
control. As soon as he realized that the case against Diels had been 
largely manufactured, he anxiously reset the balance. He removed the 
Gestapo from the Ministry of Interior not just to frustrate Frick, but also 
to free it from the red tape of bureaucracy and the interference of con-
servatives like Grauert who backed Gisevius.56 As part of this move, 
rather than leaving Diels below Daluege, who had plotted for his dis-
missal, Goering set Diels beside Daluege and directly below himself. 
Finally, trusting no one, Goering reserved for himself all appointments 
of key civil servants and heads of field posts, 57 thus denying both Diels 
and Daluege the freedom to insert their followers in decisive positions. 
Ending any authority over the Gestapo that Daluege might have 
exercised may well have pleased Goering as well as Diels, for at any 
moment Daluege might cast his lot with Frick or Himmler. Although he 
played ally with Himmler, Goering had new reasons to be nervous about 
the Reichsfuehrer's growing strength. Himmler had begun to emerge 
as a strong claimant to command over any centralized political police 
force. Even before that development, however, further growth by the 
SO was to signal an increase in his power. 
8 _____ _ 
The SD Emergent 
Between its official emergence in the summer of 1932 and the fall of 
1933, the SD became dominant among Party intelligence agencies. The 
impetus for this rapid rise seems related to the fall of Gregor Strasser 
and the subsequent realignment of factions within the Movement. 
Throughout the summer of 1932, Strasser's star had been in the ascen-
dant. As Reich Organization Leader, he had reorganized the Party, con-
solidating more power in his hands than Hitler had ever allowed any 
one man, and he had determined the Party's strategy. In September, 
however, urged on by more activist elements like Goebbels and the SA, 
Hitler abandoned Strasser's strategy for a more militant stance. In De-
cember, the dissillusioned Strasser resigned his Party post. 1 
Strasser's resignation came during the crucial round of negotiations 
that would eventually lead to Hitler's chancellorship. Previously, he had 
been a key contact with General Kurt von Schleicher, who was maneu-
vering to form a government including Nazis. Although Strasser did not 
want to split the Party, his opponents, primarily Goering and Goebbels, 
undermined Hitler's confidence with rumors to that effect, giving Hitler 
the explanation he needed for Strasser's resignation: Since Strasser no 
longer stood obediently at his side, he must be an enemy. This expla-
nation rapidly became the official position on Strasser, who was read 
out of the Party.2 Despite rumors that Himmler had "betrayed" his 
former boss and comrade to ingratiate himself with Hitler, 3 we may 
never know whether he played such a role. 
Regardless, the Strasser affair must have intensified Himmler's drive 
to secure the Movement and the future Reich from enemies. Since Sep-
tember, the uncontrolled, often rebellious actions of SA units had com-
pelled Hitler to change his tactics, and this sort of undisciplined initiative 
always disturbed Himmler. Furthermore, Strasser's removal and the dis-
ruption of his more rationalized Party structure fed internal rivalries. 
Himmler's desire to build a machine obediently responsive to the will 
of his myth, Hitler, included the creation of an extended security service 
to strengthen the SS for its police role within the Movement. The new 
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SO thus acquired greater priority. Similar concerns apparently prompted 
Hess to see Himmler's 55 as useful against the uncontrolled elements. 
This would also account for his interest in the SO, his support for its 
early development, and his apparent backing for its monopoly in Party 
intelligence.4 Hess's support would be crucial to both the growth of the 
SO and to Himmler's political police power. 
The power seizure immediately eroded the 50's new-found priority, 
however, for Heydrich had to pursue the double track of building the 
SO and assuming control over the Bavarian political police. The SO might 
have been useful for work that could not be trusted to the professional, 
non-Nazi police, but the professional police were indispensable for the 
internal security of the Reich, and the SO inevitably took second place. 
After January 30, 1933, the SO immediately slipped into that status, for 
neither the SA nor the 55 had any official role in the new coalition Reich 
government. Only individual local SA and 55 leaders got police positions 
of importance. Hundreds of others searching for jobs worked their way 
into the police from below. Only in March, with his appointment in 
Bavaria, had Himmler joined the power seizure and begun to coordinate 
the infiltration process. 
The small size of the SO meant that few members had the credentials 
or positions to make significant contributions to infiltration. The regular 
55 men played the key roles, and even if the SO had been intended for 
dominance in the political police, any effort to force 55 members of those 
police into the SO would have been premature and incautious. Conse-
quently, for several months Himmler and Heydrich preoccupied them-
selves with police affairs. Without a clear mission, the SO had a year of 
uneasy transition. Its members felt pressure to assert for themselves a 
key place in the security of Party and state, but they lacked Heydrich's 
full attention or guidance. 
By January 1933, Himmler knew he had in Heydrich a man of ability 
who shared at least the rudiments of his dream of the 55 and police. 
He could not leave such a man doing paperwork when he needed agents 
for action and negotiation, so on January 27 he made 55 Colonel Hey-
drich (who was already at work in Berlin) an officer for special duties 
(Fuehrer z.b. V.) on his staff. What followed, among other events, was 
Heydrich's previously described service as Himmler's agent in Berlin. 
The allegation that Heydrich and Oaleuge collaborated during this period 
to set the Reichstag fire has recently gained some acceptance. Although 
it cannot be totally dismissed, the current version rests entirely on ru-
mors originating in hostile SA circles and other questionable sources. 
Until more substantial evidence surfaces, it cannot be given credence.5 
Instead, Heydrich's primary mission in Berlin was probably to pave the 
way for an anticipated move of 55 headquarters, including SO Central. 
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Another area of excessive speculation is the fact that Himmler's order 
separated Heydrich "as Staff Fuehrer of the SO from the Staff of the 
Reichsfuehrer SS" and assigned him "as SS Colonel z.b. V. to the Staff 
of the Reichsfuehrer SS" with the powers of an Office Chief (Amtschef). 6 
One recent study converted this change of title into Heydrich's resig-
nation from the SO, which he then cut adrift because it could not serve 
his advancement in taking over the police? In fact, at no time did Hey-
drich cease acting as head of the SO, for the order did not remove him 
from the SO. It changed his title but named no replacement. During 
January and February, he continued to forward reports from Berlin as 
staff fuehrer of the SO, and SO Central followed him to Berlin, where 
most of its staff would remain for several months after he returned to 
Munich. During this period Hans Kobelinski, head of SO Group East, 
assumed an undefined role in directing SO work. This ad hoc arrange-
ment was, of course, untenable during such eventful times. Conse-
quently, when Heydrich returned to Munich in early March, he called 
Paul Leffler, now SO leader in Brunswick, to become staff leader (Stab-
sleiter) in Berlin. Leffler did not assume Heydrich's title, Stabsfuehrer, 
and, if his memory is accurate, Heydrich approved his replacement in 
Brunswick, indicating Heydrich's continued command. Kobelinski still 
played an undefined role in central management,8 while Heydrich re-
mained in charge of the SO through Leffler and Kobelinski. 
During the spring of Heydrich's reduced involvement, the SO had 
a series of clashes with powerful leaders of Party and state. Innumerable 
clashes at lower levels must also have occurred, only to be hushed up, 
but at least two offended parties brought their conflicts into the open. 
The first occurred in Hamburg, where the activities of the local SO leader 
led to charges of conspiracy against Gauleiter Karl Kaufmann. In May, 
Kaufman became aware of the activities of Ferdinand Funke, head of 
SO Group Hamburg. As Kaufmann understood it, Funke had assigned 
two of his men, including a non-Party member and Russian emigre, to 
spy on Kaufmann and to assemble material against him and fellow Party 
leaders. When confronted, Funke denied the charges and hastened to 
Berlin to consult Heydrich, breaking a promise to remain available to 
Kaufmann. Kaufmann then claimed to have uncovered a whole nest of 
Russian emigres in SO service against him and had Funke arrested by 
the Berlin police on charges of embezzlement. What happened next, 
according to Kaufmann's sources, was that Heydrich personally gained 
Funke's release "against the will of" Goering. 9 
On June 1, Kaufmann queried the Berlin SO Central about Funke. 
Kobelinski denied that either he or the Munich Office had given orders 
about spying to Funke, and that they would ever do such a thing. By 
this time, he said, Funke had been severely disciplined and relieved of 
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his pOSt.lO With evidence that Kobelinski was lying, on June 22 Kauf-
mann sent a formal protest to the Reich Party Leadership. He charged 
that not only had Funke gone unpunished, but also that the Hamburg 
police had monitored calls from him warning his people to join him in 
Prussia, bringing their materials. Of course, all had been arrested with 
the incriminating evidence. Furthermore, Kaufmann charged, Heydrich 
had set Funke up in Munich in a camouflaged office to continue his 
operations against the Gau Hamburg leadership. The new contact man 
in Hamburg, a certain Bartholomae, had also been arrested. In a sweep-
ing conclusion, Kaufmann charged that'assembled evidence indicated 
that Otto Telschow, Gauleiter Hanover-East, Hinrich Lohse, Gauleiter 
Schleswig-Holstein, Alfred Rosenberg, and Goering were also targets of 
this spy net, and that SA leaders were involved with the SD. He con-
tended that evidence from all over the Reich supported his charges and 
demanded that such operations be ended, thereby denying the SD its 
cover of official Party support. 11 
Should they be uncovered, relevant SD records may cast a different 
light on the affair, as indicated by the second open attack on the SD-
a more dangerous crisis in Brunswick. 12 Before his transfer in March, 
the local SD district leader, Paul Leffler, had become involved in internal 
rivalries in Brunswick, where an Old Fighter who had monopolized local 
power came into conflict with one who had not. Building from his po-
sition as minister of interior and education since 1931, Dietrich Klagges 
had become prime minister in 1933. By controlling local election lists, 
he restricted the power of a major rival, Ernst Zoerner. Allied to Klagges 
was SS officer Friedrich Alpers, who first commanded the auxiliary police 
and then won a ministry in Klagges's government. Alpers's rise marked 
the displacement of Zoerner, who left Brunswick during the summer. 
Since Zoerner and his circle had ties with Leffler, the local SD de-
veloped sources inclined against Klagges and Alpers. Imbued with the 
SD concern over behavior that discredited the Movement and the re-
gime, Leffler became alarmed over the excesses of Alpers's auxiliaries. 
His coworkers were SS-men hostile to Alpers and Klagges's appointee, 
SS-General Friedrich Jeckeln, head of all state police. In a further twist, 
Leffler learned that Hess supported Zoerner against Klagges and Alpers. 
When Leffler moved to Berlin Central in March, he left local SD affairs 
in the hands of Gerhard Klare, charged with reporting on the Klagges-
Alpers politics and on local reactions. He left Klare with a high sense 
of intrigue, and Klare carelessly expanded the net of agents nosing into 
the Klagges regime. Further disturbed by the charged atmosphere thus 
generated, Leffler, now running the SD central office in Berlin, wrote a 
report in April stating that if the Klagges reign were not broken, there 
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would be dire consequences, perhaps a local coup by military and con-
servative circles.13 
The crisis broke in June or July, when Klagges and Jeckeln got wind 
of the affair. The most damning evidence came from SO associate Wil-
helm Bonewald, who charged that Klare had orders to compile evidence 
to overthrow Klagges, Alpers, and Jeckeln. He quoted Klare as having 
stated that Heydrich was directly involved, out of a desire to break 
Jeckeln's control of the state police. He even implicated Himmler. Jeckeln 
reacted by taking Klare and some associates into "protective custody," 
and after an "investigation" he charged them with conspiracy and re-
quested that Himmler discipline them. Himmler immediately expelled 
them from the SS.14 In August, Klagges brought charges in state court 
against Herbert Selle, the non-NS chief of uniformed police and an ally 
of Zoemer. Leffler was called to testify, and the trial escalated into 
charges against Leffler in the High Party Court, as Klagges sought to 
expose and break the SO. 
The evidence assembled from the SO for the subsequent trial un-
dermined the sensational charges. Of course, the evidence may have 
been engineered, and NS judicial procedures generate little confidence, 
especially since the High Party Court was under Walter Buch, increas-
ingly an admirer of Himmler and-in this case at least-aligned with the 
Hess faction. The SO records indicated that neither Heydrich nor Himm-
ler had paid much attention to Leffler's Brunswick activities prior to 
Selle's trial. Himmler's first inquiries into the affair followed his expul-
sion of Klare. Leffler's version made it all sound like a routine and proper 
procedure that had simply gotten out of hand. His April report had 
reached Himmler, but the Reichsfuehrer's marginalia indicated that he 
considered it of questionable accuracy and had not forwarded it to the 
Reich Leadership. Finally, the prime witness, Bonewald, had been func-
tioning as a double agent, perhaps inducing Klare to exaggerate. Klare's 
earliest testimonies had been taken after a beating, and he later denied 
the most incriminating parts. IS 
The various contradictions leave the affair open to interpretation. 
Leffler had clearly carried out the SO mission of reporting on all affairs 
of Party and state that could harm the Movement. From the SO and 
ReichLeadership perspective, this was proper, but from Klagges's it was 
sinister. The SO mission thus lay at the heart of the crisis, but beyond 
that, it may have been nothing more than the work of uncontrolled local 
operatives; however, Hess's interest in the Klagges-Zoerner rivalry and 
the untestable allegations that Heydrich wanted to break Jeckeln's police 
power leave open the possibility of a conspiracy. That suspicion is rein-
forced by Hess's growing appreciation for the SO and by the decision 
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of Buch's court exonerating the SO, with only a slap on the wrist for 
the lower-ranking participants most directly involved.16 
By the summer of 1933, the SO had obviously come under attack 
from powerful quarters, and a dark cloud of suspicion had descended 
upon it. For several months, its survival remained in question. Un-
doubtedly, Himmler ordered Heydrich to keep a tighter rein on his 
business, and toward this end he resumed full supervision of SO work, 
especially of personnel matters as early as July, and by August had 
assumed the title of chief of the SO.17 Apparently at this point, Heydrich 
also returned SO headquarters to Munich. 
The return to Munich related directly to another conflict, for during 
the summer of 1933 tensions between the Himmler-Heydrich combi-
nation and the Goering-Oaluege interests also erupted. The traditionally 
cited March date for Goering's order to arrest Heydrich is questionable. 
Only in the summer did the full extent of Oaluege's double game and 
the expose of SO spying come into the open. When HimmIer received 
complaints in mid-July about Oaluege's previously mentioned fund rais-
ing, several industrial directors were so disturbed they wanted to meet 
with Himmler. An SO report from Berlin roused suspicions that Oaluege 
used such funds for his own organization rather than the SO, for which 
they were ostensibly raised.18 By autumn the breaches with Goering, 
several Gauleiter, and local NS governments had come to a head. Klagges 
had filed charges in the highest Party court accusing the SO of conspiring 
to overthrow NS governments. The attack had become so severe that 
rumors spread that the SO would be dissolved.19 
Under attack, Himmler must have turned to the Reich Party Lead-
ership for support, and at Party headquarters he apparently found it. 
Martin Bormann, Hess's staff leader, who considered the SS a desirable 
foil for uncontrolled elements, had shared his opinion with Hess. With 
Hess, Buch, Ley, and Schwarz, concern over the Second Revolution was 
mounting. Undoubtedly, they had received from Himmler useful ma-
terial gathered by the SO, and they appreciated the need for intelligence 
not censored by local leaders. Such local autonomy thwarted the central 
Party Leadership who were best situated to defuse the SO crisis.2o 
The move to save the SO appears to have been well coordinated. In 
the autumn, HimmIer announced a delimitation of its mission: Hence-
forth, it would probe into Party affairs only on the specific orders of 
Hess, the deputy of the Fuehrer, . or the competent political leader for 
the branch in question. All subsequent reports were to be factual and 
free of personal interpretations. The slate was wiped clean by using the 
NS leadership principle to give the SO a new veneer of propriety, and 
by giving Party leaders a minimal guarantee against renewed spying. 
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With these changes, Buch's court could minimize the Brunswick affair, 
reducing it to the level of a misunderstanding.21 
Up to a point Hitler shared Hess's concerns, so it must have been 
easy to persuade him to preserve the SO officially and thereby terminate 
the attacks. If Hitler did in fact prefer settlements preserving the balance 
of power, such an action was perfect. On October 17, he allegedly an-
nounced that the SO would remain. Thereafter, Hess's office responded 
to all rumblings about SO dissolution by reminding the Gauleiter of the 
Fuehrer's decision. 22 
The decision to preserve the SO meant more than a maintaining of 
the balance of power, however, for it elevated the SO at the expense of 
Party rivals. In November, Hess announced that the SO would absorb 
the NO of the Foreign Political Office.23 Apparently Hess had parlayed 
several problems into a solution that saved the SO. The head of this NO 
was none other then Arthur Schumann, the competitor encountered pre-
viously in Goebbel's NO. In 1933, his service had transferred from Propa-
ganda Command to the new Foreign Political Office, where it became 
Main Oivision I, responsible for intelligence. The Foreign Political Office 
was a new creation, a sop for Alfred Rosenberg, whose desire to become 
Reich foreign minister had been frustrated. The office's erratic work 
created problems for the Foreign Office, for Goebbels, and for Joachin 
von Ribbentrop, Hitler's foreign political advisor. Rosenberg had been 
one of the reported targets of SO spying, which activity may have helped 
the SO justify absorption of Schumann's rival service. 24 
Having secured the survival of the SO, Himmler on November 9 
made it the fifth Office (Amt) of the 55, elevating both the SO and Hey-
drich, who acquired the appropriate rank of 55 major general. 25 The 
troubled period of transition ended with the year. The SO had survived 
the relative neglect of Heydrich's preoccupation with the police, it had 
survived a concerted attack by powerful Party leaders, and it clearly had 
the support of powerful allies in the Reich Party Leadership. As Himmler 
and Heydrich expanded their political police influence, SO contacts and 
influence grew accordingly. The political police provided a coattail to 
ride upon. 
9 _____ _ 
Toward Command of 
a Reich Political Police 
Himmler's claim to command a centralized political police drew strength 
from more than just his success in Bavaria. From the beginning, he had 
nursed the SS image as the proper security force of the Reich. Perhaps 
with the intention of playing on Hitler's phobias, or perhaps just to 
proclaim a success, in March he released to newspapers reports about 
plots he had uncovered to assassinate Hitler, enhancing the image of 
his SS-SD-BPP team. If he intended to remind Hitler how he had always 
relied on the SS for personal protection, there was no need to do so. 
Hitler had already repeated that pattern when on March 17 he called on 
SS Major General ("Sepp") Dietrich to form a new SS guard for the Reich 
Chancellery, eventually christened Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler. 1 This 
development significantly enhanced Himmler's influence on political se-
curity over the entire Reich. 
Originally, Hitler's choice of Dietrich had little to do with Himmler's 
influence, for Dietrich resembled Daluege in many ways: a highly in-
dependent SS man, long associated with Hitler's personal security. He 
was Hitler's rather than Himmler's man. Although Dietrich and his Leib-
standarte remained largely independent until the late thirties, 2 Himmler 
tolerated men like him and Daluege for several reasons. Given their 
connections, he had no real choice, and by patiently enmeshing them 
in the bureaucratic machinery of the SS, he exploited their connections 
and tightened his own control over the instruments and power bases 
they established. 
Meanwhile, Dietrich's newly formed staff guard created a model 
upon which Himmler could capitalize immediately. Along with the Spe-
cial Prussian State Police Group to which it was attached, it performed 
a variety of assignments in the Reich capital. Goering appreciated its 
value, and it soon became the SS Special Detachment Berlin (Sonder-
kommando Berlin z.b.V.). Quickly turning into one of the more trust-
worthy auxiliary police units, it probably had much to do with the SS 
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becoming the sole source of political police auxiliaries under Goering 
and Diels. In this way, Dietrich's Sonderkommando Berlin provided 
Himmler with an alternative to Daluege for influence in the SS contingent 
of the Gestapo.3 Each was available to some degree, and when one was 
too independent, the other might be more cooperative. Even beyond 
Prussia, Himmler capitalized on the pattern set by the Sonderkommando 
Berlin. In the following months, similar SS Sonderkommando and political 
alarm squads (politische Bereitschaften) appeared elsewhere as political 
police auxiliaries, and, as in Prussia, often established connections with 
the political police that survived the dissolution of other auxiliaries.4 In 
so doing, they augmented Himmler's thrusts beyond Bavaria. 
By the fall of 1933, those thrusts began to produce results, as the 
political police of the other states fell under Himmler's command like a 
line of dominoes. First came Hamburg, Luebeck, Mecklenburg-
Schwerin; then, in December, Anhalt, Baden, Bremen, Hessia, Thur-
ingia, and Wuerttemberg; and in January 1934, Brunswick, Oldenburg 
and Saxony completed the line. Only Goering's Prussia and its tiny 
enclaves, Lippe and Schaumburg-Lippe, remained. 5 
Historians have several explanations for Himmler's success. Some 
contend he must have had Frick's support as part of the alliance against 
Roehm, although Frick denied this and had good reason to oppose 
Himmler's expansion.6 Some have also presumed that Himmler had 
Hitler's backing in these developments. 7 Although Himmler clearly tried 
to give the impression of Hitler's support while negotiating for command 
in some of the states, he achieved it on his own without the active 
support of either Frick or Hitler.8 His victories resulted from a long 
campaign that won him the cautious and vacillating consent of those 
directly below Hitler-like Hess-who had reason to support a cen-
tralization of authority at the expense of the independent elements of 
the Revolution. Since each of the appointments involved only a small 
detective branch in a single little state, they hardly required the Fuehrer's 
attention, nor would they have attracted anyone else's until their cu-
mulative effect appeared. Whatever support Himmler got from above 
came only as he proved he could succeed. 
From the beginning Himmler could count on the widely held pre-
sumption that the SS would playa police role in the Third Reich. For 
example, when the Brunswick government planned to consolidate its 
police organization in June 1933, the minister of the interior, Dietrich 
Klagges, wrote Himmler that he had heard of Reichsleitung guidelines 
on the takeover and reorganization of the police that apparently gave 
some preference to the SS. He asked if the intentions of his government 
in this area were appropriate. 9 
Since there are no copies of, or other references to, these alleged 
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guidelines, since SA Brigadier General Sauke was the intended appoin-
tee of the Brunswick faction, and since the position went to Munich-
based SS leader Friedrich Jeckeln after Klagges consulted with Himmler, 
Klagges may have been creating a pretext to avoid Sauke. Such a pretext 
had the advantage of credibility, and Himmler would obviously have 
cooperated, but this incident proves nothing about support for Himm-
ler's acquisitions. In no other state for which records survive is there 
any indication that Himmler had a voice in police command appoint-
ments before autumn 1933. In some cases he undoubtedly had an input 
but, as in Brunswick, even the appointment of a locally favored SS man 
guaranteed no direct influence for Himmler. For instance, Jeckeln was 
more Klagges's man than Himmler's. 
Regardless, Himmler exploited this and every other opportunity. As 
early as May he began touring SS units all over Germany, established 
or strengthened personal contacts with local political leaders, and cul-
tivated bonds between the SS and the political police. Although he pro-
gressed unevenly, he carefully nurtured his gains, apparently avoiding 
premature bids so as not to alert the opposition. Then, in the fall, he 
gathered the small states quickly. 
The First Fruits 
In Hamburg, his first coup, many clues explain Himmler's success, all 
based on three factors: the SS image, its ability to attract useful members, 
and Himmler's personal diplomacy. 
By early March, through a combination of local NS pressure and 
Frick's authority as Reich Minister, the Nazis broke SPD influence in 
the Hamburg police command, and on March 5, SA Colonel Alfred 
Richter became Reich commissioner of the police. The takeover began 
immediately with the appointment of former Police Lieutenant Colonel 
Ernst Simon as commander of the uniformed police. Both Richter and 
Simon were former Hamburg policemen, Simon being the most recently 
relieved, due to his notorious NS cell building during 1932. Knowing 
the Hamburg force intimately, they led the purge, eventually removing 
approximately one hundred. 10 
In a similar manner, the political police fell to local Nazis and NS 
policemen. The Hamburg State Police, as they were called, were a di-
vision of the detective force, or Kriminalpolizei. On the morning of 
March 6, Richter began their coordination, turning command over to 
Anatol Milewski-Schroeden, who had run the information service of the 
local Gau (Ermittlungsdienst der Gauleitung Hamburg der NSDAP). The 
Hamburg State Police had consisted of fifty-six officials and a twelve-
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man search-and-arrest team (Fahndungskommando), few of whom re-
quired purging. Having no real experience in such work, Schroeden 
relied heavily on Detective Peter Kraus, who took over the search team 
and began rounding up KPD members. Kraus, a pro-NS policeman, and 
his men now had complete freedom of action and unleashed a pent-up 
energy that earned them an evil reputation among Communists and 
Socialists. 11 
As in Prussia, local Nazis and trusted professional policemen ran 
things, and Himmler had no ready-made entree. Only a few qualified 
officials were SS men. On March 15, one of the first acts of the NS-
dominated Senate created an auxiliary police that began functioning 
within a week with the usual ratio of SA, SS, and Stahlhelm. 12 In the 
explosive atmosphere of March and April, the situation got out of hand. 
The SA took the initiative, and policemen and auxiliary teams got free 
rein, resulting, as elsewhere, in competition among factions and a lack 
of coordination. Perhaps Himmler capitalized on such conditions by 
offering SS reliability and the Bavarian model as the solution to Ham-
burg's problems. 
From the Nazi perspective, the problem was an establishment in-
adequate to destroy the KPD and other "enemies." The Hamburg State 
Police could conduct the defensive police practices of the Republic, but 
an NS revolution demanded openly offensive action, at least in terms 
of numbers arrested. As head of the State Police, Milewski-Schroeden 
lacked experience, and he drew constant criticism from Party and state 
circles. As a result, on May 15 Police Captain Walter Abraham took his 
place, becoming head of an enlarged, reorganized State Police, removed 
from the regular detective force and set directly under Police Senator 
Richter, the political head of the Hamburg police. 13 
Long before this administratively more proper solution, on March 
24 the chief of the uniformed police, Simon, created his own Kommando 
z. b. V. Originally consisting of thirty-six police officials under Police Lieu-
tenant Frank Kosa, it soon included auxiliaries, the most notorious of 
whom were SA-men. Although this team made raids and arrests for the 
State Police, its subordination to Simon created problems of control, and 
its methods led to a number of embarrassing incidents for NS state 
officials. At first, leaders like Reichsstatthalter Kaufmann praised the 
commando for its "efficiency," but as incidents mounted, they began to 
feel the need for better controls. SA-men went directly to the commando 
with denunciations, and given only strained conspiratorial theories and 
circumstantial evidence, Kosa acted without much coordination with the 
State Police. Since such denunciations often involved state officials, con-
siderable conflict ensued. Furthermore, the commando's reckless action 
resulted in legal suits and provided anti-NS propaganda about sadistic 
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interrogation methods. Himmler's people could build convincing ar-
guments for the need to bring such excesses under control. 14 
The concentration camps posed other problems. Ouring March and 
April, 1,315 official arrests filled detention facilities to overflowing. A 
wing of the correctional institution at Fuhlsbuettel set aside for political 
internees soon housed 478. This expensive arrangement allowed the 
internees to sit around indulging in political discourse, which NS circles 
criticized as coddling enemies while the state financed their political 
intrigues. Given general agreement that political internees should earn 
their keep, in April Hamburg officials built their first concentration camp 
at Wittmoor in a peat processing plant. But since this small operation 
never housed more than 140 internees, the problem remained unre-
solved. With both of these facilities entirely under regular police and 
penal authorities, a reasonable degree of propriety reigned, with only 
incidental brutality until late summer. IS 
By the time that considerable dissatisfaction over political police 
work and the handling of political prisoners had developed, Himmler 
had a number of allies in Hamburg to present his case. His road to power 
would be neither smooth nor straight, however, for his forces remained 
uncoordinated and occasionally too obvious in their approach. The SO 
constituted the major problems in this respect. 
According to Heydrich's wife, one of Heydrich's men in the Ham-
burg area, Karl Oberg, had sought the command of the State Police, but 
could not get along with Gauleiter Kaufmann. If Kaufmann had dis-
trusted Oberg and the local SO, his suspicions were confirmed when in 
May he uncovered Funke's spy ring. 16 Kaufmann's fury made the SO 
counterproductive for Himmler's immediate purposes in Hamburg. To 
offset the SO blunder, Himmler could capitalize on his personal rela-
tionship with Kaufmann, for they had been close friends (Duzbruder) 
since 1927. Kaufmann apparently felt some obligation to Himmler, who 
had helped him in conflicts with von Pfeffer and Goebbels,17 and pro-
bably did not consider the SD actions as treachery by Himmler. The 
incident could be attributed to uncontrolled locals, and Himmler un-
doubtedly hastened to reassure Kaufmann. 
Himmler made several trips to Hamburg, not just to soothe Kauf-
mann but to further his influence. In so doing, he established allies who 
must have looked upon him as a beneficial contact and upon his SS as 
offering solutions to local political police problems. One such ally seems 
to have been the head of the Senate, Buergermeister Carl Vincent Krog-
mann. Although in March 1933 he had not yet joined the Party, Krog-
mann got his high post through his involvement in the Keppler circle. 
Himmler, who courted Keppler's business contacts, had put in a word 
for Krogmann with the reluctant Hitler.18 Another ally, Or. Hans Nie-
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land, had become police president on March 14. According to Nieland, 
during the summer Himmler had personally drawn him into the SS with 
the rank of major. If so, the appointment remained a secret, for Himmler 
did not process any papers until after his appointment in Hamburg, 
when he fulfilled his promise retroactively and rapidly promoted Nie-
land to colonel. Nieland represented an early pro-Himmler influence at 
the head of the police, and later, as senator for finance, he would insure 
financial support for the local SS.19 
By October, with such a power base, Himmler was well entrenched, 
as two new appointments clearly revealed. On October 7, Nieland, who 
had been called to the Senate in May, turned his police officer over to 
SA Colonel Wilhelm Boltz. Not an ordinary SA man, Boltz commanded 
the Hamburg SA Marine Squadron and stood on good terms with Himm-
ler and Heydrich.20 
The most significant of these October appointments, however, was 
SS Major Bruno Streckenbach. Although his background in business 
hardly gave him any special credentials, he won the favor of Kaufmann, 
who later noted that Streckenbach's "special suitability and talents" rec-
ommended him for a "leading post in the Hamburg police." On October 
5, he became government counselor (Regierungsrat), and on October 20 
he replaced Abraham as head of the Hamburg State Police.21 Streck-
enbach's appointment may have marked Himmler's direct acquisition 
of the Hamburg political police as early as October. Himmler officially 
became commander only on November 24, but such delays in formal-
izing realities were typical. Regardless, clear influence began with Streck-
enbach's appointment, for that SS-man was no Oaluege, and he allegedly 
traveled promptly to Munich to study the Bavarian system under Hey-
drich. 22 
In gaining Kaufmann's support, Himmler should have had little 
trouble convincing his old friend of continued loyalty and, most sig-
nificant, Himmler could argue that a position of local state authority 
would enable him to control the local SS and SO more tightly. To wrap 
things up, he made Kaufmann an honorary SS general (Oberfuehrer), and 
Kaufmann's personal associate in the Gau Leadership, Senator Georg 
Ahrens, an SS colonel in the SO. The availability of suitable local SS men 
whom Kaufmann trusted gave Kaufmann a sense of sharing control with 
Himmler: a local man, Streckenbach, a known element, would actually 
run the Hamburg State Police, and in so doing would also keep the local 
SO in line. Toward that end, Streckenbach, like Ahrens, became a mem-
ber of the Hamburg SO, facilitating its return to smooth operations in 
that city.23 
In Streckenbach's efforts to copy Himmler's model of the system 
that combined SS with political police and concentration camps, he had 
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two major problems: the concentration camps under the penal office, 
and the Kommando z.b.V. under the chief of uniformed police. 
Previous developments had laid the foundations for an incomplete 
victory over the camps. Under increased pressure to see that political 
prisoners were handled "more properly," and impressed by the SS 
camps at Dachau and Boergermoor in Westphalia, Kaufmann had called 
on the Twenty-Eighth SS-Standarte to guard the facilities at Fuhlsbuettel 
and turn it into a concentration camp. To strengthen the regime and 
retain state control, he put the guard and the camp under the penal 
authority, whose provisional head, Max Lahts, would guarantee a severe 
regime. 24 SS Lieutenant Dusenschoen, head of the SS guard, carried out 
Lahts's orders for a stringent new regime, and his men immediately 
displayed the most infamous traits of SS camp guards. The commandant 
under the penal office was a mere figurehead; Dusenschoen actually ran 
things. Fuhlsbuettel rapidly became publicly notorious, generating con-
cern at all levels. Guards made free use of their rifles to enforce petty 
rules, and sadistic torture was so common that many inmates sought 
escape in suicide.25 
Once again, uncontrolled local SS behavior created a situation that 
inadvertently played into Himmler's hands. Effective December I, 
to bring it under control, the camp guard was placed under the authori-
ty of Streckenbach's State Police. The transfer was incomplete, how-
ever, because the Fuhlsbuettel facilities themselves remained under the 
control of the penal office, which successfully argued that the Dachau 
system could not be made to work in this environment. Thus the SS-
police-camp system remained incomplete in Hamburg. However, Himm-
ler skirted the issue the following summer after he took over the Prussian 
camps. Fuhlsbuettel returned to regular police control, and his police 
sent their political internees to Prussian camps.26 
Streckenbach was able to resolve the other problem, the Kommando 
z.b.V. more completely. The logic of centralized and uniform control 
was overwhelming, and the bad reputation of the commando led to its 
dissolution on Streckenbach's recommendation. He absorbed twenty-
eight members into the State Police, and returned the remainder to the 
uniformed police. 27 
Meanwhile, the neighboring city of Luebeck and state of Mecklen-
burg had become Himmler's next prizes, although his official appoint-
ments as commander of their political police forces actually preceded 
formal accession in Hamburg. The process has yet to be elaborated, but 
it seems to have been similar. For instance, although the Reichsstatthalter 
for both governments, Friedrich Hildebrandt, was not on close terms 
with Himmler, he became an honorary SS brigadier general. 28 
In Mecklenburg, where the Nazis had participated in the govern-
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ment since July 1932, they and their allies had quickly created a political 
section in the State Criminal Police Office (Schwerin). Here the Streck-
enbach role as trusted insider was played by Ludwig Oldach, a forty-
five-year-old, high civil servant with twenty-six years' service in justice 
and finance for both state and federal agencies. As an Old Fighter, he 
had become Kreisleiter and NS member of the State Assembly. Himmler's 
appointment undoubtedly included an understanding that Oldach 
would become head of the Mecklenburg Political Police, which he did 
on November 15, 1933. He had become a candidate for SS membership 
in September, and was officially admitted as a lieutenant on November 
1.29 How he moved into this relationship with Himmler remains unclear; 
however, the availability of this insider certainly facilitated Himmler's 
appointment, since Oldach, a known quantity with Hildebrandt and 
other locals, would be doing the real work in Mecklenburg. 
The rapid succession of announcements from Luebeck, Mecklen-
burg, and Hamburg produced a snowball effect in the remaining Hansa 
lands. Meanwhile, Himmler had been at work in the local power strug-
gles, aligning himself effectively so that when the time came, he would 
have allies. In Bremen, they stood at the very top. Frick had appointed 
Dr. Richard Markert as Reich commissioner for Bremen, and on March 
8 Markert established the usual auxiliary police and named as chief of 
police (Polizeipraesident) the local businessman Theodor Laue, an SA ma-
jor. In these moves Markert also had the support of the local Gauleiter 
and later Reichsstatthalter, Carl Roever. Laue was their man, for he had 
conflicts with the more radical elements of the local SA. 30 
Bremen already had an adequate political police, now directly under 
the authority of Laue. In June, this Central Police Post (Z-Stelle), as it 
was called, was rechristened the Secret State Police. Under the unin-
terrupted leadership of Police Captain Heinrich Kruse, the political po-
licemen worked well for the new NS regime. Typically, most of them 
had been political conservatives and nationalists, and some inclined to-
ward Nazism.31 Although none of these political policemen became of-
ficial members of the Party before 1933, NS and SS penetration had begun 
as early as 1931. For instance, police Lieutenant Erwin Schulz, a member 
of the intelligence section of the political police, was a crypto-Nazi, work-
ing conspiratorially for SA Leader Paul Wegener (later Kreisleiter) and 
the SS.32 
Meanwhile, developments in Bremen paralleled those in the rest of 
the Reich, and the excesses and tensions of 1933 had their local effect. 
Both the professional police and local Party leaders like Roever and 
Markert felt the pressure of Party radicalism, especially in the SA. After 
a visit in May, Himmler had developed contacts in Bremen, and a crisis 
that occurred in October benefited him. As a result of Laue's breach 
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with the local SA general, Roehm expelled him from the SA without a 
hearing. If he did not already belong to Himmler's camp, this drew Laue 
in, for Himmler became Laue's champion, initially working for his rein-
statement in the SA, with whom Himmler still tried to maintain close 
working relations. 33 
By the end of November, Laue and Markert, still supported by Frick, 
had clearly allied with Himmler. On November 28, Laue notified the 
Senate of Himmler's appointments in the other Hansa states and stated 
that Burgermeister Markert would discuss the matter with Reichsstat-
thalter Roever. They clearly capitalized on the bandwagon effect. On 
December 14, Roever consented, and Markert contacted Himmler, who 
accepted immediately. On December 22, the Senate learned that Himm-
ler would become commander of the political police of Bremen, effective 
the next day.34 Meanwhile, on November 13, Schulz had taken de facto 
command of the Bremen Secret State Police. In May 1934, this position 
became official, and he remained to become head of the Gestapo in 
Bremen, which remained for some time only nominally under Himmler's 
command. 35 
The appointment in Bremen apparently led to that in Oldenburg, 
for on January 5 Roever named Himmler commander in both states. 
Unfortunately, details about the Oldenburg appointment may never be 
known, because the relevant documents are lost. 36 
Meanwhile, Himmler had been accumulating other appointments, 
working on the states of the south, where his first fruits appeared in 
'Wuerttemberg. His itinerary of May tours had included Stuttgart, and 
from that time he wooed the Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter Wilhelm 
Murr. There too, after the March elections, SA and SS auxiliary police 
had gone into action under the Reich commissioner, SA General Dietrich 
von Jagow. The usual excesses followed, resulting in efforts to normalize 
police functions while ensuring that they came under proper NS lead-
ership. Toward this end, on April 28, an old NS member, Amtsrichter 
Dr. Mattheiss, formed the Wuerttemberg Political Police from the former 
political detectives in the state. 37 
As elsewhere, the SS Auxiliary Police, operating under Special Com-
missioner SS Colonel Robert Zeller, were attached to the political police, 
but in a more direct manner than usual, for Zeller became an assistant 
to Mattheiss. These SS auxiliaries, soon designated political alarm squads 
(Bereitschaften), survived the later efforts to dissolve the regular auxi-
liaries. Over a year later, Murr would recall that Himmler had convinced 
him of the desirability of having commandos for "special actions" for 
which one could not trust the regular non-NS police. Somewhere along 
the way, Himmler had also given the impression that Hitler favored 
such a close SS-political police relationship. 38 
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This case illustrates how the Leibstandarte model benefited Himmler. 
Hitler's creation of this special SS unit, and its role in Berlin, facilitated 
SS work elsewhere and gave Himmler a claim to Hitler's support, proba-
bly well beyond anything Hitler actually said. Himmler thus had a strong 
image with amenable local leaders like Murr. As 1933 wore on, Murr 
encouraged organizational developments in his political police that se-
cured for Himmler "most extensive influence," or at least so Murr later 
claimed. 39 
In fact, Himmler's early influence remained limited. As a local SS 
leader, Zeller had closer ties to Murr than to Himmler, and Himmler 
may have accepted Zeller's independence in order to build bridges with 
Murr. Murr himself maintained a direct personal interest in the political 
police until shortly before Himmler assumed the title of commander.4o 
For their part, Mattheiss and his supporters in the state ministries de-
veloped a resistance to meddling in the political police by either Murr 
or Himmler. Influence, not control, characterized Himmler's relationship 
in Wuerttemberg, and it could not have been overly extensive. 
Even SS penetration among key political policemen grew gradually, 
having little significance either before Himmler's appointment or im-
mediately thereafter. For instance, on May 24 Dr. Walter Stahlecker, 
later Himmler's head of the Wuerttemberg Political Police, was quickly 
called as deputy leader of the Political Police. He had tenuous NS and 
SS affiliations, for his actual SS initiation may have resembled that of 
Nieland in Hamburg, the 1932 date of his membership being set retro-
actively. Regardless, Stahlecker was as much Murr's man as Himmler's, 
and he became Murr's trusted agent. In addition to his political police 
position, he served as the special commissioner of the Reichsstatthalter 
until November 21, when Murr transferred him to Berlin to serve as his 
representative at the Reich capital. 41 
On December 9, Murr named Himmler commander of the Wuert-
temberg Political Police. Subsequently, the press described the appoint-
ment as the realization of a fact that had existed organizationally for 
several months, and proclaimed it as a guarantee that the will of the 
Fuehrer would be fulfilled uniformly throughout the Reich.42 Murr ap-
parently made this move entirely on his own, without signs of any 
opposition. Perhaps everyone saw it largely as an act of NS camaraderie, 
for Mattheiss remained the actual head of the political police, to the 
apparent satisfaction of the subsequent opposition to Murr and Himm-
ler. Meanwhile, Murr probably had concrete reasons for turning to 
Himmler. The expensive auxiliary police and the costs of maintaining 
their excessive numbers of protective custody internees was bankrupting 
the state. Since September, the finance minister had made such an issue 
of the matter that Murr, Minister of Interior Schmid, and State Minister 
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Morgenthaler had to find a solution. Furthermore, the impending de-
mise of the auxiliary police simultaneously threatened the loss of proper 
NS influence in the police. Consequently, with an eye toward Himmler's 
successful model next door in Bavaria, Murr decided Himmler could 
best handle their problem of political police and concentration camps.43 
Mattheiss remained the local head, undoubtedly to keep Morgen-
thaler and the other locals happy, but that could not last. Himmler's 
entrenchment, which took several months, came only after he had taken 
control of the other state political police, including those of Prussia. 
Meanwhile, friction developed between Mattheiss and the SS, and he, 
an SA officer, maintained SA links with the political police. Furthermore, 
as the rivalry of Morgenthaler and Schmid against Murr increased, the 
SA courted them as well. Himmler backed the right horse by supporting 
MUIT, who replaced Mattheiss with Stahlecker on May 11, 1934. Stah-
lecker and Himmler had become well aligned, both being in Berlin while 
the conspiratorial tensions came to a head. Morgenthaler protested in 
vain against Mattheiss's dismissal and turned to Frick, where he found 
support, but all this foundered on Murr's determination. The political 
police leadership was purged; for instance, a Dr. Roller (deputy leader 
and a Morgenthaler-Frick candidate for command) was replaced by Dr. 
Wilhelm Harster, a recent SS recruit. The fact that Mattheiss soon became 
one of the victims of the Roehm purge indicates the heat of the struggle. 44 
It would seem that Himmler's ultimate victory in Wuerttemberg also 
related to the alignment of Party forces against Roehm. 
As in the north, Himmler's appointment in Wuerttemberg precipi-
tated similar announcements in neighboring states. In the adjacent Land 
of Baden, Reichsstatthalter Robert Wagner fell in line on December 18. 
Although the details of that victory may never emerge, it seems to fit 
the general pattern. Karl Pflaumer became state commissioner in Baden 
on March 9, Minister of the Interior on May 6, and nine days later, at 
Wagner's request, Himmler drew him into the SS as a colonel. The SO 
leader for the South West, Werner Best, handled negotiations, guar-
anteeing Wagner's continued influence in political police affairs, actually 
run by his friend, Karl Berckmueller. 45 
Meanwhile, Frick's staff had taken notice of Himmler's appoint-
ments and generated a report that gave no indication of pressures from 
above for Himmler's appointments; rather, it implied local initiative. It 
attributed the appointments to lithe effort for the concentration and 
unification of the political police of the states." Although the Movement 
had generally supported such developments in the name of law and 
order, a combination of legalism, regionalism, and local Party leaders 
had thwarted progress. Nevertheless, it seemed so desirable and inevi-
table that some state officials took the initiative to effect progress, es-
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tablishing contact with Frick's ministry;46 others, like Himmler's allies, 
preferred some branch of the Movement as the appropriate vehicle. 
Essentially, this report to Frick proposed the creation of a "Secret 
Reich Police" with an appropriate central office, and there seemed to be 
an air of urgency about it. The chief of the Secret Reich Police was to 
be the minister of the interior, Frick, while the real management would 
be the responsibility of a state secretary. Aside from the personnel of 
the Secret Reich Police Office, the only Reich officials would be the 
inspectors of the Secret Reich Police, the respective heads of each state 
political police. Otherwise, the states would continue to maintain and 
man the state and field offices. Although the proposal sought to capi-
talize on the initiative already taken by the states, it indicated a desire 
to head off further faits accomplis. This contradicts the hypothesis that 
Frick supported Himmler's appointments,47 although perhaps he of-
fered Himmler the post of state secretary in order to tap into his mo-
mentum, and Himmler would have strung him along until it was too 
late. But this is pure speculation. Instead, according to Gisevius, at about 
this time Frick sought vainly to forbid further state governments from 
appointing Himmler. 48 In fact, Frick did make one such belated effort, 
unfortunately of little significance. 
Frick's move came in the states of Lippe and Schaumburg-Lippe, 
tiny enclaves of Prussia, which partially explains the success. Both states 
had small police establishments, and relied upon cooperation with Prus-
sia, especially in political police work, to ensure law and order. Never-
theless, the NS takeover brought about the usual concern over "political 
enemies," producing almost ludicrous results. For instance, by January 
1934 Lippe had a staff of fifteen political policemen, almost twenty per-
cent of the state's total police establishment.49 The relatively slow pace 
of life in Lippe and its ties with Prussia help explain why SS penetration 
was retarded. The bond with Prussia led the Lippe government to call 
upon Prussian Police Captain Otto Hellwig to command its state police. 
Hellwig soon incorporated the political police under his command,50 
where they remained under professional leadership. Nothing indicates 
support for Himmler within either the police or state government. The 
pressure came from the local SS and through the Reichsstatthalter, Dr. 
Alfred Meyer, who held the same position in Schaumburg-Lippe. (The 
process there remains undocumented, but the pattern was apparently 
the same as in Lippe.) 
For an undetermined period, the local SS commander in Lippe had 
been pressing State Minister Hans-Joachim Riecke to appoint Himmler; 
however, Riecke had simply responded that it was "out of the question." 
Meanwhile, Meyer must have come under similar pressures, perhaps 
from Himmler, for on December 20, armed with the list of Himmler's 
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appointments and the recent announcement from Baden, he asked 
Riecke if similar action was not appropriate in Lippe. To this official 
pressure, Riecke responded that it was now suitable. 51 He may have 
reversed himself because of other appointments exerted pressure for NS 
solidarity, and because Meyer may have seemed in favor. However, 
since both men stood closer to SA circles than 55, neither took action, 
and they stalled while the remainder of the little states fell in line. Per-
haps Riecke also knew about Frick's attitude, for in February, in response 
to renewed pressure through the local 55 commander, he recommended 
that Meyer refer the matter to Frick. With the support of Frick's Ministry, 
Riecke and Meyer delayed final action until June 1934, by which time 
the fall of Prussia had made the whole affair meaningless.52 
Wrapping Up the Package 
Despite these little bars to his progress, Himmler brought the other states 
into his fold. After Baden, the states of Anhalt, Hessia, Thuringia, and 
Bremen fell rapidly in line.53 In the case of Anhalt, the lack of available 
documents prevents detailed descriptions, but penetration definitely oc-
curred at the top level. There, as a result of early electoral victories, a 
Nazi, Dr. Alfred Freyberg, had been Prime Minister since April 1932. 
Himmler drew him into the 55 in November 1933 as a lieutenant colonel 
and Rangfuehrer (an honorary position) in the local regiment. Although 
this may have begun as just another of Himmler's nominal appointments 
to woo key men, it apparently developed into much more. By April 
1934, Freyburg had become a member of the SD, indicating closer in-
volvement in Himmler's plans. 54 The Reichsstatthalter, Wilhelm Loeper, 
was equally amenable, for shortly after Himmler's appointment as com-
mander of the political police, he accepted honorary 55 rank as a lieu-
tenant general. Himmler then turned to 55 Lieutenant Otto Sens to form 
the Anhalt Secret State Police as a special division of the State Ministry. 55 
From this date, 55 dominance ensued. 
Unfortunately, lack of surviving documentation prevents recon-
struction of 55 penetration in Hessia. Local developments did, however, 
introduce a new character who would become central to the shaping of 
Sipo and SD. With the NS power seizure in March, Government Coun-
selor Dr. Karl Rudolf Werner Best became special commissioner for the 
Hessian Police. This twenty-nine-year-old, law-trained civil servant, des-
tined to become second man in Sipo and SD, was at the time only 
nominally an 55 man, recruited in November 1931, allegedly because 
the 55 wanted him to wear its uniform in the Landtag. An insignificant 
member, he only earned noncommissioned 55 rank after he gained po-
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lice power, which he won purely because of his personal standing among 
local NS leaders. During the spring, Himmler remained too preoccupied, 
or for other reasons was unable, to exploit the potential link with Hessia, 
for, according to Best, he had liaison with him on only a few minor 
official matters.56 
As a result of a rift between Gauleiter and Reichsstatthaler Jakob 
Sprenger and the faction to which Best belonged, around the end of 
October Sprenger's faction shunted Best out of office.57 Himmler, by 
now looking for qualified policemen, drafted Best to begin his more 
significant career elsewhere. These events provide no insight into how 
Himmler got Sprenger to accept him as commander of the Hessian Po-
litical Police on December 20. Thereafter, his control over them remained 
nominal until their absorption into Sipo in 1936. Before that, SS pene-
tration occurred only at the lowest levels, mostly employees drawn in 
from the SS Special Commandos. Only one of these, SS Corporal Fried-
rich Berges, became a detective employee (Kriminal-Angestellter); the rest 
remained office helpers and drivers. SO penetration began only in June 
1935, when Berges and his people entered the SO and formed a post in 
the Stapo-Darmstadt. As late as February 1936, the head of the Gestapo 
Office Darmstadt, Dr. Schulze, seems to have been cool toward the SO 
and apparently remained ignorant of its penetration. 58 
Lack of documentation also obscures the story of Thuringia, but 
advanced penetration clearly occurred at the upper levels. Since April 
1933, the police president of Weimar had been SS Major Dr. Walter 
Ortlepp, an Old Fighter and jurist who had served with the state prose-
cutor's office and in state courts. In 1930, when Frick took over the 
Thuringian police, Ortlepp became his head of the State Criminal Police. 
In the following year, Ortlepp transferred from the SA to the SS and, 
as soon as he became police president, jumped to the rank of major. As 
elsewhere, although Himmler was named commander on December 20, 
Ortlepp (by now SS lieutenant colonel) actually ran the office as Himm-
ler's deputy, and built the Thuringian Secret State Police Office in Wei-
mar largely from Police Presidium personnel. Again, Himmler's control 
matured gradually. Ortlepp's deputy, however, was Detective Max 
Rausch, a recent recruit to the SS and head of an SO post in the Weimar 
Office.59 There Heydrich's SO made more open headway. 
In January, the remaining states joined Himmler's list, beginning 
with Oldenburg. The other two, however-Saxony and Brunswick-
represented more severe problems, for SS people involved in local poli-
tics retarded Himmler's progress. In Saxony, for one, the SO helped 
overcome the resistance, but did not play the decisive role. Saxony was 
the seat of the well-established SO Group South East under Lothar Beu-
tel. In the summer of 1933, the local NS regime had built its Secret State 
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Police Office as an independent central authority under the Saxon min-
istry of interior. Meanwhile, the SD had won a fairly new Party member 
who had the proper credentials for a high position in police work. Since 
1932 a V-man for the SS Ie, Dr. Herbert Mehlhorn officially joined the 
SS and SD in March 1933 at the age of thirty. As a doctor of jurisprudence 
with government experience, he could provide NS influence in the new 
Saxon Secret Police, so on September 1 he became deputy chief in charge 
of their administration. At the same time, SS Ie man Horst Boehme also 
began work with the Secret State Police. The SD link tightened when 
Mehlhorn became staff officer of SD Regional Office Middle (SD Ober-
abschnitt Mitte), and Boehme became head of SD District Office Dresden 
(SD Abschnitt 11).60 Nevertheless, although such SD penetration gave 
him internal influence, how Himmler got Reichsstatthalter Martin 
Mutschmann to give in remains unexplained. 
A combination of pressure from above and creeping penetration 
from below apparently weakened the resistance of the Party lord and 
his independent local SS leader. The Saxon Secret Police were under the 
command of SS Brigadier General Fritz Schlegel of SS Superior Region 
Mitte. Although he cooperated enough to appoint Mehlhorn on 
Himmler's recommendation, he made no great concession, for Mehlhorn 
possessed badly needed administrative expertise and was the protege 
of local Party leaders. Furthermore, Schlegel resisted Himmler's domi-
nance and, according to Mehlhorn, preferred to cooperate with Diels in 
Prussia. To break this resistance, Himmler took direct action. In August, 
after a breach, Himmler moved against Schlegel for dereliction of duty 
in command of his SS area. On September 6, he relieved him of his SS 
command and assigned him z.b. V. to SS Group South East. Like Dal-
uege, but with greater severity and humiliation, Schlegel lost his local 
SS power base. 61 When Reichsstatthalter Mutschmann finally consented 
to Himmler's appointment in early December, he apparently considered 
it more of a nominal bow to NS camaraderie than a relegation of real 
control to Himmler. Although Schlegel subsequently wrote letters pledg-
ing eternal loyalty to Himmler as his superior in both state and SS, his 
hold over the Secret Police remained firm. Himmler's full control was 
delayed until 1936 when, simultaneous with Schlegel's death, he created 
Sipo. Meanwhile, Mutschmann continually interfered in the Secret Po-
lice. According to Melhorn, he constantly had conflicts with Mutsch-
mann, who finally drove him out of Saxony in mid-1935, threatening to 
have him arrested. 62 
While the Saxon appointment remains unexplained, the Brunswick 
appointment reveals a crystallization of support for Himmler, who by 
early January had abandoned hope for Brunswick, an enclave inside 
Prussia like the Lippes.63 In Brunswick, he had an early entree with the 
Toward Command of Political Police 113 
appointment of Jeckeln, Munich-based commander of the SS Group 
South, as head of the Brunswick Political Police. Then the previously 
described rivalry within his own SS nearly cost him the command. The 
alleged Heydrich-Jeckeln rivalry, the August exposure of SO intrigues 
that implicated not only Heydrich and his SO but even Himmler, and 
Klagges's furious counterattack, all make Himmler's appointment in 
Brunswick seem amazing. 
Apparently he had support from above; for instance, he worked 
through Reichsstatthalter Loeper, whom he had recently won over in 
Anhalt. On January 19, Loeper notified Klagges that Himmler had re-
newed his request that Brunswick fall in line with Anhalt. He noted that 
Saxony was already completing arrangements, but most significant, he 
emphasized that the Reich Party Leadership had recommended ("emp-
fohlen hat") Himmler's appointment. By this time, the circle around Hess 
had definitely begun to support Himmler's efforts. 64 They had peacefully 
settled Klagges's charges and persuaded Hitler to preserve the SO. By 
entrenching Himmler's police power and pulling together amenable Gau-
leiter, they were building a coalition. 
Meanwhile, Himmler had obviously paved the way with Klagges as 
well, for he soon became one of the honorary SS generals. Since Himmler 
could blame the SO scandal on overzealous, irresponsible locals, he may 
have convinced Klagges that he represented no threat, and from at least 
this time, the two resumed good personal relations. 65 Nevertheless, 
Klagges made no great concession on January 23 when he made the 
appointment, for Himmler's command of the political police remained 
largely titular, a matter of establishing nationwide coordination and pre-
serving the image of NS solidarity. SS General and Police Lieutenant 
Colonel Jeckeln continued to head the Braunschweig Political Police for 
several years, and as part of building his bridges, Himmler had en-
trenched Jeckeln's SS power by making him commander of the local SS 
superior region, effective August 10, 1933.66 As elsewhere, establishing 
tighter control over the Braunschweig Political Police came later. 
Although the little states contributed significantly to Himmler's goal 
of becoming Reich political police chief, their importance should not be 
overrated. Most were small forces. Furthermore, in the case of many, 
like Baden, Bremen, Brunswick, Hessia, and Saxony, local NS lords 
hedged Himmler's powers, for he remained technically their subordi-
nate. Not until after he became Reich police chief in 1936 did such sub-
ordination become nominal; he and Heydrich had to build the 
independent power of the Gestapo slowly and patiently. In these initial 
penetrations, the SO played a minimal role. A well-placed negotiator, 
like Best, helped in Baden, as did SO penetration in Saxony. But in most 
cases of successful SS penetration, the men involved did not enter the 
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SO until later, in Bremen and Wuerttemberg only in 1934 or 1935. True, 
Sens (Anhalt) became a local SO leader within a couple of months of 
Himmler's appointment, and Rausch provided open SO liaison in Thu-
ringia; however, Streckenbach's case may provide the explanation. In 
Hamburg, the SO had been so discredited with the Gauleiter that only 
Streckenbach's affiliation with the SO could establish goodwill. The SO 
benefited more from the process than it contributed to it. 
As for how Himmler got the local NS lords to appoint him, nothing 
indicates direct support from Hitler. Except for Brunswick, in every case 
where the arguments of Himmler's supporters survive, they mention 
no outside support. Himmler worked entirely from within or through 
amenable Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter. Only as late as January in Bruns-
wick is Reichsleitung support mentioned, although that may also explain 
Saxony and Hessia. If Hitler had given his support, Himmler's sup-
porters would have made note of it, for that would have been significant. 
Furthermore, for Hitler to give decisive support to one faction would 
have been out of character, especially during this period. True, he in-
creasingly welcomed counters against SA lawlessness, but it strains logic 
to argue that in late 1933 he saw a political police monopoly for Himmler 
as a solution. Instead, one must attribute Himmler's success to the de-
sirability and inevitability of police centralization, to the image of 
Himmler and his 55, to his ability to win the services of men in key 
police positions or those with the credentials and contacts for such po-
sitions, to his personal diplomatic skills, and to the growing tension over 
the SA, which drove local and national Party leaders to see Himmler as 
a desirable foil. 
An efficient police to combat the enemies of the nation was such an 
accepted part of NS propaganda that local leaders could not long ignore 
the logic of a unified political police command. Pressures for such cen-
tralization increased precisely because the Nazis claimed to support it. 
However, local leaders grew ever more hostile toward Frick's efforts at 
administrative centralization. Since Nazis harbored a deep hatred for 
bureaucracy even when they commanded it, many opposed Frick for 
ideological reasons as well as personal power considerations. Given their 
further distrust of the old police establishment, a centralized political 
police was a suspicious proposition. 
Himmler at least offered a compromise. As agents of the Movement, 
he and his 55 would deal "properly" with enemies. They were often 
better controlled than the SA, or at least seem to have had that repu-
tation. In the Party's Reich Leadership, Himmler's 55 had won this image 
before the power seizure. Where the local 55 was less reliable, Himmler 
apparently promised to work with amenable Gauleiter and Reichsstat-
thalter to turn it into a useful tool if they would give him local police 
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authority. Himmler could point to his Bavarian model as proof that he 
had the knowhow the local Nazis lacked. 67 As he had done when under 
fire in Bavaria, Himmler may have hinted of his dream of a state pro-
tection corps: a plan to replace police bureaucrats with the NS men of 
the future. As with Murr in Wuerttemberg, he may have claimed Hitler's 
support; all he need do to reinforce this claim was offer reminders of 
some of the Fuehrer's speeches about the SS mission. He could also 
point to the frequent occasions in Bavaria when Hitler's support, alleged 
or otherwise, had been decisive in blocking efforts to curb him. Suc-
cessful checks on the SS, like Diels's in Berlin, were camouflaged by the 
image of Himmler's cooperation and approval-for instance, Diels's 
honorary SS rank and the extensive SS role in the Gestapo. 
To local NS leaders, the mild-mannered Reichsfuehrer hardly 
seemed as threatening as Roehm and local SA leaders. When he prom-
ised personal loyalty, he embodied Reich centralization without threat-
ening the NS locals' power-they could have their "political ideals" and 
local power too. As Werner Best remembers it, Himmler, the consum-
mate tactician, recognized each Reichsstatthalter as his personal superior 
and promised to fulfill any condition, for at the moment the most im-
portant object was to win the titles to buttress his case in Berlin. 68 
Before the spring of 1934, probably during January, Himmler estab-
lished a Central Office (Zentralbuero) in Munich to coordinate his sepa-
rate commands. From this office Heydrich increasingly did the real work 
of coordinating the political police while the more tactful Himmler con-
centrated on building the power base. 69 Meanwhile, in Berlin, in his last 
big step, Himmler redoubled his penetration tactics. Here too, the SO 
played a significant, though not decisive, role, and some of the success 
hinged upon advanced recruitment into the SO of men with proper 
credentials for government offices. In 1932, in the Silesian province of 
Prussia, twenty-nine-year-old Dr. Guenther Patschowski joined the SS, 
then the SO. After the Nazis came to power, he became a logical recruit 
for the local Gestapo regional office. 7o Silesia was the domain of SA 
General Edmund Heines, who as police president of Breslau had made 
himself head of the Gestapo Regional Office there. Of course, he had 
turned the actual running of the office over to a qualified man he thought 
he could trust, Detective Inspector Dr. Emanuel Schaefer. Schaefer's new 
subordinate, Patschowski, recruited him as an SO "associate" (Mitar-
beiter, an informal affiliation).71 Early in 1933 the Silesian Gestapo thus 
came under the covert influence of Himmler and Heydrich, at a time 
when Berlin controlled that area minimally. From there they could build 
another road to Berlin. 
By this time, Diels was expanding his facilities for combating sabo-
tage and espionage, a traditional responsibility of the Berlin-based po-
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litical police as a support for the Abwehr office of the military. Himmler 
and Heydrich would have known through their liaison man of Diels's 
plans to create a special division for this work and of his need for a 
suitable director. According to "Heinrich Orb" (a pseudonym), a tra-
ditional source for inside stories of the early Gestapo and SO, Himmler 
and Heydrich succeeded in placing Patschowski's name on the tongues 
of the Reichswehr people to whom Diels turned for a suggestion. Al-
legedly, 55 General Udo von Woyrsch, 55 Fuehrer South East, used his 
family connections in the military to boast of Patschowski's exploits as 
head of the counterespionage division. 72 
Whether these details are accurate or not, Diels drafted Patschowski 
into the Berlin office in November. When the reorganization created 
Division IV, Treason and Espionage, new Assistant Commissioner Pat-
schowski was in charge. Through his close work with the Reichswehr, 
Patschowski could weaken some of Diels's support and pave the way 
for Himmler. With Nebe as head of Division III, at least two of Diels's 
four major working divisions at that point lay in the hands of his op-
position. 73 
Photo Essays (cont.) 
C. The Consolidation of Police Power, Apri11933-April 1934 
Right: A press release photo of 12 
April 1933, showing Hermann 
Goering, just named Prussian 
prime minister. 
Below left: Rudolf Diels, Goering's 
Gestapo chief. U.S. Document 
Center, Berlin. Below right: A 
later photo of Arthur Nebe as SS 
and police lieutenant general and 
head of the Reich Criminal Police. 
Above: N5 paramilitary leaders in the vortex of intrigue, 13 August 1933. Far left, 
symbolically distancing himself from his comrades-in-arms, is Kurt Daluege, who 
was working closely with Goering and Frick and was soon to be removed from 
his command of 55-Group East; at center, 5A Chief of 5taff Roehm and Reichs-
fuehrer 55 Himmler, still frequently cooperating in the N5 takeover of the police; 
to the right of Himmler is 5epp Dietrich, leader of the new Hitler 5taff Guard and 
an alternative but independent source of 55 power in Berlin. Below: Himmler and 
Heydrich on an inspection tour through Baden and Wuerttemberg, March 1934, 
typical of the many tours during which Himmler established and entrenched 
himself in the states outside Prussia. Notice the 5D patch on Heydrich's sleeve. 
Above: 55 Major General Heydrich in Bavarian Political Police head-
quarters in Munich in early 1934 as Himmler's deputy commander 
of the political police of the Laender "outside Prussia." Below: Goering 
appoints Himmler inspector of the Prussian Gestapo, April 1934. 
D. The Selling of the Police State: Propaganda and Personalities, 
1933-1936 
Left: A seal posted by the 
Bavarian Political Police 
announces "Business 
closed by the police for 
price gouging" and "Pro-
prietor in protective cus-
tody in Dachau." Now 
the enemies of the Volk 
would be handled prop-
erly. Who could object? 
Below: "Papa" Eiche (center, smiling) conducts Dr. Robert Ley (second from 
left) and other dignitaries on a tour of Dachau, February 1936. At this time 
Himmler opened Dachau as part of a grand tour for all Party leaders, obviously 
to quell concerns about the camps and to demonstrate that the enemies of the 
Reich were subject to proper NS discipline. 
Propaganda photos taken at Dachau in May and June 1933 to show that its 
inmates were happy, healthy, well fed, and properly exercised, but required 
to earn their keep at such heavy, honest labor as road work. Such pictures 
accompanied articles to refute stories about the camp. 
Above: The Gestapo Museum, Berlin, was established to educate the public on 
the Red Menace. Photo ca. 1934. Below: A collection of seized communist hand 
guns in the museum. 
Above: "Thus intellectual Communists conceal their weapons. A seized revolver 
concealed in a book as it was found in the library of a Communist." Below: 
"From a Communist arms craftsman. A weapon camouflaged as a walking stick 
with which Communists move about inoffensively as strollers at a demonstra-
tion." 
Right: A display of "fully 
armed Red Front fighters 
ready for revolution" in 
the Gestapo Museum. 
Below left: Werner Best, 
Heydrich's lieutenant for 
Gestapo and SD organiza-
tion, legal problems, and 
Abwehr-police, and the 
key salesman of the 
police state. 
Below right: Heinrich 
"Gestapo" Mueller, Hey-
drich's lieutenant for 
combatting the enemies 
of the state and the 
Movement. Both from 
u.s. Document Center, 
Berlin. 
10 _____ _ 
Acquiring the Prussian 
Power Base 
While HimmIer's people nibbled away from within, the power struggle 
at the Reich level matured into a complex web of rivalries. Frick wanted 
to curb independent powers like Goering and Himmler and to subordi-
nate their police to his ministry. Outside Prussia, Himmler, building his 
model of the efficient, unrestrained police state, strove to impose it on 
the Reich. Within Prussia, Goering had to defend his power base from 
Frick and Himmler and to parlay it into Reich-wide power. What was 
common to all three was a growing concern over Roehm and the SA. 
Others shared this concern: the Reich Party Leadership; many local Party 
leaders and conservatives in the Movement; and the conservative es-
tablishment in business, industry, the military, and government, in-
cluding many professional police and bureaucrats. Since the realization 
of benefits to be won from the support of others escaped none of the 
competitors, by the spring of 1934 they all drew hesitantly, and with 
several reverses, into an uneasy alliance. 
In these maneuvers, Goering's tactics are the most difficult to unravel 
because he was working his way through at least three options: the 
Second Revolution, represented by the SA; a silent, controlled revolution 
of the sort Himmler supported; and a conservative end to the revolution 
represented by Frick. More decisive than any ideological considerations 
were the threats each course posed for his position, which by now had 
made the SA option completely unacceptable. Since Goering inclined 
toward a controlled revolution, having SS support pleased him, but only 
if he could keep Himmler at arm's length. Goering had a healthy distaste 
for both Himmler and Heydrich, and if he could have had his way, they 
would never have moved to Berlin. Frick recalled a conversation from 
about this time in which Goering had said, "For God's sake, if HimmIer 
takes over the police force in Prussia, he will kill all of us." Both of them 
shared low opinions of Heydrich because of the exposees of SD spying 
against Goering as well as the Gauleiter. 1 
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Since Goering needed Frick and other conservative allies to avoid 
too tight an embrace with the 55, he continued his complex game of 
working with Frick against their common enemies, while increasing the 
autonomy of his Gestapo as a check against loss of everything to Frick. 
The two had the common objective of controlling police powers, then 
being exercised indiscriminately, so by the beginning of 1934 they co-
operated in opposing the trends toward police anarchy, limiting extraor-
dinary police powers, and restoring an "appropriate" amount of 
individual rights and freedom. Although each clearly worked toward an 
NS police state, had they continued on their course the Third Reich 
might have remained a more traditional authoritarian dictatorship. 
Unfortunately, the road toward the police state was a narrow, slip-
pery slope, down which both men intended to travel. Even NS con-
servatives like Frick had no intention of limiting the power of the state 
to do what they considered necessary for "reasons of state.,,2 Likewise, 
Goering dedicated himself to building a strong "inner political instru-
ment of power" in the police. In this respect, he must have had a certain 
admiration for Himmler's model. He definitely tried to solve his Prussian 
police problems along the lines of the political police-55-concentration 
camp relationship rather that through Frick's more bureaucratically cen-
tralized, legalistic approach. In settling on his course, Goering must have 
looked to Hitler for some clues. What he found was not only a studied 
indecisiveness about such internal struggles, but also a clear predilection 
for unlimited instruments of power like Himmler's model. As the 
buildup of pressure from the SA pushed Goering toward a radical so-
lution, he had to balance his conservative allies against the need for 
instruments of power. The need prevailed in favor of Himmler's 55-
police state. By March, with Frick revealing his limitations and Himmler 
showing his strengths, Goering settled on a compromise that brought 
Himmler and Heydrich to the Gestapo Office-the very course of action 
that before that time he had fought doggedly. 
Maneuvering for Position 
The year 1934 began with a seemingly united front by Goering and Frick 
against the abuse of extraordinary police power by both the SA and the 
55. However, all first-hand accounts and sources paint a confusing pic-
ture of mixed motives and contradictory actions, especially at the Prus-
sian level. Diels maneuvered against the SA and 55, while conservative 
government officials simultaneously fought not only against the SA and 
55 but also against Diels. To further complicate matters, Diels played 
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some 55 factions against others, while some of his conservative oppo-
nents established contacts with 55 factions as well as with Frick. 
Diels has left us contradictory impressions of his position at the 
center of this vortex. For instance, he contended that from his return in 
December until sometime in March, he got Goering to support his fight 
against NS excesses. From Hitler and Goering he got a Christmas am-
nesty for most concentration camp internees. On December 8, Goering 
announced the release of five thousand, giving Diels wide authority to 
select them. By the end of the year, supposedly only about twenty-eight 
hundred remained in the legal camps, which Diels claims to have begun 
dissolving. His version is partially supported by surviving documents 
and by publicity he arranged in March, boasting of the end of the camp 
at Brandenburg and the imminent dissolution of Sonnenberg, leaving 
only two others.3 
Nevertheless, the claim of dissolving the camps was at best a half-
truth. Indeed, old camps like Brandenburg and Sonnenburg could be 
phased out; they had been makeshift to begin with. More adequate and 
less easily compromised camps under construction would replace them. 
Esterwegen, Boergermoor, Neusustrum (the Paperburg complex), and 
Oberlangen joined the list of state camps. By February the camps already 
had a capacity of six thousand, with a projected increase of two thou-
sand.4 Even worse, these official state camps, which only recently had 
been brought under the command of Schupo officers, were being re-
turned to the care of 55 police auxiliaries. The extent of Diels's control 
over these developments is uncertain, but they conform with his pre-
vious suggestions of tightening working relations between the Gestapo 
and the 55. 
In the reorganization of the Gestapo Office following Diels's return, 
and "executive" section no longer existed under Nebe. Instead, as part 
of the Gestapo Office, an 55 Commando Gestapa under 55 Brigadier 
General Henze had its headquarters at the old Columbia House, which 
remained an 55 way station for Gestapo arrestees.5 This relationship 
between the Gestapo and 55 Columbia House clearly indicates that Diels 
at least tolerated its atrocities as part of his working arrangements with 
the 55. 
The explanation for the complex Goering-Diels maneuvers must be 
that while they campaigned to eliminate SA power in police affairs, they 
intended their discipline of the 55 to prepare it for a dual role as support 
for the Gestapo and as alternative to the SA. Nothing better explains 
why they broke up some 55 camps, while others, like the Papenburg 
complex and Columbia House, remained as Gestapo instruments. For 
instance, in March 1934 Diels and his allies in the Prussian Prosecutor's 
Office succeeded in disbanding the notorious camp in Stettin run by 55 
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Major Joachim Hoffmann, also the veritable head of the Gestapo regional 
office (Stapostelle Stettin). They arrested Hoffmann and his cohorts, who 
had been appointees from Daluege's Berlin 55, and replaced them with 
professional police. Although the 5tettin case was an example of un-
controlled "55 and Gestapo" abuses, while Hoffmann typified the in-
dependent local 55 leader, Diels struck at the 5tettin 55-Gestapo only 
to establish a reliable centralized political police instrument. Goering and 
Diels made no effort to break 55 control, for their newly appointed police 
president was ex-police major SS Lieutenant Fritz Herrmann, another 
of Daluege's people, but one more accustomed to a disciplined working 
relationship. 6 
Diels's "subtle" tactics of playing all ends against the middle proba-
bly backfired. On the one hand, he built on his relationship with Roehm 
and Ernst and improved Gestapo-SA cooperation. On the other, he 
transparently sought to assure Daluege and Himmler of his loyal c()-
operation while trying to engineer actions to curb and control their SS. 7 
Eventually, his duplicity may have discredited him even with Goering. 
Meanwhile, in January, during Goering's housecleaning in Prussia, 
Frick also overplayed his hand. First he sent a notice to the state gov-
ernments decrying the misuse of protective custody, demanding caution 
and due process, and specifically noting that protective custody was not 
to be used as a form of punishment. He focused his criticism on the 
situation in Bavaria,8 where HimmIer's continued, diligent prosecution 
of Germany's "enemies" gave Frick cause to escalate his attack. To curb 
protective custody abuse, he called for centralized control of all police 
under his ministry. He then complicated his relations with Goering when 
he proposed the Law on the Reconstruction of the Reich, which passed 
the Reichstag on January 30. On paper this law gave Frick, as Reich 
minister of the interior, power to exercise the authority that had formerly 
belonged to the federal states and the Reichsstatthalter, and to intervene 
in state (Land) affairs at will. Unfortunately for Frick, Hitler, who actually 
desired some such increase in central authority, would not back him in 
any real confrontation with the local NS le~ders, who were Hitler's real 
base of power. Their resistance became especially apparent when on 
February 19 Frick tried to cement his authority by decreeing his com-
mand over the police forces of their states. The move apparently alarmed 
Goering despite Frick's continued proposal of Goering as chief of Reich 
Police. Frick thus created a common interest between Goering and 
Himmler, who had many "allies" in nullifying his maneuver, which was 
premature from their perspectives. To complete the circle, when allies 
like Wagner, the Bavarian interior minister, obstructed Frick's central-
ization, they unwittingly forced him to seek alliance with Goering and 
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Himmler-police leaders powerful enough to help fulfill his goals when 
they were ready to cooperate.9 
If Frick had been Goering's only problem, Goering might have easily 
prevailed. According to Diels, at this time Goering planned to offer Hitler 
his Prussian police as a model for a Reich police. However, when con-
fronted with Frick's drive combined with the need both to break SA 
police powers and to discipline the 55 into alliance, Goering required 
either an alliance with Himmler or Hitler's strong support. As early as 
December, all concerned had gotten the true measure of Hitler's position 
on the question of curbing extraordinary police powers. In a discussion 
with Goering and Diels, who had expounded his plans for the December 
amnesty, Hitler showed more concern about preserving the new power 
to eliminate enemies. to At this same time, Roehm and Himmler were 
able to claim Hitler's support against an effort by the Bavarian Council 
of Ministers to interfere in protective custody matters. 11 
As for Himmler, conditions had ripened for him to move from his 
lesser position to one of more strength in any arrangement with Goering. 
First, he had undermined Diels by coalescing the broadening base of 
opposition against him (ranging from conservatives like Gisevius and 
Grauert through Nazis like Nebe and Daluege), uniting it with the Berlin 
SO and his agents in the Gestapo. 
The conservative attack on Diels had resumed as soon as he returned 
to office in December. In January, Grauert gained the recall of Gisevius 
from provincial exile and established him in a special Interior Ministry 
office for coordinating the affairs of the Gestapo that still concerned the 
ministry. He even ordered the provincial authorities to have duplicates 
of all Gestapo reports, including those of the regional offices, forwarded 
to this office. Goering, learning of this more than a week later, curtly 
countermanded Grauert and put him in his place for interfering with 
"police efficiency." Even so, Grauert circumvented Goering with a bu-
reaucratic sidestep. He continued the camouflage of Gisevius's office as 
a liaison with Gestpo, took Goering up on a promise to have the Gestapo 
inform this office routinely of all business, and used Gisevius to sift out 
incriminating evidence. What they could not get from the Gestapo they 
allegedly acquired through correspondence intended for the Gestapo 
but mistakenly sent to the ministry.12 
At some point in the early months of 1934, Himmler and Heydrich 
used Sepp Dietrich to establish contact with Gisevius and Nebe, who 
were still conspiring against Diels from within the Gestapo. At their 
meeting, according to Gisevius, Dietrich "congratulated us in the names 
of Reich Leader Himmler and Group Leader Heydrich for so stoutly 
leading the fight against corruption in the state and the Party. As we 
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all know, he said, Himmler detested the excesses of the 5A. Above all, 
he could no longer put up with the rampant sins of the Gestapo. Would 
we please set forth in writing ... all our grievances. Naturally every-
thing would be held in strictest confidence. Himmler wanted to use this 
material as the basis for a personal appeal to Hitler.,,13 
The 55-men may in fact have believed their own posturing, and so 
greatly did Gisevius and Nebe hate Diels that they joined in the con-
spiracy, although the advantages they saw are not at all clear. Gisevius 
and Nebe compiled evidence against the Gestapo, including "instances 
of extortion, torture and killing" and also what they "knew of the Reichs-
tag fire.,,14 What, if any, of this Himmler could have used to win his 
case with Hitler we may never know, but clearly he gathered material 
and allies for his assault on the Gestapo. According to Gisevius, Daluege, 
nervous about the developing alliance and especially fearful of Heydrich, 
allegedly warned, "You will end by using Beelzebub to drive out the 
Devil.,,15 Regardless of any such reservations, Daluege by this time was 
also thoroughly involved with Himmler. Undoubtedly, Diels's increased 
power and independence displeased him, and he saw that Himmler's 
growing strength demanded better relations with his Reichsfuehrer. 
One source of this growing strength was the Berlin 5D. By this time 
Heydrich had returned his energies to building the 5D, with the Berlin 
office more firmly under his control than before. Around the first of the 
year he designated it the Major Regional Office East (Oberabschnitt Ost) 
and soon replaced Kobelinski with 55 5econd Lieutenant Hermann Beh-
rends, and old personal friend and loyal follower. Behrends had fol-
lowed Heydrich into the 55, the Party, and then the 5D when Heydrich 
needed men he could trust with important posts, such as the Berlin 
office, where he could not otherwise easily apply direct personal pres-
sure. According to Alfred Naujocks, who claimed to have informed Hey-
drich, Kobelinski had been dealing with Diels. In any case, they 
drummed Kobelinski out of the 55.16 
Behrends's primary duty was to support the assault on the Gestapo. 
Using the 5D agents within that office, he collected and forwarded to 
Himmler every useful intelligence. According to Orb, they had estab-
lished a line of communication between Berlin and Munich that was 
unknown to Diels's Gestapo. Behrends also provided a secure link to-
and undoubtedly a watchful check on-Daluege,17 whom Himmler had 
carefully removed from all direct 55 command. Daluege thus lost the 55 
power base that had induced Goering to give him police command, and 
his attempt to topple Diels had backfired, discrediting him with Goering. 
Given these developments, from February through April Daluege 
worked increasingly with Himmler against Diels, and by late March he 
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clearly anticipated Diels's ouster.1S By spring, to sum it up, the SS fac-
tions and some of the conservative factions allied with Frick had drawn 
together loosely in a common front against Die1s. 
Meanwhile, Goering and Frick drew together once again in their 
common effort to regulate uncontrolled police power. In February, after 
the Reich reform, Frick, better situated to clamp down on the abuse of 
protective custody, decreed procedures severely limiting the authority 
and extent of such powers. Despite their differences, Goering continued 
to support him on this issue, and in March he issued for Prussia a 
regulation to curb protective custody abuses along the lines of Frick's 
decree. Henceforth, protective custody could be ordered only by the 
Gestapo Office Berlin; Goering excluded local government (Kreis) and 
regular police officials-often uncontrolled SA- and SS-men. Wrapping 
it up, Goering made all arrests not initiated by the Gestapo Office subject 
to his own review within twenty-four hours, and unless he extended 
them, they were to expire after eight days. Only Goering's and Diels's 
office retained unlimited protective custody powers in Prussia, and the 
latter initiated much tighter controls, serving essentially as the review 
board. 19 
Although Goering by no means submitted to Frick's authority, his 
obvious cooperation was a great step forward. Together, on March 23, 
they met with the Reichsstatthalter to gain their support and proposed a 
Reich law modeled after Goering's regulation. In response Reichsstat-
thalter Fritz Sauckel claimed Thuringia already had a similar law. In 
Saxony, the Ministry of Interior responded merely by making the Secret 
State Police Office (nominally under Himmler) the sole authority for 
issuing and reviewing protective custody orders. In Bavaria, at least, 
Reichsstatthalter Epp used the occasion to mobilize against Himmler. 
Reconstituting the coalition of the previous fall, Epp and Frank, the 
Bavarian minister of justice, pressured Minister of Interior Wagner for 
restrictions along the lines of Frick's decree. But once again Wagner 
shielded Himmler from such interference in his ministry, stalemating 
the attack. 20 As long as Frick had to rely on Goering's tactic of developing 
the state police, the Gestapo, as a legitimate replacement for NS police 
excesses, Himmler's comparable state police power grew apace-a point 
that apparently did not escape Goering. 
Meanwhile, Goering hastened to counterbalance Frick's expansion. 
In March, as part of the continued process of removing the Gestapo from 
normal government channels, he separated regional offices (Stapostellen) 
from all regular police connections and local government controls and 
made them "independent authorities of the Gestapo." Now, when Frick 
moved into the Prussian Ministry of Interior, all components of the 
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Gestapo would by beyond his reach. 21 Of course, this move also tight-
ened Goering's control over embarrassingly independent regional offices 
like that at Stettin. 
Pursuant to tighter controls, Diels also tried to rein in on personnel 
policies. On March 15, he insisted that rigid civil service criteria be re-
stored and tried to establish a screening process that would give him 
control. He specifically stated that rank in the 5A or 55 no longer carried 
weight in recruitment. 22 
The Fall of Diels 
It was too late, however, for Diels to reverse 55 penetration of the Ge-
stapo. He soon learned of Goering's liaisons with Himmler and how he 
himself might lose his office. Perhaps that explains why, a little over a 
week after he had tried to tighten personnel policies, he reversed him-
self. In a memo to Goering, he highlighted the services rendered by 
55-men, bragged of having rewarded them with status as civil service 
candidates and police employees, and requested Goering's approval of 
Daluege's former policy of modifying government requirements to draw 
55 men into the Gestapo.23 
All such complicated maneuvers came to a head in April, however, 
when Frick issued a definitive regulation of protective custody affairs 
for the entire Reich. At first it seemed that the alliance against 5A and 
55 had prevailed and Himmler's police powers would be controlled, yet 
Frick's alliance with Goering required a compromise-a compromise that 
offered Himmler many loopholes. 
Frick's prologue to the protective custody regulation ambitiously 
claimed that the suspension of personal freedom was a temporary emer-
gency measure, to be lifted when the time was right. He thus, by im-
plication, claimed the right to dissolve all extraordinary police powers. 
Beyond that, however, his decree merely took Goering's Prussian regu-
lation of March and applied it with appropriate changes to each federal 
state. He limited the offices empowered to order arrests, applied the 
Prussian limits of duration and provisions for review and due process, 
and, most important, limited conditions for arrest to avoid the worst 
abuses of the past. Following the Prussian pattern meant that, as with 
Diels's office in Prussia, Himmler's political police commands in the 
other states enjoyed preeminence in protective custody arrests, subject 
only to the approval of the head of each federal state.24 
This last clause embodied the compromise, for the heads of federal 
states, such as Goering, and the Reichsstatthalter, not the Reich Minister, 
had the direct power of approval. In other words, Frick tacitly deferred 
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his claim to Reich central authority. Any real, long-range limitation of 
Himmler's political police powers would have required similar limita-
tions on Goering. Before that could happen, Frick needed more personal 
power, especially influence with Hitler. Until then, his only recourse 
was compromise with Goering and Himmler to curb all others. 
The alliance among Frick, Goering and Himmler worked itself out 
in this way during March and April. With careful checks and balances 
to preserve what he could, Goering had to share his Prussian state and 
police authority with Frick, other Reich ministers, and Himmler. Frick 
would absorb the Prussian Ministry of Interior and the regular police. 
For all of Germany, Himmler would head the independent political po-
lice offices, including the Gestapo, but as the subordinate of the head 
of each federal state, which in the case of Prussian meant Goering. 
Beyond their common opposition to an uncontrolled SA, the motives of 
the three allies are at best problematical, as is Hitler's attitude about 
these developments. For Frick, whose power remained largely nominal, 
this arrangement may actually have been a wise move in a well-planned 
strategy. Its eventual failure for him resulted less from the terms of the 
compromise than from his inability to follow it up. 
The complex union of the Prussian and Reich Ministries of Interior 
under Frick began in March and was completed by autumn. Meanwhile, 
Daluege assumed a Reich position as head of the Police Division of the 
Reich Ministry of Interior, slated to exercise command over all uniformed 
police in Germany.25 Frick obviously intended the cooperative Daluege 
as a brake to Himmler's ambitions, and it might have worked had Frick 
proven strong enough. Unfortunately, as Himmler came to outweigh 
Frick, Daluege dealt with the more likely victor. 
Although from hindsight Himmler's acquisition of the Gestapo was 
a decisive defeat for Frick, he hoped to reverse it. Aside from the recent 
limitations on protective custody, Frick planned to eliminate Himmler's 
political police when the time was ripe. Gisevus and Nebe drew into his 
camp, the former holding an improved position from which to gather 
evidence against Himmler and Heydrich. On May 1, Daluege transferred 
Nebe to the Berlin Police Praesidium, where he assumed command of 
the Prussian State Criminal Police Office.26 He was slated to take com-
mand of a Reich detective force, an ideal agency for assuming the work 
of the political police. This makes more meaningful Frick's April ad-
monition that the emergency situation was only temporary, for with it 
would also go any justification for the extraordinary political police and 
all of Himmler's police power. 
Regardless of his possible long-range plans, Frick accepted a great 
risk: acceding Himmler's acquisition of the Gestapo and the political 
police in the little Lippe states where Frick had blocked him.27 Appar-
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ently Frick had to accept Himmler's personal command over all the 
political police as essential to curbing the revolution. If he saw this as 
an interim measure, it seemed a small price. 
If these were the reasons for Frick's involvement, those of Goering 
are less clear, especially since he lost so much in the short run. The long 
and seemingly endless struggle for police power had worn Goering 
down; both Diels and Gisevius indicated as much. His position had 
become increasingly indefensible. From the Nazi point of view, even his 
ideological position was weak, which must have counted for something 
with a man who loved his own rhetoric. He never ceased to claim for 
himself the proper NS role of creating an efficient strike force against 
their enemies, yet building his own police in opposition to efforts at 
Reich centralization was too obviously personal aggrandizement. His 
own fight against more particularistic SA police lords must have im-
pressed the contradiction upon him. The very mechanism of bureaucratic 
imperialism worked against him as he resisted from his regional base 
the superior claims of Himmler or Frick to provide an efficient national 
police. 28 
More specifically, the loss of Diels as a suitable head of the Gestapo 
weakened Goering's position. The strain had been too great for Diels as 
well. The American ambassador's daughter, Martha Dodd, who saw 
him frequently during this time, commented on his obvious symptoms 
of physical and nervous exhaustion. His condition interfered with Ge-
stapo work, and Goering lost confidence in his stability.29 Furthermore, 
if Diels's account is to be believed, Goering in fact had reason to suspect 
that he would not be as decisive an agent as Goering needed for a 
pending confrontation with the SA. Not only did his illness weaken the 
effectiveness of the Gestapo, but he allegedly showed signs of unwill-
ingness to flout the law as freely as necessary.30 Whether any of this 
was true or not, Diels's personal conflicts with all of Goering's new allies 
made him a liability that had to be cut. 
In his book, Diels left a contradictory account of his removal. The 
book constantly shifts from references about his dismissal to tales of how 
he was trying to resign for reasons of health. He claims to have resisted 
persistent efforts by Goering, Hess, and Hitler to keep him in office;31 
however, Martha Dodd, who verified many of Diels's memories, gives 
no indication that he intended to resign. 
Several traditionally cited but unelaborated stories tell of some coup 
by Himmler and Heydrich that so undermined Diels that an unnerved 
Goering called them to Berlin. In one version the SD exposed and as-
sassination plot against Goering that the Gestapo had failed to detect, 
and in another Patschowski (Heydrich's plant in the Gestapo) used his 
key position in counterespionage to cause the fall of Diels.32 Some or 
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all of these developments may have motivated Goering to tum the Ge-
stapo over to Himmler, but, regardless, Goering's position in the strug-
gle for police power had become weaker and could soon become 
untenable. If a deal at this juncture saved a complete loss, it was a deal 
and not a coup forced on him suddenly, for all evidence indicates an 
extensive period of negotiation. Heydrich's wife remembers several 
weeks of maneuvering while Goering tried to keep Heydrich out of the 
Gestapo. Himmler insisted and prevailed on this point: Heydrich would 
actually run the Gestapo. 33 
Although Goering had ample reason to distrust and dislike Hey-
drich, someone like Goering would hardly fear him at this early stage. 
His distrust of Heydrich probably grew more from Heydrich's unfor-
tunate personality, in contrast with Himmler's adroit use of scapegoats 
in building his own image of reasonableness and pliability, an image 
significant to his acquisition of political police commands, ostensibly 
under Nazi lords like Goering. In fact, according to one associate, 
Himmler actually held Goering in awe and diligently sought good re-
lations, even for many years after the balance of power had shifted. 34 
Himmler's reasons for the alliance seem obvious, yet it clearly re-
quired a commitment that must have troubled him. Throughout 1933, 
his rise had been as much in alliance with Roehm as against SA unre-
liability. They had worked together well against conservative opposition 
as late as December. Yet the obvious appeals of the 55 as a police power 
were its greater reliability as an alternative to SA excesses, and this 
Himmler openly exploited. Between late 1933 and April 1934, he gradu-
ally distanced himself from his old comrade and commander, while 
many still numbered him and Roehm-SA and 55-together in the radi-
cal NS wing.35 
In all of this, Hitler's position remains the most clouded. Although 
historians have generally attributed Himmler's acquisition of the political 
police to support from Hitler-even to an uncharacteristic "order" from 
Hitler-Edward Peterson may be correct in not dismissing Diels's ver-
sion that Hitler and Hess avidly sought to restore Diels to office and to 
keep Himmler out of Berlin. Goering and Himmler may have even kept 
Hitler in the dark about their negotiations. Deeply involved in the deli-
cate operation of balancing the forces of the Second Revolution against 
moderate Nazis and conservatives, Hitler might have viewed an advance 
in Himmler's power as disruptive of that balance.36 It is premature to 
argue that in April Hitler deliberately built the 55 and police in order to 
break the SA. In fact, he had not yet decided that the SA needed break-
ing. 
What emerges clearly from the contradictory sources about the de-
velopments and deals that brought Himmler to Berlin is a healthy leaven 
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to stereotyped images of the Nazi leaders as Machiavellian draftsmen 
of a blueprint for totalitarianism. Their Third Reich grew less from design 
than as an awkward assemblage of pragamatic compromises made by 
bitter rivals on the basis of common, but by no means identical, ideo-
logical goals. If there were victors, they were those, like Himmler, who 
combined opportunism with plans general enough to allow flexibility 
and only specific enough to indicate a general sense of direction. 
On April 20 Goering introduced Himmler to the gentlemen of the 
Gestapo Office. While Goering retained the title of chief of the Gestapo, 
Himmler became its deputy chief and inspector, and Heydrich became 
head of the Gestapo Office. This distribution of titles involved more than 
a change of command, for the political police forces of Germany became 
further removed from the control of normal state administration and fell 
increasingly into the hands of leaders of the NS Movement. 37 
Of course, Goering had always been chief of the Gestapo, but those 
who really ran the central machinery-his former deputy, Chief State 
Secretary Grauert, and Diels (the inspector and head of the Gestapo 
Office)-were products of German civil service traditions. Although they 
had little respect for liberal concepts of individual rights and the limits 
of state authority, they did at least respect a traditional order that they 
saw as "legality" and "proper procedures." Even more basic, they dis-
played some psychological and intellectual restraints related to a respect 
for humanity. In contrast, Himmler and Heydrich, who replaced them, 
would sweep away all liberal and conservative obstacles. Nevertheless, 
they encountered real external restraints, for April 1934 was only a major 
turning point in terms of long-range consequences, not immediate 
changes. 
Into their hands fell the extensive Prussian political police, rounding 
out Himmler's control of such forces all over the Reich. With the Gestapo 
also came control over the border police stations in Prussian territories. 
As part of his March reforms, Goering had subordinated them to the 
Gestapo regional offices. In fact, Himmler had long been drawing the 
border police into the 55 empire, for 55-men also had a monopoly on 
auxiliary border police work in those states with Reich borders. All bor-
der police were destined for inclusion in Sipo and SO as a wing of the 
Gestapo. 38 
By now the newly acquired Gestapo had grown immensely, al-
though still only a portent of things to come. Before the end of 1933, 
under Diels, the rapidly growing Gestapo Office already included 122 
civil servants and 600 police employees, with a budget of 3,950,000 RM 
for the Gestapo and 9,850,00 RM for the concentration camps it admin-
istered.39 
Although this was a much needed resource for Himmler's always 
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inadequately funded 55, the Gestapo provided no well of luxurious ap-
pointments and easy money. In their desire to build a Gestapo of their 
own people, Himmler and Heydrich had at least three real constraints. 
First, for many purposes they needed trained police professionals who 
could not be replaced by just any 55-man. Second, although they con-
tinued to skirt some civil service personnel regulations, Frick and his 
allies constantly interfered with these tactics. Beyond these limits, they 
had to consider the power of local Party leaders and debts to Old Fighters 
in making appointments. 40 
Especially in finances, Himmler and Heydrich found Gestapo re-
sources inadequate for their needs. As a matter of fact, they had more 
trouble with the Prussian Ministry of Finance than had Diels before 
them. In particular, funding problems impeded efforts to pump 55-men 
into the Gestapo as civil service candidates and police employees. For 
instance, the monthly salary of a police employee (Krimianlangestellte) 
was only 109 RM, basically intended to support young bachelors begin-
ning their careers. This was wholly inadequate for more mature family 
men like those being brought in from the Movement, and Diels had been 
able to get supplements to raise their salaries to 160-180 RM. When 
Heydrich replaced Diels, the source for such supplements temporarily 
vanished. By juggling, he maintained some supplements, but had to 
reduce the total by 20 RM per man. Even with Goering's intervention, 
it took up to a year to settle this one financial problem. As a consequence, 
according to Heydrich, he could not lure civil service personnel from 
other agencies or compete with the uniformed police, and the increased 
demands and extended hours for Gestapo personnel exaggerated such 
problems. In fact, over the next year the numerical strength of the Ge-
stapo actually declined. 41 
Originally, the terms of the Frick-Goering-HimmIer compromise lim-
ited Himmler's freedom with the Gestapo, and it took over two years 
to dissolve those limitations completely. For instance, although Goering 
headed the Gestapo directly as prime minister, Frick, as both Prussian 
and Reich minister of the interior, could interfere, at least indirectly, in 
political police affairs. Furthermore, Goering insisted on being informed 
of all significant Gestapo business, and since he offered a necessary 
screen against Frick, HimmIer probably wanted him to remain more than 
a titular head of the Gestapo for the bulk of the year. 42 Heydrich inserted 
himself only gradually between Goering and the internal affairs of the 
Gestapo. 
On a larger scale, central control of the lower level of the Gestapo 
regional offices and field posts remained uneven. The ambiguous au-
thority of the regional offices and field posts remained uneven. The 
ambiguous authority of the regional governors and, for Berlin, the police 
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president, still provided for outside interference. The governors viewed 
the regional offices as part of their domains, and played on competition 
between those regional offices and Gestapo field workers from. Berlin. 
Their success in penetrating Gestapo business depended largely on the 
character and personal loyalties of the local Gestapo leaders, :whose ap-
pointments often involved broad political circles.43 The settlement of 
these matters occupied the better part of the year. 
Despite all the limitations within Prussia, Himmler had achieved a 
major victory. He rounded out his titles to "Reichsfuehrer SS and Po-
litical Police Commander of the States of Anhalt, Baden, Bayern, Braun-
schweig, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Luebec, Mecklenburg, Oldenburg, 
Sachsen, Thueringen and Wuerttemberg, and Inspector of the Secret 
State Police in Prussia" -a compellation to make any feudal lord green 
with envy. After actually using such a pretentious title, however, he 
found that things had not gone so far that he could get away with it. 
Frick turned it into ridicule. Himmler later limited his title to "Political 
Police Commander of the States and Inspector of the Gestapo in Prus-
sia.,,44 
Regardless of how he titled himself, Himmler held Germany's first 
unified command of political police forces. The direction of each federal 
state political police force came under Heydrich, who issued orders un-
der Himmler's titles. The facilities of the Gestapo Office in Berlin in-
cluded the Central Bureau of the Political Police Commander of the 
States.45 Although 8 Prinz Albrect Strasse became the first common 
headquarters, the political police were legally united only under 
Himmler personally. Financially and organizationally, they remained 
divided. However, having achieved even these limited victories, Himm-
ler and Heydrich began consolidating and exploiting their power base. 
Toward this end, the role of their political police powers in the purge 
of the SA proved decisive. At the same time, the SD developed signifi-
cantly enough to be ready for a role in the purge. 
11 _____ _ 
The SD and Conservative 
Opposition to June 1934 
With guaranteed survival and the increased appreciation of the Party 
Leadership came badly needed funds. When Party Treasurer Schwarz 
calculated the SO budget in January 1934, he set it at 4,000 RM per month. 
Shortly thereafter, perhaps in May, he increased it to 20,000 RM. Hey-
drich had argued for more funds on the basis of increased responsibility 
for Party intelligence work and the need to reward field service personnel 
with salaries after their long period of unsalaried sacrifice. He badly 
needed money to establish the still embryonic SO and to secure personnel 
who might otherwise turn elsewhere for better pay. Nevertheless the 
financial problems of the SO remained, for Schwarz failed to produce 
even the originally budgeted funds on schedule. In May, SO salaries fell 
in arrears so badly that, according the Heydrich, his men were threat-
ened by their debts. 1 Short funds remained a perennial problem, com-
plicated by an almost exponential increase in Heydrich's demands for 
further enlargement of the SO budget. 
In addition to the budgetary increase, a solitary payment of 68,000 
RM was also promised, apparently to cover expenses for the transfer of 
other Party intelligence organizations into the SO. Such phenomenal 
increases in funding were tied to the October 1933 order that the SO 
absorb the NO of the Foreign Political Office. Heydrich had referred to 
this order in a letter to Schwarz in May, saying that the date of this 
order "lay so far back that by further delay the danger would appear, 
and has already partially appeared, that new intelligence services would 
be formed."2 Heydrich had good reason to worry about competitors, 
for since the NS power seizure, Party intelligence agencies had prolif-
erated. The transfer of Schumann's operations to the Foreign Political 
Office had not terminated intelligence in the Propaganda Command, at 
least not at the Gau level. 
For instance, in the Gau South-Hannover-Brunswick, local remnants 
of Schumann's old NO not only survived but also took on a renewed life 
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that easily rivaled the local SO. As soon as the acquisition of power made 
the destruction of "enemies" a real possibility and the defense of the 
state a necessity, local Party leaders discovered an interest in intelligence 
work. In April 1933, the Gau Propaganda Command began a crash pro-
gram to convert its old Main Oivision III into a proper NO. Within a few 
months, it was effectively assisting local police in the roundup of Com-
munists and in the persecution of all other "enemies." As a matter of 
fact, it expected to solve some of its financial problems through rewards 
the police paid for such services. By June this NO titled itself the Aux-
iliary Troop (Hilfstruppe) of the Gestapo.3 
In the nearby state of Lippe in early 1934, State Minister and Gau 
Inspector Reicke regularly received reports from an NO in Gau Westfalia-
North and from the Ie of SA Standarte 55. In Gau Cologne-Aachen the 
police president of Cologne absorbed the Gau NO into his political police, 
where they became Gestapo employees in October. 4 In other words, 
Heydrich had competition in Party intelligence that also had received 
support from the political police in Laender he did not yet control. Many 
Gauleiter, distrustful of the SO, maintained their own services. 
The SD Monopoly 
When Heydrich expressed to Schwarz his nervousness about "new in-
telligence services" being formed, he expected Reich Party Leadership 
to share his concern. This implies that they had already granted the SO 
a tacit monopoly over Party intelligence work, perhaps only implied 
because Hitler had not yet approved, or remaining unannounced be-
cause it could not be enforced. By spring 1934, however, Himmler and 
Heydrich had the means for enforcement and used them fully. 
The means came with command over the political police, whose 
cooperation, or at least tacit consent, had been essential to the operation 
of rival intelligence agencies, and whose authority could be used to crush 
such agencies. On May 16, the new bosses ordered that in all cases of 
high treason and counterespionage the Prussian Gestapo would cease 
all cooperation with the counterespionage services of the Party Orga-
nization, of the NS Organization of Factory Cells, and of the Counter-
espionage Office of the Labor Front. They were to prosecute any SA 
actions in such matters. The SO would be recognized in the future as 
the sale intelligence organization of the Party. 5 
This assertion that the SO was the sole intelligence organization of 
the Party also indicates that prior to Hess's June announcement, the 
Party Leadership had bestowed a de facto monopoly on the SO. The 
order to the Gestapo not only enforced this decision before it could be 
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reversed, but also encouraged the Party Leadership in acts of enforce-
ment. The order belongs to the allied effort by Goering, Himmler, and 
Hess to bring the SA and other elements of the Second Revolution under 
tighter control. Hess's forthcoming June 1934 announcement about the 
SO monopoly has often been interpreted as a decision by Hitler to turn 
to the SS and SO as instruments for controlling the SA. In fact, it seems 
more complicated than that, and there were good reasons why Himmler 
and Heydrich were anxious to use their police power to push the claims 
of the SO. 
First, their allies were hardly committed permanently to them and 
to strengthening their positions. The alliance probably included no 
agreements about the SO, because Goering remained uneasy about it, 
and so did Frick. Other components of the alliance against Roehm, like 
the military and the Foreign Ministry, not only thwarted SA intelligence 
activity in the realm of foreign affairs (having won Hitler's support to-
ward the end in April), but opposed SS and SO interference as well.6 
By the same token, the military preferred limited dealings with any Party 
agencies in counterespionage work. Although the military wanted to 
rely entirely on agencies of the state like the police, especially the Ge-
stapo, manpower needs and the fear of Communist counterstrokes had 
earlier given the SA a ready pretext for inserting itself into such work. 
Thus the Gestapo order of May 16 was one big step toward reversing 
SA involvement and strengthening the bond between military and 
police. Ironically, such increased military cooperation with Heydrich's 
Gestapo gave the unwanted SO an entree into counterespionage. How-
ever, that and its involvement in foreign intelligence became serious 
only after 1934. 
As for the interpretation that Hitler had turned to the SO for an 
instrument against the SA, that remains as suspect as the tradition that 
he supported Himmler's candidacy to command all the political police. 
He clearly responded to the pressure from Goering, the Party Leader-
ship, and branches of government to curb the SA, to the obvious benefit 
of the SS and SO. This pressure probably produced Hitler's consent to 
an SO monopoly of Party intelligence, but announcements by Hess 
rather than the Fuehrer, and much foot dragging in execution were more 
characteristic of Hitler's indecisiveness. 
Ultimately Himmler and Heydrich achieved their victory by means 
of force. With police power, they softened their competition, facilitating 
the Party Leadership in enforcing "the will of the Fuehrer." On June 9, 
Hess finally published the order proclaiming the end of all intelligence 
and counterespionage services of the Party. By mid-July the work of 
absorbing the internal intelligence apparatus of the Foreign Political Of-
fice was to be completed, and beginning in July the Gauleiter were to 
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cease funding any other agencies. On July 27, Schwarz issued similar 
orders. Henceforth the Gauleiter were to receive the necessary intelli-
gence from the SO.7 
Oespite the apparent finality of Hess's and Schwarz's orders, the 
SO victory remained incomplete, and Heydrich and his people had to 
negotiate and maneuver continually against rivals. To begin with, the 
order applied only to agencies of the Party, not the state. Neither the 
Abwehr, the Foreign Office, nor Goering's Forschungsamt came into 
question. Even the Party agencies of powerful rivals survived, at least 
in part, and the delimitation of their authority vis-a.-vis the SO had to 
be negotiated carefully. The NO or Ie of the SA would probably have 
remained untouchable had it not been for the June purge. Even so, it 
was not dissolved until February 1935.8 
One powerful rival was Robert Ley, head of the Labor Front (OAF) 
and key member of the Party Leadership alliance against Roehm. This 
alliance probably gained his consent to the demise of the Labor Front's 
Counterespionage Office over to the SO; its dissolution was announced 
on September 13. Nevertheless, Ley's OAF retained an Information Of-
fice that would continue to report on influences affecting the mood of 
personnel and their recruitment. Although some friction between this 
office and the SO continued, Himmler confidently asserted that the work 
of the office should produce no difficulties. 9 
Himmler made this assertion for the sake of appearances, but he 
was hardly naive enough to trust Ley's good will to carry out his side 
of the bargain. In typical fashion, Himmler had a reliable SO agent in 
the OAF to take over the Amt Abwehr, to supervise its liquidation and 
the creation of the Information Office suitable to SO requirements. His 
man, SS Lieutenant Felix Schmidt, had been drawn into the SS and SO 
in March. Schmidt, also an Old Fighter, had well-estalbished roots in 
Party Leadership and the OAF, ensuring his acceptance by Ley. Al-
though he later drifted from the SO camp, he served adequately for the 
early years of SO-OAF relations. 10 
Given the official announcement by Hess and the economic stran-
gulation provided by Schwarz, Heydrich used his police to clamp down 
ever more tightly on any remnants of rivalry and to bring the SA under 
further pressure. On June 25, he reminded his Gestapo officials of Hess's 
order, held them responsible for its enforcement, and ordered immediate 
reports on even the most minor violations. 11 In other respects, too, the 
acquisition of the Gestapo tremendously boosted the status of the SO 
as an intelligence agency. It now had access to Gestapo sources and the 
intelligence-gathering resources of many other state agencies. On May 
30, Heydrich ordered all sections of the Gestapo Office to maintain files 
on all important affairs for the information of the SO.12 
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Continuing Restraints 
While the SD developed, Frick's growing concern over the Second Revo-
lution drove him to bring under control all radical elements-especially 
SA and SS. To limit Himmler, he planned to replace his extraordinary 
political police with something more traditional. Aware that both 
Himmler's extraordinary police and the excessive police actions of the 
SA were possible because the public and powerful elements of German 
society would tolerate almost anything in the name of law and order, 
he tried to reduce the public hysteria over "lawlessness" from which 
this tolerance grew. Both he and Goebbels agreed that the constant 
reports of enemy theats and police action inflamed rather than assuaged 
this hysteria. Knowing that the political police fed the media its news, 
he requested that they severely limit their releases, while Goebbels 
brought similar pressure to bear on the news media itself. Grudgingly, 
Heydrich took almost two months to comply.13 
If Frick could in this way weaken support and justification for ex-
traordinary police powers, he could either reduce the independence of 
the political police and bring them more tightly under his control, or he 
could dissolve them. As his April decree on protective custody indicated, 
he saw something of this sort as the desirable direction, but unfortu-
nately he failed to push for it on every front. 
In March, Reich Minister of Justice Franz Guertner and Hans Frank 
(now Reich justice commissar and minister without portfolio, head of 
the Party Legal Office, and president of the Academy of German Law) 
called for an end to the concentration camps and to the entire system 
that functioned beyond the courts and state penal authorities. Even by 
the time they coerced Hitler into a meeting of all concerned, including 
Himmler, Frick had failed to join their cause. Hitler denounced such a 
move as "premature" in the face of Germany's domestic and foreign 
problems.14 Perhaps Frick supported the Himmler-Goering position as 
part of their alliance against the Second Revolution. Perhaps he still 
believed he could simply displace his allies and their extraordinary ma-
chinery with more professional machinery. Perhaps he knew where Hit-
ler stood. 
Even at this stage of their "alliance," Frick wanted to eliminate 
Himmler from command of the political police, which he could do if he 
dissolved those extraordinary police after the right conditions had "ma-
tured." Of course, this dissolution would require a suitable detective 
force to replace or absorb those police. Toward this end, in May Frick 
began the reorganization of the Prussian Criminal Police as an indepen-
dent, centrally commanded force along the lines of the Gestapo. Simul-
taneously, his staff studied the problem of expanding the force into a 
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Reich Criminal Police. IS Such a Reich agency would be a two-pronged 
victory, both replacing Himmler's separate political police in each state 
and creating the sort of centralized police Frick desired. 
Meanwhile his April decree on protective custody was producing 
tighter controls. As in the other states, in May collective pressures finally 
brought Wagner to decree corresponding regulations for Bavaria. He 
replaced his directives of the previous year with the more restrictive 
Prussian model. 16 Yet this imposed no really significant limits on the 
pattern for the police state that Himmler had developed in Bavaria; it 
even concentrated further extraordinary police power in Himmler's 
hands. The new decrees eliminated his police competitors such as the 
SA, leaving only his ostensible state government superiors, whom he 
had already proven capable of outmaneuvering. 
Although eliminating the uncontrollable competition furthered the 
common Frick-Himmler objective of regulating and centralizing the po-
lice, Frick anticipated that that regularization would bring increased sta-
bility, which, in turn, would end the need for extraordinary police like 
Himmler's. Meanwhile, the new regulations provided what was needed: 
one identifiable authority in each state who bore primary responsibility 
for all that happened in the way of extraordinary police action. Theo-
retically, Frick could pressure and control that authority, which was 
Himmler in every case. Since the regulations also provided for the col-
lection and reporting of complete information on the extraordinary police 
activities of "these authorities," such information could be used in ar-
guments for the eventual dissolution of Himmler's political police. 
Meanwhile, from his position as Reich official responsible for police 
affairs, Frick could maneuver to weaken Himmler's base of power, using 
as a weapon the dependence of the Leander upon financial support from 
the Reich. The extraordinary political police had been built on the hys-
teria of the state of emergency, leading each Land to exceed its respon-
sibilities and resources. Frick and the minister of finance maneuvered 
to reverse these trends by refusing the funds needed to support extraor-
dinary police forces. While at first they directed the attack against the 
uncontrolled auxiliaries, later they also applied it to Himmler's political 
police and state-supported concentration camps. 17 
A careful orchestration of his limited authority enabled Frick to mo-
bilize as allies all those state officials opposed to the growth of Himmler's 
power. For instance, in Wuerttemberg, where Himmler's alliance with 
Reichsstatthalter Murr had given him titular command of the political 
police, his real influence was checked by State Minister Morgenthaler 
and the head of the Political State Police Office, Dr. Mattheiss. But in 
May, apparently in collaboration with Himmler, Murr removed Matt-
heiss and sought to replace him with his own man, SS Lieutenant Dr. 
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Stahlecker, who would work closely with Himmler. Morgenthaler mo-
bilized a counterattack and turned to Frick for support, playing of Frick's 
claim to have authority over such appointments.18 The result was a 
stalemate, with a clear but reversible advantage for Murr and Himmler: 
Until a definitive settlement, Stahlecker would be acting head of the 
political police office and Himmler's influence could grow apace. On the 
other hand, Frick's office had made its own gains by asserting its au-
thority, acquiring allies, and impeding Himmler's progress. With the 
end of the state of emergency, Frick could hope to be in position to 
dissolve or absorb Himmler's police. 
On the Prussian front, Frick tried to prevent further evolution of the 
Gestapo toward the Bavarian model. On June 19, as Prussian minister 
of the interior, he called together the Reich and Prussian ministries, and 
promised to restore the former relationship between the district gov-
ernors and the Gestapo field posts. Toward this end, he promised that 
he and Goering were working on a new decree for the Gestapo.19 Un-
fortunately, Goering's staff produced such an innocuous decree that 
Himmler and Heydrich also gave it their full support. It simply clarified 
Gestapo responsibilities to the governors without giving them any pow-
ers to limit Gestapo action. The governors would retain their respon-
sibility for political problems in parallel with the Gestapo, and the 
Gestapo posts were to keep them informed through regular reports. The 
governors could order Gestapo posts in their districts to take political 
actions, but only so long as their orders were not in conflict with those 
of the Gestapo Office.2o Goering was still playing his complex games, 
for June 1934 was no time to weaken the Gestapo. 
Whether he really believed he had Goering's support or not, Frick 
tried to accumulate allies in Prussia for the future struggle. At his June 
19 meeting he courted the governors. Among them, a new appointee 
for Cologne, Rudolf Diels, more than willingly raised objections to po-
sitions taken by Goering and Himmler. Most significant, Frick pro-
claimed to the governors that the division of police powers in Prussia 
(that is, between Gestapo and regular police) was justifiable only as a 
"transitional measure" and must be terminated. 21 Toward that end, 
Frick needed a cooling-off period after the revolutionary phase, and he 
greeted the pending July furlough for the SA as just such an opportunity. 
Frick knew Germany needed a pause and a period of calm for his plans 
to mature. He had made an open declaration of war on Himmler's ex-
traordinary police machinery and powers, but he needed a period of 
normalcy to carry out his campaign. Unfortunately, the problem of 
Roehm and the SA made that impossible. 
12 _____ _ 
The Roehm Purge 
Although conflict between the radical and conservative wings was as 
old as the Movement itself, Hitler had held them together so well that 
there had been amazingly few factional splits. However, in the spring 
of 1934, tensions became so great that Hitler reluctantly approved a 
decisive purge. The forces of the so-called Second Revolution consisted 
of those dissatisfied with the extent of the NS revolution. Having broken 
the power of the left and intimidated the liberals into submission, they 
also wanted to sweep aside the establishment, especially those allies 
who had made the initial power seizure possible and whose continued 
alliance would limit their revolution. Although the ranks of the Second 
Revolution included a wide range of lower middle class, peasants, and 
workers organized into the economic affiliates, and at least one-third of 
the Party leadership at all levels (including some Gauleiter), the SA stood 
foremost in their ranks as the most visibly threatening. 1 
Aligned against the Second Revolution were not only their would-
be victims-the leaders of finance, business and industry, the officers 
corps of the military, the bureaucracy, and conservative political lead-
ers-but also those elements of the Movement like Frick who favored 
a conservative-traditional dictatorship, or those like Himmler, Goering, 
or the Reich Party Leadership and certain Gauleiter who favored a con-
trolled revolution. Many of the latter group, although radical in their 
own right, had based their power on state bureaucratic machinery, so 
the Second Revolution, especially SA nihilism, threatened them. Al-
though Himmler shared many objectives of the Second Revolution, he 
was troubled by its lack of discipline, its questionable loyalty to the 
Fuehrer. 
The growing split between Himmler and his old friend Roehm un-
doubtedly arose from the SS mission-to watch and control those rowdy 
and undesirable elements that Roehm had failed to control, and that he 
often inflamed with radical appeals. Nevertheless, the two might have 
remained allied against the enemies of their revolution; Himmler's ac-
quisition of the police machinery of the state must have driven the wedge 
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between them. Having police authority intensified the tensions between 
Himmler's authoritarianism and his radicalism, and the forces aligned 
against the Second Revolution won him as an ally, completing the split 
between the Party's paramilitary organizations. In the process, Hitler's 
tactic of pitting the SS and SA chiefs against each other played a decisive 
role. Nevertheless, since Hitler decided on a radical solution only as late 
as June, the argument that he made Himmler Roehm's executioner is 
strained. Until June, Hitler's role remained that of the great arbiter: he 
meant to maintain distance between his lieutenants, not to split them 
irrevocably. 
The struggle for power during 1933 had brought NS differences to 
a head and created irreconcilable camps. Once they had formed, they 
pressed Hitler to his fateful decision. The established social and eco-
nomic powers of German society felt threatened, and their concern over 
NS excesses grew. They channeled numerous complaints to Frick and 
Hitler, and occasionally they pressed court actions. Most significant, 
however, when Roehm renewed his assault on the military in January 
and February 1934, he convinced them it was vital to end his threat of 
displacing them. On another front, the French, still in a position to crush 
an isolated Germany, applied external pressure to reduce the paramili-
tary formations. Aggravating the situation, Hitler received constant com-
plaints from all levels of the Party and state leadership, and a growing 
mood of public discontent over SA excesses became palpable. Until late 
June, however, this coalition of pressures could not drive him beyond 
efforts at compromise. 
Finally Hitler's paranoid suspiciou·sness and opportunistic political 
strategy combined fatally against Roehm. Memories of the Strassers and 
their links with the early SA revolts, and of von Schleicher's attempt to 
woo the Strasser wing and the SA were reignited by rumors of their 
continued machinations, especially after Schleicher's return to Germany. 
Such rumors usually featured Roehm and other dissident elements, and 
Roehm's enemies guaranteed that Hitler heard them all. According to 
Diels, as early as January Hitler had given him direct orders to make 
thorough reports on the SA, and soon Diels was adding to the rumor 
mills with stories of Communist infiltration of the SA. At midmonth, in 
a conference with Goering and Diels, Hitler allegedly referred to the 
elimination of Schleicher and Strasser. Perhaps it was meant only as 
Henry II had meant his ill-fated remark about Thomas a Becket, but 
Goering interpreted it as a death warrant.2 Regardless, as far as Roehm 
was concerned, Hitler still pursued compromises until June. 
On June 4 he convinced Roehm of the necessity for more subtle 
approaches to their goals, and they agreed to a rest leave during June 
for the SA leadership and a furlough during July for SA troops. The 
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tensions heightened, however, on June 17, when von Papen made a 
speech in Marburg attacking NS excesses and raising the specter of a 
rightist coalition that could either topple Hitler or destroy his freedom 
of action. As long as Hindenburg still lived and his succession remained 
unsettled, the military held a decisive trump card. Around June 21, it 
apparently played that card, for Blomberg and Hindenburg allegedly 
threatened Hitler with a military coup if he failed to end the tensions. 
Hitler then decided to take drastic action. On June 24, Himmler set his 
machinery in motion. 3 
The roles of Himmler and Heydrich and their organizations in Hit-
ler's decision are the subject of controversy. According to the rumor 
mills of the Third Reich, the combination, especially Heydrich, initiated 
a conscious conspiracy to destroy the SA through fabricated evidence 
of a pending coup. The traditions, reinforced by circumstantial evidence, 
have been repeated as fact in memoirs and testimonies, and elaborated 
into sensational histories that require careful examination. 4 
Based largely on the testimonies of involved SS and SD leaders, 
Wolfgang Sauer assembled a scholarly, convincing account of how belief 
in a pending SA coup grew largely from grossly exaggerated evidence. 
Himmler and Heydrich, using SD reports, and Gen. von Reichenau and 
the Abwehr deluged Hitler and the military with threatening intelli-
gence. When the evidence was insufficient, they even manufactured it. 
Elaborating on these accounts, Heinz Hoehne described Heydrich as 
one who had long dreamed of a purge of enemies like Roehm, who 
worked to win Himmler to his cause by the spring of 1934, and who 
then did the most to engineer the final event. In contrast, Shlomo Aron-
son concluded that Heydrich was in no way the central figure in the 
purge. In fact, although there are indications of Abwehr-SD cooperation 
against the SA, and although Heydrich clearly coordinated with General 
von Reichenau (chief of von Blomberg's ministerial office) as the result 
of a Goering-Himmler-Reichenau alliance, most evidence indicates that 
the Army, especially von Reichenau, provided most of the incriminating 
evidence and agitation against Roehm. Heydrich's role appears increas-
ingly that of executor rather than instigator. 5 
Since the documents generated within the police, SS, and SD rele-
vant to June 30 were destroyed on orders, only scraps and vague passing 
references survive. 6 There are only the memories of witnesses not di-
rectly involved or of participants from below the circle accused of fab-
ricating the "SA putsch." They had no firsthand knowledge of the 
motivations and conscious thoughts of their superiors, other than what 
they deduced from the passing remarks of men who loved to posture. 
Goering, a surviving central figure, was uncooperative at Nuremberg, 
and naturally preferred to shift the blame for "excesses" onto Heydrich. 
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If Wheeler-Bennett must argue that the stories about the involvement 
of certain generals "are completely lacking of confirmation and should 
be treated with great reserve,"7 the same objective reserve must be 
applied (although to a lesser extent) to the involvement of the notorious 
villains of the Third Reich. Although their roles as executioners are be-
yond doubt, their motives and actions in precipitating the purge require 
more analysis. A layman's understanding of human psychology sug-
gests several alternatives less sensational than images of Machiavellian 
geniuses conspiring to destroy their enemies by complete fabrication. 
The mental processes of Goering or Reichenau need not concern us 
here, but rather those of Himmler and Heydrich. For Heydrich, the route 
from his first position under Himmler in 1931 to June 3D, 1934, was 
shaped by his responsibilities, first as secret service chief and then as 
de facto head of the political police. A desire to eliminate competitors 
mayor may not have been part of the formula. He learned from the 
very beginning that uncontrolled, putsch-inclined elements in the Move-
ment or reactionaries who hindered the Fuehrer's goals (as described 
by Himmler) were as much the proper objects of suspicion as Marxists. 
He learned that an ability to see enemies behind every bush and to 
demonstrate the most fantastic liaisons between the most unlikely bed-
fellows earned an NS secret service chief his laurels. His more cautious, 
more objective, or less imaginative opponents fell by the wayside. Under 
such conditions, he may well have lost touch with reality and objectivity. 
His responsibilities required winning agents or inserting them into 
the SA, the Party leadership, the state bureaucracy, and conservative 
circles. They had to report back with every scrap of suspicious infor-
mation, every outburst or careless remark of frustrated revolutionaries 
or worried conservatives. As Heydrich's net grew, the "evidence" in-
evitably multiplied, increasing his suspicion of a potential COUp.8 As 
Heydrich presented this evidence from allover the Reich, Himmler, 
whose own theories of conspiracy had shaped Heydrich's system, must 
have become equally convinced, especially since the military produced 
so much corroboration. Although their common desires to eliminate 
opponents, personal enemies, and troublemakers played a role in their 
readiness to jump to conclusions, it need not have been a cynically 
conscious process. In this way Heydrich and his SO offices, Himmler's 
other lieutenants (like Eicke), and Goering as well drew up their lists of 
suspects, eventually the execution lists for the purge. Reports of the 
existence of such enemy lists as early as April are, therefore, consistent; 
however, the point at which they became "murder lists" is less clear. 
Almost .all accounts of events leading to June 30 reveal a mutual 
escalation process that undoubtedly convinced the Goering-Himmler-
Reichenau group of the necessity for drastic measures and pressed them 
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to convince Hitler. As the Reichswehr, SS, and police took precautionary 
measures against the suspected coup, the SA responded to what it saw 
as suspicious preparations. That, in turn, led to more reports of SA 
machinations and to more countermeasures. In forwarding such infor-
mation to Hitler, no one had to resort to deliberate fabrication; they 
merely communicated their own excitement and fear. Rather than con-
sciously deceiving, they exaggerated out of the natural human tendency 
to convince others as they themselves had been convinced. Of course, 
they may have consciously fabricated,- but for no other motive than to 
prove what they "knew" to be true but could not prove properly. Their 
efforts to seize and assemble proof in the days following June 30 testify 
to their belief. 9 Even if they suspected that their case was really weak, 
psychological mechanisms would suppress their doubts, for they had 
risked everything and exposure could destroy them. Since the forces of 
the Second Revolution were indeed capable of doing what was sus-
pected, they would always be a threat, and there was every reason to 
nip them in the bud once and for all. In this way the victims of June 30 
(most of whom were far less innocent than the other victims of Nazism) 
fell prey to the very same mechanisms that destroyed all other" enemies" 
of the Third Reich. 
The precedent for the purge lay in the actions against the Marx-
ists. The Roehm purge followed as the second logical step in the self-
righteous destruction of "enemies" on the grounds of suspicion. That, 
after all, was the essence of "preventive law enforcement," the phi-
losophy of the police state. This process reached its logical conclusion 
in genocide, the destruction of "enemy races" during time of war. 10 This 
is the context of the cold-blooded behavior attributed to Heydrich and 
his agents, including many who later accused him. There is no need to 
question the many corroborating testimonies of the manner in which 
Heydrich issued his execution orders or of the ferocity of their execution, 
directed against enemies on whom the executioners had projected the 
worst of their own hates and fears. 
SS and police-both uniformed and political police-were available 
all over the Reich for the purge, or "counter-coup." They had material 
support from the Reichswehr, whose troops stood by in case the SA 
could not be emasculated. They operated under the direct orders of 
Hitler at Bad Wiessee, Roehm's vacation headquarters. Heydrich, work-
ing in unison with his superiors, Himmler and Goering, directed op-
erations from Berlin. All over Germany his SO and police lieutenants 
followed written and oral directives for specific actions. In a few cases, 
local initiative or rashness added to the deaths. Most SA leaders involved 
were arrested, though a few were shot on the spot. The key personnel 
were then summarily shot, and the less significant eventually released. 
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In most cases involving those who were not SA-men, Heydrich allegedly 
gave orders that they be shot for resisting arrest, or that a "suicide" be 
arranged. ll Which of these names, if any, Heydrich personally added 
to the list remains debatable. 12 Undoubtedly he and Himmler consulted 
with Goering about many "preventive executions," but it is mere specu-
lation to assign specific responsibilities. 
For HimmIer and Heydrich personally, the purge conveyed some 
clear message and some invaluable opportunities. If, as argued, they 
had not intended a fusion between SO and political police all along, they 
increasingly pursued that line of action after June 30. HimmIer had long 
seen the necessity and the benefits of joint command over SS and police. 
If Heydrich had missed the value of this before, it now became apparent. 
Until this point the SO and the political police had been merely com-
plementary organizations united only in his joint command. SO-men in 
the political police had facilitated his control in some cases, but they had 
not been indispensable. Most SS members of the political police were 
not directly under his command as SS-men but merely as policemen. 
Any police could have been relied upon to :make the arrests between 
June 30 and July 2. When an instant execution was intended, however, 
SS-men usually got the assignment. Political policemen accompanied 
them to the place of action to provide the cover of a legal arrest but were 
not trusted to shoot. The most crucial roundups were assigned to units 
of the Leibstandarte, to Eicke's concentration camp guards, or to other 
special SS units, in the pattern of the SS Bereitschaften-for use where 
the general police could not be employed. The Prussian Gestapo were 
still considered too close to the general police to be completely reliable. 
The reason is clear. One cannot legally order a policeman to go 
beyond the limits of his authority; that is, he cannot kill except in self-
defense of to prevent a dangerous criminal from escaping or committing 
a serious crime. Heydrich could not rely on policemen to assume the 
role of executioner. At any moment their sense of propriety might take 
over and they would insist on due process. Men like Leibstandarte Cap-
tain Kurt Gildisch, believing that prompt, decisive action was necessary 
to prevent an uprising, simply obeyed orders and executed their victims 
on the spot. They adhered to their oath to obey Hitler and their SS 
superiors. Their responsibilities did not include questioning SS General 
Heydrich about the particulars of his orders to shoot someone, at least 
not during a state of emergency. 13 
June 30 made integration of the police with an obedient SS command 
an obviously desirable course. In his SO, Heydrich already had subor-
dinates who ranged from those who merely felt a strong sense of obe-
dience-as long as they believed that the fuehrer principle worked for 
the best-to others who would do any kind of dirty work. For such 
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reasons, in areas where control over the political police had been tenu-
ous, on June 30 he dispatched reliable SO officers as provisional heads 
of the local Gestapo-for instance, Ernst Mueller in the area of Breslau 
and Liegnitz. Subsequently Heydrich told Goering that he needed to 
replace the majority of Gestapo field post leaders as a result of their 
performance during the purge. 14 Obviously it would be to Heydrich's 
advantage if the remaining 55-men who were not SO were to be trans-
ferred to his command as chief of the SO. They had to become SO 
members. 
The purge tightened Himmler's control over the political police and 
eliminated some opposition among the rest of the police. A number of 
those purged were SA police presidents like Heines in Silesia, who had 
interfered with control of the Gestapo. There, after the purge, SO Police 
Commissioner Ernst Mueller became head of SO Major Region South-
east, which was then freer to function in the former SA stronghold of 
Silesia. In the Breslau Gestapo office, he was succeeded by Anton Ounck-
ern, one of the Bavarian police reliables recently drawn into the 50.15 
The purge also provided a pretext for inserting SO men and other 
trusted agents into organizations and agencies that they wished to ob-
serve. Surveillance of the SA seems in fact to have increased rather than 
diminished. 16 The SA Ie or NO was finally dissolved in February 1935. 
Had he remained, Roehm would certainly have preserved this rival of 
the SO. The purge also induced many to volunteer their services to an 
SO, now credited with having saved the new Germany from anarchy 
and rule by undesirable elements. In this way, the contacts of the SO 
information net grew. 
Although the purge clearly strengthened Himmler and Heydrich's 
control over the political police, it unevenly shaped their positions in 
the general power struggle. Himmler and his 55 had proven, as never 
before, their "loyalty" to the Fuehrer and reminded him of his depen-
dence on them. As a reward, Himmler and his 55 became fully autono-
mous, free of all ties to the SA. As several scholars have stated, Hitler 
abandoned the forces of the Second Revolution, with whom he sym-
pathized, because he realized they were impractical and anachronous. 
He retained, however, their goals of breaking the old order and raising 
a new one. He understood the techniques of modern revolutions, which 
function more subversively but produce more pervasive changes. 
Himmler and the 55-police concept provided a reliable instrument for 
such a cold, silent revolution, which undermined and replaced the old 
order slowly, operating below a surface of seeming normality. Within a 
generation they would pervade society with a whole new world view. 17 
The elimination of the SA forced Hitler to rely on the 55 to save him 
from control by the old order. The same developments entrenched the 
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SD as the information service of the new order. However, although the 
Party leadership around Hess had groomed Himmler, the 55, and the 
SD as allies, thereby elevating them considerably, their role in the purge 
made them independently powerful rivals. 
For one thing, the purge affected their public images in conflicting 
ways. The role of the 55 and SD in suppressing undesirable elements 
enhanced their image with some. As they dominated various legitimate 
functions in Germany, specifically the police administration, they be-
came avenues for advancement for either families of note or the lower 
middle class who wanted to rise in the world. Entry into higher social 
circles thus became easier, and 55 contacts with powerful circles of busi-
ness and finance increased.18 This newly acquired preeminence, as well 
as the brutal 55 role in the purge, brought the equally negative reactions 
of fear and distrust. The total image of the 55 and its police affiliates 
can only be understood as a peculiar synthesis, as was also true of the 
relations between Himmler and his former allies. 
When the military, Goering, and the Party Leadership first allied 
with him, Himmler was a useful junior partner with valuable instru-
ments at his command. Fortunately for him, they did not all see him as 
the next Roehm, but to prevent that from happening he had to maneuver 
carefully, maintaining an image of propriety and cooperation. The con-
tinued growth and entrenchment of his 55-police system depended on 
his ability to play the game subtly enough to avoid a united opposition, 
yet forcefully enough to win. To do this he had to keep his 55 and police 
in line. As for Heydrich, head of the political police and SD, he generally 
understood the rules and played them well, but at times his ego problems 
or his impulsiveness created more troubles like those of the previous 
summer. The same was true of others in the 55. 
In general, the military came out of the purge in a state of compla-
cency. Most generals realized the implications of what had happened 
only in stages and at different rates. At first, a generally cooperative 
spirit prevailed between the military and the political police, although 
attitudes toward the 55 and SD were ambivalent. Gradually, an oppo-
sition to Himmler's system developed, but never decisively enough to 
break the military from its dependence upon the 55 for the "necessary" 
dirty work of the Third Reich. This dependence emerged when they 
relied on the 55 to execute the SA. It would find its logical conclusions 
in the Einsatzgruppen on the Russian front years later. 19 
As for Goering, he gradually relinquished police power to Himmler, 
while retaining enough of a foothold to bolster his prestige. Meanwhile, 
June 30 restored-perhaps increased-his former suspicions of Himmler 
and especially of Heydrich. From this point on, he played them off 
against his other opponents in the state and Party. Within the Movement 
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itself, the Party leadership discovered that while the 55 had replaced 
the SA as a threat, they, like Hitler, were dependent on the 55 as an 
instrument for controlling the revolution. There thus emerged a three-
sided tension among the 55, the Hess-5chwarz leadership, and Robert 
Ley's machinery, specifically the OAF. In this struggle, the 50 spy net 
would prove a valuable tool for Himmler. 20 
The remaining factor, the conservative bureaucratic leadership, ex-
emplified by Wilhelm Frick and entrenched in the machinery of state, 
drew a clear lesson from the blood purge. They knew they could not 
accept the 55-they had to shunt it aside also. With no interruption in 
the assault they had developed prior to June 30, Frick and his cohorts 
continued their conservative counterattack against the growing system 
that combined the SO, police, and concentration camps. In this coun-
terattack, they had hopes for appeal to Hitler. By most accounts, Hitler 
was shocked and upset by the full scope of the bloodletting, and suffered 
psychologically from so brutal a split with old friends. Regardless of how 
much the purge had served his immediate needs, psychologically he 
must have blamed those who encouraged it, specifically the military and 
Himmler, on whom he allegedly vented anger when first shown the full 
death list. 21 Despite his obviously growing dependence on Himmler for 
police and security services, Hitler had good reason to remain ambivalent 
about further expansions, even about continuation of Himmler's police 
power. 
13 _____ _ 
The Conservative 
Counterattack 
If Frick had not been building his forces before June 30, the experience 
of the purge would have compelled him to do so. On the first day of 
the action, when he realized that something was afoot, he rushed to 
Goering, who was busy coordinating things with Himmler and Hey-
drich. Goering allegedly dismissed him, telling him not to worry, that 
things were being taken care of and that he could go home. 1 If Frick 
had needed it, he now had a clear lesson about his relative standing 
among supposed allies. They had maneuvered without his knowledge 
and would conduct their extraordinary police work without his inter-
ference. 
On Monday, July 2, at the end of the purge, Frick issued a decree-
not a product of haste but part of his ongoing campaign, for it had been 
in preparation for a week before June 30. Even so, the wording and 
conception of the decree made it a self-defeating choice for a test of 
strength against Goering and Himmler, especially at that particular mo-
ment. In it, Frick attacked the participation of non-police agencies, spe-
cifically the 50, in political police work. Oisdainfully, he referred to the 
50 as "the private security service of the Reichsfuehrer 55." He charged 
that such unsuitable cooperation interfered with routine, endangered 
secrecy, and made it impossible to discipline or punish those responsible 
for abuses. He notified all state governments that he strongly desired 
such cooperation to cease immediately.2 
Of course, Frick was attacking the uncontrolled exercise of police 
power by an organization of the Movement, the very abuse he had 
sought to curb by cooperating with Goering and Himmler. Breaking the 
5A had eliminated one major component of the problem, but the role 
of the 55 and 50 in the purge put their threat in sharper focus. Unfor-
tunately, that role also made their link with the political police at least 
temporarily unassailable. By flying in the face of a real constellation of 
power, Frick may well have predetermined his failure. 
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In one fatal move, he challenged Hitler's recent acknowledgement 
of the SO, almost as though he sought to shock Hitler into a return to 
proper procedures of state and to a relegation of Party organs to their 
proper position vis-a.-vis the state. He apparently assumed that most of 
what had happened was without Hitler's knowledge, and that Hitler 
would support him if he set things right. Perhaps Frick wished to test 
the Fuehrer's sincerity about the order Hess claimed he had given on 
the 50's monopoly, or perhaps he believed recent events would induce 
Hitler to reverse or to limit his support. It that was the case, for a man 
who was losing the means to play such a game he chose a poor tactic. 
From this point on, Frick's formerly close working relationship with 
Hitler deteriorated.3 Coming as it did in the heat of the "suppression 
of the coup," a time when Hitler felt his rule had been narrowly saved, 
Frick's maneuver must have given Hitler further doubts about one who 
insisted on due process during "emergencies." This gambit, like many 
others culminating in futile appeals to the Fuehrer, must have under-
mined Hitler's respect for Frick. Losers, especially those who made an 
issue of their losses, did not earn the respect of one who believed in 
social-Oarwinistic processes. 
If this move undermined Frick's standing with Hitler, it directly 
affronted Goering. Always amenable to efforts to counterbalance Him-
mler, Goering was susceptible to appeals for more proper (that is, more' 
rational and efficient) police procedures. Instead, Frick's tactic openly 
challenged Goering's power and the "sharp strike force" he wanted to 
develop. On July 5, he responded decisively and self-confidently. Citing 
the free hand Hitler had given him and Himmler for the political police 
work of the preceding days, he claimed that Frick stood in opposition 
to the Fuehrer's guidelines. Under these conditions, SO cooperation was 
indispensable; therefore, Goering asked Frick to rescind the decree as 
far as the political police and the SO were concerned, and informed Frick 
that he had already instructed Prussian officials that the decree was 
inoperative for the Gestapo.4 
In no position to question or test Goering's assertions about Hitler's 
orders, Frick stood checkmated on the political police. Nevertheless, as 
Goering's response indicated, in regard to the regular police he could 
press his case more successfully. For instance, by October, Saxon law 
once again forbade state policemen to be members of the SO. Through-
out 1934 and 1935, a variety of regulations appeared prohibiting 55 mem-
bership among uniformed police. Some emanated from police 
authorities, some from the 55 itself. Although they were inconsistently 
enforced, it seemed that Himmler could be excluded from authority over 
all the regular police.s If the political police remained Himmler's only 
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special domain, Frick then had all the more reason to try to terminate 
their extraordinary status. 
Himmler reacted to Frick's attack more adroitly and less sponta-
neously than Goering. The response reflected the necessity for him to 
balance carefully two opposing pressures: the more radical N5 pressure 
to "partify" the police and put police work in hands that would deal 
properly with the enemies of the nation; and the demand for a return 
to normal, legal and proper (though "effective" and authoritarian) police 
institutions. The former demand had helped Himmler win command of 
all political police; he sought constantly to remind N5 circles that he had 
given these police their proper ideological directions. On May 24, Hey-
drich had attempted a visual reminder of this state of affairs by en-
couraging Gestapo personnel to wear their N5 uniforms to emphasize 
the identity between Gestapo and N5. 6 
Himmler responded to Frick on July 4. Without reference to Frick's 
circular letter, he ordered on his own authority that, given the 50's 
special position as sole security agency of the Party, it was a special 
"supplement" (Ergaenzung) to those organs that protected the state. 
However, he promptly and carefully balanced this order with an appeal 
to those yearning for more normality in police affairs by forbidding fur-
ther executive action by the 50 and limiting its cooperation with the 
police to informational support. 7 He thus defused Frick's major argu-
ment, simultaneously calming fears of 55 power growing out of June 
30. After such maneuvers, the purge represented proof of the continued 
need for extraordinary powers, rather than the threat of an uncontrolled 
55. Henceforth Himmler needed only to maintain an image of propriety 
sufficient to stifle fears that that power would be abused. 
On the same day, Himmler made yet another significant move to 
elaborate his 55-police-concentration camp model. 5ince May, Eicke 
had been reorganizing the Prussian camps, so Himmler named him 
"Inspector of the KL (concentration camps) and Fuehrer of the 55 Camp 
Guard Units [Wachverbaende)." A step toward his goal of creating a 
centralized concentration camp system for the entire Reich under his 
command as Reichsfuehrer 55, this maneuver eliminated state control 
(Goering's, Frick's or any other minister's) over the Prussian camps and 
made Himmler answerable only to Hitler for their management. 8 He 
also tried to use his position as commander of the political police in the 
other states to achieve a similar goal, bringing his Oachau model to the 
Reich level. Although this tactic had failed, at least temporarily, in Ham-
burg,9 it apparently succeeded in 5axony. 5uccess or failure in the 
smaller states mattered not, however, for he dissolved their little camps 
and transferred all internees to the Prussian, 5axon, and Bavarian camps. 
The confidence with which Himmler attempted this coup grew from 
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the service the SS rendered on June 30, and there is no indication that 
he discussed it with Hitler. Goering must not have known of it, or at 
least he failed to understand its full significance. Himmler obviously 
attempted it without the knowledge of Frick and other ministers. They 
knew Eicke had taken over the Prussian camps, but they must have 
assumed he came under Himmler as inspector of the Gestapo, and, 
therefore, under state control. lO Since Himmler concealed his full inten-
tions until August, however, this coup remained unchallenged. 
Meanwhile, Goering made the next gambit in coordination with 
Himmler and Heydrich. It resulted from the "lessons" of June 30 and 
the troublesome interference of bureaucrats, like Frick's futile attack on 
the SD-Gestapo relationship. On July 6 Goering issued the decree on 
the Gestapo that he had promised Frick for the clarification of relations 
between Gestapo field posts and the regional governors. Now, however, 
he responded to Frick's previous declaration of war with a double blow, 
dealing both with the field post problem and with Frick's contention 
that the status of the Gestapo was provisional. Goering stated that he 
had intentionally removed the Gestapo from all other police and ad-
ministrative channels and made it an independent part of the admin-
istration directly under him. He had endowed this department with an 
especially great meaning for the stability (Bestand) of the new state, and 
he intended to stand by that decision. He would administer the Gestapo 
field posts. As a special authority, the Gestapo would handle all com-
plaints and appeals itself, with himself as the final appeal: "Only if, in 
important cases, my orders go with the least delay directly to the au-
thorities responsible for executive action, and only if I can receive from 
them important reports in the same manner, is the work possible in the 
Gestapo which the situation requires."n 
Concerning the field posts, Goering reiterated their separateness and 
independence from the regional governors, and he clarified the division 
of labor. As partial compromise, the regional governors retained re-
sponsibility for political police work, with the Gestapo posts keeping 
them informed by regular reports and executing their directives unless 
they contradicted Gestapo orders. Goering, expecting this duplication 
of responsibilities to increase efficiency rather than cause competitive-
ness, ordered all authorities to cooperate: "The sharp instrument of the 
Gestapo, which I have created for the new state, has necessitated un-
doubted rifts in the structure of authority. However, bureaucratic friction 
can be avoided through a sincere cooperation.,,12 
On the very next day, before he had full knowledge of what Goering 
had done, Frick continued on his aggressive tack. First he notified Goer-
ing that he intended to resubordinate the Gestapo field posts to the 
district governors because of the problems resulting from their separa-
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tion. Then he issued orders to all Land governments that provincial and 
district governors were to forward monthly political situation reports to 
him. In this order, Frick tried to place on record two significant facts 
and to create mechanisms for the eventual replacement of the extra-
ordinary political police. First, he remarked, as if in passing, that the 
independent political police resulted from the special circumstances sur-
rounding the power seizure-a reaffirmation of his major attack. Then 
he argued that their separation from regular administrative channels had 
cut the rest of the government off from its normal sources of political 
information, depriving the Reich ministries of knowledge they needed. 
Frick's order creating the governors' reporting system gave them the 
pretext for establishing their own political intelligence system indepen-
dent of the political police.13 
Goering's response to both acts came two days later, in the form of 
a letter to Frick. He nullified Frick's intended resubordination of the 
Gestapo field posts, because his decree of July 6 had settled the problem 
and, as he had stated in the decree, conditions necessitated the inde-
pendent political police. He elaborated in a handwritten note appended 
to his official response: The "Roehm revolt" had clearly proven the nec-
essity of the Gestapo; freed of bureaucratic encumbrances, it existed for 
the lightning-quick execution of the Fuehrer's measures. Goering then 
promised Frick to forward a report; after Frick had studied it, they could 
discuss the matter. 14 Initially, Goering also responded mildly to the 
creation of a political situation report system in the administration. He 
welcomed it as a complement to his July 6 decree on the Gestapo and 
noted that he had already ordered the field posts to give their political 
situation reports to the governors. He then asked to receive directly copies 
of the governors' reports. Perhaps intentionally, Goering avoided any 
reference to the "temporary special police" argument that Frick pur-
sued. 1S 
If Goering's initial response to Frick's move was as mild and co-
operative as this correspondence suggested, he soon changed. Perhaps 
he began to realize the full significance of Frick's move, or perhaps some 
of those around him, like Himmler and Heydrich, incited fears of a 
devious plot. In any case, on July 11 he then drafted several very hot 
responses to Frick that made some distorted interpretations of Frick's 
order. Unfortunately, the surviving records do not indicate whether 
Goering actually dispatched such letters to Frick, but clearly they were 
defensive and hostile reactions to Frick's latest move. 16 Whether or not 
it was Himmler and Heydrich who had incited Goering's anger, they 
certainly fanned the flames later in the month. On July 21, they for-
warded a report from the Duesseldorf field post complaining that the 
local governor was establishing a political system separate from that of 
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the Gestapo. They complained that duplication of effort would hinder 
their work and asked that the governor be ordered to turn to the relevant 
Gestapo field post for his reports. 17 
Meanwhile Frick and his allies pressed Goering with numerous ac-
counts of the problems created by an independent political police. Frick 
complained that the Gestapo Office disobeyed Goering's repeated orders 
to keep all responsible agencies informed. For instance, Frick still lacked 
complete knowledge of the fate of many officials after the recent purge. 
Governors and local police officials generally remained in the dark, and 
the political police who should be accountable to them were actually 
conducting investigations into their affairs. Sometimes local Gestapo 
leaders questioned the authority of governors to give them orders. Frick 
and his officials, supposedly responsible for law and order, could not 
function. 18 
This campaign began of July 13 with a letter of complaint from Frick 
to Goering. He expressed the surprise with which he had received the 
decree of July 6 and objected to matters of such significance to his min-
istry being decided without his knowledge or participation. Indeed, 
Goering had led him to believe that he was going to restore the authority 
of the governors over the Gestapo field posts. He requested that in the 
future such misunderstandings be avoided by a closer cooperation with 
his ministry. Although he insisted that the situation be corrected as soon 
as possible, he accepted Goering's explanation that it was necessary as 
a transitional solution because of the tense political situation caused by 
the "Roehm revolt.,,19 While trying to stand his ground, Frick apparently 
hoped to establish a closer relation with Goering and to build an over-
whelming case for his cooperation in controlling and eventually elimi-
nating the extraordinary political police. In the following days, Frick 
continued with this tactic. 
On July 16 he issued two orders. In an order to the Prussian gov-
ernors, he began by asserting that his basic thesis was generally ac-
cepted-that is, that the separation of the Gestapo field posts was only 
a transitional settlement. Then he ordered complete reports on every 
problem arising between the governors and the Gestapo. He would build 
his case thoroughly. 20 
In the other order, Frick sought to arouse a broader awareness of 
the problem of the political police. He ordered lower-level state police 
authorities, especially the political police to observe more carefully the 
limits of their authority and, before taking an action, to check its pro-
priety with the highest Reich and state authorities wherever possible. 
He specifically criticized the political police for losing sight of their proper 
mission and expanding their activities into more totalitarian controls, 
such as dissolving societies that were not illegal, or forbidding their 
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meetings, or prohibiting the distribution of church literature of a purely 
church-related nature. He defined their competence as limited to the 
observation, discovery, and legal prosecution of political crimes.21 As if 
the disappearance of the SA danger would make the growth of the 
political police a more obvious threat, Frick hoped to generate support 
against Himmler's controls and to induce from the responsible police 
officials more self-restraint. 
Meanwhile, the even more glaring abuses of the concentration 
camps won Frick more conservative allies for the counterattack. Even in 
staunch Nazi circles, the camps generated a growing awareness that the 
police state threatened them as well. During the summer of 1934, from 
all over the Reich came challenges to the concentration camps and to 
the recent excesses of the purge. In Breslau, the public prosecutor had 
twenty SS men arrested in conjunction with especially wild actions there. 
In Saxony, the prosecutor collected evidence leading to a state case 
against twenty-five SA guards from the defunct camp at Hohnstein and 
against the 5axon Gestapo official who delivered prisoners to them. In 
Bavaria, Himmler's opponents temporarily reopened the case of the 
deaths of Franz and Katz at Dachau. Frick assembled evidence that nu-
merous Party members and even Old Fighters had been languishing in 
the camps before the purge. Belatedly, Frick had joined Hans Frank and 
Frantz Guertner in their attack on the camps.22 
From top to bottom, the state bureaucracy aroused itself. Even the 
Party split over the issue of the camps and extraordinary police action. 
No one doubted what had happened in the camps in the past, and the 
rumors of what went on during the purge had spread across the land. 
In his own speech on the "Roehm revolt" before the Reichstag on July 
13, Hitler had elaborated on the 5A excesses and on the "wild" camps, 
including the case of the 55-Gestapo camp at 5tettin, for which Hoffmann 
and other 55-men had been shot during the purge.23 If these were ex-
amples of the uncontrolled behavior of the "enemies" just purged, they 
would seem to call for a push to abolish the system that allowed them. 
Stalemate 
In fact, nothing better than a temporary stalemate resulted, lasting into 
1935 and followed by the long-range victory of the 55-camp system. 
Most opposition efforts initiated in 1934 petered out or hung fire until 
a new wave of counterattacks in 1935. Hitler stood by his earlier decision 
to preserve the developing machinery of the police state, while at the 
same time not confronting the conservative opposition with a clear de-
feat. 24 
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Preserving some semblance of a compromise, Hitler and HimmIer 
sought to calm the fears of those who felt threatened. On August 7, 
after Hindenburg's death and Hitler's assumption of the presidency, 
they proclaimed a general amnesty for many in protective custody, es-
pecially SA-men seized during the purge. Hitler then announced that, 
since the crisis of June 30 had passed, he wanted Frick's more restrictive 
protective custody regulations (of April 12 and 26) "to be carefully ob-
served by all authorities." The result was a general, significant reduction 
of the total number of camp internees.25 
This development encouraged the conservatives to believe in the 
viability of their argument that the extraordinary system was a transi-
tional measure, and that given time and continued pressure, the Fuehrer 
would restore a more normative legal order. Meanwhile, their own ef-
forts to break up the system met with delay and obfuscation by HimmIer, 
repression by more radical NS leaders, and often final defeat when Hitler 
consented to have a strong legal case quashed. Each time they had to 
accept one or more of three different arguments as prevailing: First, the 
enemies of the nation were still strong enough to require a continued 
state of emergency. Second, any assaults on the system manned by the 
SS and police would undermine the authority of the NS state, thereby 
playing into the hands of the enemy. Finally, the system had been 
brought under proper control, the "wild" stage of the revolution had 
passed, and further abuses would be so insignificant that the system 
could handle them properly. The last two arguments contained just 
enough truth .to be convincing in right-wing circles, thereby undermin-
ing support for the conservative counterattack. 
In fact, the consolidation of the concentration camps and the political 
police under HimmIer eliminated many bases for complaints against the 
system. Lest this statement be misunderstood, it requires qualification 
on two significant points. The "improvements" in question in no way 
prevented the later horrors of the camps; as a matter of fact, in their 
own insidious way they made them more possible than the previous 
"wild" system. The "wild" camps caused alarm and provided an irre-
futable basis for demands that they be eliminated or controlled. On the 
other hand, the camps under Himmler, officially and rigidly regulated 
by a disciplined organization accountable to the head of state, created 
the impression of responsible state management and made it possible 
for some to believe that any abuses that remained were merely inciden-
tal. 
The nature of the improvements also requires closer analysis. First, 
in regard to the concentration camps, Eicke gave the new Reich-wide 
system the same regulations and disciplinary code that had cleaned up 
Dachau in 1933. In all of the "wild" camps, the horrors resulted from 
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woefully inadequate facilities and the lack of regulations for the behavior 
of guards. Without guidelines for behavior toward internees, conditions 
conducive to orgies of sadistic vengeance had developed in most camps. 
Eicke replaced this with a regimen designed to regiment the prisoners 
and to dehumanize their relations with the guards. To ensure rigid order 
and obedience from the internees, a system of graded punishment 
ranged from denial of mail and reduced rations through corporal pun-
ishment to execution. For some offenses, such as attacking guards or 
attempting escape, execution would be immediate. In other cases, it 
would be ordered by a camp court, with no outside appeal. To dehu-
manize relations with prisoners, the guards' behavior was regulated to 
maintain distance and to eliminate human contact. Taught to treat in-
ternees "objectively," that is, as objects, the guards could execute dis-
cipline obediently and without qualms. This eliminated sadistic excesses 
that provided the bases for outside attack and undermined discipline. 
Simultaneously, the guards were constantly indoctrinated with the line 
that the prisoners were "dangerous enemies of the state" who deserved 
no pity. Prisoners thus became suitable objects of retribution, preventing 
questions about the propriety of extreme forms of punishment. Rather 
than as individuals, the guards as groups administered the punishm.ents 
at assemblies of the internees, giving it all an air of due process. 26 
Of course, shooting prisoners on the spot or executing them on the 
orders of a camp court remained illegal where not absolutely necessary, 
and it could provide the basis for a legal action and an attack on the 
system. The maintenance of this threat guaranteed a period of relative 
moderation in the camps that prevailed through 1935 and until 1938-39. 
Improvements in the Prussian Gestapo were in much the same vein. 
Himmler imposed his control over the Gestapo from central office to 
field post, not only to build his own empire but also to eliminate the 
abuses that made it vulnerable to criticism and "bureaucratic" interfer-
ences. Primarily for this second purpose, Goering supported him. The 
tightening of the direct authority of the Gestapo Office over the field 
posts eliminated their irregularities and removed them from the undis-
ciplined authority of local NS leaders. The appointment of SS officers 
to their command or the absorption of their leaders into the SS not only 
facilitated SS penetration but also ensured Himmler's and Heydrich's 
personal control of them. Diels had lacked this institutional authority, 
which was the basis of Himmler's victory. For that reason, one can 
assume that Himmler and Heydrich were sincere in issuing the orders 
to regulate police behavior and to prevent excesses by the Gestapo. Such 
orders were not a facade, as is usually contended. They were of a more 
insidious character that must be understood. 
As early as June 16, Goering had decreed a complete accounting of 
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all protective custody internees. Heydrich tried to follow suit; however, 
establishing discipline with the newly acquired Gestapo took time. The 
freewheeling actions of the purge disrupted the process, and a full ac-
counting of the internees was impossible before August. Heydrich re-
sorted to reminders about the terms of Goering's and Frick's regulations 
as he strove to eliminate uncontrolled abuses by Gestapo personnel. A 
typical guideline reminded them that "it is unworthy of a member of 
the Gestapo Office to insult or to handle internees unnecessarily roughly. 
In case it is necessary, the arrestee is to be treated with the necessary 
severity [Strenge], but never with chicanery and unnecessary persecu-
tion. I will prosecute severely, with the most rigorous means, offenses 
against this order."27 
On October 11, Himmler spoke to all the personnel of the Gestapo 
Office. The speech provides insight into what he wanted the Gestapo 
to be. First, he proclaimed June 30 as the heaviest of burdens that could 
have befallen those who had to shoot down old comrades who had failed 
and become untrue, indecent, and disobedient. The day had proven that 
Hitler's state was not yet victorious but that the Gestapo consisted of 
the most absolutely useful, loyal, and obedient people. He then pointed 
out that behind the events of June 30 were Jews, Freemasons, and Ul-
tramontanists who had infiltrated the Movement and brought on chaos, 
hoping that foreign enemies would intervene once again in Germany. 
Using this as a springboard, Himmler lectured all the detectives on 
searching for the Jewish enemy who lay behind everything that was 
subversive and destructive of German society. He made it clear that 
from here on, the investigators who operated with an understanding of 
the racial conspiracy behind all crime would be the most successful. 28 
After this insight into basic ideology (an insight that came almost as 
an aside to his scapegoating), Himmler described the working proce-
dures and the image he desired for his organization. He proclaimed that, 
as opposed to a bureaucracy, the Gestapo should handle its business 
with soldierly speed. By "bureaucracy" he did not mean careful efficient 
work, but just the opposite: red tape and an anonymity that produced 
irresponsibility. He wanted prompt responses to all queries from other 
agencies, and, where that was impossible, assurances that the matter 
was being pursued. When an official completed his responsibility for an 
assignment, he would personally bring it promptly to the attention of 
the next official rather than shuffling it through the paper mill. 29 
Such behavior would establish the proper image with the public. 
The Gestapo was not to appear as a blind, anonymous bureaucracy, 
especially in cases concerning protective custody. When "the little man 
among the people" reported something, or when the wife waited in fear 
to hear of the fate of her husband taken into custody, they were not to 
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receive facsimiles of paperwork sent as a matter of routine. For that 
reason, Himmler insisted on personally signing orders and reports for 
which he was responsible, and others would do likewise. 
The Yolk must hold the conviction that the most just authority, which works the 
most exactly in the new state, is the dreaded Gestapo. The Yolk must come to 
the view that, if someone has been seized, he had been seized with right; it must 
have the view that, in all things that are not to the detriment of the state, the 
members of the Gestapo are men with human kindness, with human hearts and 
absolute rightness. We must not forget-beginning from the highest to the last 
official and employee-that we exist for the Yolk and not the Yolk for us. 
I also wish that everyone who comes to you will be handled courteously 
and SOciably. I wish that you will use on the phone a courteous and proper tone. 
I wish further that no man will growl in any way. Please, see yourself as helpers 
and not as dictators. 30 
These last passages reveal Himmler's contradictory and ironically 
naive concepts. They compare well with the previous analysis of the 
camp regulations. Himmler wanted the Gestapo to be dreaded for its 
efficiency and coldblooded thoroughness in dealing with enemies, yet 
he wanted the good citizen to know that there was no need to fear that 
organization. He actually believed that policemen could successfully dis-
tinguish between the enemy and the citizen good at heart, that he could 
eliminate the enemy objectively and behave toward everyone else with, 
not just propriety, but also humanity. Himmler was convinced that the 
people could see "enemies" among them seized and crushed and not 
respond to the police with some hostility grown of fear and distrust. Of 
course, he was not so naive as to believe that all this could come into 
being immediately; it would take time for the "poisons of the old order" 
to wear away. What we see in Himmler was not atypical of Nazis. It 
was his genuine conviction that totalitarianism could produce a har-
monious, egalitarian, and paternalisticly authoritarian society. 
Himmler's speech also sought to dispel rumors that he feared could 
damage harmony and morale in the Gestapo. He cited stories that he 
and Goering or he and Goebbels were enemies, that Goering and Hess 
were bloody rivals, that the SS and the military were enemies, that 
General Fritsch aspired to replace Blomberg or that Heydrich coveted 
his position, or that Heydrich had been overthrown, even murdered. 
Of course, Himmler dismissed all of this as seeds of doubt sown by the 
enemy. 31 
Two facts are significant here. First, it was already common gossip 
that Heydrich would overthrow Himmler if he could. This, the basis for 
many of the legends that still surround the Gestapo and SD, might be 
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an accurate description of their later relations, but for these years, it was 
mostly premature. Heydrich's biographer, Aronson, put this in its 
proper perspective by emphasizing the debt that Heydrich owed Himm-
ler and the extent to which he was dependent on Himmler for his po-
sition at this time. 32 
Second, Himmler's concern about rumors of real rivalries grew from 
several considerations. He did not want his subordinates to view their 
milieu conspiratorially. Not only would that be detrimental to morale, 
it would also encourage them to conspire, creating problems of control. 
Some might betray him to his enemies, other might seek his favor by 
being spiteful toward his opponents, generating incidents and more 
tensions. To prevail, he had to control his organizations and ensure that 
they acted against his opposition only as he saw fit. Of equal importance, 
however, the spirit of camaraderie in the Movement had to prevail. By 
the time Himmler gave this speech in October, the complex web of 
rivalries had reached the point where he began suffering some setbacks, 
fueling his need to control his people and maintain an image of propriety. 
On August 18, Himmler had revealed his hand and overplayed it. 
He notified the Prussian Ministries of Finance and Interior that the bud-
gets for the state camps, Papenburg and Lichtenburg (the only two 
official Prussian camps), were no longer correct. "The responsibility for 
the camps, which were formerly directly subordinated to me [as In-
spector of the Gestapo], will henceforth be assumed by [me] the Reichs-
fuehrer SS." Furthermore, he had taken over the former jail at Columbia 
House and the SA camp at Oranienberg. Effective September I, they 
would be financed through a new budget line and one lump sum for 
the administration of all four facilities would be paid to him as Reichs-
fuehrer SS. The SS personnel for the camps would be paid on a military 
pay scale. As a result of these changes, the minister of the interior no 
longer had responsibility for the camps and all requests for funds would 
go directly to the minister of finance. 33 
Himmler had to reveal his hand in order to establish the budget for 
the next fiscal year. He had already broached the matter personally with 
the minister of finance, whom he wanted to deal with Frick. The directive 
apparently reached the offices of the Interior Ministry without warning. 
On first reading, everyone was puzzled over Himmler's sleight of hand. 
Then the passage about the authority of the Prussian minister of the 
interior made it obvious.34 Countertactics began. 
The finance minister informed Goering through a note. While pro-
fessing a willingness to cooperate, he made sure Goering appreciated 
fully that through this move he would also surrender the political affairs 
of the camps to the Reichsfuehrer SS. He went on to observe that the 
whole matter seemed inseparable from Goering's plans for the future 
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organization of the Gestapo.35 Goering was not fully aware of the sig-
nificance of Himmler's tactic, and his staff also seemed unaware of what 
Himmler was doing with the camps. Even if the note from the Finance 
Ministry failed to arouse him fully,36 a little thrust from Frick might have 
pushed him into action. 
On August 28, however, Frick gave his consent to the general terms 
of Himmler's proposal, apparently with ulterior motives. Since he had 
no real control over the economic affairs of the camps, he lost nothing. 
Instead he hoped that the separation of the budget for the camps from 
that of the Gestapo would eliminate some of Himmler's freedom, for he 
used inflated camp funds to expand his police. Meanwhile, he appar-
ently intended to hang Himmler up on technicalities related to his. pro-
posal. 37 He probably believed the camps would soon be eliminated 
anyway. Having retreated from a fight he thought no longer important, 
Frick sought to tighten other screws and to goad Goering into action 
against Himmler's Gestapo. In Prussia, Frick's staff had been develop-
ing regulations to control the actions of all executive police, hoping to 
include the Gestapo. Toward this end, they sent a draft of the regulations 
to Himmler for his comments on how they should be developed. Himm-
ler sought to sidestep this maneuver by responding that because of the 
independent and extraordinary status of the Gestapo, it should be ex-
cluded from such a regulation. 38 
Independent responses similar to this one gave Frick a pretext for 
taunting Goering about his failure to exercise enough direct control over 
the Gestapo. On September 27, Frick chided him about correspondence 
of political significance being answered by the Gestapo Office itself and 
perhaps not even being seen by Goering.39 This and the note from the 
finance minister apparently roused Goering to action. In October, he 
ordered that his ministry exercise more direct control over Gestapo cor-
respondence, and he assured Frick that he was developing tighter con-
trol. 40 Indeed, Goering quickly asserted himself. Although he supported 
Himmler's effort to keep the Gestapo free of external controls, he sought 
to preserve his own personal control. He made a move he had been 
contemplating for at least a month, notifying Himmler that it was time 
to formalize their relationship with a clear delineation of authority that 
he intended to decree. As an interesting aside, his message clearly re-
vealed that he suffered from what he called his "work overload," and 
that his drive was weakening.41 Even so, Himmler had overplayed his 
hand and was threatened with some loss of ground. Heydrich had tried 
to avoid anything that might give Goering offense or create enough 
concern to produce such a move as this. Toward that end, he had begun 
to review carefully all correspondence between Gestapo offices and 
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Goering.42 Of course, this inevitably led Heydrich to insert himself in-
creasingly between Goering and his "sharp instrument." 
The resultant clarification of Himmler's authority that Goering issued 
on October 15 has been interpreted as a clear but temporary defeat for 
Himmler. A temporary obstacle it was, but hardly a defeat. Himmler 
had been summoned to work with Goering's staff on the drafting of the 
clarification, and at that time he apparently began a concerted but tactful 
drive for more independence that gradually wore Goering down. 43 By 
the time he issued the clarification, Goering had lost some of his initial 
determination. He merely specified the general understanding he 
thought he had had with Himmler in April, reasserting the subordi-
nation of Himmler as inspector and of the Gestapo under his authority. 
Although he insisted that, except for political situation reports and cer-
tain emergency measures, correspondence with other state offices was 
to go through his offices, he gave Himmler considerable leeway on the 
basis of the understanding between them. Significantly, Goering re-
tained control of budgetary matters and the appointment, promotion, 
transfer, and release of all the highest officials. Beyond that, the Gestapo 
would be run by Himmler under whom, as inspector of the Gestapo, the 
state concentration camps would also be administered.44 This last point 
was the closest Himmler came to a defeat. Himmler did not run the 
camps as Reichsfuehrer SS; instead, Himmler held them as Goering's 
appointee-a position Goering could modify of terminate if he so 
chose.45 
Even the retention of the camps under the Gestapo, and therefore 
under Goering's authority, was only a temporary setback. Himmler had 
complete control of them and they certainly remained free of Frick's 
influence, as before. Goering's bureaucrats were frustrated in their at-
tempts to exercise any influence, because, although Eicke administered 
the camps under Himmler as inspector of the Gestapo, he was com-
mander of the SS camp guards under Himmler as Reichsfuehrer SS. Eicke 
simply ignored their instructions and requests.46 Meanwhile, for Himm-
ler, Goering remained a valuable ally because his primary concern con-
tinued to be preservation of the "sharp strike" capacity of his Gestapo. 
In contrast to whatever reversal these developments may have 
seemed for Himmler, they actually brought increased freedom of action 
and an expansion of his official authority. For instance, he apparently 
convinced Goering that his title as inspector of the Gestapo poorly por-
trayed his full authority as Goering's deputy. As a result, by the end of 
the month protective custody arrest orders no longer had to be issued 
under Goering's direct authority as "Prussian prime minister and chief 
of the Gestapo," but rather under Himmler's as "Prussian Gestapo 
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deputy chief and inspector.,,47 Goering increasingly withdrew from di-
rect responsibility and involvement. He hardly abdicated everything to 
Himmler at this point, however, for his retreat remained incomplete 
until 1936. Meanwhile, he would make gestures toward asserting himself 
and would complain to Himmler about failures to honor the recent guide-
lines. Nevertheless, Goering's staff was powerless to exercise any control 
and told him so. Goering lacked the confidence to turn to Hitler to control 
Himmler, because Himmler's obstructionist tactics were so frustrating. 48 
In the end, Goering gave up and revealed the full extent of his 
abdication. On November 20, he essentially reversed the previous 
month's restrictions, made Himmler, as his deputy, solely responsible 
for the Gestapo, and removed responsibility from his ministry offices. 
All correspondence henceforth went directly to the Gestapo Office. Goer-
ing maintained direct control only of the finances, merely demanding 
that he be kept fully informed of all other matters of significance. He 
instructed Himmler that he wanted the Gestapo freed, as far as possible, 
from executive responsibilities, and that he especially wanted the field 
posts brought into closer association (Zusammenhang) with the governors 
and the state administration. Despite this general expression of support 
for some of Frick's arguments, Goering trusted Himmler to work out 
the details with the ministers involved.49 In other words, Goering with-
drew from the contest between Himmler and Frick, while trying to main-
tain an appearance of neutrality. Perhaps he was also trying to save face, 
for the contest must have become too much for him. He had been torn 
for too long between the contradictory desires for a "proper" order and 
for a freewheeling police force to defend the new order. After all, the 
former concern was being pursued most properly by Frick, and he had 
entrusted the latter to the able hands of Himmler. 
By the end of 1934, Frick had thus generally lost ground in his efforts 
to control Himmler's power in the political police and concentration 
camps. He could only hinder their growth, limit their finances, and 
obstruct some of Himmler's infiltrations of 55-men into positions of com-
mand. Beyond this his real hope remained a tighter control for himself 
over all other police. Central to this tactic was the establishment of a 
Reich criminal police to replace the political police when a state of nor-
mality was restored. 50 
14 _____ _ 
The Selling of the 
Police State 
Between 1934 and 1936, the nascent police state evolved into an estab-
lished system, with Himmler in command. Before he could overcome 
Hitler's ambivalence about his control of all police and gain appointment 
from the Fuehrer, Himmler had to reduce opposition to more extensive 
police power. To do this, he had to "sell" the idea of a permanent police 
state. In that "sales campaign," the major thrust had to be against the 
contention that the extraordinary political police and concentration camp 
system was only a temporary response to a state of emergency. Beyond 
Himmler's opposition, the targets of the campaign were the rest of the 
establishment and the N5 leadership who could affect the decision. The 
more general target is less easily defined. It included the judiciary, 
the civil service, especially the police, the General 55, broad segments 
-of the Movement, and even the general public, for all contributed to the 
power bases of those struggling over the police. 
Himmler's "sales campaign" to win approval of a stronger police is 
not to be seen as a contemporary public relations campaign, but rather 
as a fight to convince opponents and to educate key segments of society. 
It was not a carefully planned and coordinated program, but one that 
evolved in response to a complex environment. It was such a natural 
process of argument and counterargument that surviving participants 
are amazed at the suggestion that there was any campaign to sell the 
police state.1 Even so, there can be no denial of the striking contrast 
between the surviving evidence and the traditional image of a police 
state grown out of secrecy. Equally striking, the components of the" sales 
campaign" have long been recognized as the propaganda base of the 
Nazi regime. 
The uses of foreign policy adventures, imperialism, orchestrated 
fears, and scapegoating as devices for establishing and maintaining to-
talitarian regimes are established parts of the model for analyzing the 
Third Reich. Nevertheless, for two reasons this model requires re-
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examination. First, its specific application to the selling of the police state 
has yet to be documented in any detail. Second, the general acceptance 
of the totalitarian model as an explanation for the workings of the NS 
police state has led to oversimplification in the literature, both popular 
and scholarly.2 Unfortunately this has clouded the extent to which the 
process was intuitively and/or spontaneously generated, rather than 
cynically calculated. There is a general failure to comprehend the role 
of mutual escalation among the participants. 
Modern radical right revolutionary movements employ both foreign 
affairs distractions and scapegoating tactics. Specifically, in the National 
Socialist world view, the Germans, as inherently superior people, were 
the victims of a conspiracy to prevent their natural hegemony. Other 
nations and international forces ensnared Germany in external entan-
glements and undermined her internal strength. This explained all the 
frustrations of German history, especially the current humiliations. The 
proper response was a determined defense and an aggressive counter-
offensive. From this position, it was easy to move to imperialistic ad-
venture in fulfillment of the natural destiny that one's opponents sought 
to deny. By implication, aggressive expansion became the only secure 
defense against the nation's enemies. Such scenarios, built on the themes 
of national greatness, defense, and security, have proven useful for dis-
tracting the economically, socially, and politically frustrated, focusing 
their attention on "higher" priorities so they can be manipulated. Since 
elites often believed in such national mythologies, they too became sus-
ceptible to manipulation by leaders like Hitler. While Hitler used such 
appeals to direct Germany toward goals evolving in his own mind, 
Himmler elaborated on them for the development of the institutions he 
believed essential to the pursuit of Hitler's goals. 
The other side of this coin-scapegoating-developed to its inherent 
extremes during the Third Reich. Internal conflict in a nation is generally 
believed to sap its strength for external struggle. Consequently, external 
or nonnational enemies would seek to encourage, even to generate, 
internally divisive forces. Within this framework, a xenophobic concern 
with foreign enemies equates easily with tendencies to distrust the non-
conformist. The NS world view, bred from centuries of European intra-
cultural tensions and hostilities, elaborated an international conspiracy 
theory that linked Germany's external enemies with internal minorities 
and with a variety of cultural movements. Not only did the Jew stand 
prominently at the head of the international conspiracy, but Slavs, Gyp-
sies, and blacks played supporting roles. Not only Communism but 
organizations with international, liberal, or pacifist inclinations, like the 
Masonic Order or the Esperanto movement, served as the machinery of 
penetration and discord, as did radical or innovative cultural move-
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ments, like the Sex Reform movement, and nontraditional art forms or 
even new schools of scientific and intellectual thought-Freudian psy-
chology, for instance. Foreign dominated or "Roman" Christianity be-
came suspect for many Nazis, and the most radical rejected even German 
Protestant Christianity. 
Conservative Nazis like Frick and all conservative allies shared this 
mythology to some extent. The vast majority accepted the foreign affairs 
scenario as far as justifying some degree of imperialism. Most shared 
the fears and prejudices upon which scapegoating was based. Conse~ 
quently, they were open to the selling of the police state as long as it 
could be tied to the defense of society against such evils. 
In 1935, Hitler began an escalation of foreign policy that heightened 
international and, therefore, internal tensions. The convenient juxta-
position of heightened concern over the external enemy and growing 
fear of the internal enemy provided the basis for the transition from the 
nascent police state of 1934 to the more secured one of 1936. The foun-
dations had been laid in 1933 when revolutionary zeal and fear of an 
imminent Communist coup created an expanded political police and the 
spontaneous terrorism of SA and SS auxiliaries and concentration camps. 
The radical menace of the Second Revolution had allowed Himmler to 
consolidate the initial foundations into the nascent police state by late 
1934. Its survival and continued growth depended on new and more 
sinister internal threats that in turn derived their significance from the 
heightening international tensions. 
Himmler's ability to capitalize best on the juxtaposition of foreign 
and domestic enemy mythologies lay in his total acceptance of them, 
combined with both an intuitive and conscious awareness of their po-
litical utility. Since the collapse of 1918, he had believed Germany's only 
hope for the future lay in eastward "settlement." In his early adulthood, 
the NS world view fortified this belief and fused it with the theories of 
the internal enemy that provided him with such a coherent explanation 
of Germany's problems. Subscribing totally to the double myth, he 
would create the police state or the state protection corps to defend the 
Reich against its internal enemies, and he would have the SS contribute 
in every way possible to external adventure and advances. His strength 
as a rival in the internal power struggle was that he remained dedicated 
and sincere. He and his lieutenants were able to sell the police state 
precisely because they were sincere. As their tactics succeeded, an 
awareness of their utility must have developed. At an early time, Himm-
ler joined the chorus of radicals encouraging Hitler's foreign policy ad-
ventures,3 and as Hitler's posture became increasingly war-prone, 
Himmler offered the internal security system necessary to prevent a 
repetition of the "stab in the back." This increased Hitler's willingness 
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to grant Himmler police powers he might otherwise have preferred to 
distribute among other competing lieutenants. 
Following the summer of 1934, Germany's international position had 
reached another nadir. The abortive Austrian coup of July made Mus-
solini an enemy, and Hitler's other desired ally, Britain, vacillated be-
tween hostility and ambivalence at best. The return of the Saar in January 
1935 brought no significant changes in the international climate, but as 
the first successful restoration of German honor, it whetted appetites. 
Although Hitler postponed the announcement of rearmament until 
March, not only the military but also the Party leadership got exciting 
glimpses of what lay ahead. On January 3, at a conference of Gau and 
Reich Leaders, Hitler revealed rearmament plans and apparently some 
long-range foreign policy goals. 4 No matter how vaguely stated, they 
would have fired Himmler's and Heydrich's imaginations, increasing 
their determination to furnish reliable instruments for the Fuehrer's pur-
poses. 
The atmosphere in military, government, and Party circles deter-
mined receptivity to Himmler's arguments. A defensive paranoia pre-
vailed, contemplating several years during which Germany would be 
highly vulnerable to intervention by its enemies. The military had to 
consider seriously the possibility of a Franco-Italian attack,5 a fear rein-
forced in April 1935 by the Stresa Front. To this were added the threats 
of the Franco-Czech-Soviet pacts in May and the Comintern pronounce-
ment of the Popular Front tactic in August. The "international con-
spiracy" was obviously mobilizing. 
Of course, Hitler and lieutenants like Himmler used these "threats" 
to manipulate and mobilize Germany as they desired; however, it is a 
best a half-truth to describe this as a cynical manipulation. The threats 
did in fact exist, verifying the world view that demanded a new order 
for Germany. They provided the propaganda base that enabled Hitler 
to build toward the Rhineland occupation as early as June 1935, and to 
push it to conclusion by the following March. Of course, that devel-
opment was, in turn, part of the process of giving Party radicals an 
outlet for action while driving reluctant conservatives into dangerous 
international adventures, 6 but it was process that compelled the manipu-
lators as much as the manipulated. 
Success in the Rhineland increased both fears and the desire for 
more. After March 1936, Germany's position improved and, in reality, 
became secure; however, given a xenophobic world view, one's enemies 
could be expected to take more decisive action. Popular Front victories 
and the ratification of the encircling alliances provided the proof that 
they were mobilizing. Although the Four Year Plan of 1936 to prepare 
Germany for war reveals aggressive intent, and although the military's 
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contingency plans included offensive as well as defensive actions, this 
was not simply the behavior of confident aggressors. In the NS view of 
international struggle for survival, distinctions between offense and de-
fense lost all meaning. By the end of 1936, the growing confidence in 
Germany also produced an increased anxiety of the sort that is felt as 
success becomes visible but remains just beyond reach. In this atmo-
sphere of mounting tension during 1935-36, Himmler consolidated his 
power. 
If the external enemy was mobilizing, then surely his internal sub-
version was on the rise. This assumption went hand in hand with grow-
ing frustrations within the Movement about completing the NS victory. 
Even if the purge had repressed talk about a second revolution, agitation 
continued for destroying the power bases of internal enemies and for 
Nazifying the institutions of German society still largely in conservative 
hands. In this process, Himmler returned to a stance sympathetic to the 
goals of the Second Revolution, making his SS part of the more radical 
component. Hitler must have generally concurred, as long as such radi-
calism did not disrupt his plans and his manipulation of conservative 
allies. 
For the rank and file, frustrations and enthusiasms vented them-
selves most easily and naturally on the Jews. Beginning in April and 
May of 1935 and growing through the summer, a wave of "spontaneous" 
local actions against Jewish property spread across the Reich. As usual, 
NS leaders increased their power bases by supporting and leading such 
actions. SS and SO leaders certainly responded to the pressure. The local 
SS participated often, to the extent of conflict with the local police. Of 
course Himmler sympathized with the spirit of these actions, but he 
intended to control his organization as Roehm had not. Consequently, 
down through the propaganda organs of the SS came official appeals 
against anti-Semitic excesses. 7 
The responsible state officials were in a comparable position. Most 
of them, like Frick, though anti-Semitic, were primarily concerned with 
legality, due process, proper controls, and the necessity of avoiding 
excesses that might invite economic and international repercussions. 
During late summer, both Schacht and Frick pressed for government-
controlled action to solve the "Jewish problem" and to defuse the pres-
sures for uncontrolled violence. The resultant Nuremberg Laws defined 
the Jewish enemy and set limitations on his economic and social role. 
Again, this was a case of the use of ideology and anti-Semitic fervor to 
manipulate the power base in Germany; however, it was also a case of 
the agitators being agitated to increasingly radical positions by the very 
process they employed. 8 
Although the need to attack the "Jewish problem" beckoned Himm-
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ler and some of his people, it did not, in its existing, simple form provide 
all the arguments needed to justify the police state. The real Jew was 
the target of Nazi frustrations partially because he was so vulnerable; 
every Nazi tough knew he could handle his local Jews. The Jewish prob-
lem did not justify elaborate SS and police institutions. Such institutions 
instead interfered with those direct, simple solutions the local tough 
would employ. Nevertheless, new justifications for the police state were 
needed, for success threatened the old ones. Although dedicated Com-
munists would always be good for periodic roundups and the exposure 
of new plots, the old hysteria was wearing itself out. The number of 
camp inmates did not rise after Heydrich took over the Gestapo and 
Eicke consolidated the camps.9 Instead, the process of consolidation 
demanded reductions of internees, and the abatement of the old hysteria 
provided no justification for anything else. 
The new justification required a carefully elaborated scenario por-
traying an all-pervasive and subtly camouflaged enemy who made nec-
essary an extensive and sophisticated security system to detect, expose, 
and defeat him. In 1935, Heydrich began openly and publicly to define 
such "threats" and to propagandize for the means to combat them. The 
SS press widely disseminated copies of a speech in which he proclaimed 
that the nature of the NS struggle had changed. The power seizure had 
not ended it. The enemies of the nation, though denied control over-the 
government, maintained their threat to Germandom. The obvious and 
basic enemies remained: the Jews and their instruments, the Freema-
sons, and the politically active priesthood, most notably the Jesuits, who 
misused the Church. They could either be driven legally from Germany 
or kept under control. Of course, their international ties would remain 
an ever-present threat against which Germany would have to steel itself. 
Such open enemies remained to be dealt with forcefully. But now they 
were joined by the camouflaged enemy-those who worked secretly 
from within, trying to destroy the union between the leadership and 
the people, those who strove to prevent the erection of the NS ideology. 
These enemies would try to seize and hold key posts in the state and 
the Movement. They would use bureaucratic red tape to impede the 
Nazi mission. Like the Devil, who quoted scripture, they would adopt 
NS jargon for arguments to confuse and misdirect the new order. 10 
To be able to identify the enemy was the goal. State apparatus like 
the police could not manage alone, for they could only strike against 
the overtly illegal enemy. As the enemy had adapted himself to the new 
struggle, so must the methods of combating him be changed. Revolution 
had changed to evolution, and power seizure had to change to a cam-
paign for ideological and spiritual conversion. For this, the SS was most 
suitable. 11 
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Although he redefined the threat, at this point Heydrich did little 
more than assert the necessity of a close and continued link between 55 
and police, and of the maintenance of eternal vigilance against the un-
defeated enemy. Essentially, his message was intended primarily for 55 
consumption, demanding of them the more disciplined and controlled 
behavior needed to combat subtle enemies, but maintaining the radical 
edge by exhorting them to cold and inhuman treatment of the enemy: 
55-men had to set the example and excel in everything they did. 
Nevertheless, this pep talk precipitated the campaign to sell the 
police state, or, more accurately, it established a new plateau in 55-police 
propaganda. In the following months, Heydrich and his lieutenants elab-
orated on the theme of the subtle hidden enemy in a broadly based 
propaganda campaign that will be detailed in subsequent chapters. By 
April 1936, as the internal struggle for police power moved to its climax, 
Heydrich reached the logical conclusions of the argument in another 
article, given broader exposure. 5ince the enemy sought to insinuate 
himself into Party and state, there were four consequences for those 
who bore the struggle against him: (1) The political police must certainly 
have contact with the state administration, but they must be indepen-
dent of its control, because the enemy might succeed in penetrating that 
administrative apparatus. Those involved in maintaining national se-
curity must consist of the smallest, most impenetrable circle. (2) The 
men for this job had to be special. Beyond technical, administrative, and 
detective training, they had to be imbued with the ideology in order to 
know the real enemy and to deal with him as would a combat corps. 
That was why the political police should be 55, as so many of them 
were. (3) The political police had to work closely with the SO. (4) The 
50, as part of the 55 and the ideological intelligence agency of the Party, 
was best prepared to identify the enemy. The police mission was tactical 
and executive; the 50 mission, intelligence gathering and investigative. 
Together, they provided the strategic basis for the leadership of the 
movement and, therefore, of the state. The personal authority of Himm-
ler and Heydrich guaranteed this necessary link between political police 
and 50.12 Obviously, it had to be preserved and expanded. 
For such a small organization, the 50 was amazingly well equipped 
to contribute to this "sales campaign." It had a staff of academic, ad-
ministrative, and law-trained ideologues with access to popular and 
professional outlets and to professional colleagues who could be re-
cruited to the cause. For a while it even had what was tantamount to 
its own newspaper, Das Schwarze Korps, the 55 newspaper begun under 
Himmler's commission in March 1935. The editor in chief was Gunter 
d' Alquen, a Hitler Youth Leader since 1925, N5 press member since 
1930, 55 man since 1931, political editor for the Voelkischer Beobachter 
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since 1932, and member of the SO since September 1933.13 For several 
years the SO worked through d' Alquen' s paper, and through his con-
tacts and others in the Party Press and Propaganda Ministry, other major 
media were available to push their line. The legal and administrative 
bureaucracy could be reached through professional organs and through 
SO-held seats on the Academy for German Law and in the universities. 
Nevertheless, such a "campaign" developed more spontaneously 
than consciously, as a product of minds sharing common convictions 
and reinforcing one another in a tense environment. The link between 
the SO and the intellectuals, the judiciary, and the press was a natural 
rather than a contrived conveyor belt. According to participants 
d' Alquen and Best, there was no true propaganda campaign. Public 
relations specialists were nonexistent, there was no clear sense of di-
rection, and those like Best, who presented arguments, argued from 
personal conviction. 14 Nevertheless, he did orchestrate the Gestapo and 
SO contributions. But supporting arguments also came from quarters 
not suspect as Himmler-Heydrich propagandists. Many respectable 
voices, growing out of the old call for law and order, spoke with con-
viction of the camouflaged enemy; they responded to the mounting 
tensions in international affairs and "popular" agitation at home, and 
were susceptible to Heydrich's appeals. In publications from 1935-36, 
the voices of moderation were almost nonexistent. It must have been 
devastating to the morale of those who would have put brakes on Himm-
ler. They must have felt a mixture of fear over being identified with the 
camouflaged enemy and guilt that they might be weakening the order 
at its moment of crisis. 15 
In fighting this battle, Himmler's extremist zeal must have worked 
against him to some extent, however, leaving some hope that he might 
be curbed. Under pressure from disturbed conservative elements, Hitler 
had occasionally to rein him in. Regardless of the image of Himmler's 
SS, it was hardly monolithically controlled, as the Austrian debacle had 
recently shown. His SO was a constant target of Party leader complaints. 
Himmler himself sought to push the battle against enemies beyond the 
limits that Hitler considered necessary at that time. The struggle against 
the churches is a case in point. Himmler was ranked among the radicals 
in his attitude toward the churches, especially the Catholic church, 
which his SS journalists attacked in Das Schwarze Korps. He used his 
police powers to limit them in every way possible and to force them into 
the most narrowly defined role of permissible action. Yet Christianity 
had deep roots in German society, and NS leadership had constant 
reminders of the need to move cautiously. As elsewhere, the machinery 
for making policy on religion became a hopeless mire of competing and 
contradictory influences. Likewise, Himmler's police would find them-
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selves sometimes protecting the church and its property and on other 
occasions breaking up church functions and arresting individual 
priests. 16 
On religious as well as racial issues, Himmler and his instruments 
offered Hitler a sharp force for movement along lines he personally 
favored, but a force that if given too much rein could create dangerous 
situations.17 Such considerations must have counterbalanced Himmler's 
appeal in Hitler's mind during 1935-36, and must have given some le-
verage, no matter how small, to those who sought to block or limit him. 
Himmler's radical attitudes about the militay are a case in point, but in 
this most decisive arena, he managed to maintain his balance long 
enough to capitalize on and orchestrate the combination of international 
and domestic tensions of 1935-36. 
15 _____ _ 
The Military Factor, 
1934-1936 
Although the military had emerged from the Roehm purge with some 
complacency and with renewed confidence, tensions soon developed 
with the 55, and Himmler's attitudes certainly contributed to the prob-
lem. Basically, he shared the belief of the Second Revolution that, as a 
reactionary body, much of the professional officer corps had to be swept 
away before the new order could be complete. Beyond that, as the agent 
primarily responsible for security, he knew that the generals' loyalty to 
the Fuehrer was qualified. 
As a counter to the military, Himmler was to build both the 55 police 
system and the Waffen-SS (the Armed 55, the 55 military units of World 
War II) that would threaten to replace the Army. However, until rearma-
ment was announced in March 1935, the miscellaneous armed 55 units 
were no more than a sensitive issue between the military and 55. The 
Leibstandarte, the Political Purpose Squads, the Death's-Head formations 
(Eicke's camp guards), and efforts oflocal 55 units to be armed as Border 
Protection forces were minor irritants. 1 The later rivalries between the 
military and the Waffen 55 do not adequately explain early conflicts. 
Whatever the reason, in 1934 and 1935 severe tensions developed 
between the Army and the 55, but especially the Gestapo and SO. In 
the latter case, this conflict has, among other causes, been attributed to 
Himmler and Heydrich's desire to have a monopoly in all matters of 
security and intelligence, including the military sphere, especially its 
Abwehr agency.2 Although they eventually pursued total victory over 
military intelligence, the SO was far from ready to assume such a mo-
nopoly in 1934. The early tensions had less grandiose bases for conflict. 
Conflict with the Abwehr 
Tensions between the military and 55 certainly mounted after the Roehm 
purge, but as an inevitable result of the general mood of conspiracy. 
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Some of the military resented the murder of those generals who fell 
victim and disdained, in an elitist manner, all Nazi riffraff. The SS, in 
turn, were contemptuous of the military. This mutual hostility produced 
frequent clashes, ranging from fist-fights to intrigues, but such tensions 
would have developed regardless of Himmler's ambitions. Aggravating 
the discord, elements among Himmler's conservative enemies did every-
thing possible to turn the military against the SS and political police. 
From the Ministries of Interior and Justice, men like Gisevius and Dohn-
anyi channeled material to the generals to convince them of their error 
in continuing to cohabit with the Nazis. 3 Thus they played the role of 
camouflaged enemy, spreading the devisive rumors that Himmler had 
fulminated against in his October talk with Gestapo officials. 
On the other side, Himmler and his people responded as they had 
done to the evidence against Roehm. As a result, military and SS re-
peated the mutual escalation process of the previous spring, but this 
time against each other. By the end of the year, Himmler had convinced 
himself of the imminence of a military coup, and his people assembled 
evidence to support this fear. They especially focused their suspicions 
on the military Abwehr and General Fritsch, chief of Army Command.4 
Suspicion of the Abwehr, or of many of its chief officers, stemmed 
from a longstanding conflict. The Abwehr was a department of the Min-
istry of War, staffed extensively by military personnel. A unified service 
for all branches, its responsibilities included liaison with the Foreign 
Ministry, espionage in foreign countries, sabotage, and counterespio-
nage related to the military and defense establishment.5 The military 
thus had an interservice agency for handling all operations relevant to 
military security and intelligence. Unfortunately, this domain was not 
clearly enough defined to be free of encroachment. 
In two areas Abwehr and police responsibilities were inextricable. 
The first was espionage and sabotage cases, which the police handled 
as crimes against the state and against property. Since no clear line 
separated political crimes that concerned the military from those that 
did not, the military Abwehr had always worked closely with the political 
sections of the criminal investigation police involved in such cases, the 
so-called" Abwehr-police" or counterespionage police. The two had to 
share information, and in matters primarily concerning the military, the 
police had to be willing to accept Abwehr decisions about when to take 
action. The second problem grew from the Defense Ministry's lack of a 
militarized police establishment like that of some other European states. 
Since the Abwehr had neither the authority nor the means for searches 
and arrests in the civil sector, they had to rely on the civil police-even 
in cases that were clearly military-defense matters. Consequently, in the 
last year of the Weimar Republic, when responsibility for coordinating 
work on political crimes and subversive activities was concentrated in 
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the Criminal Police Office under the Berlin president, that office estab-
lished close contacts with the Abwehr. In May of 1933, when Goering's 
new Gestapo Office assumed these responsibilities, the close contacts 
carried over. 6 
If relations between the police and the Abwehr had been relatively 
smooth in the Weimar period, it was because the police had known their 
place. Not only had they felt subordinate to the military, but the political 
police were also too few in number to be overly aggressive in their work. 
Nor were the police at that time impelled by a conspiratorial world view 
that created a crisis atmosphere, driving them to intrude into every area 
out of fear that the traditional guardians lacked the proper ideological 
awareness to do their job. That was a new mood beginning under Goer-
ing's enlarged Gestapo and growing under Himmler and Heydrich. Long 
before the latter two arrived, the problem of divisions of labor had be-
come triangular with the creation of Goering's Investigation Office for 
monitoring communications. Bureaucratic competition had begun. 
In fact, the rivalries were more complicated than that, for foreign 
intelligence added yet another dimension to the intelligence-espionage 
field. In this domain, the Foreign Ministry traditionally considered itself 
solely responsible for political, as opposed to military, intelligence. 
Again, the impossibility of any clear delineation meant potential com-
petition and friction that the Nazi advent greatly exaggerated. Not only 
did the Gestapo and the SD insist that the link between internal and 
external enemies required their involvement overseas, but a range of 
other Nazi organizations inserted themselves as well. First Rosenberg's 
Foreign Political Office, then the Foreign Countries Organization of the 
Party (Auslands-Organisation der NSDAP, the "Gau" for Party members 
in foreign countries), and the Ribbentrop Office under Hess became 
involved in what was only the beginning of a scramble for the intelligence 
empire.7 The rapid growth of espionage and counterespionage work 
immediately after the NS takeover produced serious conflicts. 
To handle the expanding Gestapo Abwehr-police work, Diels had 
transferred Guenther Patschowski from the Breslau Gestapo post in No-
vember 1933. He headed the newly enlarged Division IV (Abwehrpoli-
zei), which bore primary responsibility for a centralized direction of 
Abwehr-police work in Prussia, and, therefore, for liaison with the mili-
tary Abwehr. If Orb's version that the military nominated Patschowski 
is true, it complements other evidence that they sincerely tried to mini-
mize problems between the organizations. If he is also correct that 
Himmler and Heydrich rigged this nomination, they may have been as 
concerned about the ideological reliability of those in charge as they 
were with their assault on the Gestapo. Orb contended that Patschowski 
helped undermine DieIs, but he gave no details. 8 
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A complete explanation of Gestapo-Abwehr relations must be based 
on an inevitable bureaucratic competition exacerbated by ideological dis-
trust. Himmler's and Heydrich's aspirations were an added factor that 
only became significant in later years. Beyond that, many subtleties com-
plicate the analysis. Competition and hostility between organizations is 
usually limited by the necessity of getting important. jobs done and main-
taining a semblance of propriety. 9 For instance, from his advent in office, 
Patschowski's official directives accepted the Reichswehr's traditional 
Abwehr role and exhorted his sqbordinates to "a comradely coopera-
tion ... in the interest of national defense." Although he always sought 
to preserve the Gestapo's monopoly on executive action, SA involvement 
caused more concern than Abwehr intrusion; as with the auxiliary police, 
the increased Abwehr workload had led to the use of SA men as auxiliary 
Abwehr field agents. lO 
Comparatively, Patschowski must have been able to maintain tol-
erable relations with the Abwehr, for he held his own. Elsewhere, the 
Gestapo lost ground and suffered humiliation. For instance, Legations 
Counselor Karl von Buelow-Schwanten of the Foreign Ministry was able 
to use an incident to convince Goering that Gestapo involvement in 
foreign intelligence had been disastrous and harmful to the Reich, and 
had to be terminated. On January 16, 1934, when Diels went to inform 
Buelow of Goering's consent, Buelow not only gloated but rubbed Die!' s 
nose in a description of the poor quality of his intelligence reports and 
the inferior value of Gestapo agents. Diels could only concede.ll 
Goering may well have felt some pressure from above. For instance, 
since foreign reactions were most important to Hitler, he intervened on 
several occasions in favor of the traditional institutions and against those 
of the Movement. Both the military and the Foreign Ministry had Hitler's 
support in their efforts to curb SA and SS foreign activities in the spring 
of 1934.12 Furthermore, as part of his frequent guarantees to the military, 
in October 1933 Hitler had issued a "Cabinet Order" delegating to the 
military sole competence for control of espionage and sabotage against 
Germany's military strength, including related industries and govern-
ment agencies. 13 Of course, NS leaders did not necessarily take him at 
his word, and such an order was only meaningful if one had the means 
to enforce it. The means were the political police, and although they 
would do away with other rivals to the Abwehr, they never completely 
terminated their own or SO efforts. For instance, under Diels the Prus-
sian Gestapo violated the Goering-Buelow agreement by maintaining 
foreign agents, though apparently not as part of any official network. 
After his arrival, Heydrich tried to establish control over such agents, 
specifically in the United States, allowing only a special, limited Gestapo 
contact with them. He thus moved toward conformity with Abwehr and 
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Foreign Office desires. He also respected Abwehr desires to work only 
with the police by removing the SO from the distribution list of Gestapo-
Abwehr paperwork. 14 
Heydrich apparently tried to maintain better relations, but other 
pressures intervened. The bloodletting of June 30 exaggerated tensions 
between the Abwehr and the Gestapo and SO. One of the victims, Major 
General Ferdinand von Bredow, had headed the military Abwehr prior 
to 1932. Bredow's death allegedly alienated both Major Hans Oster of 
the Abwehr (whose role in the conservative resistance is well known) 
and Navy Captain Conrad Patzig, who had served under Bredow and 
now headed the Abwehr. Patzig bacame an outspoken opponent of the 
regime, but especially of radical 55 influence. Both men moved into the 
conservative alliance against Himmler, but this group remained too torn 
by its own ambitions and jealousies to be effective. For instance, Patzig 
is said to have sought cooperation with Buelow, but the latter, equally 
concerned about military rivalry, apparently thought he had the Gestapo 
under control. 15 
Patzig's hostility may have helped the Ministry of Interior maintain 
yet another hold on Gestapo affairs, for, according to Gisevius, for some 
time Blomberg and Frick supervised military-Abwehr-Gestapo coopera-
tion through their respective ministries, and Himmler only gradually 
persuaded Blomberg that direct dealings with him as commander of the 
Political Police were more efficient. Unfortunately, Gisevius, always in-
accurate and vague about temporal relationships, also failed to define 
the administrative mechanics of this liaison. According to Orb, it in-
volved the so-called Sonderbuero Stein, a civil office in a hybrid position 
under the chief of the Heereswaffenamt. Vague in its origins, this office 
allegedly became the Special Action Post (Sonderdienststelle z.b.V.) in 
the building of the Police Presidency Berlin. 16 Also according to Orb, it 
was permeated with SO spies, and became a source of further distrust 
by the Abwehr when the so absorbed it after Himmler took over the 
Gestapo. 17 The Koehler-Orb versions of these stories are so vague and 
confusing that either they must be fabrications or they were intended 
to obscure something important. 
By October 1934, after Heydrich reorganized the Gestapo Office, he 
designated Patschowski's Abwehramt as main Division III. Despite Pat-
schowski's alleged role in SO penetration of the Gestapo, this branch 
contained relatively few SO people, with him and his deputy the only 
ones of significant rank. Personnel changes remained insignificant dur-
ing Heydrich's first year, with no increase in SO representation. Except 
at the lower ranks, experts with counterespionage-police training staffed 
it entirely. Within the Gestapo Office this Abwehr Branch was an "inner 
sanctum," with its offices sealed off from the rest of the building and 
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guarded. Heydrich worked intimately with Patschowski, displaying spe-
cial interest in this area. It had four major subdivisions: III 1 and 2 dealt 
with high treason and counterespionage cases stemming from Eastern 
and Western countries respectively; III 3 worked on all politically mean-
ingful foreign intelligence of a non-Abwehr nature; III 4 was a support 
facility for records, technical support, and training.1s 
Toward a Modus Vivendi 
November of 1934 seems to have been an important month in Abwehr-
Gestapo relations. To begin with a seemingly small point, four new 
police officials transferred into the Gestapo from the Police Presidency 
Berlin and several others from the Berlin Schupo. Perhaps this relates 
to the dissolution of Sonderbuero Stein; it certainly seems related to 
more direct Abwehr-Gestapo liaison. Among the transfers, Detective 
Inspector Ernst Henschel assumed leadership of a newly created section 
first called Special Assignments (Sonderauftrage), then III z.h. V. for 
Evaluation (Auswertung). Detective Inspector Fritz Bolle took over Desk 
III 1A for Poland and Danzig, which may be significant in light of con-
temporary developments to be explained here. Schupo Captains Kurt 
Pomme and Willy Suchanek became Heydrich's adjutants, and, according 
to Orb, Pomme maintained liaison with the Abwehr. As professional 
policemen from outside the Gestapo, these men seemed untainted by 
SD membership. Thus Pomme in particular may have helped build Ab-
wehr trust. According to Orb, Abwehr leaders developed hostility to-
ward Patschowski as they realized he was an old SD plant. Pomme, as 
a long-serving liaison between the police and the Movement, could mini-
mize friction. 19 
With Pomme's arrival, the mounting SS-military tensions of the fall 
of 1934 and the alleged increase in Patzig's hostility was balanced by an 
improvement in Gestapo-Abwehr working relations, at least from the 
Gestapo perspective. Patschowski persuaded the Abwehr to let him sim-
plify their procedures in such a way that Gestapo control grew, over 
observation as well as executive action.20 This was possibly the first sign 
of Patzig's ultimate fall. 
On December 31, Patzig was transferred from the Abwehr to a ship's 
command, a clear victory for Himmler and Heydrich, who had con-
stantly complained to Blomberg about him. According to some sources, 
Heydrich actually engineered his removal, but more likely it resulted 
from a combination of circumstances and Blomberg's general desire to 
work well with the Nazis. He found a good pretext in Patzig's aerial 
reconnaissance over Poland. The maintenance of the new German-Polish 
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agreement, especially at this juncture, greatly concerned Hitler, and 
Patzig's activities could have sabotaged it. When Blomberg discovered 
the operation, he ordered Patzig's removal. 21 Many military men 
strongly opposed Hitler's policy on Poland, giving good reason to believe 
they would sabotage it. Behind this incident lay other reasons to suspect 
the Abwehr. One month after the Polish agreement, they had had the 
bad taste to expose dramatically the Polish spy ring of Captain von 
Sosnowski, which had been in operation since 1932. Given this history 
and the mounting tensions with the SS, Blomberg removed Patzig as a 
gesture of goodwill and replaced him with Navy Captain Wilhelm Ca-
naris. 22 
Canaris's appointment is commonly described as "a blow to the 
influence of the SS at court" because of the tradition that Canaris was 
such a capable member of the resistance and a check upon the Gestapo 
and SO. Such views also presume a check to Himmler's and Heydrich's 
design to take over the Abwehr.23 Canaris's ambivalent role in the re-
sistance has been treated elsewhere. 24 It had certainly not begun in 1935. 
That Himmler and Heydrich could have been so naive as to believe that 
the Abwehr would be turned over to them at this point strains credulity. 
Not only were they overextended in digesting what they already had, 
but the political realities of the military's power and Hitler's promises 
to the generals stood in the way. Instead, Canaris's appointment was 
the best that the SS leaders could hope for,25 guaranteeing smooth per-
sonal relations and politically acceptable Abwehr leadership. 
The forty-seven-year-old Canaris, a professional sailor since 1905, 
had been active in right wing and anti-Communist actions following the 
war, including the Kapp Putsch. As a man who cultivated an air of 
mystery, he was generally associated with a number of intrigues, in-
cluding the escape of the murderers of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Lux-
emburg. Having no love for the Republic, he displayed enthusiasm for 
the new regime and was generally considered pro-Nazi. 26 He cultivated 
social relations with Nazi leaders, apparently to a greater extent than 
most of his fellow officers. When Canaris was training officer on Hey-
drich's ship, the two had established a friendly relationship, one of the 
few Heydrich had with fellow officers. Although this relationship lapsed 
during the intervening years, they resumed and intensified it in 1935. 
The Heydrich and Canaris families became neighbors upon Canaris's 
arrival in Berlin, and they spent much time together. Although this 
friendship may have been based partially on expediency, third parties' 
descriptions of Canaris's fear and distrust of Heydrich must be balanced 
against this intimacy. Canaris also knew HimmIer prior to 1935 and 
carefully cultivated that contact before he became head of Abwehr. 27 
Despite these relationships, Himmler and Heydrich could have 
The Military Factor 179 
played no real role in the choice of Canaris. Apparently, Patzig nomi-
nated his own successor. Knowing the problems were beyond his scope, 
he hoped that Canaris could preserve some control for an indefinite 
period. Although Admiral Raeder was reluctant to support the nomi-
nation, Canaris was simply the only suitable choice for the admiral, 
determined to maintain the Abwehr as a naval enclave in the ministry. 28 
The transition consumed the latter part of 1934, while Canaris 
learned the job he would assume officially on January 1. His primary 
problem was to establish a modus vivendi with Heydrich, who had been 
pushing for a more equal relationship with the Abwehr. The Sosnowski 
affair had apparently given him pretexts to press for access to Abwehr 
files for information essential to Gestapo and SO work. This was only 
a fair balance for the requirement that the Gestapo turn over all relevant 
material to the Abwehr, and that they serve obediently in Abwehr 
searches and seizures. Patzig had doggedly resisted a fair exchange, 
probably to the point of legitimizing the claim that he endangered na-
tional security by his territoriality.29 
Both Canaris and his superiors felt great pressure to establish mu-
tually satisfactory arrangements with Himmler and Heydrich, both for 
the sake of their missions and for political harmony. At this point, 55-
military tensions reached a crisis. Goering, Himmler, and Heydrich had 
launched a campaign of accusations directed especially at Fritsch, whom 
they accused of planning a putsch for January. Hitler intervened and, 
at the highest levels, both sides made concerted efforts to ease the pres-
sure. On January 3, 1935, at a joint meeting of officers and Party leaders, 
Hitler proclaimed his absolute faith in the Army. He specifically asserted 
that his trust was so strong that he would refuse to see any evidence 
presented against the generals by Party members. This impressed 
Himmler with the necessity of getting himself and his organizations back 
in line. On January 13, Blomberg had Himmler speak to a meeting of 
senior Army officers to explain the role of the 55 and to air the growing 
suspicions so they could be put to rest. At about the same time, the Gestapo 
published a report, 'The Poisoning of the Relationship between the Bearer 
of the Arms of the Nation and the Bearer of the Ideology in the State and 
the Party," which also aired suspicions and put great emphasis on the 
responsibility of II enemies" for developing the tension. 30 
Although such efforts prevented an open rupture, 55-military ten-
sion continued. Nevertheless, Abwehr-Gestapo cooperation grew from 
these efforts, undermining Ministry of the Interior control, and marking 
a major victory in Himmler's move for police power. Part of the cause 
of this victory lies with anti-Himmler elements like Gisevius, who over-
played his hand at this moment, enabling Himmler to shift blame for 
the tensions to third parties with personal ambitions. Someone in the 
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Abwehr command told Heydrich about Gisevius's approaches to the 
military, and at the same time Blomberg decided to establish direct work-
ing relations with the Gestapo, cutting out the Ministry of Interior as 
intermediary authority. 31 
The basis for the new Abwehr-Gestapo cooperation grew from a 
three-hour conference between Canaris and Heydrich on the afternoon 
of January 17. Also present were Major Rudolf Bamler, head of the 
counterespionage section of Abwehr (commonly believed to be even 
more pro-Nazi then Canaris); Werner Best, who had recently come to 
Berlin to begin his career as Heydrich's deputy and lieutenant for Ab-
wehr relations; Patschowski of the Gestapo's counterespionage police; 
and SS Major Heinz Jost, who represented the SD.32 
The outcome was a ten-point program for solving their conflicts, 
including a division of labor between Abwehr and Gestapo, and a rec-
ognition of a legitimate role for the SD. Since the division of labor as-
signed five missions to the Abwehr and five to the Gestapo, it would 
seem to be the origin of the term "the Ten Commandments," a label 
applied generically to this and subsequent charters of cooperation. 33 
As Werner Best observed, they easily defined their separate spheres 
of responsibility, but the problem lay (1) in the inevitable overlap of 
these spheres, (2) in Heydrich's drive to build a comprehensive base for 
his own service, thereby expanding that overlap, and (3) in the military 
desire to do as much of the work as it could without Gestapo involve-
ment. Officially, the Abwehr had responsibility for military espionage 
and counterespionage, for control and observation of military installa-
tions, for defense of the Reichswehr and related concerns, for all cases 
involving national defense, and for the regulation of Gestapo executive 
police support in such work. The Gestapo's responsibility included com-
bating political crime, controlling the border police and their intelligence 
service, doing countersabotage police work and related intelligence in-
side Reich borders and in support of Abwehr, handling cases of indus-
trial sabotage and espionage and related intelligence, and monitoring 
communications in cooperation with the Abwehr and Goering's Inves-
tigation Office. 34 
Cooperation Bears Fruit 
In a significant achievement of this accord, the SD won official recog-
nition for involvement in Abwehr work, a contact the military had tried 
to minimize in the past. The accord acknowledged its competence in 
industrial espionage and gathering intelligence around the borders but 
did not include intelligence work in foreign countries, probably because 
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SO work there was too insignificant to attract attention. Nevertheless, 
such recognition of the SO enhanced its monopoly among Party services, 
for it further guaranteed the exclusion of the Labor Front Information 
Service from Abwehr work. Establishment of liaison between SO and 
Abwehr field posts further expanded SO contacts. In this respect, the 
SO and Gestapo would play a key role in the selection of counter-
espionage workers in the various industries. By November, the Abwehr 
had accepted the legitimacy of the SO to the point that officers of Abwehr, 
political police, and SO, down to the level of field post commanders, 
got together in Gestapo headquarters to become fully acquainted with 
each others' organizations and operations and to enhance cooperation. 35 
For Himmler, the major coup came when Blomberg agreed to sup-
port the expansion of Himmler's police empire in the interest of national 
security. Heydrich and Canaris drafted a message for Blomberg to for-
ward to the Prussian Ministries of Finance and Interior requesting ex-
panded budgetary support for Gestapo-Abwehr work and for the 
Gestapo-controlled border police. This required the bureaucracy to re-
lease the brake it had applied to Gestapo growth. The request included 
salaried positions for Gestapo officials to work directly in the military 
Abwehr, initiating an exchange of personnel comparable to that between 
the Gestapo and the Investigation Office. In addition to establishing 
direct relations between the military Abwehr and the Gestapo, Blomberg 
also urged Frick to proceed quickly with the creation of a "unified or-
ganization of the police counterespionage services in the Reich.,,36 Thus 
began support by Blomberg for Himmler's 55-police system based on 
arguments for national security. 
In July, Blomberg wrote Hitler making further recommendations 
advantageous to Himmler. He complained that the division of the po-
litical police into little state forces severely hampered their Abwehr police 
work, and he recommended a unified Reich political police. Although 
he did not exclude unification under Frick, he implied a preference for 
a separate force under Himmler. First he attributed full credit to Himmler 
for the success being achieved under the existing organization; then he 
argued for an autonomous Reich political police separate from other 
administrative authority. His justifications were the need for selectivity, 
secrecy, and efficiency-by then familiar arguments for an extraordinary 
political police force. Sufficiently impressed, Hitler arranged a meeting 
at Obersalzberg to discuss the matter with Blomberg, but unfortunately 
no minutes have survived.37 Regardless, Blomberg intervened at a cru-
cial moment, undoubtedly significant to Himmler's final victory. 
Other fruits of cooperation redounded to the benefit of all three 
organizations-Abwehr, Gestapo, and SO. Although their relationship 
remained basically competitive, sincere efforts at cooperation from top 
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to bottom resulted in the rapid construction of the counterespionage 
system desired by all parties. Of course, each leader continued to seek 
advantages for himself and his organization, but they were generally 
cautious about taking them at the expense of each other. They made 
every effort to ensure close cooperation at the operational level and 
apparently achieved it, despite the problems of overlapping jurisdic-
tions. 38 
For the Gestapo, a number of major advantages accrued. Not only 
did Abwehr police numbers increase as a result of military support for 
their budget requests, but Himmler increased his powers as de facto 
Reich chief of political police before this position became official. For 
instance, as early as April 1936, the Reich Tariff Administration (Reichs-
zollverwaltung) extended cooperation to all of his political police, ex-
panding his effective control over border affairs. Meanwhile, the Gestapo 
enhanced its freedom to operate in affairs concerning the Foreign Min-
istry. During 1935-36, given Wehrmacht support and the weight of its 
national security arguments, the Gestapo gained more leeway for direct 
relations with foreign police and for the maintenance of agents in foreign 
countries. In return, it limited and controlled these agents both for im-
proved operations and to avoid incidents that could undermine that 
freedom. Of course, incidents continued, such as kidnapping Germans 
in foreign countries for arrest in Germany; however, it is usually im-
possible to assign responsibility for such infringements. 39 In any case, 
this increased freedom and the enlarged base of power that came with 
it indicate that the understanding between the military Abwehr and the 
Gestapo and SO weakened the Foreign Ministry's resistance. 
To preserve its cooperative relationship with the Abwehr, the Ge-
stapo did what it could to minimize the problems of overlapping juris-
dictions without surrendering any of its intelligence base. In May 1935, 
for instance, Patschowski reorganized his Division III, limiting its work 
entirely to counterespionage-police affairs. As a result, the old Sub-
division III 3 for "Elaboration of All Politically Relevant Foreign Intelli-
gence" became a special commission for general defensive and 
preventive measures, alien and minority affairs, and border patrol. Of 
course, the Gestapo did not cease its foreign intelligence work, but 
merely removed it from Abwehr Division III and concentrated it in Di-
vision II. Such a transfer of responsibilities would smooth relations by 
minimizing the conflicting interests of those Gestapo personnel in Di-
vision III who worked with the Abwehr. It would also enhance the 
legitimacy of Gestapo intrusion into Abwehr and Foreign Ministry do-
mains by making more obvious the relation between the Gestapo's for-
eign intelligence and its fight against internal enemies (the responsibility 
of Division 11).40 
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Despite improved relations, Abwehr resentment continued against 
Patschowski. Consequently, Heydrich relieved him of his counter-
espionage-police responsibilities in the summer or early autumn of 1935. 
Temporarily exiled to a field post in Breslau, he directed intelligence 
operations against Poland. Effective January 1, 1936, Best expanded his 
responsibilities to include direction of Division III; his talents in dealing 
with the Abwehr had proven valuable. According to Best, his new re-
sponsibilities were to be transitory, a gesture of conciliation to the Ab-
wehr, but he developed such a close and cooperative relationship with 
Canaris that the assignment lasted until his separation from Sipo and 
SD five years later. 41 
Best gives the impression that for the next five years, military-
Abwehr-Gestapo relations generally involved close cooperation, marred 
only by occasional outbursts of competition and recrimination. Usually 
the two organizations worked together well, despite extensive dupli-
cation of effort. They exchanged information and cooperated like dif-
ferent branches of the same organization. Occasionally, however, an 
individual member of one branch, driven by professional ambition, re-
sentment, or some other motive, became competitive and failed to keep 
his opposite number informed. This caused wasteful duplication and 
left holes in the total intelligence picture that could otherwise have been 
filled. Once afoot, such competitiveness could become contagious. Best 
and Canaris had to devote much of their time and energy (to the det-
riment of other work) ironing out such wrinkles. 42 
Sometimes these attacks on competitiveness required detailed ad-
ditions to their so-called Ten Commandments. One drawn up in De-
cember 1936, apparently marking a high point in the Best-Canaris 
relationship, nevertheless reveals typical sources of conflict. First, they 
reiterated their basic division of labor. Military espionage and counter-
espionage belonged to the Abwehr, and the Gestapo should forward all 
relevant information it received and provide assistance upon request. 
The counterespionage police of the Gestapo conducted searches and 
made arrests in cases of espionage and sabotage inside the Reich, and 
the Abwehr similarly was to forward all relevant information it had. The 
police were to keep the Abwehr fully informed in such cases and were 
to refrain from action until the Abwehr had fully exploited the intelli-
gence value of observing a suspect and his contacts. Military personnel 
could be present during interrogations that would be conducted by the 
police. The two organizations were not to employ the same confidential 
agents; instead, each branch was to surrender any agents who seemed 
more useful to the other. 43 
Best's descriptions reinforce the general impression emerging from 
many other documents and incidents. The officials at the top sincerely 
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sought to maintain an efficient cooperation for the sake of their important 
missions, to avoid the dangerous impression of internal divisiveness, 
and to ensure discipline and control within their own departments. To 
defeat competitors, each had to control his own forces, for competition 
gotten out of hand could be self-defeating. Subordinates, sensing ten-
sion, exaggerated it, perhaps to prove themselves and please their 
bosses. Then the leaders were driven simultaneously to capitalize on 
spontaneous competition that brought benefits and to cooperate with 
their competitors in honest efforts to control and minimize the resultant 
friction. 
None of the divisions of labor cited so far prohibited Gestapo foreign 
intelligence outside the military sphere. Rather than reducing such ac-
tivity, the reorganization and tighter controls related to these ageements 
apparently enhanced it. Nevertheless, the surviving files of the relevant 
sections of Division II indicate that in 1935 Gestapo foreign intelligence 
remained relatively meager and crude, relying on occasional informants 
and newspaper clippings until as late as 1937-38. Gestapo personnel 
devoted special attention to the western border states and to Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The border police and their contacts did 
much of the work, especially with the police of the neighboring states. 
In conformity with the division of labor, the Gestapo focused most of 
this work on foreign support for "enemies" inside the Reich. By 1938-
39, such extensive lists of supporting enemies had been developed that 
they were easily converted to very thorough arrest or elimination lists. 
This was, however, a logical product of domestic political police work 
and should not be extrapolated into advanced work for the conquest 
and domination of neighboring states. Comparatively speaking, during 
these early years, Gestapo foreign operations generally conformed to 
the police practices of other European states. They focused on their 
defensive police mission and patterned their methods after those of rival 
intelligence services operating out of Poland and Czechoslavakia 
through their border police. At least, this was the way the Gestapo saw 
it. 44 
In much of its work, the Gestapo exploited extensively its natural 
relations with the police of other countries; their mutual preoccupation 
with the Communist threat provided an excellent common ground for 
cooperation. The Gestapo also exploited the minority problems of these 
countries, reaping benefits by offering a little cooperative support from 
their side. As a case in point, Best and Heinrich Mueller went to Belgrade 
in April 1936 to induce Yugoslavian police cooperation based on fears 
of Communism and problems with Croatians. In return, of course, they 
allowed neighboring police as little insight as possible into the Gestapo 
itself.45 
The Military Factor 185 
Along with all the cooperation between Abwehr and Gestapo and 
its advantages came yet another victory that eventually strained these 
good relations to the breaking point. As both sides encouraged their 
personnel to cooperate completely, the Gestapo and SO gained access 
to military installations and briefings on aspects of military security, thus 
acquiring a basis for penetration and surveillance that would have taken 
years to develop otherwise. Although the Gestapo and SO generally pre-
ferred to handle the delicate matter of suspected military officers in open 
cooperation with military authorities, they proceeded clandestinely 
when they encountered reserved and suspicious responses. For in-
stance, by the end of 1936, the Gestapo and SO had written directives 
on the observation of Wehrmacht members in which Heinrich Mueller 
revealed the philosophy of "preventive law enforcement." When they 
suspected a punishable offense, they would proceed through proper 
channels, which required military cooperation. When no concretely pun-
ishable offense was involved and the military was likely to respond with 
legalistic resistance, "the Gestapo must stand outside the law, without 
detriment to the activities of the military legal authorities, and carry out 
the observation of military personnel." For the sake of harmony, Gestapo 
officials intended to clear with military officials, at least as far as possible, 
even this extralegal infringement on the sanctity of the officer corps. 
Especially sensitive cases, however, such as HimmIer's focus on General 
Fritsch, required complete secrecy. Nevertheless, during the 1935-36 era 
of relative harmony between Abwehr and Gestapo-SO, most work on 
such cases stood in abeyance. 46 
Of course, this avenue for surveillance served the military as well, 
giving Abwehr people a similar access to Gestapo-SO, and later 5ipo 
and 5D circles in which they established amenable contacts. Since Himm-
ler could not claim that his own 55 was immune to the "camouflaged 
enemy," the Abwehr-Gestapo cooperation also provided for some sur-
vellance of the nascent Waffen 55 units (SS-Verfugungstruppen), even 
after Hitler had withdrawn the right of Army inspection of these units. 
Perhaps HimmIer welcomed this Abwehr, Gestapo, and SO surveillance 
of Dietrich's 55-Bodyguard "Adolf Hitler," which was not yet under his 
tight controJ.47 
Since the Gestapo and SO usually failed at subtlety and delicacy, 
surveillance of the military remained a point of tension, disrupting the 
relative harmony of 1935-36 relations with the Abwehr and leading to 
further 55-military confrontations. For instance, as early as April and 
May 1935, the Army discovered listening devices in its telephones. Of 
course, they may have predated the understanding, but since 55 mi-
crophones were also discovered in Abwehr offices, Blomberg and Fritsch 
had the bases for complaints to Hitler, whom they pressed to make 
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occasional reaffirmations of military immunity. 48 Repeated incidents 
raise the questions of how seriously lieutenants like Himmler took such 
orders and how well they controlled the competitive behavior of sub-
ordinates. 
Happenings such as these must have given Canaris second 
thoughts, making him amenable to the approaches of the conservative 
opposition to Himmler. By late 1936, when Heydrich began to probe 
openly into the former liaison between the German military and the Red 
Army, Canaris became less cooperative. The 1937-38 trials of German 
military officers that grew out of Heydrich's investigations, followed by 
the Blomberg-Fritsch purge, would press Canaris into that complex and 
contradictory role that has credited him with membership in the resis-
tance.49 By then, however, it was too late to crack the firm foundations 
of the police state. In playing their political games and placing primary 
emphasis on the building of traditional measures for national greatness, 
key military leaders had cast their weight with the arguments for a police 
state, no matter how ambivalent they felt about the 55. This left the 
conservative opposition to Himmler to its own limited devices, without 
the support of key military leaders who could have made it decisive. 
16 _____ _ 
Persistent Opposition 
The period between January and June 1935 saw much legalistic sparring 
as various elements of the conservative opposition made exploratory 
probes at the evolving 55-police system. Himmler's people responded 
by developing rationalizations for the nascent police state and using 
them to parry the thrusts and to establish a broader base of support for 
the expansion of their powers. The subsequent display of relative 
strengths and weaknesses determined the strategy of both sides during 
the decisive period that followed, from June 1935 to June 1936. 
On January 10, Frick initiated 1935 with another effort to prod Goer-
ing into asserting himself, apparently without effect. The occasion was 
a minor matter concerning a veterans' organization that refused to expel 
its Jewish members. Openly playing the role of Hitler's chief of political 
police, Himmler had gone directly to the Fuehrer with the problem of 
this organization, whose behavior, he alleged, was a public affront to 
the Movement. He displayed an overzealousness that Hitler was not 
ready to unleash at this time, and since his query came during the No-
vember period of mounting 55-military tensions, the timing may have 
been especially poor. Hitler gave him a cool response, rejecting his sug-
gestions and telling him to let time solve such problems. 1 
Perhaps this rebuff encouraged Frick to challenge Himmler's de facto 
position and to goad Goering into reinserting himself and Frick between 
Himmler and Hitler. All hope of curbing Himmler hinged on minimizing 
his direct appeals to the Fuehrer and maximizing his subordination to 
the legal state authorities. Frick reminded Goering of this and empha-
sized the necessity of their being the intermediaries in such communi-
cations, especially since the case in point involved a Reich ministry-
the military. 2 If Frick also sought to shore up the ground he was losing 
as intermediary in the Abwehr-police relationship, he certainly chose a 
poor argument to employ on Goering, who had consistently shown that 
to cut red tape he favored the elimination of all intermediaries in police 
action. 
At the end of the month, Frick directed his search for support into 
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Himmler's second most important bastion, Bavaria. Hoping to stir 
Reichsstatthalter Epp and Interior Minister Wagner into action, he con-
tended that the number of protective custody internees in Bavaria was 
excessive, several hundred more than in all other states combined, in-
cluding Prussia. He ordered that Goering's Prussian system of account-
ing be applied and that Wagner assume direct responsibility instead of 
deferring to the Bavarian Political Police.3 
Neither Goering nor the Bavarian officials seem to have responded 
officially to either probe, but Wagner apparently referred the Bavarian 
affair to Himmler. In the ensuing debate, Himmler argued that Dachau, 
which accounted for so many of the internees in Bavaria, was more than 
a Bavarian camp. In the evolving Reich-wide system, it served as a 
terminal base for the more serious cases. Using such arguments on Feb-
ruary 20, Himmler took Frick's decree directly to the Fuehrer to thwart 
the pressure to release internees he deemed dangerous. He got Hitler's 
concurrence,4 and in so doing not only parried Frick's thrust but also 
reinforced his de facto position as Hitler's chief of political police, for it 
was he-not Wagner or Epp-who had channeled the decision over 
Frick's head. 
Not only was Hitler's decision another legitimizing step for Himm-
ler's uncontrolled reach, but Frick had also conceded important points. 
The preface to his order about protective custody in Bavaria agreed that 
the "recently observed increasing Communist activity" required sharper 
measures and that recidivists in protective custody should be held for 
considerably longer durations. Thus he accepted both the basis for con-
tinued emergency police power and the argument that, as enemies of 
society, repeated offenders had no rights.s Common elements of con-
servative and NS ideology had tied Frick's hands for effectively resisting 
Himmler's drive. 
Nevertheless, even such self-limiting efforts at opposition encour-
aged others, throwing up numerous, sometimes serious, obstacles to 
Himmler's progress. For instance, throughout the spring and summer, 
Epp tried to assert more control over the Bavarian police to curb the 
anti-Church crusade in which Himmler and Heydrich were especially 
active. In May, Hjalmar Schacht, Reich Minister of Economic Affairs, 
protested to Hitler about persecutions of clergy and Jews and about the 
uncontrolled Gestapo. Yet these opponents also made concessions such 
as Frick had made about defense against the nation's enemies,6 and 
Himmler's people began exploiting them. 
Since 1933, a special Criminal Law Commission had been devising 
a new criminal code as part of a truly NS body of law for the new order. 
This effort represented the thinking of NS jurists like Hans Frank, who 
had sometimes blocked, sometimes abetted Himmler in Bavaria. The 
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commission wanted to create a criminal code based on voelkisch princi-
ples, freeing the new order from the fetters of liberal constitutionalism 
and the inalienable rights of the individual, so the state could take "the 
necessary" steps to preserve law and order and build a great nation. As 
typical NS jurists steeped in conservative-authoritarian traditions, they 
desperately sought a compromise. They expected the police to operate 
within the limits of due process, controlled by proper state authority; 
yet, simultaneously, they wanted the police to be free enough to strike 
effectively at the enemies of society. Early in 1935, Dr. Drews, President 
of the Prussian Supreme Administrative Court, proclaimed that the 
forthcoming laws would make Germany a constitutional state (Rechts-
staat) in the sense that men would be bound by the law, and that, there-
fore, there would be a legal delimitation of police competence. But 
there would have to be exceptions so the police could take action 
without legal basis in matters concerning the maintenance and existence 
of the state. 7 
Drews's speech was significant because his court heard all appeals 
against police action. This advocate of delimited police power fully ac-
knowledged the necessity of allowing the police to go beyond the law 
in defense of the state. Thus his thesis had two edges: it applied legal 
limits to both the Fuehrer and his police arm, but for the immediate 
future, Himmler could use such views about raison d'etat to entrench 
his power. In the long run, both he and Hitler would block the final 
promulgation of any body of law that limited their power. 8 
Taking their cue from Frick's concessions in his January decree and 
building on arguments like Drews's, Himmler and his people directed 
their "sales campaign" at Guertner and the conservative bureaucrats of 
his ministry. To parry the many legal actions and demands for closer 
administrative control that police excesses had provoked, Himmler ap-
pealed to concerns over renewed Communist efforts. On March 28, he 
sent the minister of justice a long memorandum on the "Communist 
movement." Since the "camouflaged enemy" argument was unsuitable 
against bureaucrats who were its prime target, he expanded to its fullest 
potential their shared concern over the threat from the left. Himmler 
began from the secure basis of the NS attack on "liberal-individualistic" 
political theory. The NS critique, with which the conservative jurists 
agreed, argued that this liberal theory placed the rights of the individual 
above the interests of the community; it created a system of legal loop-
holes through which defense attorneys could guarantee extraordinarily 
mild judgments against their criminal clients. The effect was to tie the 
hands of the police in preventing crime or exposing the criminal. Himm-
ler then linked this concern to the "Communist threat" by noting how 
KPD pamphlets had often instructed the proletariat on how to guarantee 
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its rights before the law. The forces of Marxism and bolshevism obviously 
used the "liberal-individualistic" philosophy to undermine the state.9 
Against the rights of the citizen to respect and due process (which 
he skirted rather than denied), Himmler raised the concept of a state of 
emergency in which even the most liberal legal system recognized the 
preeminence of the survival of society and the state. Then he fused the 
threat to national survival, represented by Communism, with the threat 
represented by conventional criminals. Toward this end, he made liberal 
use of the recent "crisis," the "Roehm putsch," and Hitler's and Guert-
ner's justifications for that action. Those who rise up against society 
must be struck down commensurate with the damage they intended to 
do. Himmler concluded that the NS system would always respect the 
rights of the good citizen, but the criminal element, in removing them-
selves from the community of citizens by attacking it, naturally forfeited 
their rights as citizens. He cited the emergency decrees and legislation 
of 1933 to show that the NS state had left liberal political concepts behind, 
de facto if not yet de jure. He appealed to the conservative-reactionary 
desires for a return to the traditional Prussian legal definition of the 
police mission as that necessary to maintain law and order.1o 
He tried to excuse police excesses by referring to other modem states 
that used force to extract confessions. Not only did he cite the Stalinist 
police state, but he also took special pleasure in public statements by 
American policemen on the necessity for getting confessions to guar-
antee convictions and to further investigations. He either quoted or mis-
quoted a Major Sylvester of the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police and a Captain Willemse, former head of the New York homicide 
squad. From Willemse he allegedly had a frank advocacy of the "third 
degree" and the use of any trick to get a confession. Even naked force 
was justified against hardened criminals. Otherwise, the police would 
be guilty of turning loose on society a criminal who would continue to 
rob and murder. ll 
To cap his argument, Himmler emphasized how the KPD, ostensibly 
destroyed in 1933, had completely resurrected itself, perhaps more per-
vasive and efficient than before. It was indestructible, because it operated 
with impunity from all neighboring states, supported by the Comintern 
and the Soviet Union. He depicted an indefinite state of siege for which 
the police had to be free to act as necessary. Although third degree 
interrogations were necessary to break the secretive underground sys-
tem, he had ordered his political police not to use force. Nevertheless, 
he asked that these special circumstances be taken into consideration, 
and threatened that if his police were not allowed to crack the KPD with 
forceful interrogation, the resulting overload of police work might bring 
about their collapse, leaving the Reich defenseless. 12 
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Although such arguments typified Himmler's thinking, the style of 
the memorandum was not his. Heavily laced with the proper sort of 
legal references and judicial theory that carried weight with jurists and 
bureaucrats, it was the handiwork of the law-trained civil servants of 
the Gestapo and the SD jurists whom Heydrich cultivated. First among 
them was Werner Best, recently arrived in Berlin as Heydrich's deputy 
at the Gestapo Office. His main Division I dealt with administrative and 
legal problems, where he served as a buffer between Himmler and Hey-
drich and the bureaucrats they despised. The perfect man for the ob-
stacles that confronted Himmler and fIeydrich in 1935, Best assisted 
ideally until they moved into a more radical phase in 1938-39. Among 
NS jurists, he was a radical, expressing views that, compared with those 
of the conservatives and reactionaries, seemed very suitable to his su-
periors. Yet he spoke the language of the lawyers and could woo them 
on their own terms. Once the police system that he visualized had been 
achieved, however, the limits of his service became apparent to Himmler 
and Heydrich, always suspicious of lawyers.13 
Both the eyewitness Gisevius and the scholar Aronson have de-
scribed how Best dealt with the opposition. Not only could he employ 
the language of law and bureaucracy, but in his zeal for the achievement 
of a "cleansed and revitalized" new order, he could also stretch his 
arguments to cover a world of sins. However, given the combination of 
legalism and NS values that few dared contest, he must have been for-
midable indeed. Unlike his bosses, he had the social and professional 
credentials to gain entry into the civil service establishment, and, more 
important, the personality and character that engendered cooperative 
working relationships in the traditional system. He functioned as though 
he accepted at face value Himmler's expressed desire for a true peoples' 
police and was really offended by police and SS excesses. Since he shared 
the conviction that they could be corrected from within through training 
and indoctrination rather than through external controls, he could have 
been sincere in promising that reforms were possible if the opposition 
withdrew their complaints. As Gisevius put it, "It was his business to 
placate aroused bourgeois consciences." But while Gisevius may have 
understood Best's role, the calculated cynicysm he attributed to Best 
does not ring true. Best is better understood as one who sincerely be-
lieved in his arguments. This explains why "his name was actually in-
cluded by some credulous persons in lists they drew up of the potential 
Opposition.,,14 Only status as sincere believers explains why he, others 
like Ohlendorf, and cases like Nebe (who actually was in the "Oppo-
sition") served the new order zealously and became involved in its 
crimes. 
Although Best claims that he intended merely to clarify the evolving 
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status of the Gestapo, in his zeal he became a very effective "salesman" 
for the forthcoming 55-police state. Not only did he publish a number 
of supporting articles, but he also disseminated other professional publi-
cations "with suitable relevance to the education" of the political police. 
The articles he distributed preached lines similar to Himmler's March 
memorandum to Guertner, thus encouraging not only the 55 elements, 
but specifically the more traditional, professional police, to serve in the 
evolving system with the zeal of pioneers in a revolutionary reformu-
lation of German society and national strength. Their roles were to be, 
simultaneously, defenders and shapers of the new order. IS 
Limitations of the Attack 
The combination of legalism, N5 idealism, and images of ominous 
threats to the nation frustrated the conservative opposition during the 
spring of 1935. Finding every thrust successfully parried, they finally 
refocused their attack. They assembled every scrap of evidence of past 
abuses by the 55 and political police and in concentration camps, and 
presented it to all potential allies and to N5 leaders who might be goaded 
into curbing Himmler-either out of some sense of order or out of fear 
for themselves. The conservatives encouraged legal and administrative 
appeals against the excesses to bolster their case and to mobilize the 
machinery of the state for controlling the police before it was too late. I6 
In short, they attacked along two lines: legal action for damages to 
the victims or their survivors, and criminal prosecution of police officials 
and camp personnel for mishandling, manslaughter, or murder of in-
ternees. In the first category, individual citizens had to initiate the ac-
tions. Officials of the ministries of justice and interior encouraged such 
actions to cite as evidence in their arguments for more stringent regu-
lation of the police and camps. Criminal prosecution could be initiated 
whenever they learned of an offense and could investigate it thor-
oughlyP 
Unfortunately, most of these actions stemmed from the early years 
of spontaneous terror or the Roehm purge. Given the termination of 5A 
freedom, the tightening of Himmler's control over 55 spontaneity, Hey-
drich's increased control over the political police, and Eicke's consoli-
dation and regulation of the concentration camps, prosecutable incidents 
decreased significantly,I8 and those that took place were more easily 
concealed. Already apparent by the spring of 1935, these marked "im-
provements" coincided with the mounting conservative attack and 
therefore defused it. 
Although some of the cases of pre-1935 abuse could be won, bringing 
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moderate punishment of the offenders, especially 5A men, such cases 
were usually quashed. The defenders of the police system minimized 
the seriousness of the cases through arguments about the criminal or 
antisocial behavior of the victim and his un-German character, making 
sympathy a questionable quality. Even where such arguments were im-
possible and the excesses could not be excused, the cases had little value 
against Himmler's system because most of them had occurred before he 
had established his control. 5ince his control was eliminating such of-
fenses, continued publicity besmirching the system could be labeled 
counterproductive. Hitler and other Nazi leaders, even those worried 
about Himmler's power, responded in favor of a system they believed 
necessary for defense and reacted against conservative tactics that would 
limit their own power as well. Given this alignment, Hitler in effect 
protected Himmler against interference by ignoring conservative appeals 
for support. 19 
In March and April, Frick made his last significant efforts on this 
tack. Frustration over his ineffectiveness in controlling Himmler drove 
him to two futile and self-defeating gestures. The occasion for the first 
was one of many requests for corrective measures forwarded by his office 
to Himmler. Probably in hopes of Party support, and capitalizing on 
strained 55-Gestapo and Party relations, he chose the case of a Party 
District Leader (Kreisleiter) whom the Gestapo had arrested for express-
ing concern over conditions in the camp at Papenburg. According to 
Gisevius, in marginalia on the official note Frick threatened Himmler 
with criminal proceedings if such illegal arrests continued. Of course, 
the threat was bluff and bluster, because Frick dared not order Daluege 
to execute an arrest,20 nor would he risk the likely violent consequences 
of such an act without Hitler's support. Before it ever got that far, Hitler 
would quash the proceedings and Frick would again be humiliated. 
He immediately followed with a second appeal directly to Hitler, one 
even less well chosen. The case was that of a lawyer representing Dr. 
Erich Klausener's wife, who was suing her insurance company to collect 
for his death. The lawyer, who had attemped to prove that Klausener's 
death on June 30 was not a suicide but was 55 and Gestapo work, had 
been arrested for slander. Digging into the purge touched a very sore 
point with Hitler; Frick's conclusion that such incidents merited more 
stringent Reich regulation of protective custody procedures won no sup-
port from him.21 Frustrated, Frick turned again to Goering. By them-
selves, Frick's ministerial decrees were ineffective, but when Goering 
supported them with similar decrees to the Prussian Gestapo, Frick had 
more success in making his authority felt in the other states, even Ba-
varia. He thus turned to Goering to issue a model decree for Prussia, 
but it must have exceeded what Goering considered appropriate, infring-
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ing upon the "sharp striking force" of his Gestapo. Preferring to continue 
his retreat from the struggle, Goering submitted the proposal to the 
Ministerial Council as a law and invited Himmler to attend, leaving the 
final settlement to a Frick-Himmler confrontation.22 
Before the meeting, held in late April or early May, Himmler had 
sufficient time for mustering support to smother Frick's new-found en-
ergy. According to Gisevius, he used Frick's threatening note and the 
appeal in the Klausener case to turn Party support against Frick. Himm-
ler took both memoranda to a meeting of the Party Reich Leaders, who 
rebuked Frick for improper relations between Party leaders, thereby 
undermining his hopes at the Ministerial Council. Himmler completed 
the destruction at the council meeting by associating the whole attack 
with Gisevius's personal ambitions and demanding the removal of this 
source of disharmony. Consequently, Frick's proposed law died, and 
Gisevius was quietly transferred to Nebe's Criminal Police Office.23 
Meanwhile, another appeal against a Gestapo order brought an even 
more decisive defeat to the conservatives. On May 2, the Prussian Su-
preme Administrative Court of Appeal in Berlin denied the right to 
contest Gestapo confiscation, arrest, and custody orders (Polizeiverfue-
gungen) in administrative courts. The only channel of appeal was, as 
Goering had contended, through Gestapo offices to Goering. The court 
based its decision upon the argument that the November 1933 law had 
established the Gestapo as a special police, and appeal against this cate-
gory of administrative agency was expressly excluded from the Prussian 
Police Administrative Law of 1931. Since the 1931 law was written before 
the establishment of the Gestapo and therefore did not assign it to either 
category-ordinary or special police-the burden of deciding the Ge-
stapo's position fell upon the court. The court, which really had little 
choice considering both its traditions and the logic of the argument, 
interpreted the Gestapo as a special police authority. Under other con-
ditions, however, the court might have ruled that some Gestapo actions 
were beyond its authority and therefore subject to review. At least Wer-
ner Best was concerned enough to say that in light of the trial, the 
immunity of the Gestapo from court review had to be ensured by a new 
law. The court apparently reached a decision it thought "most proper" 
for this particular case.24 So far the Gestapo remained beyond the courts 
because the judiciary did not feel either compelled to exert restraint or 
capable of doing so. 
In determining how much censure is due German jurists for their 
acceptance of the growing police state, one must consider that they had 
never occupied a very strong position in shaping law through the courts, 
for the tradition of judicial review was weakly established in Germany. 
The court was unaccustomed to making radical decisions. By the same 
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token, court actions of the Weimar period that had gone against open-
ended police action to protect "public security and order" had been a 
target of the law-and-order campaign. 25 Drews's January speech on legal 
reform had expressed the court's mood: ultimately the state and public 
order came before individual rights. 
In the face of all these defeats, Guertner remained undaunted. On 
May 14, he forwarded from his ministry a memorandum that, according 
to Gisevius, was composed by officials to goad Frick to action. Along 
with the memorandum they forwarded Himmler's letter of March 28 on 
the "Communist movement." Guertner, clearly unimpressed by the Red 
scare tactic, knew the Communist movement could be checked but not 
destroyed. Perhaps such sophisticated conservatives were more cynical 
in the use of the Red scare tactic than the Nazis. In any case, Guertner 
argued that (1) the use of corporal punishment was disruptive rather 
than desirable in penal institutions, (2) officials who practiced brutality 
should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law, and (3) by Himmler's 
own admission, forceful interrogation had already proved ineffective in 
crushing the KPD. He concluded that Frick should decree a uniform 
regulation for the camps to replace Eicke's, forbidding all forceful in-
terrogations, and that both ministries should prosecute and punish of-
fenders. 26 Though frustrated, the conservatives were poised for a more 
concentrated line of attack. 
Even if their thrusts of the spring of 1935 had been successfully 
parried, they had produced results-unfortunately, results that ulti-
mately strengthened Himmler and ironically moved Germany closer to 
the 55-police state. Largely through conservative efforts, until 1938 ap-
parent propriety and control prevailed in Gestapo and concentration 
camp procedures.27 For instance, one of the 1935 incidents on which 
Guertner based his efforts was the shooting of two inmates at the Co-
lumbia House in March and April. Under investigation, the guards 
claimed they had followed regulations that mandated shooting prisoners 
who resisted, meaning Eicke's orders. If the maintenance of discipline 
were not reason enough for Himmler, the pretext that such incidents 
gave his enemies induced him to reduce further the autonomy of his 
police and camp personnel to exercise terror. He forbade officials and 
guards to touch prisoners without permission. All requests for corporal 
punishment or forceful interrogation had to be cleared by him, Eicke, 
or Heydrich. Punishment was to be public and under the supervision 
of a commandant, who had to account to him for violations.28 
Unfortunately, Himmler's every concession to propriety weakened 
his opponents' case. For the sake of appearances, they had to respond 
in kind or risk turning Hitler against them. For example, when the camps 
or the police had a reasonable claim that shooting a prisoner was to 
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prevent his escape or for self-defense, the Public Prosecutor's Offices 
either had to drop charges or be accused of undermining public confi-
dence in the regime. Even so, unless careful camouflage could be ar-
ranged, their close surveillance negated Eicke's provisions for camp 
executions, which were clearly illegal. Consequently, as early as April, 
Eicke carefully redefined his orders, issuing a secret order "to the effect 
that these severe penal regulations are not really used," merely pub-
lished to intimidate inmates.29 
Although Guertner remained undaunted and continued to encour-
age Frick's resistance, both men had to concede important points and 
fall back on alternative strategies. Their earlier attacks on NS police ex-
cesses having helped to concentrate political police power in Himmler's 
hands, they now sought either to eliminate or control him by concen-
trating all police authority in their hands. Since all involved accepted 
the desirability of concentrated police power, the argument now was 
about who should control that power and define its proper limits. 
Building toward Himmler's Offensive 
The continuing struggle at the ministerial level affected the evolution of 
the Gestapo below, which, like the camps, became more controlled and 
regulated. This process involved a dichotomy. The 5S recruits and 
professional policemen, resorting to spontaneous acts of repressive ter-
ror, had to be disciplined so the political police system would be less 
vulnerable to demands for restored ministerial control. At the same time, 
this heterogeneous police force had to be welded together into an obe-
dient instrument for repression to be employed as Himmler and his 
Fuehrer saw fit. Ironically, responses to the opposition shaped the Ge-
stapo as much as ideology or design. 
With the January 1935 transfer of Werner Best to Berlin as Heydrich's 
deputy in the Gestapo Office, the last major personality in the shaping 
of the early Gestapo had arrived. He brought with him organizational 
and administrative talents that had served well in the development of 
the SO. His personality and abilities were well suited for building good 
relations with the Abwehr and for countering conservative attacks. 
Since, in addition to being Heydrich's deputy, he headed Main Division 
I for administrative and legal affairs, and later Main Division III, Abwehr 
Police, he was in position for his strong personality to shape the Gestapo 
significantly. 
Best immediately organized his new main division and repeatedly 
shuffled its personnel. 30 His extensive attention to organizational struc-
ture and detail helped tighten control of the Gestapo and strengthen it 
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as a force in the internal power struggle. For instance, tighter control 
required rationalizing the jurisdictional patchwork quilt caused by the 
geographic division of the German police. The several little states, often 
incontiguous, and the numerous enclaves that they produced had long 
been obstacles to efficient police work. During 1935 and early 1936, while 
Frick's broader Reich reform remained stalemated, Heydrich and Best 
ironed out a few smaller complications that undoubtedly won points for 
Himmler and his forces as being the most capable of managing a unified 
German police command. In 1935, on March 11 and April 1, respectively, 
they incorporated the political police of the little states of Lippe and 
Schaumburg-Lippe into the Prussian Gestapo, making them outposts 
(Aussendienststellen) of the Field Post Bielefeld of District Minden. With 
this as a precedent, Heydrich and Best turned to the Ministry of Interior 
for support in the subordination of the Gestapo field post in the Prussian 
territory of Sigmaringen to political police of the surrounding state of 
Wuerttemberg.31 Such successful streamlining may have been useful 
wedges for cracking resistance to Himmler's appointment as chief of 
German Police. 
Simplified and rational organizational relationships were rigorously 
pursued by the leaders from Himmler down. Too much has been made 
of how they allegedly employed to their advantage the tangle of ad-
ministrative jurisdictions. They hardly enjoyed this maze. Either they 
had inherited most of it from the past, or it had grown during more 
recent evolutions in the power struggle that had prevented rational de-
velopment and required piecemeal accretions. Occassional, tempting op-
portunities did induce Himmler or Heyrich to use deliberately their many 
jurisdictional complexities as a smokescreen. However, generally they 
sought to clarify and simplify internal relationships for the sake of ef-
ficiency. A continuous stream of directives to assist the bewildered mem-
bers of lower offices in directing their work through proper channels 
and to avoid time-consuming side tracks testify to the scope of the con-
fusion cause by the union of separate state political police forces, with 
their different forms of administrative accountability. 32 This confusion 
would take years to overcome and required the acquisition of extraor-
dinary authority by Himmler. 
Within the Prussian Gestapo itself, they rationalized regional juris-
dictions in order to tighten control over field personnel who, by virtue 
of their distance from Berlin, displayed both independence and suscep-
tibility to local NS lords. Their continued revolutionary indiscretions and 
police excesses strengthened opposition arguments. Tightening control 
began shortly after Heydrich took over the Gestapo Office in May 1934. 
After the distractions of the summer of 1934, he resumed the effort and 
continued it into 1935. When several of the growing number of field 
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posts were consolidated under the local supervision of one such post, 
the locally responsible Gestapo official was more capable of exercising 
direct control than the Gestapo Office in Berlin, especially if he were 
well chosen. This arrangement preceded the system of superior field 
posts (Staatspolizeileitstellen) that would emerge after the creation of Sipo. 
Logically, the first field posts in this regional grouping were those 
of the province of East Prussia, separated from the rest of Germany by 
Poland. There, in May 1934, the posts of Allenstein, Elbing, and Tilsit 
were subordinated to the one at Koenigsberg. Their geographic location 
gave these posts their importance, yet physical separation from the rest 
of the Gestapo made control more difficult. Complicating matters, the 
powerful Gauleiter and provincial governor, Erich Koch, who considered 
the local Gestapo his tool, was unfriendly to the SD. 33 
Suspicion that these regional groupings were designed to neutralize 
the most troublesome Gestapo field posts is reaffirmed by the order of 
their development. After Koenigsberg, in July and August, the province 
of SiIesia, recently won from SA dominance, was similarly subordinated 
to the key post at Breslau. In September, Pomerania, the site of Hoff-
mann's excesses, was put under the supervision of the Stettin post. 
Then, in the spring of 1935, following the creation of a new Gestapo 
jurisdiction in the Saar, the Saarbruecken post received responsibility 
for that at Trier. Here was a special set of problems requiring rationali-
zation. Saar-Pfalz-Trier, crucial to Gestapo work due to its location on 
the French-Luxembourg border, included several police jurisdictions: 
Bavarian, Prussian, and the newly created Reich police for the Saar. It 
was also the domain of the troublesome Gauleiter Josef Buerckel, whom 
Best had been at such pains to cultivate.34 
Best also tightened other mechanisms for control by the Berlin Of-
fice-for instance, over the agents employed by the Gestapo. The poor 
quality of foreign agents had embarrassed Diels and cost his Gestapo a 
role in foreign intelligence. Domestic agents must also have been a prob-
lem, even under Heydrich, but, strangely, little was done by Berlin to 
exercise control over the agents of the field posts until Best established 
a centralized reporting and card file system for identifying unreliable 
agents and informants.35 The lateness of such a move indicates a high 
degree of amateurishness during the early years, even among the profes-
sional police branch of Himmler's system. 
Equally troublesome was persistent, cruel, and high-handed behav-
ior. Himmler's admonitions against such behavior during his October 
speech expressed the naive ideal he pursued-and unrestrained but 
well-behaved police. However, he and his lieutenants were neither un-
aware of nor indifferent to resultant excesses and the problems they 
caused. The Gestapo needed constant reminders that certain potential 
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"enemies" required careful treatment, especially foreign citizens whose 
abuse could have international repercussions. Even the treatment of the 
"little man" among the numerous protective custody arrestees required 
certain basic precautions and considerations, because the image of pro-
priety and humane treatment were often inseparable. Gestapo members 
had to be reminded to refer the infirm to hospital detention facilities 
rather than to the camp regimen, where their subsequent death might 
require an investigation, or where they might cause discipline and san-
itation problems. To combat spontaneous lawlessness in the Gestapo 
and to preserve propriety, the central office sent constant reminders to 
field posts to comply with Frick's timetables for due process and review 
of protective custody cases. 36 These procedures are in marked contrast 
to Himmler's tactics of ignoring Frick's complaints or coldly excusing 
Gestapo excesses. 
By the same token, Himmler and Heydrich learned that too free-
wheeling a police force disrupted authority and discipline within society 
in general. For instance, too quick a response to student complaints 
against teachers as politically unsuitable led to unfounded arrests that 
were "injurious to the respect and authority of the teaching staff." 
Overzealous political policemen had to be ordered to coordinate action 
through appropriate officials for education.37 
The tendency of Gestapo officials to respond to pressure from Party 
organizations bent on their own objectives caused Gestapo involvement 
in disruptive and embarrassing actions. Toward this end, Himmler's 
expanding net of liaison personnel and agencies in the Party organiza-
tions regulated Gestapo reponsiveness without ordering Gestapo offi-
cials to ignore Party calls for police action. Regulated responsiveness 
was essential, for an unresponsive police would increase Party hostility, 
resurrect demands for Party organizations to exercise police powers, and 
undermine Himmler's appeal as a police leader who guaranteed proper 
ideological guidance for the police. For instance, Robert Ley's German 
Workers' Front (DAF), the DAF Information Office, now under 5D in-
fluence, was sufficiently reliable to screen DAF requests for Gestapo 
action in economic problems. Both Ley and Best ordered their respective 
field posts to deal with each other primarily through the DAF Infor-
mation Office. Once again, the 5D served a key function in defusing a 
tense situation, for the three-way Party struggle among Hess, the 55, 
and Ley remained acute.38 
As one side effect of "selling" the Gestapo, Best had to educate his 
police officials about the press as a tool of public relations. He not only 
guided them toward behavior conducive to a better public image, but 
he also instructed them on how to cultivate that image. Typically, their 
press releases on police actions had been a dry report of the action taken 
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and its legal bases. Best reminded them that the purpose of press releases 
was "to convince the public of . . . the necessity of the Gestapo regu-
lations." The threat to public security had to be emphasized to win the 
support of the reader disinterested in legal technicalities.39 
Overall, such efforts produced a Gestapo sufficiently controlled to 
be safe from demands for ministerial control, yet efficient enough against 
"enemies" to satisfy NS demands for security. Such a balance must have 
pleased Hitler, but hardly moved him to bestow greatly expanded power 
on Himmler. Instead, the opposition continued for several months more 
with some hope of reversing his expansion. 
17 _____ _ 
A Conservative Victory? 
Until Himmler's triumph in June 1936, the conservative opposition con-
tinued its fight on two major fronts. It sought to curb the Gestapo within 
Prussia, and it tried to establish Reich central control over all police, 
including the political police. On the first front, the opposition achieved 
a fleeting victory in the fall of 1935. On the second, there was a near 
success, then stalemate. 
Despite the curbing of uncontrolled radicals in 1934, the struggle 
still had more complexity than one between two polarized camps-the 
conservative opposition versus Himmler's group. It might be described 
as occurring along a continuum. At one end lay the conservative allies 
who sought to limit the Nazis and build their own power base. Among 
their leaders, the one most directly involved in police matters was Franz 
Guertner, Reich and Prussian minister of justice. Below him, in his and 
Frick's ministries and in other state bureaucracies, were a rank of profes-
sional civil servants hoping to thwart Himmler's growth. Most were too 
sophisticated to be overwhelmed by NS propaganda. Their mixed mo-
tives ranged from honorable to self-serving, but in every case they were 
bound to the Nazis by mutual objectives and mutual enemies. To fight 
the Nazis openly was dangerous on two counts: A strike that was not 
decisive was the same as committing suicide, yet to strike too decisively 
might threaten mutual objectives and give victory to mutual enemies. 
As Reich and Prussian minister of the interior, Frick lay near the 
center of the continuum, the object of contending appeals from both 
extremes. On the one hand, a NS conservative with much in common 
with the professional civil servants, Frick would build a system of cen-
tralized, authoritarian government, basically acceptable to conservatives. 
On the other hand, as a dedicated Nazi, a thoroughgoing anti-Semite 
loyal to his Fuehrer, he felt the considerable weight of arguments from 
Himmlers camp, based solidly on the NS world view, and once Hitler 
indicated support for any of Himmler's positions or actions, Frick's re-
sistance crumbled. 
In fact, much of what has been, and will be, attributed here to Frick 
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may well have been the work of officials around him. An older man 
obviously tiring of the long fight, from day to day he would act decisively 
or recklessly when frustrated and bitter. At another time, he would be 
indecisive or lethargic. As an experienced Old Fighter, he knew the 
significance of his declining status with Hitler and worried self-defeat-
ingly about interpersonal Party politics. Although he sought to play the 
game at all levels, as his position declined he became less willing to 
involve directly his legal and administrative experts, whose arguments 
might have prevailed in an occasional high-level confrontation. Instead 
he chose to attend such meetings alone. Some witnesses indicate that 
he lost interest in the details of important policy formulation, and was 
therefore incapable of arguing decisively.1 
A gradation of Nazis stood between Guertner and Himmler on the 
continuum, clouding the sharpness of anti-Himmler arguments. They 
ranged from Hans Frank, for instance, to Werner Best, clearly within 
Himmler's camp. As jurists they phrased their arguments more ap-
pealingly than Himmler or Heydrich, and, in fact, their positions were 
more conservative. They weakened Frick's determination to resist 
Himmler's expansion and undoubtedly served in arranging compro-
mises between Frick and Himmler. Goering belongs on the continuum 
between Frick and Himmler also, as a vehicle for compromises rather 
than a member of Himmler's extreme wing. 
Above all of this sat Hitler, traditionally described as manipulating 
such divisions cynically in a divide-and-conquer process, or as slowly 
and calculatingly building toward his secret goal of a totalitarian police 
state. Although these were indeed the effects of his role, most evidence 
indicates that his behavior in this struggle was less calculated and more 
a mixture of disinterest, fumbling intuition, and an aversion to making 
decisions, the result being gradual accumulations of power to the most 
persistent, flexible, and opportunistic competitors, especially if they of-
fered Hitler the power he wanted at a time when he could seize it. In 
fact, Hitler's decisions affecting this struggle were frequently inconsist-
ent. If success lay through personal appeal to Hitler, Goering and Himm-
ler held most trumps, but Hitler had made no final decisions. As late 
as 1935, Goebbels allegedly told Diels that Hitler had reservations about 
the operation of the Gestapo under Heydrich.2 
Out~ide this continuum were other potential allies, power bases, 
and alternative channels of appeal to the Fuehrer. From all appearances, 
Himmler's people made an effort to "sell" the Gestapo to these potential 
allies. Regardless of sharp splits among the officers, von Blomberg'S 
support shifted the weight of the military, that bastion of conservative 
strength, toward Himmler. The role of the barons of finance and industry 
in this struggle has never been explored beyond their contributions to 
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the SS. They divided themselves into conservative wings behind 
Schacht, and more pliable and opportunistic wings supporting Goering 
and Himmler. Finally, the Party power structure, split at the top between 
Hess-Schwarz and Ley and ranging down through the Gauleiter to local 
leaders, held numerous government offices with police powers and re-
sponsibilities. These Party leaders with their overlapping interests in the 
state may have been a decisive factor at least in Frick's defeat-if not in 
Himmler's victory-because Frick threatened their independence. 
For Frick, the Reich centralization of the police under his ministry 
was merely one major aspect of an intended Reich reform that over-
extended his capacities. He wished to consolidate in one rationalized 
and centralized bureaucracy all the machinery of governing and policy 
making, with his ministry as the keystone. Since 1933 Frick had made 
periodic moves toward police centralization, only to let the matter drop 
time and again. Goering's tricks with the Gestapo had frustrated his 
earliest moves to consolidate the political police, and, although he con-
tinued to pursue a centralization of all criminal police as a counter to 
the Gestapo, every obstacle he encountered encumbered his progress 
unduly. Each time he found a particular thrust frustrated (by Goering's 
retention of the Gestapo, for example), he marked time for several 
months, then added it to his growing list of frustrations, creating one 
massive problem to be solved in toto. Such a spirit certainly permeated 
a memorandum compiled in June 1935 by Daluege's staff in the minis-
try.3 
The memorandum was a position paper on all the problems pro-
duced by the different types and concepts of "police" and by the mul-
titude of ministries and state and local jurisdictions to which they were 
responsible. The authors further complicated their problem by including 
"special police" who fell under other ministries, such as river and harbor 
patrols, railroad police, conservation officials and game wardens, air raid 
wardens, and border and tariff officials. Within this mass of conflicting 
and overlapping jurisdictions, the problem of the political police, com-
plex enough in itself, became totally submerged and seemingly minor. 
Only a complete reorganization of the entire governmental structure 
could solve these problems, an impossible task even in the most totali-
tarian of states, especially if the Fuehrer did not devote himself to it as 
a high priority. 
If indeed Frick had encumbered the solution of the political police 
problem with total Reich reform, there is little wonder that he failed to 
outmaneuver Himmler. He had failed to focus enough energy on either 
a direct assault on the political police or a clever encirclement-that is, 
the creation of a suitable replacement, a Reich Criminal Police. If he and 
his ministry had approached the police problem as a single package, 
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hoping to dilute the intense controversy over the political police, they 
would have had a viable tactic only if police centralization could have 
been disentangled from the insoluble issues of Reich reform. 
When he finally did make a move focused specifically on the de-
tective police, Frick may have precipitated Himmler's ultimate victory. 
In late spring 1935, Frick suddenly tried to make Hitler choose between 
himself and Himmler as the responsible authority for the political police. 
This maneuver grew from a complex tug of war over accountability for 
the Reich Security Service (Reichssicherheitsdienst, or RSD), a police 
detective bodyguard formed for the close protection of the Fuehrer and 
other key leaders-an organization similar to the American president's 
Secret Service.4 
As if to pressure Hitler, Frick complained that he could not assume 
responsibility for the RSD in his police division of the ministry unless 
he had complete authority over all involved officials, their service, ca-
pabilities, and cooperation with other criminal police. He argued for the 
unification of all detective police, both political and criminal, directly 
under his ministry. He buttressed the case with several examples of the 
domestic and foreign repercussions of political police actions over which 
he had no control. Unfortunately, his arguments flew in the face of 
Hitler's desire for personal involvement in the selection of all RSD per-
sonnel and for direct command over them through his personal staff. 
Frick concluded with a child-like demand that Hitler choose between 
him and Himmler to have Reich-wide responsibility for the political po-
lice, solving jurisdictional problems once and for all. 5 Predictably, Hitler 
procrastinated. 
Meanwhile, Frick's staff continued its work on the unification of all 
police under a central Reich authority. As early as March, they had 
drafted a law for police administration that would give Frick extensive 
powers for regulating all police organizations in the Reich. Frick, know-
ing he was powerless to push through and enforce such legislation, 
sought support from Hitler.6 He must have received some encourage-
ment, for by June he was informing representatives of the various states 
that the uniformed police would be taken over by the Reich on April 1, 
1936. Through the entire summer, however, open discussion of cen-
tralization remained limited to the uniformed police, leaving the most 
sensitive issue of the criminal and political police in abeyance. As a 
matter of fact, as late as August, the criminal police were specifically 
excluded from centralization. 7 
By this time von Blomberg had gone directly to Hitler to urge cen-
tralization of an autonomous political police. Although he had worded 
his note in such a way as to strengthen Himmler's case, the position he 
took in person before Hitler is not known.8 Subsequent documents in-
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dicate that Hitler remained ambivalent about the place of the political 
police in the Reich chain of command, but he apparently consented to 
Blomberg's appeal for unification. For instance, at some subsequent 
time, Frick met with Hitler and apparently left with the understanding 
that the Gestapo would be incorporated under his ministry. By October 
he was so confident of victory that he not only ordered plans for their 
absorption but apparently anticipated that the 55 and SD could be 
shunted aside to mere auxiliary police roles.9 
What Hitler actually told Frick remains unclear, but during the sum-
mer of 1935 things became ripe for mobilizing support against Himmler's 
growing power. The Gauleiter renewed pressure against the spy net of 
the SD, a bugbear for many of them, and friction returned to SD-Party 
relations in 1935. Throughout the year, Gau and Reich leaders, who 
resented the penetration of SD agents into their domains, fought back 
with every means available, frustrating specific aspects of SD work and 
conducting a grumbling campaign in general that aroused further fear 
and resentment of SD activities. 
One basis for such hostility clearly lay in the SA under the new staff 
chief, Viktor Lutze. Although he had turned against Roehm, the severity 
of 55 repression had shocked him, and he resented it. Frustrated in his 
efforts to expose the 55 role in the events of June 30,10 he sought to 
build what machinery he could within the emasculated SA to oppose 
the 55. One of his creations was a counter to the SD. At some time prior 
to April 1935, Lutze charged SA General Kurt Kuehme with the for-
mation of an intelligence organization that, although ostensibly focused 
primarily on the SA, would delve into political developments in general. 
Lutze approached Hitler and got his support for an intelligence operation 
to serve the SA as the SD did for the 55 and the Party. 11 
Hitler's consent is another measure of how far he remained from 
the details of constructing the police state. Although he was disrupting 
Himmler's effort to eliminate competitive agencies, he may simply have 
seen this as nothing more than a sop to the SA. On the other hand, if 
he was deliberately counterbalancing Himmler's growing organization, 
he did so without clear understanding of the division of labor evolving 
below him. In any case, armed with Hitler's consent, on May 6 Lutze 
turned to Schwarz with a request for funds. Schwarz's immediate re-
action indicated no special concern, and only at the end of the month 
did he bring the matter to Hess's attention. Hess immediately went to 
Hitler for a clarification. Hitler then denied or rescinded his approval, 
and Hess forbade the establishment as a contradiction of the approved 
monopoly of the SD.12 
Throughout the summer, it seems, Hitler vacillated. Indecisive about 
how much to give Himmler and how much of a balance to retain against 
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him, Hitler was certain only of the necessity for internal order and the 
desirability of extensive police power. Perhaps such a mood encouraged 
him to nod approval whenever Frick outlined plans for centralizing all 
police. In any case, Frick's people continued to formulate legislation for 
a Reich police, with the target date of April 1, 1936. During the autumn 
they drummed up support in the Reich and Prussian ministries, and by 
November they were preparing drafts for submission. They planned for 
all the regular uniformed and detective police in Germany to become 
Reich civil servants under Frick's ministry. For local direction, the district 
officials of the states would continue their former function as local police 
authorities, but under Reich ministry control.13 Himmler would have to 
become an obedient civil servant or be shunted aside. 
As justification for this proposed police reform, Frick's supporters 
played on the mounting tension over international affairs and on the 
belief in the necessity of a Reich police for national defense and security. 
Plans to create a centralized criminal investigation office added another 
appeal. They offered the recent success in creating a Reich police force 
for the Saar as proof of feasibility and as a measure of what was needed. 
Finally, to combat the general lethargy in Reich reform, they argued that 
the urgency of police reform demanded action before the completion of 
a total reform. 14 
With the centralization of all police under Frick's ministry, the Reich 
chief of police would have been Kurt Daluege as head of the Police 
Division (Abteilung III). Daluege would have the image of NS reliability 
to make him acceptable to the Party, thus countering Himmler's appeal; 
he had fewer enemies in the Movement than Himmler. Consequently, 
Frick's people had no choice but to continue backing him as their alter-
native, despite growing suspicions of his ambitions15 and his increasing 
subordination to Himmler. They could hope that a Frick victory would 
win him back. Although he undoubtedly still played a double game, 
Daluege was increasingly in a position to weaken Frick's work for cen-
tralizing the police to the exclusion of Himmler. 
By this time, however, the tide had shifted again, in Himmler's favor. 
Both of Lutze's efforts had been frustrated by a combination of political 
police action from below and Bormann's support from above. Bormann 
also cooled the Party leaders' attacks on the SO. When Kuehme contin-
ued efforts to build an SA intelligence agency, including clandestine 
fund raising, Heydrich had his agents arrested and registered a protest 
with Hess, who, along with Schwarz, took official action to end SA 
intelligence operation. Although Lutze may have maintained some clan-
destine operations, any hope of creating a rival to the SO had vanished, 
given Party financial control and official pressure, and the executive 
action of Heydrich's police.16 
A Conservative Victory? 207 
Bormann's work within Party headquarters culminated in February 
1936 when he issued for Hess an unusually blunt order to the Party to 
"abandon all distrust of the SO" and to support it wholeheartedly in 
the performance of its tasks. He announced that Hess would receive all 
SO reports of Party difficulties without embellishment and interpreta-
tion, and the proper state prosecutor would be notified of punishable 
offenses. Henceforth, there should be no cause for friction between SO 
and Party; any future problems were to be reported to Hess for settle-
ment with Himmler.17 Bormann and Hess supported the SO because, 
in their struggles with Ley and the Ga.uleiter, they needed reliable sources 
of information and checks against corruption in the Movement. With 
his team of SO and police, Heydrich zealously watched and purged the 
OAF.1s Throughout the summer and into the winter, many who had 
Hitler's ear thus supported one or more aspects of Himmler's growing 
system. Consequently, at the same time that he may have been en-
couraging Frick, Hitler was also amenable to Himmler's proposals. 
Himmler used his direct access to Hitler to outmaneuver Lutze, Frick, 
and other opponents.19 Consequently in October, at the same time that 
Frick was anticipating the absorption of the Gestapo, Himmler had con-
fidence enough to notify his Land police offices that he anticipated the 
creation of a Reich political police with its own autonomous budget. 20 
Hitler had made decisions in Himmler's favor without Frick under-
standing their full implications. However, Frick should have gotten the 
message clearly when Hitler finally acted on the Reich Security Service 
(RSO). On October 21, he notified Frick that although the RSO would 
always be directly subordinate to the chief of the Reich Chancellery, Dr. 
Lammers, and commanded directly by Hitler, Hess, and Bormann, 
Himmler would have formal responsibility for the RSO and the personal 
security of key leaders. Frick's ministry would merely handle adminis-
trative and budgetary affairs. 21 From this Frick must have realized the 
weakness of his position vis-a.-vis Himmler and the danger of pressing 
Hitler to choose between them. 
Meanwhile, Himmler checkmated Frick's proposed legislation. On 
November 1, in response to a number of attacks on his SS-police-con-
centration camp system, he again went directly to Hitler and won his 
support.22 On these particular complaints and in a number of subsequent 
cases, Hitler showed continued and decisive support for Himmler's sys-
tem, and from all appearances he must also have instructed Frick to 
include Himmler's opinions in any plans for centralizing the police. The 
matter would now hang fire until spring, when Frick's people began 
ironing out the details with Heydrich's staff. 
Before this stage was reached, however, the conservative opposition 
had achieved an apparent victory. That success and its subsequent de-
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terioration involved the struggle to limit the power of the Gestapo inside 
Prussia. 
Victory and Defeat on the Prussian Front 
If Himmler indeed suffered a setback, it apparently resulted from an-
other case of overplaying his hand. Unfortunately, the evidence for re-
constructing these developments is spotty. In the previously mentioned 
memorandum in which Frick demanded that Hitler choose between him 
and Himmler, Frick made an allusion to a Gestapo law that Himmler 
had proposed for Prussia. According to Frick, Himmler's draft asserted 
that Himmler would determine the tasks of the Gestapo.23 Since both 
the final form of the law, issued in February 1936, and a draft discussed 
by the Prussian ministerial council on June 27, 1935, both reserved de-
termination of Gestapo business to Goering in understanding with Frick, 
considerable changes must have been made in Himmler's draft between 
the time of Frick's memorandum (Mayor early June) and the council 
meeting.24 
If Frick accurately interpreted Himmler's draft of the law, then 
Himmler had certainly bid for greater personal power and independence 
from Goering. Under the previous laws, Goering, as chief of the Gestapo, 
determined its tasks. If Himmler hoped to assume Goering's old au-
thority, the final Gestapo Law issued in February was indeed a victory 
for Frick and a setback for him. By the same token, Goering's apparent 
support for Frick in this new law becomes more understandable. Frick 
could have goaded Goering into reasserting limitations over Himmler 
and into sharing this limiting authority with Frick and the regional gov-
ernors, as checks to Himmler's growing independence, for Goering 
would not abdicate his last vestige of control over the Gestapo. 
In the background of this development, both Goering and Himmler 
had been under considerable pressure to reform and clarify regulations 
governing the Gestapo, especially in regard to its relations with regional 
and local government and also with respect to the concentration camps. 
They apparently preferred to procrastinate, using their power to set 
precedents and to create fait accompli. The decision of the Prussian 
Supreme Administrative Court of May 2, 1935, may have forced the 
issue, however. Although it recognized the Gestapo as a special police, 
not subject to the regular procedures for review by administrative courts, 
it did not absolutely exclude the possibility of court intervention in Ge-
stapo actions. Thus Werner Best had emphasized the necessity of a new 
law to guarantee the Gestapo immunity from review.25 
The draft legislation drawn up in Best's office probably included a 
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clause on court review like that in the final law. In addition to Himmler's 
new claim to power, it probably sought also to guarantee the continued 
independence of the Gestapo field posts from the regional governors. 
This, however, was a point of ambivalence for Goering, who did want 
close cooperation between the Gestapo and the state administration. It 
might be surmised that Himmler also sought to increase the indepen-
dence of his concentration camps from state control. Consequently by 
the end of June 1935, whatever Himmler's supporters may have tried 
to gain was checkmated or reversed in most cases. At the June 27 meeting 
of the Prussian Ministerial Council, the draft law, which contained bas-
ically the final form of the law, in no way resembled Frick's description 
of Himmler's proposal. Both the law and the minutes of the meeting 
require analysis. 
In one respect, the law represented an advance of Gestapo power, 
but in other respects it checked Himmler's independence. All previous 
laws and the controversial sections of the ordinance of March 8, 1934, 
were abrogated and replaced by this one law, which reaffirmed the 
subordination of the Gestapo Office to Goering as prime minister of 
Prussia; however, its independence from Minister of Interior Frick be-
came less secure than before. Although Goering would still decide what 
business in particular fell to the Gestapo, henceforth he would do so 
"in understanding with" (im Einvernehmen mit) Frick. Although this was 
typical of promises easily ignored, it also had teeth. Both Goering and 
Frick would now issue executive orders pursuant to this law. Indeed, 
the ordinance for the execution of this law, finally issued on February 
10, 1936, was in fact signed by Frick as well as Goering.26 This gave 
Frick veto power. 
The local Gestapo offices (Staatspolizeistellen) were specifically resub-
ordinated to the regional governors (Rezierungspraesidenten). The de jure 
independence of the Gestapo from Frick's ministry seemed considerably 
weakened. To prevent Himmler and Heydrich from relying on their 
personnel in the Gestapo field structure and the Gestapo office to ignore 
and sabotage this piece of legislation, Frick as well as Goering would 
henceforth supervise the appointment and dismissal of Gestapo civil 
servants through the usual state civil service procedures. Goering had 
apparently consented to act in understanding with Frick to curb Himm-
ler. 27 
Despite the fact that Best and his legal experts had been working 
on the law for at least a year, the only real advance in Gestapo power 
was the codification of Gestapo immunity from court review of its orders. 
Frick and Guertner lost in their drive for judicial and administrative 
review of Gestapo actions because they were opposing the entire, ar-
bitrary concept of the fuehrer principle. As a Nazi, Frick had to acquiesce, 
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for court review was part of the "liberal" system of checks and balances. 
The NS system demanded that the courts operate in harmony with the 
executive and not serve as opponents to its power. This concession by 
Frick is another indication of a possible compromise between him and 
Goering. By submitting to this clause, Frick made it easier for Goering 
to support other clauses for increased control of the Gestapo without 
feeling that he had dulled his sharp instrument. 
Some misconceptions about this law and the ordinance for its exe-
cution require explanation. The worst error is the contention that this 
law made the Gestapo a Reich-wide political police force. In his sum-
mation at Nuremberg, a Soviet prosecutor said this law had made the 
Gestapo Office the central office for all of the political police of the Reich. This 
error has been picked up and repeated by academic and popular his-
torians, some of whom have even cited the February 10, 1936, law as 
their authority.28 The contention is totally fallacious, for it was a purely 
Prussian law. Although the Gestapo office physically contained Himm-
ler's "Central Bureau" for commanding the political police of the other 
states, this bureau existed only under Himmler's personal authority as 
commander of these police in each state. It had no official place in the 
Gestapo Office, and the Prussian Gestapo law of 1936 left this un-
changed. Unfortunately, later Gestapo training materials contributed to 
the confusion. When interpreting the law of 1936, they often added to 
Section 3 that the Gestapo Office had the authority to "decree regulations 
for the entire Reich." This interpretation was rendered later, however, 
after the developments of July 1936. Other official publications also 
twisted or reversed the significance of the law. Since they sought as 
usual to maintain outwardly the image of propriety within the NS gov-
ernment, they usually hailed the law as a codification of the Gestapo's 
development up to that point, thereby obscuring the law's possible sig-
nificance as a potential check on Himmler. 29 
Another source of misinformation has been Section 2 (4) of the Ex-
ecutive Ordinance, which read, "The Secret Police Office administers 
the state concentration camps." This is traditionally viewed as an aspect 
of Heydrich's struggle to build his personal power within the 55 system 
in rivalry with Himmler. Heydrich allegedly engineered this clause to 
have the camps directly subordinate to himself rather than under Himm-
ler through the 55 chain of command. Because of subsequent sabotage 
of this clause by Himmler's actual operating procedures, the Gestapo 
Office exercised control only to the extent that it assigned internees to 
camps of its choice and ensured that they were treated commensurate 
with their "offenses." A standard interpretation states that Himmler 
carefully maintained personal control of the camps to keep Heydrich 
from gaining too much power. 30 
A Conservative Victory? 211 
Control of the concentration camps may well have been one aspect 
of a developing Himmler-Heydrich rivalry, but the popularity of this 
version has further obscured the real significance of Frick's potential 
victory in the February law. If Frick and Goering had kept the camps 
under control of the Gestapo, while continuing to extend their own 
control over it, they would have won a most significant victory over 
Himmler's emerging system. Himmler's success resulted from his ability 
to keep the camps independent de facto of state supervision. In this 
context, Heydrich should have been supporting rather than opposing 
the removal of the camps from the Gestapo, a state agency. 
Best's testimony at Nuremberg is the prime source that this clause 
of the ordinance represented a power play by Heydrich. In fact, energy 
was generated in the Gestapo Office to regain control over the camps, 
but that came after the June 1936 reorganization of the police nullified 
this clause of the February ordinance. Best probably confused the times. 
Furthermore, as Eicke understood it, the energy for the later move came 
from Best, who, according to Eicke's August 1936 complaint to Himmler, 
had "stated on various occasions that the situation in the camps is dis-
gusting and that it is high time the camps were returned to command 
of the Gestapo.,,31 Gestapo concern over the camps seems to have been 
as much a matter of Best's conceptions of propriety as of Heydrich's 
power plays. 
To return to the Ministerial Council meeting of June 27, 1935 and 
the events leading up to the actual decree, the minutes of the meeting 
indicate more of the nature of the possible compromise among Goering, 
Frick, and perhaps Guertner to curb Himmler. After some discussion of 
Gestapo affairs, the council expressed its general consent to the draft as 
presented at that time by Himmler, who must have been forced to submit 
to the compromise. Himmler and Frick had worked out the details, and 
after June 27 the draft underwent only minimal changes. Most signifi-
cantly, the Council "confirmed that for the present the specially created 
instrument of the Gestapo for the combatting of the state enemies cannot 
be dispensed with." However, they counterbalanced the acknowledged 
necessity for a "taut, pervading authority" with the expressed desire 
that its "absolutely necessary connection with the agencies of the general 
administration (Oberpraesidenten, Regierungspraesidenten, Landraeten) be 
preserved. ,,32 
This was, however, still a compromise and not yet a complete defeat 
for Himmler, for the conservative ministers, who included not only Frick 
and Guertner but also Popitz and Schacht, had accepted the continued 
existence of the extraordinary police, the Gestapo. They accepted the 
argument that such police were essential to combat the threats against 
Germany. They abandoned their position that the state of emergency 
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was over and that the Gestapo and the camps were no longer needed. 
In return, Goering accepted resubordination of the field posts to the 
governors. The last minute on the proposed law indicated that Frick had 
draft proposals on procedures for remedies against Gestapo measures; 
however, knowledge of their nature awaits further evidence, for they 
never saw application. 33 
Although Goering proceeded within the month to circulate the draft 
to the ministers for specific comments, setting a deadline of August 3 
for its decree, action hung fire until February 1936.34 The reasons for 
the delay are not documented. Himmler apparently counterattacked, 
and Goering may have had second thoughts. As before, Goering con-
tinued to playa vacillating role in the power struggle through the spring 
of 1936. The draft law and opposition pressure encouraged him to con-
tinue asserting administrative control over the Gestapo field offices, but 
he would soon reverse the process. His inconsistent orders undoubtedly 
confused and frustrated responsible officials trying to control the Ge-
stapo; they certainly remain a confusing factor today. The complications 
arising from the highly legalistic struggle between Frick and Himmler 
must certainly have discouraged this flamboyant personality from be-
coming actively involved. Frick had apparently convinced him that he 
could and should prevent the Gestapo from slipping through his fingers 
into Himmler's, and Goering might have tried to reassert his and Frick's 
administrative control. On the other hand, torn by Himmler's arguments 
for the necessity of maintaining the "sharp instrument" for combating 
Communism and other threats to the new order, Goering vacillated. 
When Himmler and Frick had recourse to Hitler, he withdrew further 
from the competition, to avoid being on the wrong side, and directed 
his attention to paths of less resistance-the more glamorous Luftwaffe 
and the more lucrative economic sphere. 
From June 1935 through spring 1936, Goering and Himmler felt op-
position from the ministers around them, from the administrators, bu-
reaucrats, and officials of Prussia, from the judiciary, and from influential 
private sources, exerting great pressure to reform the 55, Gestapo, and 
camp system. Goering's governors pressed him to resubordinate the 
Gestapo field posts and decried the delay in issuing the new law. Pow-
erful Gauleiter like Erich Koch added to this pressure in their dual roles 
in Party and state. The camps came under renewed attack. At the Reich 
level, Guertner tried to preserve the case against the Saxon Gestapo 
official Vogel for his role in camp excesses prior to June 30, 1934.35 
By October, such pressure produced mixed results, but Himmler's 
overall defenses seemed more firm. For instance, in response to sus-
picion about the frequency of death due to unnatural causes in the 
camps, in October the Gestapo published guidelines requiring camp 
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commandants to report immediately to the Public Prosecutor's Office 
every case without clear medical evidence of death due to natural causes. 
A clear concession to the demand for propriety and due process in the 
camps, the guidelines would discourage excesses without creating out-
side controls and would strengthen official apologies for the system. 36 
In contrast to such concessions, the political police continued to violate 
Frick's April 1934 directives on protective custody by using such custody 
for the preventive detention of enemies of the state, like KPD officials 
who might return to their old work. 37 In such cases, the conservative 
opposition found protests awkward. 
Real measures of the emerging constellation of power appeared, 
however, in Saxony and Bavaria. In Saxony, Hitler quashed the case 
against Vogel in September. In Bavaria at an October 8 meeting of the 
Ministerial Council, Wagner deflected Epp's efforts to tighten control 
over the BPP by responding that Himmler was in control and that he 
could intervene only if Frick, as Reich minister, had the authority.38 The 
answer to that question came shortly. 
On November 1, under pressure from all these attacks, Himmler 
turned to Hitler for support. Undoubtedly he employed all of his appeals 
about the necessity' of the Gestapo and the camps for the internal defense 
of national security. In Hitler, impatient with internal administrative 
details and increasingly preoccupied with preparations for "national de-
fense," he found a responsive ear. On November 6, he forwarded the 
results to Goering, Frick, and Guertner. On the issues of Gestapo field 
post subordination to the governors, specifically Koch's case in East 
Prussia, Hitler "decided that no change should be made in position of 
the Koenigsberg Gestapo." On Guertner's demand that in protective 
custody cases prisoners have access to legal assistance, Hitler prohibited 
the consultation of lawyers. And on Guertner's call for more stringent 
measures to avoid deaths in the camps, Hitler responded. "In view of 
the conscientious direction of the camps special measures are not con-
sidered necessary."39 Himmler had won most points of contention. 
Meanwhile, in legislative and judicial matters the tide had also 
turned decisively in Himmler's favor. A significant expansion of police 
powers had come in June 1935 with passage of an ordinance on criminal 
punishment. The new law destroyed the principle of punishment only 
for crimes under the law. Henceforth, one could be punished for any 
act that went against the "public" sense of propriety. In this way, the 
police and the leadership of state and Party became the only real judges 
of what constituted a crime. As another aspect of the voelkisch concept 
of law, essentially any violation against "the living law of the Germanic 
racial community," that is, the Nazi weltanschauung, became a crime. 
These new crimes would now be punished by analogy with the most 
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similar law. In this way, crimes of "racial defilement" were prosecuted 
even before the September 1935 passage of the Law for the Protection 
of German Blood and German Honor.40 The broad interpretation of 
protective custody powers had given the Gestapo this de facto authority 
for some time; now it was established in law. 
The judiciary showed itself equally adaptive to the growing totali-
tarian mood of law and order. In December 1935, the Prussian Court of 
Appeal (Kammergericht) upheld sentences against juveniles for activities 
in a Catholic youth movement. In the spirit of the "camouflaged enemy" 
argument and the philosophy of totalitarian solidarity for national de-
fense, the judges ruled that such organizations in which undue emphasis 
was placed on religious beliefs undermined the NS drive to build an 
indivisible national community and, therefore, indirectly assisted Com-
munist subversion. 41 
While such measures harmonized with arguments emanating from 
Gestapo and SD sources, courts were also rendering decisions directly 
undermining the conservative opposition. On October 7, 1935, the Ham-
burg Administrative Court went as far as an SS jurist could ask. Beyond 
ruling that political police orders were immune to test in administrative 
courts, it decided that the courts could not even test whether or not 
such orders lay within the political authority of the state once the state 
had assumed that they did. This was the kind of freedom the Gestapo 
needed in Prussia, where the court decision of the previous fall had not 
eliminated the court's right to test political orders to determine if they 
were really within the purview of the political police.42 
In light of all this, it seems unlikely that the law finally passed be-
cause HimmIer had to accept it under pressure from the ministers, gov-
ernors, and Gauleiter. Most of that pressure had been deflected with 
Hitler's support in November, and only the threat of court review re-
mained a serious opposition trump in Prussia. All parties involved had 
accepted the law in its final form, but HimmIer's victories had apparently 
encouraged him to counterattack with proposed executive directives for 
the law that became a bone of contention in December. This may have 
been a tactical maneuver, however, for he backed down by the time he 
and Goering met to settle details with Hitler in January, guaranteeing 
HimmIer's position.43 By then, Himmler had turned a potential defeat 
into a desirable compromise. 
Although his opposition may have forced Himmler to negotiate and 
to accept the draft during the summer of 1935, by February the law 
represented a renewed expression of the spirit of compromise and com-
mon front that had existed prior to June 1934. Himmler accepted a role 
for Frick in the basic policy and personnel matters of the Gestapo for 
the sake of harmony and propriety and in return for freedom from attack 
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through the courts. Because he probably held to the Ministerial Council's 
expressed desire for close cooperation between police and administra-
tion, he could accept the apparent subordination of the field posts to 
the governors. In both cases, he could count on Goering's values to 
prevent too much interference by Frick or other bureaucrats. Given these 
realities and Himmler's increased strength by the beginning of 1936, the 
law now gave far more than it took away. 44 Best, as their legal expert, 
may have steered Himmler and Heydrich in this direction, more legally 
and administratively proper than they might otherwise have chosen. In 
any case, on February 10, 1936, the law became effective. 
Goering, "in understanding with" Frick, immediately bolstered the 
new law with a number of specific directives, and throughout February 
and March, earnestly involved himself in an effort to ensure close co-
ordination between the field posts and the governors. For his part, Hey-
drich dutifully ordered his field post leaders to observe the new 
relationships. Of course, he thought it proper to exploit every loophole. 
For instance, although Goering ordered the Gestapo Office to forward 
to the governors informational copies of all directives sent to the field 
posts, it had been easy to convince him that orders relevant to Abwehr 
police work should be excluded from this directive for the sake of na-
tional security. Furthermore, Heydrich widened the loophole by distin-
guishing between orders that fell under Goering's directive and 
"personal assignments" sent to individual field post leaders. According 
to Heydrich, the governors need not receive the latter. He thus left 
himself the freedom, for reasons of security or other priorities, to violate 
the procedures as he saw fit, while simultaneously ensuring tranquility 
by ordering his subordinates to adhere to the guidelines.45 
For his part, Goering predictably set clear limits as to how far he 
would allow administrative interference in Gestapo work. The new ar-
rangement was not to disrupt Gestapo business. liThe Gestapo must ... 
remain a tightly organized, forceful instrument in the hands of the state 
government." The governors could intervene only in cases of special 
political interest, and he repeated the old formula limiting their au-
thority to give directives only insofar as they did not contradict those of 
the Gestapo Office. In such cases, the Gestapo Office would medi-
ate.46 
An added effect of the new Gestapo law was to heighten the au-
thority of the Gestapo to use local regular police for executing Gestapo 
business where Gestapo personnel were unavailable or of inadequate 
strength. Consequently, on March 19, when the Prussian Supreme Ad-
ministrative Court acknowledged that the Gestapo law removed review 
of Gestapo actions from its purview, it ruled that the same immunity 
applied to the actions of county and local police acting for the Gestapo.47 
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Nevertheless, the Prussian court would still not go so far as to re-
nounce its right to judge the validity of Gestapo authority in cases not 
clearly within political police competence. On this issue, there would 
be an ongoing battle in professional legal publications over the legal 
philosophy of the N5 state. In support of 55-police desires, the more 
radical interpretations argued that the legislature, executive, and judi-
ciary should not stand against one another as checks and balances but 
represented merely different activities of the same organism. The judi-
ciary could not contest what the executive had undertaken as its political 
responsibility. Against these arguments and the compliant decisions of 
the courts, the conservatives would fight rear-guard actions, mostly in 
vain.48 Arguments for national solidarity and an escalating concern over 
national security decisively shaped the attitudes of those who counted. 
Meanwhile, Goering began reneging on his compromise with Frick, 
influenced by Himmler and his supporters, who appealed to Goering's 
concern about Gestapo freedom and efficiency at the expense of close 
coordination with the administration. On April 2, he weakened the ef-
fectiveness of the governors' control by removing them from partici-
pation in the system of political situation reports, contending that their 
involvement endangered national solidarity and security by increasing 
the chances of leakage. A release of pessimistic or negative reports might 
affect public morale or provide the enemy with propaganda detrimental 
to the regime. He also repeated the line that the Party and, by impli-
cation, the ideologically oriented Gestapo and 50 were better attuned 
to the mood of the nation than the bureaucracy.49 
If any doubts remained that the apparent conservative gains of the 
previous months were nullified, an article by Best published on April 
15 should have dispelled them. He proclaimed an interpretation of the 
February law that reasserted the total independence of the Gestapo Of-
fice. Goering was its chief; Himmler, his deputy, was responsible for its 
activity, and no other ministry could interfere. A special secret police 
had to be separate from the general administration, bound by legalistic 
procedures. Henceforth, the Gestapo operated according to "special 
principles and requirements." In this interpretation, Best fell back on 
the older Gestapo law of November 30, 1933, as a precedent. Despite 
its abrogation, he asserted that it had proven itself in practice, and there-
fore was a part of the new law. Consequently, the Gestapo remained 
"an independent branch of the interior administration," not a depart-
ment of the Interior Ministry. 50 
As for the Gestapo field posts and cooperation with the rest of the 
government. Best's interpretations stood the law on its head, as one 
historian put it. Best stated that at the intermediate level, relations be-
tween the Gestapo and the inner administration were a two-way street. 
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When the Gestapo needed help in political police work, it had the power 
to issue orders to local authorities. When a governor felt the need for 
political police action in his district, he had the authority to issue orders 
to the local Gestapo field office. This kept simple problems at lower 
levels and avoided excessive red tape. He then quoted Goering's direc-
tive that the governors could not counter orders from the Gestapo Office, 
and that in cases of conflict the latter had the final word. Although he 
claimed the new arrangement met the wishes of the administration for 
input into Gestapo activity, in fact his interpretation essentially subor-
dinated the administration to the Gestapo and made appeal against it 
dependent on Goering's approval. 51 
In one last twist, Best proclaimed the separateness of the concen-
tration camps from state control. He declared that the Gestapo admin-
istered the camps through the inspector of the concentration camps 
(Eicke) attached to the Gestapo Office.52 Again, the dual authority of an 
55 official serving as an authority for the state so confused the chains 
of authority as to destroy any hope of direct control. 
In a paean of triumph, Best proclaimed the emerging police state in 
terms designed to appeal to all right-thinking citizens: 
With the establishment of the National Socialist Fuehrer State, Germany for the 
first time has a system of government which derives from a living idea its le-
gitimate right to resist, with all the coercive means at the disposal of the state, 
any attack on the present form of the state and its leadership. National Socialism's 
political principle of totalitarianism, which corresponds to the ideological prin-
ciple of the organically indivisible national community, does not tolerate within 
its sphere the development of any political ideas at variance with the will of the 
majority. Any attempt to gain recognition for or even to uphold different political 
ideas will be ruthlessly dealt with, as the symptom of an illness which threatens 
the healthy unit of the indivisible national organism, regardless of the subjective 
wishes of its supporters. 
Proceeding from these principles, the National Socialist Fuehrer State has 
created for the first time in Germany a political police which we regard as modern, 
i.e., as meeting our present-day needs; an institution which carefully supervises 
the political health of the German body politic, which is quick to recognize all 
symptoms of disease and germs of destruction-be they the result of disinte-
gration from within or purposeful poisoning from without-and to remove them 
by every suitable means. 53 
Best then described how the new political police must be ideologi-
cally attuned to detecting the enemy and must function as a fighting 
formation. In this way he fused his article with the companion piece by 
Heydrich, who elaborated on the necessity of the close union between 
political police and 55.54 
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Himmler and his people were now ready to proclaim openly their 
goal of an 55-police system independent of regular, restricted state au-
thority. They had explicitly flouted all that Frick and the conservative 
opposition had sought, and the opposition's inability to answer effec-
tively contributed to Himmler's forthcoming victory. In Hitler's survival-
of-the-fittest system, they now had little hope of blocking unification of 
the police under Himmler. 
18 _____ _ 
Himmler's Triumph 
During early 1936 the "sales campaign" reached new levels as a variety 
of sources delivered it to a wide spectrum of German society-but always 
with the same monotonous uniformity. For instance, the broad outline 
of the message for the general public appeared in the January 23 issue 
of the Voelkischer Beobachter, describing the Gestapo as the indispensible 
organ for the defense of the state against its enemies. The article em-
ployed the increasingly familiar theme of the camouflaged enemy to 
reassert the need for a special political police. Assured that due process 
provided sufficient guarantees against the Gestapo's abusing its power, 
the good citizen had nothing to fear from the Gestapo and should ignore 
the rumors spread by those domestic and foreign enemies who had good 
reason to be apprehensive. 1 
One new element, however, was publicity for the SO. As part of an 
effort to reduce hostility and fear of it as a Cheka that spied on Party 
and Volk, the article depicted the SO as a supplement to the Gestapo in 
combating the enemy. Going a step further, the state protection corps 
emerged in the propaganda as an ideologically guided elite, created by 
55 presence in the Gestapo.2 Hencefoth, Gestapo and SO (soon Sipo 
and SO) would be described as an exemplary team-the union of political 
police and SO, of state and Party-in common cause against the enemy. 
In March, in a speech before the State Council in Berlin, Himmler 
elaborated extensively. Guertner had spoken before him, apparently 
giving a "law and order" line about how punishment was the ultimate 
deterrent for crime. With due respect for this argument, and after a 
careful show of honoring Frick for pre-1923 work in Munich, Himmler 
proceeded to rub the noses of the conservative opposition in their "er-
rors" of the past few years. He charged them with failure to see their 
true enemies as incorrigible, being either of racial stock inherently hostile 
to a great Germany, or fanatical adherents of an ideology born of that 
hostility. Instead, the opposition had insisted on emptying the concen-
tration camps, believing the internees had learned their lessons. The 
result, he proclaimed, was the rebirth of an almost impenetrably secret 
220 Foundations of the Nazi Police State 
Communist movement. The opposition was even so misguided as to 
talk of dissolving the political police. Now that the period of open strug-
gle had passed, they would absorb its work in the regular criminal 
police. 3 
Himmler decried this course as suicidal. Not only was the best pre-
vention the rooting out and elimination of the racial and ideological roots 
of opposition, but it could be done only by a special police force, free 
of bureaucratic encumbrances, free to strike at this enemy like a combat 
unit. He described Germany's struggle as one that would last perhaps 
a century, as long as the enemy operated freely from neighboring states, 
and as long as they had command posts in Moscow and Wall Street. 
He claimed that from the beginnings in 1933-34, five years were needed 
to build a proper political police apparatus that combined the technical 
knowledge of the police and civil service with the ideological insight 
and soldierly qualities of the Movement. Again, in answer to criticism 
of the SO, he described it as the instrument of "ideological intelligence," 
essential as a supplement to executive police work against political ene-
mies. He concluded by alluding to the creation of a "corps" for the 
struggle, a corps to be formed in the fusion of Gestapo, 55, and SO. 
Omitting reference to any other police, he insisted that such a corps was 
vital as the model for future generations in the ongoing struggle of the 
German nation. 4 
Of course, these same themes would soon be presented in the com-
panion articles by Heydrich and Best in the April 15 issue of D~utsches 
Recht. The essence of the newly proclaimed state protection corps re-
mained carefully limited to a fusion of the 55 with the political police, 
although the argument easily and obviously extended to the rest of the 
police. In his March speech, Himmler offered his audience a choice 
between the conservative opposition, with its "fatal errors," and himself 
and the 55-the only ideologically reliable agency for the job. He warned 
of two dangers inherent in any political police: becoming flaccid and 
withering into ineffectiveness, or becoming like the Cheka. Since one 
could not dispense with a political police, these dangers could only be 
avoided through proper leadership.5 Given the world view of the con-
servative opposition and the mood of the times, such arguments must 
have been persuasive enough to split and weaken them. Himmler un-
doubtedly presented the same arguments to Hitler. 
On the other side of the contest, Frick also had successes in bols-
tering his claim to command of a national police. Not only was he Reich 
minister of the interior, but through his alliance with Goering and the 
acquisition of the Prussian Interior Ministry, he also directed all the 
uniformed police of the superstate. He had created a Reich police force 
for the Saar as well. However, his constant complaints to Hitler about 
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Himmler's disobedience revealed his weaknesses and impotence. Frick's 
demand of the previous spring that Hitler either give him all political 
police power or let it be assumed by Himmler, who already claimed it, 
was undoubtedly the most self-defeating gesture he could have made. 6 
Himmler appeared to have the necessary strength, will, and understand-
ing to guarantee internal security under any conditions. Frick desired a 
return to more "normal" systems and was weak against determined 
opposition. In his shifting tactics, he had conceded Himmler's basic 
arguments about the continued emergency status and the necessity for 
the sort of repressive measures he himself opposed. After the fateful 
sparring of late 1935, Himmler had emerged on top. 
At some point afterward, apparently in May, Frick learned that Hitler 
had decided to give Himmler command of the new national police. By 
June 8, Frick's ministry obediently began the paperwork for such a Fueh-
rer order,7 and Himmler was secure enough in his victory to propose 
the terms under which he would assume command. 
In presenting his viewpoints to Hitler on June 6, Himmler insisted 
that the title "Chief of the German Police" was most appropriate, since 
it incorporated both the command and administrative authority desired. 
He preferred this to "Commander of the German Police" (Befehlshaber), 
which could be interpreted as limiting him to command authority only.8 
Obviously, he was alerting Hitler to efforts that would be made to limit 
his command, and he was confident of Hitler's support for his relatively 
unlimited authority. Himmler also intended to preserve the division 
between the regular police and the special political police. He wanted 
two separate divisions (Abteilungen), the regular police (old Abteilung 
III) continuing under Daluege's leadership, and the Gestapo, a new 
division, expanded under Heydrich to include all aspects of political 
police work, even those sections of Frick's ministry that elaborated po-
litical police affairs at the ministerial level. 9 
If Frick had been forced to accept the logic of Himmler's appointment 
on the basis of the NS world view, he continued to resist for both per-
sonal and objective reasons. He not only distrusted Himmler personally, 
but his tactics and arguments indicate that he understood reasonably 
well the threats inherent in Himmler's approach to police work. Despite 
repeated defeat, both he and his close associates, like State Secretary 
Hans Pfundtner, continually tried to limit Himmler's power. 10 They ap-
parently had no knowledge of the full extent of Hitler's intentions to 
support Himmler, for as late as June 8, Frick's legal division submitted 
drafts of decrees giving limited authority to Himmler. As a matter of 
fact, they still envisioned a relative victory for themselves. One Minis-
terial Councilor proposed that Himmler be "Inspector of the German 
Police," directly subordinate to the Minister of Interior, who would be 
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responsible for the details relevant to the execution of the proposed 
decree. Himmler's deputy inspector was to be Daluege,l1 undoubtedly 
expected to assume the real working responsibilities. Apparently, Frick's 
supporters also hoped to reincorporate the political police into the rest 
of the police. In other words, they expected to eliminate all intermediate 
authorities between Frick and Himmler and to subordinate Himmler and 
all German police directly under Frick. Daluege could guarantee a certain 
degree of cooperation from below. 
This bubble burst abruptly on June 9, when Heydrich gave Pfundtner 
Himmler's version of the Fuehrer decree. For the first time, Frick became 
fully aware of the scope of Himmler's victory. Himmler would be titled 
"Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police"; he would be "per-
sonally" subordinate to the Interior Minister and would hold the rank 
of Reich minister participating in cabinet meetings. From the ministry, 
he would assume responsibility for national defense and military affairs 
as far as they concerned Abwehr work, matters pertaining to foreigners, 
to border affairs and to the churches, and all the work of the former 
police division (Abteilung III). "In his own capacity," he would regulate 
and represent the ministry in these affairs, and he would manage the 
organization of the police. Heydrich explained that Hitler desired the 
new title for Himmler to make him comparable to the commander in 
chief of the Army or the Navy. As if to apply pressure, the draft decrees 
that Heydrich offered were dated for Hitler's signature on June 15.12 
Pfundtner dealt cautiously with Heydrich, avoiding any sort of con-
frontation. He contested only issues directly affecting his own compe-
tence. He got Heydrich to agree that Pfundtner would retain authority 
over legislation concerning affairs under Himmler's future police re-
sponsibilities, and they agreed that some matters affecting foreigners 
required further consideration. Pfundtner promised to return with 
Frick's responses the next day. He immediately notified Frick, suggesting 
some changes in the draft and some tactics for fighting back. Basically, 
however, he simply gave in.13 
Tactically, Pfundtner suggested that Frick consult with Goering, 
since the matter also concerned him.14 Undoubtedly, Pfundtner sus-
pected that, as in the past when Himmler tried for such a power play, 
Goering might be goaded into limiting it. Frick obviously thought oth-
erwise. By now, aware of Goering's diminished interest in police affairs 
and his general predilection for seeing things Himmler's way, especially 
if Hitler supported it, Frick preferred to keep Goering out of the problem 
until he had arranged what he could with Himmler. 15 As for Himmler's 
proposed drafts, Frick evidently saw much more danger in them than 
Pfundtner, so much so that he rushed immediately to Hitler to reverse 
whatever he could. The fact that he got an instant audience indicates 
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that he retained some influence, and that the Fuehrer still valued Frick's 
opinions on police affairs. 
Although all interpretations of this meeting have minimized the 
concessions Frick got from Hitler, they had potential significance. By 
this time, with Himmler's command of the police a foregone conclusion, 
his title, Chief of the German Police, had become inconsequential. The 
real issue was Himmler's relationship to Frick's ministry, and on this 
Frick scored a point. Hitler either denied or reversed Himmler's claim 
to standing as a Reich minister, instead he would be a state secretary 
within Frick's ministry.16 This left Frick some possible control over 
Himmler. Unfortunately, Hitler always refused to be bothered with ad-
ministrative details, leaving it up to a trial of strength between Frick and 
Himmler. The compounding of such details to his advantage was Frick's 
only hope of success. Himmler's strength lay in his position as chief of 
all police with very broad powers, and Frick could only try to limit them 
without nullifying what Hitler intended. To limit Himmler, Frick had to 
consolidate into the machinery for control a number of concessions from 
Himmler over administrative details. Hitler had given Frick no more 
support than a vague limitation to the effect that Himmler's position 
was "within" Frick's ministry and, therefore, without ministerial stand-
ing. 
As the only documented case study of Hitler's alleged support for 
Himmler on his road to complete police power, this affair warrants a 
few observations. First, this incident of support proves nothing about 
previous developments. Although it clearly stands as the culmination 
of a growing acceptance of Himmler for the role, it indicates nothing 
about whether any such role was a foregone conclusion in Hitler's mind 
even a few months previously-much less in 1933 or 1934. Most im-
portant, it provides a clear measure of just how ambiguously Hitler did 
indeed support those like Himmler who often came away from an au-
dience claiming full support or claiming Hitler's approval of a very spe-
cific move-in this case, the exact status of Himmler as chief of police. 
Apparently, in seeking approval from Hitler, the best course was to 
propose a very general scheme designed to appeal to a specific aspect 
of the Fuehrer's vaguely expressed goals, then to take whatever expres-
sion of approval Hitler gave and proclaim it to the other parties. A skillful 
player elaborated to his advantage the sort of relevant details that Hitler 
preferred to ignore. The final outcome depended on who else had access 
to Hitler or had the power to ignore some or all of the pronouncement. 
A successfully ignored clause provided the crucial measure of how se-
riously Hitler took the matter relative to his other problems of rule. If a 
decree was involved, as in this case, a good strategist proclaimed Hitler's 
support for a draft and tried to buffalo the other involved parties into 
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approving as much as possible of the draft so it could be signed quickly 
by the Fuehrer. After that, the real issue was who had the power either 
to enforce or to nullify the decree. 
In this case, the concessions Frick won from Hitler have two possible 
interpretations. Either they show how far Himmler was willing to ex-
aggerate claims of Hitler's support and, on his own initiative, to build 
what he wanted, or they show how Hitler's support could quickly be-
come vague in detail, subject to modification, and by no means unlim-
ited. The entire incident, however, portended an unusually thorough 
victory for Himmler in the coming years. Not only did Himmler have 
the necessary power (the machinery of 55 and police) to enforce every 
concession he won and to erode those given the opposition, but, at that 
moment, the issue of the police held such significance for Hitler that he 
was compelled to make a rare decision. 
If, as posited, Hitler had only begun to support the expansion of 
Himmler's police power-the creating of an 55 and police system-as 
late as spring 1936, the reason must lie in the development of his foreign 
policy goals. After securing his domestic power in 1934, Hitler turned 
increasingly away from details of internal affairs to concentrate on in-
ternational pursuits. Nevertheless, with mounting international tension 
during 1935-36 and the emergence of a more aggressive military and 
foreign policy, he must also have become. more concerned about internal 
security. In his few public pronouncements on domestic security, the 
only primary concern he had expressed was the prevention of internal 
collapse at moments of international crisis-the nationalist version of 
the 1918 defeat. As such crises became increasingly part of his plans for 
the future, he became more willing to risk an imbalance in his divide-
and-conquer system in order to create a strong mechanism of "internal 
defense" by giving one man the necessary authority to build it. En-
couragement from Blomberg and perhaps other conservative powers 
who shared this concern for security was undoubtedly significant. Fi-
nally, the expansion of a reliable, yet radical N5 police would help Hitler 
balance an expanding conservative military establishment. The contem-
porary expansion of Goering's authority over industrial affairs in the 
Four Year Plan fits the same formula. 17 
Meanwhile, having gained some approval from Hitler to continue 
his influence in police affairs, Frick tried to reshape a few concessions 
on details into some semblance of control. One point of immediate defeat 
was Himmler's compound title, Reichsfuehrer 55 and Chief of the Ger-
man Police. Hans Lammers, the chief of Hitler's Chancellory involved 
in these transactions, speculated that Himmler proposed the title. If so, 
it was an afterthought to the proposals he presented to Hitler on June 
6. Lammers claimed to have objected because Himmler's Party title 
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equaled the rank of Reichsleiter directly under Hitler, and, therefore, 
equated to a Reich minister. As chief of police, he should have been 
equivalent to a state secretary subordinate to the Minister of Interior. 
More significant, the fusion of these titles would confuse chains of com-
mand and frustrate efforts at control. Perhaps at this time Hess and 
Schwarz also objected, since on later issues, according to Schellenberg, 
they raised similar objections to fusions of Party and state by Himmler. 
Frick hoped to eliminate the title from the draft decree, but to no avail. 
Hitler decided the title should be preserved. IS Having bought Himmler's 
plan for the fusion of the SS and police, he preferred having the chief 
of police immediately accessible to himself. 
To counter this defeat, Frick did succeed in inserting behind "Reichs-
fuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police" the phrase "in the Ministry 
of Interior." In other alterations to the drafts of the proposal, he changed 
Himmler's personal subordination to direct subordination, eliminated the 
chief's rank as a Reich minister, made his attendance at cabinet meetings 
possible rather than mandated, and tried to limit Significantly the re-
sponsibilities Himmler would assume from the ministry.I9 
On June 12, after Heydrich received the proposed changes, he and 
Pfundtner met as the first of an ever-widening circle of negotiators. By 
June 24 they had concluded the basic details of the final settlement, and 
all involved accepted the last of the decrees. Throughout the process, 
Heydrich, representing Himmler, conceded a number of minor points-
even a few major ones-only to introduce new demands, often negating 
the concessions. Frick and his negotiators were slowly worn down and 
finally recommended concessions on Heydrich's most adamant posi-
tions. Throughout the process, the fact that men like Pfundtner and 
Daluege would acquire expanded powers from the overall reorganiza-
tions undoubtedly weakened their determination. Pfundtner seems un-
believably naive about the significance of some of the concessions he 
recommended to Frick and a bit overwhelmed by "necessary" conces-
sions to Himmler in the name of national security.2o 
On June 17, Hitler signed the decree appointing Himmler. Its form 
reveals some of the results of the struggle: 
I. To ensure a unified concentration of police responsibilities in the Reich, there 
will be appointed a chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry of the 
Interior, to whom will be transferred concurrently [zugleich] the direction and 
executive authority for all police matters within the competence of the Reich and 
Prussian ministries of the interior.21 
As an obscure compromise, Frick won the inclusion of the office of 
the chief in the Ministry of the Interior. Himmler won the inclusion of 
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the word zugleich for reasons of his own. Apparently, he felt it gave him 
an independent claim to authority, despite his inclusion in the minis-
try.22 The next clause held more compromises: 
II. (1) The deputy chief of the Secret State Police of Prussia, Reichsfuehrer 55 
Heinrich Himmler, is named to chief of the German Police in the Reich Ministry 
of the Interior. 
(2) He is personally and directly subordinate to the Reich and Prussian Minister 
of the Interior. 
(3) For his sphere of competence, he represents the Reich and Prussian 
minister of the interior in the latter's absence. 
(4) He carries the title: The Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German Police 
in the Reich Ministry of the Interior. 23 
The fusion of personal and direct subordination was a compromise 
between the separate terms proposed by Himmler and Frick. From 
Frick's point of view, as long as "directly" was included, a clear bu-
reaucratic-administrative relationship existed. From Himmler's, the term 
"personally" corresponded more with NS concepts of the fuehrer prin-
ciple, which preferred personal to bureaucratic relationships. Further-
more, in the reality of NS power relations, a personal relationship was 
like that of feudal lord and vassal. Though ostensibly subordinate to his 
lord, the vassal was absolute in his own domain (sphere of competence), 
and his lord should not interfere therein. Himmler would soon show 
that he interpreted his "subordination" to his personal and direct su-
perior in that manner. Given Himmler's parallel subordination to Hitler 
as Reichsfuehrer 55, his inclusion in the Ministry of the Interior gave 
him the authority of that ministry without subordinating him to it. 24 
The third clause of the decree stated that Himmler would "take part 
in meetings of the Reich cabinet insofar as his sphere of competence will 
be affected. ,,25 Frick hoped thus to control his access to cabinet meetings, 
but in fact Himmler would show that his definition of police responsi-
bilities went far beyond anything Frick would dream. 
Even before its publication, Heydrich revealed some repercussions 
of the decree. On June 15, he and Pfundtner met to settle details about 
the wording of Himmler's appointment, of the related press notice, and 
of Frick's order for the execution of the decree. He announced that 
Daluege would not be named as Himmler's deputy; instead, only in 
Himmler's absence would Daluege act as deputy. At the same time, 
Heydrich explained how the police would be divided, with all uniformed 
police under Daluege, whom Hitler would promote to general of the 
Police. Henceforth, this branch of the police would be known as Order 
Police (Ordnungspolizei, or Orpo). Then came a surprise for e~eryone: 
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the birth announcement of Sipo. All criminal police or detectives would 
be fused with the Gestapo and its border police under Heydrich's com-
mand as Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei, or Sipo).26 Not only would 
the Gestapo remain a special, separate police, but Heydrich also gained 
its potential replacement, the Criminal Police. 
Himmler planned a press release accompanied by an explanatory 
article by Gunter d' Alquen in the Voelkischer Beobachter. He wanted the 
public to see these developments as a necessary and desirable improve-
ment in "law and order" and "national security," with all involved-
Hitler, Frick, Himmler, Daluege, and Heydrich-as one happy team, 
completely in accord over what was best for fhe nation. 27 
At the June 15 meeting, Himmler also dodged another of Frick's 
attempts to bring him under control. In the letter of appointment, Frick 
wanted Himmler named to office "under call to the status of an official 
of the civil service" (unter Berufung in das Beamtenverhaeltnis), thus es-
tablishing Frick's authority over him. Consistent with the NS spirit, how-
ever, Himmler refused. He would remain an agent of the Movement in 
the service of the state, and the encumbering phrase had to be re-
moved. 28 
Subsequently, negotiations over the wording of Frick's order for the 
execution of the decree became heated. As a definition of Himmler's 
competence within the ministry, the wording of Frick's order for the 
decree offered a last opportunity to limit Himmler. In previous negotia-
tions, they had agreed that, aside from absorbing the Police Division 
(Abteilung III) of the ministry, Himmler would demand few changes in 
the old arrangements. On June 22, however, Heydrich revealed that 
Himmler had increased his demands to absorb numerous sections and 
desks of the ministry and to consolidate his absolute control over police 
affairs. Only on the key issue of military and national security affairs 
did Frick's people retain a significant compromise-subject, of course, 
to erosion. Himmler had responsibility for the Abwehr aspect of these 
affairs; the legislative aspect remained for the rest of the ministry.29 
Although Himmler's victory was already apparent, its full impact 
emerged only with time. As if to herald these developments, in the July 
15 issue of Deutsches Recht Werner Best presented an "official" definition 
of Himmler's new position. He justified the union of SS and police under 
one leader with some of the arguments used for extraordinary Gestapo 
powers. Again, he trotted out the parallel between the Wehrmacht as 
executive against the outside and the police as executive of the interior-
an "innere Wehrmacht." Most significant, he proclaimed in this fusion 
of SS and police a permanent identity essential to the further reconstruc-
tion of the Reich and the security of the nation's future. 3o 
Himmler's new title replaced the old ones; Reichsfuehrer SS und Chef 
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der Deutschen Polizei im Reichsministerium des Innern marched off behind 
his name, often as an impressive string of initials, RFSSuCdDPiRMdl. 
Significantly, in typing this title, his subordinate offices often rendered 
it as "RFSSuCdDPiRMdl." The end of the double underlining made it 
clear to all subordinates where the real seat of power lay as far as they 
were concerned.31 The tail of Himmler's title, "in the RMdI," originally 
a sop to the defeated Frick, soon provided a mantle of legality for Himm-
ler and Heydrich, and even for Hitler himself. Himmler and his police 
became subordinate to Frick in title only as Himmler pursued an in-
creasingly independent course. The police gradually evolved from an 
agency of the state into an instrument of the sovereign Fuehrer. 
As the German historian Hans Buchheim described what happened, 
the appearance of maintaining the police under the old agencies of the 
state fitted well with the NS pattern of "revolution." They never really 
abolished the old institutions; they just hollowed them out and allowed 
them to dry up while the new institutions of the Third Reich, such as 
the SS-police, grew up through and around them.32 The change occurred 
gradually and carefully, to provide camouflage and to prevent the old 
institutions from absorbing the revolutionary body. 
The official state position within the ministry was at best a bogus 
legality. For internal use, Himmler's police offices issued orders openly 
under the heading "Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police." 
When he made proposals to the cabinet, however, or when he had to 
deal officially with state agencies outside his offices, he had the use of 
the official label "Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior.,,33 Al-
though Himmler's relationship to Frick originated in an awkward com-
promise, he soon realized its value as camouflage. Thus began a wide 
range of changeable state, semistate, and SS titles used against rivals as 
"covers" and as "confusion factors" that would proliferate in the future. 
Of course, whenever Himmler's departments issued a legal draft or 
any directive using the authority of the Ministry of Interior, Frick was 
supposed to sign it. This provided his one chance to impose some con-
trol, unless Himmler, as was often the case, already had Hitler's ap-
proval, and could therefore force the issue. Needless to say, despite the 
established channels, Heydrich's offices found occasions to bypass Frick. 
Whenever this happened, Frick issued one of his usual ultimatums de-
manding adherence to proper procedures, and Best's office dutifully 
circulated it with a cover letter ordering compliance.34 Of course, com-
pliance was for the subordinates; Heydrich or Himmler resorted to 
breaches as necessary. 
Meanwhile, Frick gradually lost official contact with Hitler. His con-
stant complaints about Himmler's uncontrollability must have under-
mined Hitler's confidence and all hope of appeal against violations and 
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abuses. Increasingly, Frick had to submit his complaints through chan-
nels at the Chancellery. At Nuremberg, Hans Lammers, head of the 
Chancellery, recalled that Hitler finally told him, "Tell Herr Frick that 
he should not restrict Himmler as chief of the German Police too much; 
with him the police is in good hands. He should allow him as much 
free rein as possible!" According to Frick, in 1937 he ceased entirely to 
report directly to Hitler in his official capacity. Thereafter, he only dined 
with him occasionally or encountered him at group meetings of Party and 
state leaders. 35 
Needless to say, Frick found equally frustrating all efforts to assert 
his "personal and direct" authority over Himmler. Later, he claimed that 
when Himmler became chief of the police, he had asked him to appear 
at least once every fortnight to report on events in the police. Himmler 
never came. Within less than a year, Frick had surrendered all hopes of 
control, even through his power to sign the ministerial decrees on the 
police. Himmler's monopoly on access to Hitler had made Frick a rubber 
stamp, so in May 1937 Frick declared Himmler's rulings valid as minis-
terial decisions. 36 
Before this final surrender, the opposition lost one last hope for a 
barrier against a full victory by Himmler. The centralization of police 
command had not settled the complex problem of financing, for police 
personnel remained under the state budgets. Shortly after he became 
chief, Himmler pushed for legislation to create a Reich police budget, 
but counterproposals from the Ministry of Finance produced another 
round of negotiations and a repetition of the June "compromise." In 
March 1937, all involved parties finally issued the necessary legislation, 
and with the advent of the new fiscal year on April 1, they completed 
creation of a centralized Reich police force, with the minor details re-
quiring a few more years for settlement. 37 
As before, the resultant compromise imposed minimal limitations 
on Himmler. In fact, by taking away state (Land) control of police fi-
nances, it ended a significant fragmentation of his power, reducing all 
limiting influences to two main ministries' budgets and to Schwerin von 
Krosigk, the Reich minister of finance. Despite Hitler's general support 
for Himmler, the ministries and von Krosigk could use financial argu-
ments and technicalities to block Himmler's complete budgetary control 
over the police. 38 
In the end, Himmler would triumph over all such arrangements, but 
only after a certain degree of hindrance. As Buchheim so aptly put it: 
Although the police were now constitutionally and organizationally divorced 
from the authority of the government, this did not mean that all legal, official, 
technical and organizational links with the previous system were severed, par-
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ticularly for matters of minor political importance. Time was required for the 
official character of the police and its internal and organizational regulations to 
pe adapted to the very different forms and rules operative in the 55. Many aspects 
of police administration therefore remained unaffected but they were allowed 
to continue only on a "subject to cancellation" basis and only as long as estab-
lished practice did not run counter to the aims and actions of the political police. 39 
19 _____ _ 
The Formation of Sipo and SD 
On June 26, 1936, after assuming his position as chief of police, Himmler 
created the two major divisions he had announced during negotiations. 
He united all uniformed police into the Order Police (Ordnungspolizei), 
with General of the Police (and SS General) Kurt Daluege as their chief. 
SS Lieutenant General Heydrich became chief of the Security Police, or 
Sipo, consisting of all detective police, both political and criminal,l thus 
reestablishing the former link between the plainclothes detective forces. 
But instead of the criminal police reabsorbing the political police and 
returning them to subordination under the state administration as 
Himmler's opponents had desired, the criminal police assumed more of 
the extraordinary status of the political police. 
Although the terms "security police" and "order police" had long 
been employed in Germany, the new designations did not derive from 
traditional usage. One historian suggested that Heydrich chose the title 
Security Police because it paralleled Security Service (SD) and because 
he desired to fuse the two. 2 This may be correct; however, the two terms 
referred to new distinctions between the two branches of the police. The 
Order Police maintained order among the citizens, while the Sipo pro-
vided security against their enemies. This meant that within their usual 
realm of activity, the Order Police retained their basically reactive func-
tion, while Sipo assumed the new preemptive function that distinguished 
NS police work from that of liberal states. (More about that later.) 
Having achieved his goal of command of all police, HimmIer re-
moved himself from the detailed work of a police chief. As before, he 
continued the struggle to expand his police powers, and he provided 
guidance in the fusion of SS and police; however, expanded SS interests 
in the economy, in political policy (including foreign policy), and in the 
future Waffen-SS demanded a growing share of his time. Consequently, 
his two police lieutenants assumed the active roles of chiefs of police. 
For Heydrich, the process of becoming in fact the chief of political police 
was now completed. HimmIer clearly signaled his less direct involve-
ment when he failed to create any office to administer his functions as 
HAUPTAMT SIPO 
CdS Heydrich 
Buero Trinkl I Deputy Best 
1 1 
V.Administration and Law P.P. Amt Political Police Kr. Amt Krlpo 
Chef Best Chef Heydrich Chef Heydrich 
Deputy Nebe 
I I 
II PP Inner Political Police III PP Abwehr Police 
Deput y Mueller Deputy Best 
Further subdivisions within the SIPO Main Office varied somewhat over the years. They were designated 
by capital letters or Arabic numerals; for Instance: 
• Under AMT Administration and Law subdivision V 5 was Training. 
, 
• Under AMT Political Police II A was Communism and other Marxist Movements, and III L was Espionage. 
• Under AMT KRIPO Kr. I was Organization. 
Figure 2. Hauptamt Sipo 
The Formation of Sipo and SD 233 
chief of German Police. Instead, he had two adjutants for liaison with 
his two chiefs, and he acted through the Orpo and Sipo Main Offices.3 
The designation of the Orpo and Sipo Main Offices (Hauptaemter) as 
ministerial offices was an affront that Frick's people refused to acknowl-
edge. "Main office" was an SS term, not a proper ministerial designation. 
The ministry always spoke of the Chiefs of Orpo and Sipo, refusing to 
use the term "main office." Nevertheless, Himmler created the two main 
offices as his ministerial offices, and so they were. 4 
In Main Office Sipo, Werner Best served as Heydrich's deputy. In 
addition to being the ministerial office for Sipo affairs, the Main Office 
was also the administrative center for Sipo as a Reich police. Essentially, 
it fused the relevant components of the Gestapo Office with a few sec-
tions from the Prussian State Criminal Police Office. Heydrich retained 
his staff of Gestapo adjutants, Schupo Captains Pomme and Suchanek, 
and SS Lieutenant Neumann for liaison with Himmler. Trinkle now 
headed a Main Bureau (Hauptbuero). The heart of the main office was 
Office V for Administration and Law, with Best as office chief, expanding 
his role to the entire SipO.5 
The other two offices of the main office were Political Police (Amt 
PP) and Criminal Police (Amt Kr.). Essentially, they consisted of the 
appropriate specialists to represent the Gestapo Office and Criminal 
Police Office in ministerial work. In the Political Police Office, Heinrich 
Mueller was deputy for domestic political police affairs and Best for 
Abwehr police affairs. Arthur Nebe was deputy in the Criminal Police 
Office. 6 
The elevation of Heinrich Mueller to Heydrich's deputy for domestic 
political police affairs signaled his rise in the Gestapo. Effective July 1, 
1936, he became head of Division II of the Gestapo Office, responsible 
for action against the internal enemy. Best remained in charge of Division 
III, Abwehr police; this division of labor in the Gestapo lasted until the 
war. Mueller had thus risen to the number three position in the Gestapo 
and was responsible for all political police work in the Reich. On Sep-
tember 20, the Gestapo Office officially assumed the work of the com-
mander of the Political Police of the States. It was de jure as well as de 
facto central headquarters for a unified Reich political police force. 7 
The proclamation of a Reich-wide Gestapo preceded this act by al-
most a month. On August 28, a uniform system for designating all 
political police posts as Gestapo posts was ordered. The central authority 
of the political police in each non-Prussian state was designated as Ge-
stapo, State Police (Superior) Post --- . The name "superior post" 
paralleled that developed in Prussia and was applied in the states large 
enough to have a system of political police field posts rather than just 
one central office: Baden, Bavaria, Wuerttemberg, and Saxony. The des-
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ignations of "posts," "outposts," "border commissariats," and "border 
service posts" were also applied uniformly after the Prussian pattern. 8 
Although the geographic borders of each state's political police sphere 
still determined the territories of the field posts, that small deference to 
the states gradually vanished in a rationalization of a Reich-wide Ge-
stapo. 
Although these changes sounded the death knell for Land limitations 
on Heydrich's full command over a centralized political police, which 
had been evolving since late 1933, the inclusion of the criminal police 
marked a more radical transition. Of course, the criminal police had 
been purged like other branches of government and infected by infil-
tration and conversions to Nazism, but for the most part it had under-
gone relatively little change as a result of the Nazi takeover. Detective 
work was highly specialized, and crime fighting had been a Nazi priority. 
This explains why detective and administrative personnel had a certain 
immunity from the purge; however, it makes all the more perplexing 
the Nazis' delay in reforming the criminal police organizationally and 
operationally. The lack of police centralization had been a problem since 
the nineteenth century. Prior to Himmler's great change, the only sig-
nificant NS reform had been Frick's conversion of the State Criminal 
Police Office in Berlin into a central office for the Prussian Criminal 
Police, and that was not done until January 1935.9 
If Frick had intended to build a Reich Criminal Police as a replace-
ment for the Gestapo when "normality" returned, he had a ready-made 
corps amenable to such a goal. Although the regular detectives may 
have disdained political work, being pleased to have it separated from 
themselves, a rivalry and hostility had developed between them and the 
Gestapo on which Frick could have capitalized. The rivalry involved 
methodology and the detectives' claim to the use of sophisticated, sci-
entific techniques only. The Gestapo's advocacy of forceful interrogation 
in special cases had become a point of controversy. Whatever the real 
differences between their methodologies, however, they were unim-
portant compared with the differences as perceived by the professional 
detectives, for these distinctions were the essence of their self-image as 
criminal detective policemen. They saw themselves as scientific spe-
cialists, immune to ideological contamination and above-and distinctly 
separate from-the Gestapo and its crude methods and dirty work. 10 
The rivalry between the Gestapo and criminal police had grown since 
Heydrich took over the Gestapo and Nebe acquired the Prussian Crimi-
nal Police. It found expression in arguments over whose methods were 
more effective. By May 1936, Heydrich was ready for a maneuver de-
signed to win his case. Since Apri11933, a number of children had been 
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mysteriously murdered in North Prussia and Mecklenburg. In March 
1935, Adolf Seefeld had been apprehended for the crimes and convicted 
for eleven of the murders, but much mystery still surrounded his meth-
ods. Under the pretext that he was possibly a Communist agent, the 
Gestapo interrogated him and extracted a story of how he had poisoned 
these victims, as well as confessions of many other murders. Although 
the account of one of the criminal police witnesses to the affair raises 
doubts about accuracy, such details would have seemed puny compared 
with the success of the Gestapo's "thorough" workY Heydrich could 
substantiate his claim that his police had the proper approach. The re-
lease of the report on May 23, 1936, came notably close to the timing of 
Hitler's decision to make Himmler chief of all police; perhaps it provided 
the finishing touch, at least for public consumption. 
The failure of Frick and Nebe to nationalize the criminal police has 
never been explored. Perhaps Frick preoccupied himself with other prob-
lems; perhaps his people failed to realize how little time they had or 
how total Himmler's plans were for the police. In any case, the extent 
and the rapidity of the reform following June 1936 gave Himmler and 
Heydrich claim to being the only men in the Reich thoroughly deter-
mined and capable enough to build the police force Germany allegedly 
needed. This claim gave them an appeal to all professional policemen, 
including the regular detectives, and they would exploit it. 
For Heydrich, acquisition of the criminal police meant the addition 
of over nine thousand men to his command-almost six thousand in 
Nebe's Prussian Criminal Police, the rest from the other states.12 This 
more than doubled the size of Heydrich's forces, for at this time the total 
political police establishment numbered probably less than seven thou-
sand. 
Within a few months, the reorganization of the criminal police had 
advanced sufficiently to establish centralized command. Nebe's Prussian 
State Criminal Police Office was physically and operationally removed 
from the Berlin Police Presidency and charged with the technical lead-
ership of the criminal police of all states. Although the detective forces 
would remain administratively and financially components of their re-
spective state or community establishments until the completion of the 
reforms in 1937, for technical operations they were subordinate to Nebe's 
office, with training guidelines issued under the authority of the chief 
of Sipo. The large number of cooperative centers (gemeinsame Laender-
zentrale) that had been created to coordinate the states in combating 
specific types of crime now became official Reich centers (Reichszentrale), 
most of which Nebe consolidated into his headquarters. In another cen-
tralization, for the first time in the history of the criminal police in Ger-
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many a single office coordinated the work with foreign police and 
international police organizations. 13 Such reforms became part of Himm-
ler's and Heydrich's claims to legitimacy as police chiefs. 
Although the term Reich Criminal Police (Kripo) appeared only after 
the consolidation of the following year, the uniform designation "State 
Criminal Police" (Staatliche Kriminalpolizei, as opposed to Landeskri-
minalpolizei), was applied in each state (Land). In the command structure 
of field posts, the reorganization of the Kripo proceeded more thor-
oughly and rationally than the immediate reorganization of the political 
police under the new Reich Gestapo. In the Gestapo, the political police 
of most states retained their separate field post systems directly under 
the Gestapo Office. In contrast, the Kripo often consolidated the posts 
of several states into regional jurisdictions with similar crime problems, 
coordinated under the direction of a superior post. For instance, the 
Kripo Superior Post Halle had jurisdiction that included three Prussian 
posts for the Province Magdeburg and the posts for the states of Anhalt 
and Thuringia. The jurisdiction of superior Post Bremen included the 
posts for the city-state, for the Land Oldenburg, and for the two Prussian 
districts of Aurich and Stade, all North Sea coastal areas. 14 Once inertia 
had been broken and reform begun, the less politically sensitive issue 
of criminal police jurisdictions was more easily rationalized than juris-
dictions of the political police. 
The need to coordinate police work that cut across Orpo and Sipo 
lines contributed to the creation of a new office of police authority. The 
criminal policemen in the field posts held a unique position that en-
couraged their sense of autonomy within Sipo. Although Nebe's Berlin 
Office provided their central command in technical matters, the criminal 
policemen in the field retained their old subordination to the adminis-
trative structure of each of the states or the Prussian provinces and 
districts. This subordination remained unchanged even after further cen-
tralization of the police in 1937, so they never acquired the fully extraor-
dinary status of the Gestapo. They remained subordinate to the local 
police presidents and directors in the cities where they were headquar-
tered and, as such, remained partially under Order Police authority as 
well as under Sipo command. Such an arrangement was necessary to 
retain the local coordination of crime fighting, especially cooperation 
between the detective force and the uniformed police. To square the 
problems that could arise from such overlapping jurisdictions and to 
ensure a uniform application of Sipo directives to Gestapo and Kripo, 
inspectors of Sipo were established. Paralleling the newly created in-
spectors of the Order Police, they were part of a general organizational 
system to coordinated Reich central with regional authority, and police 
with administrative and military authority.1s 
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Effective October 1, 1936, inspectors of 5ipo were established for 
each Prussian province and the states of Baden, Bavaria, Saxony, and 
Wuerttemberg. (The smaller states would be incorporated later.) Their 
responsibilities included ensuring Sipo cooperation with regional and 
local state officials, with the Gauleiter and other Party regional officials, 
and with the military district officials within their jurisdiction. The oc-
casional differences among the state boundaries and those of Party Gau 
and military districts often made their work difficult. Of course, the 
inspectors had to effect cooperation for the sake of efficiency; however, 
they were also to guarantee 5ipo independence from top to bottom. The 
inspectors' "personal and direct subordination" to the provincial gov-
ernors or state ministers of interior not only duplicated Himmler's "sub-
ordination" to Frick, but Heydrich also reinforced that parallel with an 
order that, although they should conform to the assignments of these 
ostensible superiors, he would have the final authority in cases of conflict 
with policies of the chief of Sipo. Finally, Heydrich charged them with 
ensuring the organizational assimilation of Gestapo and Kripo posts.16 
The inspectors had to wean Kripo away from local police officials and 
state authority while securing cooperation with them. 
Of course, the inspectors became involved in later power struggles 
among Heydrich, Daluege, and local officials, and their significance vis-
a-vis the military officials increased as the war approached. Historians 
must be cautious, however, about reading too many later objectives into 
the act of their creation. In later power struggles the inspectorates as origi-
nally established proved inadequate for subsequently developed objec-
tives and had to be redesigned. Meanwhile, the posts were filled only 
gradually, but always by high-ranking SS and 50 officers,17 and despite 
all their gains, Himmler and Heydrich still suffered some restraint. Their 
various apparatuses, even the Gestapo, worked under many of the same 
restrictions that any society places on its institutions. A sense of pro-
priety still pervaded all orders and daily business, and during the years 
immediately following 1936, the agencies could violate social norms only 
under "extraordinary" conditions. Neither the Gestapo nor Sipo and SO 
was the almost unlimited instrument of terror they would become. Their 
development was just beginning. 
At this time, the Gestapo had instructions to proceed with tact and 
foresight, to avoid the public eye, and to coordinate carefully all actions 
that might lead to conflict with other authorities. Relations with the Party 
became increasingly delicate again, especially as tension between 55 and 
Party mounted. Himmler. had to remain constantly on guard against 
creating solid Party opposition while continuing the SO and police func-
tion of safeguarding inner security. The threat of attack against protective 
custody remained. In December, the Gestapo received orders to use 
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protective custody only in emergencies, for "excessive use of protective 
custody must discredit this strongest weapon of the Gestapo and give 
encouragement to the wide-spread efforts to abolish protective cus-
tody.,,18 
Having won his fight for control of the police, Himmler illustrated 
his new propriety by denying the 55 any executive action. In September 
1936, he ordered the 55 to refuse all further executive orders from Party 
or state officials and to refer them to the proper police authority. 19 This 
was, of course, propriety achieved by mirrors. What he denied his 55 
was now done by his police. 
Some members of Sipo and SO generated internally and sponta-
neously part of the pressure responsible for the image of propriety. 
Having achieved their goals of a powerful, centralized police establish-
ment, they developed a greater awareness of where Himmler was 
headed, and they sought to retard the development of completely un-
controlled institutions under irresponsible or dangerous men. This 
seems to be the proper context for Heydrich's traditionally attributed 
drive to reabsorb the concentration camps under Gestapo authority. 
With him, it would have been largely an amoral power play, but Werner 
Best strongly encouraged such a move for other reasons. 
The February 1936 law had placed the camps in Prussia under the 
Gestapo, but Himmler's tactics and the new Reich police structure put 
all this in limbo. If this were not enough incentive for Best, continued 
irregularities in the camps undoubtedly disturbed his sense of propriety, 
and the rumors that "disgusting things went on in the camps" embar-
rassed him as the one legally responsible. Now that the threat of the 
previous winter (that external control might be imposed) had passed 
and Himmler was semiautonomous lord of police and camps, Best ap-
parently expected the more proper state control of the camps through 
police officials to be restored. His agitation became so great by August 
that Eicke complained to Himmler about it. Best's hopes were futile, 
however, and on August 2 Eicke's staff established itself at Oranienburg, 
far removed from the Gestapo Office. Eicke's separate command over 
the camps would continue, for he ran them more to Himmler's liking 
than Best's police bureaucrats and lawyers would have done.20 
Another impetus for an appearance of propriety grew from the re-
ality that Himmler's extraordinary police powers existed without legis-
lative foundations. They were grounded primarily on Hitler's will, which 
might change in the face of determined opposition. The basis of the new 
Reich Gestapo and its power was application of the Prussian Gestapo 
Law (February 1936) to the entire Reich, without enactment of a new 
Reich law, justified solely by the Nazi principle that the will of the lead-
ership made law.219f course, this interpretation was supposedly only 
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a stopgap measure until a future codification of Reich police law could 
solve all such problems, but both Hitler and Himmler resisted such 
codification, for laws could interfere with their plans and be used by the 
opposition to curb their power. 
Meanwhile, to control such pressure for codification, the propa-
gandists of Sipo and SO continued to push their arguments about the 
necessity for extraordinary police power, given the preeminence of na-
tional security and order over individual needs. 22 In October, when 
Himmler spoke before the constituent assembly of the Committee for 
Police Law, he sought to head off any effort to repeal his achievement. 
He reminded them how, when they had come to power, they had found 
the police a hated and impotent force. 
Then we National Socialists set to work ... , not without right, for we bore that 
within us, but certainly without law. From the outset, I had taken the position 
that it was a matter of indifference to me if our actions were contrary to some 
paragraph [of the law]; in the fulfillment of my mission, I did basically in my 
work for the Fuehrer and Nation that which suited common sense. It was entirely 
irrelevant if other people moaned about the "violations of the law" in those 
months and years in which the life or death of the German nation was on the 
line. There was naturally talk abroad-with much support from numerous circles 
at home-of the condition of lawlessness in the police and, therefore, the state. 
They called it lawless because it did not suit what they understood as law. In 
reality, through our work, we laid the foundations for a new law, the law of 
destiny of the German nation.23 
Himmler then described this new police and this new law as the 
foundations for the emergence of a new Germany and for the future 
defense of the nation against its enemies. To play its role, the police had 
to emerge with the image of "friend and helper of every fellow-
countryman," and they had to establish a deeply rooted sense of right 
and wrong in the people themselves. He charged the committee with 
codifying, in simple sentences, the national cultural principles he 
claimed to have salvaged in his SS and police work. As further insurance 
against trouble, he stacked the committee with his SO jurists and pro-
pagandists.24 
Regardless of the limitations that remained, the foundations of the 
police state were securely laid. Himmler had tied the SS and police 
together, and the Sipo and SO had come into being. To be sure, the two 
were still ostensibly separate organizations-Sipo, under Main Office 
Sipo, remained a state police agency, and the SO, under the SO Main 
Office, was an SS-Party organization-but they had a common head, 
SS-General Reinhard Heydrich, who bore a joint title like Himmler's: 
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chief of Sipo and SO. More important, the overlap of personnel between 
SO and Gestapo (soon to include Kripo) tied the leading posts of the 
police with the SO, while a steady influx of SO members would enter 
Sipo from below. Sipo and SO was a de facto entity that would acquire 
semiofficial status in 1939 with the creation of the Reich Security Main 
Office. Although most leading members of Sipo and SO sought to deny 
its unity and to treat the overlapping membership as a matter of mere 
form, the entity became in many ways a growing reality. The third 
component of this entity was the Kripo. 
The sudden addition of the criminal police to Heydrich's realm was 
the most significant departure from the status quo. Arthur Nebe, head 
of the Prussian State Criminal Police Office, was a Nazi but not an SS-
man. His close allies, the Oaluege-Frick faction, had expected him to 
stay under Oaluege's command. Needless to say, his subordination to 
Heydrich created significant opposition, and the fact that Himmler made 
such a decisive move indicates the importance to him and Heydrich of 
having closer personal control over the Kripo. They derived two main 
benefits from the inclusion: greater respectability for Sipo and SO, and 
ideological consistency in police work. Since the criminal police were 
widely considered to be a purely professional police force, highly skilled 
and relatively free of SS penetration and control, Kripo enhanced the 
image of Sipo and SO. On the one hand, the subordination to Heydrich 
of this significant body of policemen accelerated the process of creating 
the new police force. On the other, the fact that others considered Kripo 
relatively free of 55 influence made the criminal police a useful cloak to 
cover interference in more normally impenetrable areas. For instance, 
the military thought of the Kripo as reliable long after their own coop-
eration with the Gestapo had gone sour.25 Whether Himmler and Hey-
drich perceived such roles in advance is problematic, but Kripo obviously 
contributed to the Sipo image. 
This sort of double-edged value accrued in the person of Authur 
Nebe as well. He was drawn into the 55 and SO, effective December 2, 
1936, as an SS major, remaining only one step behind Heinrich Mueller 
until they acquired parity in 1939. Himmler and Heydrich undoubtedly 
recognized Nebe's stance as a veritable double agent, yet they kept him 
because he had the respect of the criminal police and would have been 
a logical choice for any NS chief of detectives. He would provide effective 
leadership and expertise. More important, Hitler favored him, and his 
retention was perhaps a compromise with Frick and Oaluege. Whatever 
opposition there was to the inclusion of Kripo in the Sipo would be 
somewhat cooled, for his presence would give the opposition hope that 
the Kripo would not become another tool for Heydrich. Nebe's position 
and his highly vaunted cooperation with the "resistance" perpetuated 
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the myth that the criminal police were free of 55 control. In fact, as he 
stayed on, not only did he provide camouflage, but he also cooperated, 
making his removal unnecessary, even undesirable. Like most other 
leaders trapped in the mesh of Sipo and SD relationships, Nebe and 
other Kripo leaders passed the supreme Nazi test as commanders of the 
mass murder squads on the eastern front. They clung tenaciously to 
their myth of separateness, and Nebe played his mostly ineffectual dou-
ble role until his elimination after the July 1944 attempt on Hitler. 26 
Beyond all this, the primary reason for the union of Kripo with the 
Gestapo under one command lay in Himmler's version of NS ideology. 
In his mind, one could not separate questions of race, genetics, and 
criminality. Habitual criminality was a mark of inferiority, of foreign 
elements in the blood. A good German might succumb to criminal be-
havior, but often he could be salvaged. On the other hand, anyone with 
excessively "polluted" blood was subhuman-a threat to society and an 
element conductive to further genetic deterioration. The internal con-
spiracy that Himmler saw against Germany fomented a high rate of crime 
and the seduction of good Germans to commit criminal and immoral 
acts. Not only would crime and immorality undermine the moral fiber 
of the nation, but "related" homosexuality and abortion would reduce 
the manpower pool of national strength. The Jews and other "subhu-
mans" lay behind all of this, just as they fostered communism, socialism, 
and liberalism to undermine solid German institutions. 
The 55 adopted the biological school of criminology almost as second 
nature. Of course, they distorted it beyond any claim to science. Hey-
drich assured that it became the sole orientation of crime fighting, and 
Nebe apparently accepted the basic theory also, despite his alleged re-
sistance to any infection from Himmler's "Nordic cult. ,,27 From this point 
on, official statistics on criminals emphasized their racial and national 
origins, with recidivists drawing special attention. Political and criminal 
offenses were seen as inseparable-both fostered by the common 
enemy. An effective fight against this enemy and all of its manifestations 
had to be conducted by one office; it could be coordinated properly in 
no other way. Since such views were widely held in Nazi circles, pro-
claimed in Mein Kampf and repeated ~ven by moderate Nazis,28 they 
provided a convincing argument for the union. 
The imagined interrelationship of crime and political offenses jus-
tified the logical extension of the extraordinary powers of the political 
police to the regular detectives: Both fought the common enemy of the 
nation in a time of emergency; both required emergency powers, since 
the execution of justice for any crime had to be swift and severe. The 
Kripo could make protective custody arrests on its own authority and 
often served as the executive arm of the Gestapo in localities without 
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Gestapo personnel. Capital punishment had been more freely applied 
in Germany since the advent of NS rule; now it would be directed at 
habitual criminals, with the extermination of the "criminal element" as 
the goal.29 This step could be taken and publicly proclaimed several years 
before the Final Solution could be secretly launched to strike at the "root" 
of the problem in exactly the same way. Severe punishment and even 
destruction of the "criminal element," a ubiquitous theme in most cul-
tures, was an easy step to take in Nazi Germany. Exterminating "the 
criminal element" became one of many steps in the escalation that led 
to the boundless mobilization of Germany and its police against the 
"enemies of the Volk." 
This proffered freedom and "efficiency" in the prosecution of crime 
undoubtedly had its appeal to many professional detectives. The process 
of their incorporation into the 55 and SD began relatively late, continu-
ally lagged behind progress in the Gestapo, and was never as complete. 
Even so, it occurred, and the professional criminal investigation detec-
tives joined their Gestapo counterparts in fusion with the SD. Each com-
ponent of Sipo and SD could retain its supposedly separate mission, its 
self-image, and its nominal separateness from the other components, 
but they were welded together into a unit. In fulfilling their missions 
diligently, each made its contribution to the functioning of the police 
state. Despite their insistence that they did not support the work of the 
other components, whom they often rejected, even opposed, they were 
all trapped in the meshes of a machine that coordinated their efforts; all 
were drawn into the extralegal and heinous acts of Sipo and SD to pre-
serve their roles and their self-created images. 
Himmler and Heydrich had won; the 55-police state had come alive. 
The individual parts adapted themselves to survive within it, and, in 
doing so, carried on and ensured the growth of the NS police state 
toward the Staatsschutzkorps-police state terrorism and the execution of 
racial policies that resulted in genocide. In subsequent years Sipo and 
SD would become intensely involved with the "Jewish problem," less 
out of design than through functional pressures. Rivalry between Ge-
stapo and SD would compel each to compete with the other. At the 
same time, both felt the need to assert its more "legitimate" authority 
over the uncontrollable NS elements prom~ to embarrassing excesses, 
and its more ideologically appropriate authority over bureaucratic agen-
cies. As an unintended result of the Kristallnacht, in 1938 the Gestapo 
became the official vehicle for the first Final Solution-forced emigration. 
But the responsible Gestapo office came under SD-trained personnel, 
specifically Adolf Eichmann. This office would then be responsible for 
resettlement from allover Europe to the ghettos in Poland and then the 
ultimate Final Solution: transportation to the extermination camps. 
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Closely related was the responsibility of Sipo and SO for the Ein-
satzgruppen, which conducted the mass shootings of more than one 
million victims on the Eastern front. This in turn grew from involvement 
in foreign intelligence and the escalation of Hitler's plans for expansion. 
In the Austrian Anschluss, the annexation of the Sudetenland, and the 
establishment of the Protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia, Sipo and 
SO created the prototypes of the Eistazgruppen. Here, as later, they 
played the role of establishing the German police and security apparatus 
and of securing the areas being absorbed. After Sipo and SO agents 
executed the Gleiwitz canard, Einsatzgruppen entered Poland, where 
their role in the emasculation of the potential Polish resistance and the 
terrorizing of Jews presaged their future mission in Russia. Wherever 
Germany conquered, Sipo and SO extended its field network with its 
machinery for police state terrorism and the execution of Nazi racial 
programs. Another building block in the criminal edifice of the Third 
Reich was the domestic euthanasia program, in which Sipo personnel 
played key roles. Though terminated in the Reich proper, this program 
grew into the extermination of "useless eaters" in the Eastern territories. 
In both euthanasia and genocide, Sipo and SO experts facilitated tech-
nical developments. 
As the war proceeded, the fully totalitarian police state finally 
emerged, with Sipo and SO at its heart. Under the pretext of national 
survival in the f~ce of a world of enemies, Sipo and SO would purge 
Germany of all its threats-racial, criminal, moral, religious, and intel-
lectual. After 1938, the previously "normalized" concentration camps 
filled faster than expansion of facilities could handle. Without intention, 
they evolved into supplements to the newer extermination camps, for 
death by exposure, malnutrition, and disease was hardly a desirable 
process inside Germany. 
Whether any specific aspect of the Nazi police state evolved func-
tionally or was assigned as a conscious step toward Hitler's goals, there 
was a component of Sipo and SO to assume executive responsibility for 
it. It is hard to conceive of the Third Reich and its horrors without Sipo 
and SO-the union of 55 and police, preconceived only abstractly by 
Himmler in the early years and only begrudgingly accepted by everyone 
else as it gradually evolved to meet later demands. 
Conclusion 
This study has proposed some revisions of our understanding of how 
the 55 and police came into being. Granted that prior to 1934 Himmler 
had ambitious dreams, they were nothing more specific than creating 
The Formation of Sipo and SD 245 
centralized police and intelligence services under 55 leadership that pos-
sessed a clear ideological understanding of what needed to be done. 
The exact nature of that link between SS and police emerged only after 
1934. The formation of Sipo and 50 in 1936 marked not only a major 
step in the achievement of those dreams, but also the emergence of 
Heydrich as a driving force in the ongoing process. Prior to this time, 
Heydrich and his SO had played roles more secondary than previously 
believed, roles more appropriately compared to those of craftsmen ex-
ecuting, with some independence and bumbling, the vague designs of 
the architect who was Himmler. 
Further revision include a more gradual evolution toward an ir-
reversible police-terror system than previously supposed, and new in-
sights into the process by which this happened. Foremost among the 
new perceptions is the openness with which Himmler's people argued 
for the essential components of the police state. The system was not 
imposed too quickly and secretly for anyone to resist-it was offered, 
and in many ways accepted, as the answer to widely felt fears and 
concerns. 
The foundations were firmly laid in 1936, not in 1933-34, when the 
system was merely nascent. Until 1936, although Himmler frequently 
had powerful support for specific steps along the way, he created his 
system largely with his own resources and on his own initiative against 
significant opposition. Although Hitler frequently preserved from attack 
some parts of the system that Himmler had already built, there is little 
evidence that Hitler supported any significant expansion prior to naming 
him chief of the German Police in 1936. On the contrary, there is more 
evidence of Hitler's ambivalence and reluctance to increase Himmler's 
weight in the delicately balanced distribution of power. The initial pro-
cesses of Himmler's rise to power prior to 1934 occurred piecemeal and 
at levels well below those concerning Hitler; after 1934, Hitler's attention 
turned increasingly from domestic to foreign affairs, leaving him even 
less inclined to attend personally to the growth of the police state. 
Given the premise that Himmler did not build his S5-police system 
with Hitler's support, an explanation of how he overcame his opposition 
becomes a more serious problem. The answers lie in a combination of 
factors, not the least of which were the mistakes of more powerful op-
ponents like Roehm. To his credit, however, Himmler had abilities as a 
planner, organizer, salesman, and political strategist. He could attract 
and exploit valuable lieutenants to do what he could not do. Above all, 
he combined his abilities with an evolving plan for a police-state structure 
that ideally suited the logic of Hitler's NS world view. Many rivals suc-
cumbed to this logic, especially as Himmler and his lieutenants applied 
it in the power struggle the evolved around them. 
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The base of Himmler's power was the 55, which Hitler had pro-
claimed quite early to be the special security and police force within the 
Movement. Although there is no indication the the Fuehrer had any 
preconceived role for Himmler's 55 in a future police state, its mission 
within the Movement led members of the Party Reichsleitung to see the 
55 and SO as potential checks on the SA and other elements opposing 
centralization. Even at his weakest, Himmler often had Reichsleitung 
support for specific expansions of his power and for defense against 
powerful attacks. At the same time, his relationship with Roehm was 
sufficiently close that the latter rarely opposed and in fact often sup-
ported Himmler's expansions, at least initially. 
Most significant, Himmler evolved a plan for a new institution with 
a revolutionary ideological mission, while his competitors tried merely 
to seize the existing instruments of power, as much for personal ad-
vancement as for any other reason. Although Himmler's personal power 
was inseparable from the system he built, his system was conceived as 
a logical fulfillment of Nazi ideals. By pursuing a rationalization of 
power, he had a "moral" advantage over those who would keep it frag-
mented. In the struggles of bureaucratic empire building, champions of 
rationalization have advantages. Since Himmler's rationalization pro-
gram had a revolutionary quality from the NS perspective, he had a 
further advantage over conservative rationalizers like Frick. Further-
more, in the process of clarifying their goals, Himmler and his lieuten-
ants would have been more likely to acquire that sixth sense that 
successfully competitive executives must have. Such a sense of direction 
helps to exploit every opportunity, often subconsciously, but usually to 
more advantage than opponents without clearly formulated goals. 30 
A further advantage lay in the early vagueness of the grand scheme. 
Without a detailed preconception of his future system, Himmler avoided 
an overly ambitious frontal assault like Roehm's, which produced a 
united opposition. Evolving his goals piecemeal, he pursued limited, 
achievable objectives for which he often had support as powerful as his 
opposition. In 1933, when he began his campaign, he focused only on 
the political police establishments of the smaller states. 
Penetration of, involvement in, and use of state bureaucratic police 
powers were consistent with the revolutionary goals Himmler evolved, 
but they were contrary to conceptions of Second Revolutionaries like 
Roehm. Their fear of contamination by the establishment denied them 
weapons in the power struggle.31 In contrast, the more conservative NS 
bureaucrats entrenched themselves in state offices and disdained Party 
radicalism. Not only did they thus deny themselves allies, but their 
brand of opposition increased Himmler's awareness of the need to re-
place conservative bureaucrats with 55-men holding proper ideological 
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perspectives. Ironically, the nature of his opposition helped shape his 
image of a state protection corps as a synthesis of the extremes, pre-
serving the advantages that each forfeited, and transcending them both 
in its radicalism. 
From 1933 to 1935, Hitler clearly revealed his predilection for unlim-
ited police powers to eliminate enemies and to maintain "order," thus 
supporting Himmler and encouraging Goering to move in directions that 
paralleled Himmler's. In so doing, Hitler constantly undermined the 
more conservative elements who would have limited the scope of the 
emerging police state, so that they gradually abandoned their most ef-
fective arguments and strategies. This, however, was the limit of Hitler's 
role in the matter, for before 1936 he apparently preferred the contra-
dictory goal of efficient, unlimited police power without concentration 
in the hands of one lieutenant. Only the mounting international tension 
of 1935-36 and preparations for a more aggressive foreign policy forced 
him to act. By then, related concern over counterespionage had increased 
Blomberg's support for Himmler's system. The very fact that Himmler 
recruited Blomberg's intercession on his behalf is the strongest proof 
that he had to work to win Hitler's support as late as 1935. 
Though Hitler and ideological consensus were clearly central to 
everything that happened, if this reinterpretation of the development 
of the police state stands, then the intentionalist arguments about all 
developments for which the police state was central require revision to 
include functionalist perspectives to such a point that intentionalism may 
cease to be a valid concept in any but the most abstract sense. 
As for arguments about the role of ideological consensus, Graf is 
certainly correct in arguing for a continuity between Wilhelmine attitudes 
and the police of Weimar and NS Germany. There was indeed an ideo-
logical consensus at work that bound together police, NS, and conserv-
ative allies. Graf is also correct in pointing to the Papen coup of 1932 as 
a decisive turning point-not, however, in labeling it the decisive turning 
point-rather than as one in a series of steps. The next such step was 
the NS "power seizure," putting the police under Nazi command, while 
people like Diels maintained the continuity and laid foundations for the 
next step. That came with Himmler's acquisition of the Gestapo, prop-
erly labeled by Aronson as a decisive turning point, perhaps the most 
decisive. Nevertheless, Graf again is correct in emphasizing that little 
immediate change occurred. What followed was indeed a gradual tran-
sition. The next major step was Himmler's 1936 acquisition of command 
over all German police, at which point the building process had created 
a solid foundation. 
Through each of these steps, many problems weakened conservative 
opposition. More than anything, however, the conservatives were de-
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feated by their own beliefs and values. Whether they were Nazis like 
Frick or non-Nazis like the generals, or Guertner and Schacht, they 
shared in more moderate form many of the same basic assumptions as 
Himmler. They could not refute his law-and-order and national security 
arguments, while he exploited the conflicts of interest among them over 
what to preserve and how. Meanwhile, their own drives to repress per-
ceived enemies prevented them from mounting adequate resistance 
against his arguments for radical enforcement. They thus sacrificed 
whatever humane conservative values they may have held, and con-
tributed directly to the construction of one or more aspects of the police 
state. The inherent logic of the anti-liberal, anti-Marxist, racist, nation-
alist, survival-of-the-fittest world view that they shared overwhelmed 
them just as it did the mass base of Nazi power they disdained. 
Although "ideological consensus" does explain the development of 
the evils of the Third Reich, it was not such a consensus in detail that 
all involved moved intentionally toward either the 55-police state es-
sential to the fulfillment of these evils or toward those evils themselves. 
It was rather an "ideological conjunction" that sabotaged resistance. Police 
states are not all the same, but ideological compulsions to curb basic 
rights or to repress minorities or ideas lead all who hold them down the 
same slippery slope. 
This reassessment of Hitler's role in the formation of the police state 
does not exonerate him or anyone else from responsibility. It merely 
puts in more accurate perspective the nature of the leader's responsibility 
in complex modern societies. It should no longer be stated that Hitler 
ordered the creation of this system or that he preconceived the system 
and set Himmler to work on it. Himmler, nevertheless, created his sys-
tem with the intent of appealing to Hitler, and it did. Giving the Four 
Year Plan to Goering and the police to Himmler were logical correlations 
of his foreign policy goals. Regardless of the need to balance all against 
all, regardless of what Hitler thought of Himmler and lieutenants like 
Heydrich, Himmler offered the security instrument most suitable to the 
future Hitler foresaw. The division of the conservatives, marked most 
notably by Blomberg's call for a security system like Himmler's, must 
have facilitate Hitler's final decision. 
This study has suggested that the membership of the separate agen-
cies in Sipo and SO were bound together in an uneasy union, but in 
such a way as to drive them not only to fulfill their missions but also to 
contribute to the further growth of police state terrorism and ultimately 
genocide. Each had a mission and an organizational image that its mem-
bers embraced precisely because they proclaimed their separateness 
from and transcendence above those they disdained in Sipo and SO, in 
other parts of the SS, or in the Movement in general. The ethos of each 
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separate branch thus enabled its members to do their jobs self-right-
eously, while denying any connection between themselves and the less 
respectable work of others. Consequently, then and ever since, members 
of each branch have denied that Sipo and SD constituted any real union 
of its components. When they were required to contribute to-even 
participate directly in-the work of other branches that they disdained, 
they could dismiss such contamination as temporary and an unfortunate 
but necessary evil if they wanted to remain with their chosen branch 
and fulfill its mission, which would contribute to a better Germany. 
The special union that Sipo and SD represented offers insights into 
how its members came to play the roles that they did. Especially since 
so many of its members came from the so-called better elements of 
society, there is a need for better explanations than a takeover by sadists 
or authoritarian personalities. With the foundations laid by this study, 
it should be possible to explore more fruitfully the more pressing ques-
tions raised by the Nazi experience, at least as far as how it came to be 
that its horrors were performed by professional policemen, lawyers, 
academics, civil servants-the full range of ordinary German citizens 
who belonged to Sipo and SD. 
Appendix 
Table of Comparative Officer Ranks 
55 German Army U.S.Army German Police 
Reichsfuehrer Generalfeld- General of the Chef d. Deutsch. 
marschall Army Polizei 
ObstGruppen- Generaloberst Generaloberst d. 
fuehrer Polizei 
Oberguppen- General General General d. Polizei 
fuehrer 
Gruppenfuehrer Generalleutnant Lieutenant Generalleutnant d. 
General Polizei 
Brigadefuehrer Generalmajor Major General Generalmajor d. 
Polizei 
Oberfuehrer Brigadier 
General 
Standartenfuehrer Oberst Colonel Oberst d. Schupo 
Reichs Kriminaldi-
rektor 
OSturmbann- OberstIeutnant Lieutenant OberstIeutnant d. 
fuehrer Colonel Schupo 
Oberregierungs-u. 
Kriminalrat 
Sturmbann- Major Major Major d. Schupo 
fuehrer Reg- u. Kriminalrat 
Hauptsturm- Hauptmann Captain Hauptmann d. 
fuehrer Schupo 
Kriminalrat 
Obersturmfuehrer ObertIeutnant First Lieuten- Oberleutnant d. 
ant Schupo 
Kriminalkommissar 
Kriminalinspektor 
USturmfuehrer Leutnant Second Lieu- Leutnant d. Schupo 
tenant Kriminalsekretaer 
Kriminal-Oberassis-
tent 
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Sturmschar- Stabsfeldwebel Sergeant Major Meister 
fuehrer Kriminalsekretaer 
Kriminal-Oberassis-
tent 
Hauptschar- Oberfeldwebel Master Ser- Hauptwachtmeister 
fuehrer geant 
Oberscharfuehrer Feldwebel Tech Sergeant Revier-Oberwacht-
meister 
Kriminal-Oberassis-
tent 
Scharfuehrer Unterfeldwebel Staff Sergeant Oberwachtmeister 
Kriminalassistent 
Unterscharfuehrer Unteroffizier Sergeant Wachtrmeister 
Kriminalassistent 
Anwaerter 
Obergefreiter Rottwachtmeister 
Rottenfuehrer Gefreiter Corporal Unterwachtmeister 
Sturmmann Oberschuetze Private First 
Class 
SS-Mann Schuetze Private Anwaerter 
Anwaerter 
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Official Titles and Terms 
AA 
Ab 
Abtl 
Asst 
Bd. 
BPP 
Bue. 
Cd-
CdS 
d. 
F 
f. 
GeStapo 
GeStapa 
GL 
GPL 
HAbtl 
Id-
IdS 
K(L)St 
Kr 
KR 
Kripo 
LReg 
Lt 
m 
MdI 
MdJ 
MPras 
MR 
NS(DAP) 
OAb 
OPL 
Auswaertiges Amt; Foreign Office 
Abschnitt; region (SA, SS, SD) 
Abteilung; administrative division or branch 
Assistent; assistant 
Band; volume 
Bayerische Politische Polizei; Bavarian Political Police 
BuescheI; bundle, sheaf of documents 
Chef der-- ; chief of the --
Chef der Sipo; chief of the Sipo 
der, des; of the 
-fuehrer; leader (as part of rank or title) 
fuer; for 
Geheime Staatspolizei; Secret (or Privy) State Police 
Geheime Staatspolizei Amt; Secret State Police Office 
Gauleitung or Gauleiter; Gau command or commander 
Gaupropagandaleitung; Gau Propaganda Office or Command 
Hauptabteilung; Main Division (administrative) 
Inspekteur der---; inspector of the---
Inspekteur der Sipo; inspector of the Sipo 
Kriminalpolizei (Leit) Stelle; Kripo (Control) Post 
Kriminal; detective (as part of rank/title) 
Kriminalrat; detective councilor 
Kriminalpolizei; Detective Police 
Landes Regierung; state government 
Leutenant; lieutenant 
-meister; - master (part of rank or title) 
Ministerium des Innern; Ministry or minister of the Interior 
Ministerium des Justiz; Ministry or minister of Justice 
Minister Praesident; prime minister or premier 
Ministerrat; ministerial councilor 
Nationalsozialistische (Deutsche Arbeiterpartei); National Socialist 
(German Workers Party) 
Oberabschnitt; Main Region (SA, SS, SD) 
Oberst Partei Leitung; Highest Party Command 
Orpo 
OSAF 
PD 
PK 
PLPA 
PPKdL 
PPras 
Pr 
PrFM 
R 
RdErl 
Reg 
RegBez 
RPras 
RR 
RFSS 
RK 
RKM 
RPL 
RStH 
RuSHA 
RWM 
SA 
Schupo 
SD 
Sipo 
SS 
SSO 
S(L)St 
StSek 
StVCuI 
StVdF 
u. 
UAb 
VO 
WM 
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Ordnungspolizei; Order Police (uniformed) 
Oberst SA Fuehrung; Highest SA Command 
Polizei Oirektor or Oirektion; police commissioner, chief, or headquar-
ters 
Partei Korresdondenz; Party correspondence files 
Politische Landespolizeiamt; State Political Police Office 
Politische Polizei Kommandeur der Laender; political police commander 
of the states 
Polizei Praesident or Praesidium; police president, commissioner, or 
headquarters 
Preussisches; Prussian 
Preussisches Finanz Ministerium; Prussian Finance Ministry or min-
ister 
Reichs; imperial/national 
Runderlass; decree 
Regierungs; government 
Regierungsbezirk; governmental district 
Regierungs-Praesident; district governor or officer 
Reigierungsrat; government councilor 
Reichsfuehrer 55; Reich commander of the SS 
Reichskanzlei; Reich chancellery or chancellor 
Reichskriegs Ministerium; Reich War Ministry or minister 
Reichspropagandaleitung; Reich Propaganda Command or Office 
Reichsstatthalter; Reich territorial governor (of a Land) 
Rasse und Siedlungs Hauptamt; Race and Settlement Main Office 
Reichswehr Ministerium; Ministry or minister of National Defense 
Sturmabteilung; Storm Troopers, Brown Shirts 
Schutzpolizei; State Police (uniformed) 
Sicherheitsdienst; Security Service (of the Reichsfuehrer SS) 
Sicherheitspolizei; Security Police (plainclothes detectives) 
Schutzstaffel; Protection Squadron 
SS officers files 
Staatspolizei (Leit)Stelle; Gestapo (Control) Post 
5taatssekretaer; state secretary 
5tellvertretender Chef und Inspekteur; deputy chief and inspector (of the 
Prussian Gestapo) 
5tellvertretender des Fuehrers; deputy of the Fuehrer 
und;and 
Unterabschnitt; subregion (SA, SS, SD) 
Verordnung; decree 
Wehrmacht; Armed Forces 
Publications 
AHR 
AP5R 
CEH 
OAL 
GVtP 
American Historical Review 
American Political Science Review 
Central European History 
Oienstaltersliste der 55 
Geschaeftsverteilungsplan 
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IMT International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals before 
the 
JCEH 
JCL,C&PS 
JMH 
JPS&A 
KDAL 
MBliV 
NCA 
PrGS 
RGBI 
TWC 
VB 
VfZ 
Archives 
BA 
BA-MA 
BDC 
By 
GIStAnwalt 
GStA 
HA 
Hess 
HStA 
HZ 
LC 
NA 
NSach 
PA 
Sach 
StA 
Journal of Central European History 
Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 
Journal of Modern History 
Journal of Police Science and Administration 
DienstaItersliste der hoeheren Kriminalbeamten (Prussia) 
Ministerialblatt des Reichs- und Preussischen Ministeriums des Innern 
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Red Series) 
Preussische Gesetzsammlung 
Reichsgesetzblatt 
Trials of the War Criminals (subsequent trials-Green Series) 
Voelkischer Beobachter 
Vierteljahrshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte 
Bundesarchiv (Koblenz) 
Bundesarchiv-Militaerarchiv (Freiburg) 
U.S. Document Center, Berlin 
Bayerisches 
Generalstaatsanwalt bei dem Kammergericht, Berlin 
Geheime Staatsarchiv Berlin-Dahlem (also Hauptarchiv) 
Hauptarchiv der NSDAP (Hoover Institute Microfilm) 
Hessisches 
Ha uptstaatsarchiv 
Institut fuer Zeitgeschichte 
Library of Congress (Washington, D.C.) 
National Archives (Washington, D.C.) 
Niedersaechsisches 
Politischesarchiv des Auswaertigen Antes (Bonn) 
Saechsisches 
Staatsarchiv 
Introduction 
1. A detailed analysis of relevant literature is found in the bibliographical 
essay under "Subsequent Literature." 
2. See Pierre Aycoberry's analysis of the significance of Hans Buchheim's 
contribution resulting from his early Gutachten on SS-police-KL systems, The Nazi 
Question: An Essay on the Interpretation of National Socialism, 1922-1975 (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1981), p. 209. 
3. The reader can both achieve an overview of the debate and trace its 
evolution through historiographical essays such as Aycoberry (originally in 
French, 1979), especially pp. 208-15; Hans Mommsen, "National Socialism-
Continuity and Change," and Karl D. Bracher, "The Role of Hitler: Perspectives 
of Interpretation," in Fascism: A Reader's Guide, ed. Walter Lacquer (Berkeley: 
Univ. of California Press, 1976); Klaus Hildebrand, The Third Reich (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1984; originally in German, 1979), pp. 136-40; with fur-
ther elaboration by Tim Mason, "Intention and Explanation: A Current Contro-
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'versy about the Interpretation of National Socialism," and Mommsen, "Hitlers 
Stellung in nationalsozialistischen Herrschaftssystem," and Hildebrand, "Mono-
cratie oder Polycratie? Hitlers Herrschaft und das Dritte Reich," in Gerhard 
Hirschfeld and Lothar Kettenacher, "The Fuehrer Staat": Myth and Reality (Stutt-
gart: Klett-Cotte, 1981); John Heiden and John Farquharson, Explaining Hitler's 
Germany: Historians and the Third Reich (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble Books, 
1983); Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpre-
tation (London: Edward Arnold, 1985); Mommsen, "Flight from Reality: Hitler 
as Party Leader and Dictator in the Third Reich," Syracuse Scholar 8 (1987): 51-
59; and on the most recent twist, Konrad H. Jarausch, "Removing the Nazi Stain? 
The Quarrel of the German Historians," German Studies Review 11 (1988): 285-
301. 
4. See Kershaw, Nazi Dictatorship, pp. 5-10. 
5. For example: Andreas Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie, Politik und Kriegs-
fuehrung, 1940-1941 (Frankfurt a.M.: Bernard & Graefe, 1965); Klaus Hildebrand, 
The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1973); 
Karl D. Bracher in Die Nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung (Cologne: West-
deutscher Verlag, 1960), and The German Dictatorship (New York: Praeger Pub-
lishers, 1970); and Eberhard Jaeckel, Hitler's Weltanschauung: A Blueprint for Power 
(Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan Univ. Press, 1972). 
6. For example: Hans Mommsen, Beamtentum im Dritten Reich (Stuttgart: 
Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1966); Peter Diehl-Thiele, Partei und Staat im Dritten 
Reich (Munich: Bech, 1969); and Edward N. Peterson, The Limits of Hitler's Power 
(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1969). 
7. Heiden and Farquharson, Explaining Hitler's Germany, p. 47. 
8. Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 3 vols. (New York: 
Holmes & Meier, 1985). Although he has avoided taking a clear position in the 
debate, Hilberg describes "the machinery of destruction, moving on a track of 
self-assertion, engaged in its multipronged operation in an ever more compli-
cated network of interlocking decisions .... We know that the bureaucracy had 
no master plan, no fundamental blue-print, no clear view of its actions. How 
then was the process steered? How did it take on Gestalt?" 3:998. 
9. Kershaw, Nazi Dictatorship, especially p. 61, n. 2, for one complete chain 
of published exchanges during 1980-81; and Jarausch, "Removing the Nazi 
Stain?" on the more recent Historikerstreit. 
10. Kershaw, Nazi Dictatorship, p. 80. 
11. For an interesting elaboration of this "dialectical" perspective in devel-
opmental psychology, Michael Basseches, Dialectical Thinking and Adult Devel-
opment (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publishing, 1984), especially pp. 9-15, 20-30. The 
potential of this approach for psychohistorical analYSis remains wholly un-
tapped, yet highly relevant to the Nazi experience. 
12. For example, Christopher Graf, PoIitische Polizei zwischen Demokratie und 
Diktatur (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1983). 
1. Factionalism in Pursuit of Power 
1. The early history of the Nazi Movement found excellent summary in 
Dietrich Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party: 1919-1933 (Pittsburgh: Univ. of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1969); and a pioneer study of Hitler's position and of faction-
alism can be found in Joseph Nyomarkay, Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi 
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Party (Minneapolis: Univ. Minnesota Press, 1967). For elaborations of internal 
ideological differences prior to 1933, see, Barbara Miller Lane, "Nazi Ideology: 
Some Unfinished Business," CEH 7 (March 1974): 3-30; Lane and L. Rupp, Nazi 
Ideology before 1933 (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1978); and Simon Taylor, Prelude 
to Genocide: Nazi Ideology and the Struggle for Power (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1985). The most widely accepted interpretation of Hitler's own ideology is Jae-
chel, Hitler's Wetanschauung. Michael H. Kater, "Hitler in a Social Context," CEH 
14 (September 1981): 243-72, explores the social aspects of Hitler's charismatic 
technique. 
2. Arguments over the deliberateness of Hitler's style and its effects on his 
control are central to the debate. For a clear review of the problem and related 
literature, Hiden and Farquharson, Explaining Hitler's Germany, pp. 64-66. 
3. Robert Koehl, "Feudal Aspects of National Socialism," APSR 54 (Decem-
ber 1960): 921-33. 
4. In addition to Nyomarkay and Orlow, Jeremy Noakes, "Conflict and 
Development in the NSDAP, 1924-1927," JCH 1 (October 1969): 3-36, provided 
a deeper study of the Strasser faction. In contrast, Lane, "Nazi Ideology," forced 
a serious reconsideration of what in fact constituted the differences between the 
factions. More recently, Udo Kissenkoetter, Gregor Strasser und die NSDAP 
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1978); and Peter D. Stachura, Gregor 
Strasser and the Rise of Nazism (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983) have 
fleshed out these analyses. On factionalism in Bavaria: Geoffrey Pridham, 
Hitler's Rise to Power: The Nazi Movement in Bavaria, 1923~1933 (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1973). 
5. Recent studies of the early SA: Richard Bessel, Political Violence and the 
Rise of Nazism: The Storm Troopers in Eastern Germany, 1925-1934 (New Haven: 
Yale Univ. Press, 1984); Conan Fischer, Storm troopers: A Social, Economic and 
Ideological Analysis, 1928-35 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983); Mathilde 
Jamin, Zwischen den Klassen (Wuppertal: Hammer Verlag, 1984); and Erich G. 
Reiche, The Development of the SA in Nuernberg, 1922-1934 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 1986). 
6. OSAF, GRUSA VII, "Schutzstaffel (55)," 12 April 1929, U.S. National 
Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy T-580, Captured German Documents 
Microfilmed at the Berlin Document Center, Roll 87, Folder 425 (hereafter cited as 
T-580/roll no.!folder no.). "Die wichtigsten Daten aus der Geschichte der 55," 
from SS Handbuch, n.d., probably Waffen-SS in orgin, U.S. National Archives 
Microfilm Publications, Microcopy T-175, Records of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief 
of the German Police, Roll 232, frame 2720313 (hereafter cited as T-175/roll no.! 
frame no.). Hitler on the origin and purpose of the 55: Secret Conversations, 1941-
1944 trans. Norman Cameron and R.H. Stevens (New York: Farrar, Strauss & 
Young, 1953), p. 138. For the official history of the 55, Gunter d' Alquen, Die 
SS, Geschichte, Aufgabe und Organization der Schutzstaffel der NSDAP (Berlin: Junker 
& Duenhaupt Verlag, 1939), pp. 6-7. On the early 55, Hans Buchheim, "The 
55-Instrument of Domination," in Helmut Krausnick et al., Anatomy of the SS 
State (New York: Walker & Company, 1968), pp. 140-42; Heinz Hoehne, The 
Order of the Death's Head (New York: Coward-McCann, 1969); Peter Hoffman, 
Hitler's Personal Security (Boston: MIT Press, 1979), pp. 15-22; and Robert L. Koehl, 
The Black Corps (Madison: Univ. Wisconsin Press, 1983), chaps. 1-3. One of the 
most significant folders of primary sources on the formative years of the 55 is 
T-580/87/425. 
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7. Rundschreiben Nr. 1, Munich, 21 September 1925, and Richtlinien, n.d., 
T-580/87/425. 
8. GRUSA VII, 12 April 1929, T-580/87/425; and Hoehne, The Order, pp. 
25-28. For detail on early SA-SS relations, Andreas Werner, "SA und NSDAP." 
(Inaugural dissertation, Friedrich-Alexander-Universitaet, 1963), pp. 400-402, 
495-99, 585-87; and Bessel, Political Violence, pp. 65-66. 
9. On Himmler's positions, Dienstaltersliste der Schutzstaffel der NSDAP, 
Stand von 1. Oktober 1934 (henceforth DAL) T-175/204/2673857; and d' Alquen, 
SS, pp. 7-8. 
10. SS Befehl Nr. 1, Munich, 13 September 1927, T-580/87/425. 
11. The early biographies of Himmler are uneven and dated: Willie Fris-
chauer, Himmler (New York: Belmont Productions, 1962); Roger Manvell and 
Heinrich Fraenkel, Himmler (London: William Heinemann, 1965); Josef Wulf, 
Heinrich Himmler (Berlin: Arani Verlag, 1960). Interesting short sketches can be 
found in Joachim c. Fest, The Face of the Third Reich (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1970), pp. 111-24; and Hoehne, The Order, pp. 29-50. An interesting effort at 
psychoanalysis of Himmler is Peter Loewenberg, "The Unsuccessful Adoles-
cence of Heinrich Himmler," AHR 76 (June 1971): 612-41, who identifies symp-
toms of an obsessive-compulsive character and schizoid personality in the 
adolescent diaries of Himmler. Finally, Bradley F. Smith, Heinrich Himmler: A 
Nazi in the Milking, 1900-1926 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), has made 
extensive use of available sources to produce a most satisfactory account of the 
development of Himmler's character. 
Werner T. Angress and Bradley F. Smith, "Diaries of Heinrich Himmler's 
Early Years," JMH 31 (September 1959): 206-24; and Helmut Heiber (ed.), Reichs-
fuehrer! ... Briefe an und von Himmler (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1968), 
provide some primary inSights, as does the occasionally questionable Felix Ker-
sten, Memoirs, who, as confidant and masseur, saw aspects of Himmler that 
normally would be revealed only to a psychoanalyst. A useful firsthand descrip-
tion is Werner Best, "Betr.: Heinrich Himmler," September 18,1949. On Himm-
ler's reactions to the Final Solution, Kersten, pp. 119-20; and Raul Hilberg, De-
struction of European Jews 1:332-33. 
12. Hoehne, The Order, pp. 41-43. Interestingly, ittook Himmler almost two 
years, 1925-27, to work his way through Mein Kampf. Transcript of Himmler's 
"Gelesene Buecher" notebook, Library of Congress, Himmler File, container 418. 
13. Angress and Smith, "Diaries," pp. 210, 216. 
14. Smith, Himmler, p. 165. 
15. Oberst Walter Nicolai, Geheime Maechte, International Espionage und ihre 
Bekaempfung im Weltkreig und heute (Leipzig: K.F. Koehler, 1923), pp. 11-13. 
16. Ibid., pp. 20, 89, 121, 184. The significance of such ideas to Himmler at 
this time is indicated by his rejection of Georg Popoffs Tscheka as "a bad book," 
because "the word Jew is not mentioned in connection with the Cheka, which 
is almost completely Jewish ... " Smith, Himmler, p. 165. 
17. Wilhelm Hoettl, The Secret Front, pp. 30-45, is a source of this rumor. 
18. Kersten, Memoirs, p. 54. 
19. Kissenkoetter, Gregor Strasser, pp. 59-60, revealed Himmler's heretofore 
unsuspected role in building the Party's Propagandaleitung and propaganda 
work before Goebbels. For Goebbels's account of Himmler and his continued 
role in running the RPL for several months after Goebbels's takeover, EIke Froeh-
lich (ed.), Die Tagebuecher von Joseph Goebbels: Saemtliche Fragmente, 4 vols. (Mun-
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ich: K.G. Sauer, 1987), 1: 20.XI. & 22.XI.29; 23.111., 28.1V., 2.V., 12.V., 24.V., & 
29.VII.30. 
20. On attention to details and his tendency to drive himself, Angress, 
Smith, "Diaries," p. 215; for an example of Himmler's attitude on discipline, 
letter, Himmler to Kaltenbrunner, July 14, 1944, T-175/59/2574386; on loyalty to 
Hitler and manipulation, Kersten, Memoirs, pp. 53-54,244-47. 
21. Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
22. Smith, Himmler, p. 171. 
23. On the appeal to Hitler, Hitler's Secret Conversations, pp. 87, 352. Fest 
identified a passage in one of Hitler's Reich Party Congress speeches in 1938 as 
an attack upon "pseudo-academic folkish occultism," which might have been 
directed specifically toward curbing Himmler and his ilk, Face of the Reich, p. 113. 
Albert Speer relates several occasions upon which Hitler disdained Himmler's 
mystical and romantic preoccupations, Inside the Third Reich (New York: Mac-
millan, 1970), pp. 94-95, 122. 
24. On Party tensions, especially in Berlin in 1930, Martin Broszat, Hitler 
and the Collapse of Weimar Germany (Leamington Spa, UK: Berg Publishers, 1987), 
pp. 11-25; Taylor, Prelude to Genocide, pp. 89-106; and Bessel, Political Violence, 
pp. 62-63. The Berlin SA or Stennes faction's version of this and the subsequent 
conflicts can be found in Walter Jaehn, Wie es zur Stennes-Aktion kam!, printed 
by Walter Stennes, Documents of the Hauptarchiv der NSDAP, Microfilm of the 
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Roll 4, Folder 83 (hereafter 
cited as HA/4/83). 
25. Nyomarkay, Nazi Party, pp. 119-21; and Bessel, Political Violence, pp. 63-
65. 
26. Hoehne, The Order, pp. 66-68; and Koehl, Black Corps, pp. 34, 45-46. On 
the SS as spies and headquarters guards, Jahn, Stennes-Aktion, pp. 3-4. 
27. Letter from the Partei- und OSAF, Stabschef Wagener to OSAF-Stellv., 
3 October 1930, and Hitler's announcement of intentions for SS independence, 
Partei- und OSAF, 7 November 1930, T-580/85/403. SS Befehl Nr. 20, Munich, 
1 December 1930; and SA Befehl Nr. 1 (Gleichzeitig fuer SS), 16 January 1931, 
T-580/89/449. 
2. The Roots of the SO 
1. The Lebenslauf of Alfred Riechers (b. 2.3.95), Berlin Document Center/ 
SS Officers Files (hereafter, BOC/SSO), claims entry into the "gesamten Nachr. 
Abtlg. in die SA" in 1922-23, and after the Party Verbot in 1923, membership in 
the "geheimen Nachr. Dienst" of the Movement. Saxon KR Erich Vogel (b. 
13.7.89) worked from September 1926 for the NSDAP "im Nachrichtendienst," 
informing the Party confidentially, especially regarding government and police 
measures (BOC/SSO). 
2. Kissenkoetter, Strasser, pp. 59-60. Lebenslauf, BOC/SSO Dr. Otto Rasch 
(b. 7.12.91), claims service in the Gau NO at Dresden since 1930. The PL of Gau 
Hannover-Sued-Braunschweig during 1930 issued monthly reports, well in-
formed on enemy organizations; BA/Schu 209, Monatl. Rundschreiben d. GPL, 
Nr. 10, 15.12.30. RPL, Abtl. NO, 19.12.31, makes a reference to independently 
working Gau NachrichtenstelIen, N.Saech. HStA Hannover, 310 I1A/37 II. 
3. On Strasser, Orlow, Nazi Party, 1919-1933, pp. 211, 306 n.; on Stennes, 
clipping from VB, 15 April 1931, "Oas Berliner Polizeipraesidium schuetzt durch 
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Befehlsausgabe die Stenees-Revolte," T-175/357/2866878; and Jaehn, Stennes-
Aktion, HA/4/83. 
4. Warnings about spies and especially KDP agents in SS Befehle Nr. 27, 
6 June 1931, and Nr. 53, 10 October 1931, T-580/87/425; Gau-Muenchen-Ober-
bayern, Propaganda Abtlg. (N.D.) to all Bezirks-und Ortsgruppenleiter, 13 Oc-
tober 1931, HA/71/1533; and OSAF, Ie Nr. 7459/31, re "Nachrichtendienst," 9 
December 1931, HA/16/306. T-175/375/EAP 173-b-16-05/398 is a Polizeipraesi-
dium Berlin collection of materials on KPD efforts to penetrate and undermine 
the SA, 1930-32. The propaganda played cleverly on factionalism in the NSDAP 
and appealed to the socialistic elements in the SA. Frames 2866846-55 provide 
insight into exploitation of a turncoat, Lt. a.D. Scheringer. 
5. The early history of the SA intelligence service can be pieced together 
from scattered documents in Folder 1773, HA/27 A and 28A; see especially Nr. 
XVI a 315/31., Der Oberstaatsanwalt bei dem Landgerichte Muenchen I to the 
General staatsanwalt bei dem Oberlandesgerichte Muenchen, 12 February 1931, 
re "Riester, Herbert ... wegen Vorbereitung zum Hochverrat," HAI28A/1773. 
According to Beilage I of Andreas Werner, SA und NSDAP (inaugural dissertation, 
Frierdrich-Alexander-Univ., 1964), in April 1931 Riester's Ie was under Wilhelm 
Weiss's Nachrichtenstab, directly subordinate to Roehm. 
6. 12 February 1931, "re Riester," HA/28A/1773. Examples of Riester's re-
ports precede and follow this document. 
7. Der OSAF, Stabsbefehl and Verfuegung Ie Nr. 3274131, both of 9 June 
1931, HA/16/306. 
8. On the development of RPL propaganda machinery and the monthly 
reports, Orlow, Nazi Party, 1919-1933, pp. 204-5. For examples of these devel-
opments from December 1930 in such Gaue as Schwaben, Weser-Ems and Han-
nover-Sued-Brauschweig, BA/Schu 209. 
9. The surviving Goebbels's diary entries contain no references to his RPL 
ND before 5 October 1932. Until shortly before that date, all entries indicate that 
Franke was running the RPL for him and much to his satisfaction. Goebbels's 
rapid about-face against Franke in late 1932 indicates he probably paid little 
attention to the actual workings of the RPL organization until serious problems 
arose. Tagebuecher von Goebbe/s, 1: 12.X.30., 17.XII.30.; 2: 15.1.31., 26.11.31., 
6.III.31., 17.V.31., 19.IX.32., 5.X.32., 2.XIII., 13.XIII. & 14.XII.32., 11.1 & 24.1.33. 
Both Gau Sachsen, PL, Rundschreiben Nr. 16/31, 22 May 1931, (BA/Schu 20811 
Bd.1I137-38) and Gau Weser-Ems, 2 July 1931, to all B.-u. OGL (BA/Schu 209) 
refer to the May directive of RPL for the establishment of an ND. The key passage 
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Documents 
The unconditional surrender of Germany at the end of World War II has given 
historians a unique opportunity. For perhaps the only time in history, the ex-
tensive files of the political police and security agencies of a modem nation are 
accessible-materials that are usually destroyed or kept secret almost indefi-
nitely. Nevertheless, the resultant collection of documents is a mixed blessing. 
On the one hand, they overwhelm with sheer quantity, while on the other, 
evidence is missing on an equally grand scale. 
The records of the Third Reich were extensively damaged, some groups 
more than others. Those relevant to Sipo and SD fall on the side of extensive 
damage, but not so far as generally assumed. Given the nature of the organi-
zations, there was significant deliberate destruction, both as a matter of routine 
security and as part of last-minute efforts. Fortunately, given the habits of mod-
em bureaucracies, they could not eliminate every copy of many important docu-
ments. 
The management of the captured documents has further mixed the blessing. 
The victorious Allies assembled records from all over Germany for the Nurem-
berg Trials, consequently destroying contexts. The physical relationships of 
documents within files is often as significant as the content of any single docu-
ment. The significance of earlier drafts, related notes, responses, assembled 
information on the subject of the document, even such details as who possessed 
the document or Who produced a note, can be destroyed with the context. 
However, Allied efforts to reorganize the documents for trials or for the dena-
zification process also created new, equally useful contexts, bringing together 
related documents from different provenances. 
Immediately after the war, the Allied governments removed from Germany 
much of the captured material, but they have allegedly returned almost all of it 
to German archives within the last three decades. Before its return, however, 
significant collections were microfilmed, making them more readily available to 
scholars around the world. The results of several such filming projects are listed 
below, the most extensive of which was that undertaken by the U.S. National 
Archives. German archivists redistributed to appropriate archives much of the 
material returned to Germany, and years of painstaking work have reestablished 
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some of the original contexts and created newly valuable ones. In the Federal 
Republic, these archival holdings remain almost completely open to scholars. 
Less is known about the materials captured by the Soviet Union or remaining 
in the hands of the East European governments. As in the West, the Soviets 
have allegedly returned the materials they held. Unfortunately, political tensions 
have severely limited scholarly access in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and 
the German Democratic Republic, especially in the sensitive area of political 
police and security agencies. The few documents made available from the Eastern 
side are significant and valuable pieces, leaving the student of Sipo and SO with 
the insecure feeling that much of what one needs for greC!.ter accuracy lies just 
beyond reach. The published papers from the National Archives conference, 
Captured German and Related Records, summarizes the history and problems of 
these materials, recently updated by Josef Henke's article. 
The complex history of the documents has created several problems for this 
work. I began research with the readily available microfilmed publications and 
the holdings of the National Archives in Washington. When it became possible 
for me to work in the German archives, I reviewed much of the material that 
had been microfilmed, to benefit from any newly established contexts and to 
find the new documents that had been integrated into the old files. In initial 
research, I collected some documents from the microfilm. Subsequent work on 
the same folder in German archives gave other materials new significance, and 
they were collected then. It would be a herculean task to convert microfilm 
references to archival or vice versa; consequently, documents are referenced to 
the source from which I first collected them. Where documents have been pub-
lished, however, preference has been given in citations to the more readily avail-
able published source. Similar problems have arisen since the National Archive 
began microfilming its Nuremberg Trial materials. Some testimonies and reports 
are cited from the original collection, others from microfilm. 
The incompleteness of the surviving documents does not deny us a valid 
history of Sipo and SO, although overly abundant evidence in one area mixed 
with thin or nonexistent documentation in another does produce uneven pic-
tures and a narrative with gaping holes. Such sources inevitably yield both rela-
tively valid descriptions and analyses mixed with guesswork. The hope is that 
solidarity in some areas has educated the guesswork in others. Many of the gaps 
in the evidence have been filled, a process that will continue. The historian, like 
the detective, follows clues that lead from obvious sources to less apparent ones. 
One obvious line of research required the scouring of regional and local 
archives, which provide details on grassroots aspects often unavailable in central 
archives. Beyond that, however, each local archive has documents created by 
central offices but surviving only in regional files. I have worked in many such 
local archives to find missing pieces; however, such work is endless, and much 
of what must be left for later may conceal significant new information. 
Another endless but valuable line of enquiry leads through the surviving 
personnel files, especially those of the SS, which mix officially compiled data 
and evaluations with unofficial observations and personal contributions. Though 
most frequently used for biographical data, these records also contain a wealth 
of otherwise unrecorded insights into the organizations to which the men be-
longed. 
Although the following list is incomplete, it includes all archives exploited 
for this book. References to relevant guides are given in parentheses. 
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The Archives of Former Reich Agencies 
The Bundesarchiv Koblenz (see Granier) 
NS-1 Der Reichsschatzmeister, NSDAP 
NS-6 Der Stellvertreter des Fuehrers 
NS-lO Persoenliche Adjutantur des Fuehrers und Reichskanzler 
NS-19 Personalstab des Reichsfuehrers SS 
NS-26 NSDAP Hauptarchiv (see Heinz and microfilm) 
R-18 Reichsministerium des Innern 
R-43 Reichskanzlei 
R-58 Reichssicherheitshauptamt, its subordinate agencies: Geheime 
Staatspolizei, ReichSkriminalpolizei, Sicherheitsdienst des Reichs-
fuehrers SS and predeccessors 
Subsequently subdivided into R-l34, Sicherheitspolizei und poli-
tische Nachrichtendienste (microfilm T-175) 
Schu Schumacher Sammlung, a miscellaneous collection taken from the 
holdings of the Berlin Document Center (microfilm T-580 and T-611) 
Bundesarchiv-Militaerarchiv-Freiburg 
RH-1 Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres-Adjutantur 
RW-4 Oberkommando der WehrmachtlWehrmachtfuehrungsstab 
RW-5 OKW-Amt Auslandsnachrichten und Abwehr (microfilm T-77) 
RW-6 Allgemeines Wehrmachtamt, Abtl.-Ausland (microfilm T-77) 
OKW-901 Reichsministerium, WehrmachtabteiIung, Geheime-Akten 
ueber persoenlicher, politischer Schriftwechsel 
Z-518a Richtlinien fuer den Unterricht ueber politische Tagesfragen 
Politisches Archiv des Auswaertigen Amtes, Bonn (see U.S. Department of State, 
Historical Office; microfilm T-120) 
Referat Deutschland 
Referat Inland II G (geheim) 
Referat Inland A/B 
Archives of the Former Laender 
Bavaria: To avoid duplication of Aronson's and McGee's work and the mi-
crofilmed collections, I have made only cursory checks on the holdings of these 
archives. (See Heinz and Hauptarchiv microfilm.) Subsequent to my research, 
in 1977 the Hauptstaatsarchiv underwent reorganization, with all relevant hold-
ings consolidated into AbteiIung II. 
Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Munich, Abteilung I 
Bayerisches Innen Ministerium 
--, Abteilung II 
Reichsstatthalter Epp 
Gesamtstaatsministerium, MA-99 
Akten des bayer. Ministerpraesident Siebert, MA-106 
Bayerisches Staatsarchiv, Munich 
Polizeidirektion Munich 
Bremen: 
Staatsarchiv Bremen 
3-P.l.a. Senatsregistratur, Polizeisachen im allge. 
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4,13-P.l.c. Sicherheitspolizei, Kriminalpolizei, Geheime Staatspolizei 
4,65 Polizeidirektion Bremen, Nachrichtenstelle 
Senat des Inneres holds selected folders from the above. 
Brunswick (Braunschweig): 
Niedersaechsisches Staatsarchiv, Wolfenbuettel 
112 A Neu Braunschweigisches Staatsministerium 
133 Neu Polizeidirektion Braunschweig 
Hamburg: The useful holdings of the Staatsarchiv Hamburg and the Archiv 
der Landesjustizverwaltung have not been exploited directly by me because of 
Henning Timpke's extensive publication of the relevant documents. 
Hessia: 
Hessisches Staatsarchiv Darmstadt 
G-12 Akten des Sicherheitsdienstes und der Geheimen Staatspolizei 
G-12(A) 
G-21 
N-1 
R-1 
Lippe: 
Darmstadt 
Landespolizeiamt Darmstadt 
Hessisches Justizministerium 
NSDAP Akten 
Ersatsdokumentation ueber die Taetigkeit des hess. Innen Min-
isterium bezw. des Reichsstatthalter in Hessen, Ministerialaus-
schreiben dieser Behoerde von 1907-1944 aus Landratsaemter, 
usw. This ambitious effort to reconstruct the destroyed state ar-
chives from the files of local offices was complete for the years 
1933-36 at the time of my review. 
Staatsarchiv Detmold 
L-76 Reichstatthalter und Staatsminister 
LBO Ie Lipp. Regierung, Abtl. des Innem, Polizeiangelegenheiten, 1924-
1949 
L-80 IeP Der Landespolizeidirektor und der Fuehrer der Landespolizei 
L-133 NSDAP, Kreisleitung Detmold und Lemgo 
Oldenburg: 
Niedersaechsisches Staatsarchiv Oldenburg 
136 Oldenburgisches Staatsministerium des Innem 
Prussia: 
Geheimes Staatsarchiv Berlin-Dahlem (Hauptarchiv Berlin, successor to the Prus-
sian State Archive) 
77 Preussisches Ministerium des Innem 
90 Preussisches Staatsministerium (90, Abtl.P, holds the most relevant 
material) 
219 Landes Kriminalpolizeiamt Berlin (material from R-58, Bundesarchiv) 
Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Wiesbaden 
Abtl. 483 NSDAP Hessen-Nassau contains records of SD Gruppe West, 
later OAb Rhein, and Stapostelle Frankfurt a.M. 
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Niedersaechsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Hannover 
Hann. 112a Oberpraesident der Provinz Hannover 
Hann. 3101 NSDAP, Gau Suedhannover-Braunschweig und Gau Osthan-
nover 
Schaumburg-Lippe: 
Niedersaechsisches Staatsarchiv Bueckeburg 
L4 Lfd. Regierungsregistratur-Rep. IV-
Wuerttemberg: 
Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart 
E-130 b II Staatsministerium 
E-130 IV Staatsministerium 
E-140 Reichsstatthalter in Wuerttemberg, 1933-1945 
E-151a Ministerium des Innern, Abtl. I, Kanzleidirektion 
E-151b --, Abtl. II, Recht lund Verfassung 
E-151c --, Abtl. III, Polizeiwessen 
Staatsarchiv Ludwigsburg 
E 188 c Landespolizeidirektion Nordwuerttemberg-Personalakten 
K 100 Staatspolzeileitstelle Stuttgart, 1933~1945 
K 110 SD-Dienststellen in Wuerttemberg und 
Hohenzollern, 1933-1945 
U.S. Archives 
Library of Congress, Washington D.C. (see Weinberg) 
Manuscript Division 
The Deutsches Auslands-Institut Collection 
The Himmler Files 
The Rehse Collection (Hauptarchiv der NSDAP) 
National Archives, Washington D.C. (see National Archives) 
Aside from a complete collection of the American microfilming projects and 
miscellaneous research aids, this archive holds the materials collected for the 
International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg and subsequent American Trials, 
which are currently being microfilmed. All captured German documents belong 
to Record Group 238. 
U.S. Document Center Berlin (see Browder) 
Files on individuals, used for political and judicial purposes but available to 
scholars. The most Significant: 
NS Party Membership Files 
PK Party Correspondence 
SSO SS Officer's Files 
RuSHA Rasse und Siedlungs Hauptamt Files on SS Personnel 
Miscellaneous 
Generalstaatsanwaltschaft bei dem Kammergericht Berlin 
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Holds materials assembled for the prosecution of NS criminals. 
Institute fuer Zeitgeschichte, Munich 
A valuable miscellaneous collection of relevant literature and documents, 
made especially useful by an extensive indexing system. 
Polizei-Fuehrungsakademie Hiltrup 
A useful collection of literature, manuscripts, and miscellaneous documents. 
Microfilmed Documents 
Captured German Documents Microfilmed at the Berlin Document Center. T-580. 
Captured German Documents Microfilmed at the Berlin Document Center. University 
of Nebraska Microfilming Program at the Berlin Document Center. T-611. 
Documents of the Hauptarchiv der NSDAP. Microfilm of the Hoover Insitiute on 
War, Revolution and Peace. HA. 
Miscellaneous SS Records: Einwandererzentralstelle, Waffen-SS, and SS-Oberabschnitte. 
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OKW). Microfilmed at Alexandria, Va. T-77. 
Records of the National Socialist German Labor Party. Microfilmed at Alexandria, 
Virginia. T-81. 
Records of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police. Microfilmed at Al-
exandria, Virginia. T-175. 
Records of the United States Nurnberg War Crimes Trials: Interrogations, 1946-1949. 
National Archives Microfilm Publications. M1019. 
---. USA v Otto Ohlendorf et al. Case IX. National Archives Microfilm Pub-
lications. M895. 
Published Documents 
Anger, Walter (ed.). Das Dritte Reich in Dokumenten. Frankfurt a.M.: Europ Ver-
lag-Anst., 1957. 
Boberach, Heinz (ed.). Meldungen aus dem Reich. Berlin: Hermann Luchterhand 
Verlag, 1965. 
Browder, George C. "Die Anfaenge des 5D: Dokumente aus der Organisations-
geschichte des Sicherheitsdienstes des Reichfuehrers 55," Vierteljahshefte fuer 
Zeitgeschichte 27 (1979): 299-324. 
Dickmann, Fritz. "Die Regierungsbildung in Thuringen als Modell der Mach-
tergreifung: Ein Brief Hitlers aus dem Jahre 1930." Vierteljahrshefte fuer Zeit-
geschichte 14 (1966): 454-64. 
Germany, Reichsministerium des Innern. Ministerialblatt des Reichs- und Preus-
sischen Ministeriums. Berlin: Carl Heymans Verlag, annual. 
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Historische Kommission des Reichsfuehrers 55. Die Erhebung der oesterreischen 
Nationalsozialistischen im luli 1934. Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1965. 
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Jacobsen, Hans Adolf, and Werner Jochmann (eds.). Ausgewhaelte Dokumente zur 
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Klein, Thomas. Die Lageberichte der G(?heimen Staatspolizei ueber die Provinz Hessen-
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lin: Verlag der Nation, 1970. 
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--, Der Regierungsbildung der NSDAP. Organizationsbuch der NSDAP. Mun-
ich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, annual. 
--, Stellvertreter des Fuehrers. Anordnungen des Stellvertreters des Fuehrers. 
Munich: n.p., n.d. 
Peter, Karl H. (ed.). Spiegelbild einer Verschwoerung. Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 
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Contemporary Literature 
Under this heading, the literature falls into two general categories: official pub-
lications of the Weimar and Nazi periods and public commentaries on the police; 
studies, exposes, and dramatizations of the NS police state by foreigners and 
emigres. The former has obvious value. But aside from its insights into contem-
porary perceptions, the popular and polemical literature offers little. Some more 
reliable contemporary publications are included below, while the few reliable 
exposes will be found under "Memoirs." 
Alquen, Gunter d'. Die 55, Geschichte, Aufgabe und Organisation der Schutzstaffeln 
der NSDAP. Berlin: Junker und Ounnhaupt Verlag, 1939. Official history of 
the SS. 
Barek, Lothar. Die Organisation des staatlichen Sicherheitsdienst in Baden. Luebeck, 
Berlin: Deutscher Polizei-Verlag, 1931. 
Best, Werner. Die Deutsche Polizei. Darmstadt: L.c. Wittich Verlag, 1941. 
--. "Die Geheime Staatspolizei." Deutsches Recht 6 (April 1936): 125-28. 
---. "Der Reichsfuehrer SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei." Deutsches Recht 
6 (July 1936): 257-58. 
---. "Neubegruendung des Polizeirechts." Sonderdruck aus Jahrbuch der Aka-
demie fuer Deutsches Recht 1937: 132-38. 
Cantor, Nathaniel. "Recent Tendencies in Criminological Research in Germany." 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 27 (March 1937): 782-93. 
---. "Prison Reform in Germany-1933." Journal of Criminal Law and Crimi-
nology 25: 84-90. 
Daluege, Kurt. Nationalsozialistischen Kampf gegen des Verbrechertum. Munich: F. 
Eher Verlag, 1936. 
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--- and Julius Schweichert. Entfesselung der Unterwelt: Ein Querschnitt durch 
die Bolschewisierung Deutschlands. Berlin: Eckart, 1933. 
Frank, Hans, et al. Grundfragen der Deutschen Polizei: Arbeitsbericht der Akademie 
fuer Deutsches Recht. Hamburg: 1937. 
---. "Rede des Reichsjustizkommissare Staatsminister Dr. Frank bei der 
Gruendungskundgebung der Deutschen Rechtsfront in Hamburg." 
Deutsches Recht 2 (July 1933): 33-36. 
Festgabe fuer Heinrich Himmler. Darmstadt: L.c. Wittich, 1941. 
Gay, Willy. Die preussische Landeskriminalpolizei. Berlin: Kameradschaft Verlags-
gesellschaft, 1928. 
Gritzbach, Erich. Hermann Goering, WerkundMensch. Munich: 1938. Trans. Gerald 
Griffen, Herman Goering, the Man and His Work. London: Hurst & Blackett, 
1939. The only authorized biography. 
Hartenstein, Wilhelm. Der Kampfeinsatz der Schutzpolizei bei inneren Unruhen. Ber-
lin-Charlottenburg: Offene Worte, 1926. Official training material. 
Henning (Polizeirat). "Das Wesen und die Entwicklung der politischen Polizei 
in Berlins." Mitteilungen des Vereins fuer die Geschichte BerZins 43 (1925): 88-
92. 
Heydrich, Reinhard. "Die bekaempfung der Staatsfeinde." Deutsches Recht 6 
(April 1936); 121-23. 
-. Wandlungen unseres Kampfes. Munich-Berlin: Eher, 1935. 
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Hoehn, Reinhard. "Die Wandlung im Polizeirecht." Deutsche Rechtswissenschaft 
1 (1936): 100-123. 
---. Die Wandlung in staatsrechtlichen Denken. Hamburg: Hanseatische Ver-
lagsanstalt, 1934. 
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(January 1946): 362-87. 
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by a leading person in NS Party who became disenchanted and spent time 
in Gestapo custody. 
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in France, Germany and England" (sic; should read Italy). Journal of Criminal 
Law and Criminology 27 (September 1936): 305-27. 
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Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 26 (January 1936): 847-56. 
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tliche Polizei Preussens. Berlin: Kameradschaft Verlagsgesellschaft, 1927. 
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Ahnenerbe Stiftung Verlag, 1942. 
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Schlierbach, Helmut. Die politische Polizei in Preussen. Emsdetten: H.& J. Lechte, 
1938. 
Schoenfleder, Roland. Vom Werdern der deutschen Polizei: Ein Volksbuch. Leipzig: 
Breitkopf & Haertel, 1937. 
Schulze, Fiete. Fiete Schulze-Briefe und Aufzeichnungen aus dem Gestapo-Gefaengnis 
in Hamburg. Berlin: Dietz, 1959. 
Schuster, V.J. (ed.). "Die Deutsche Polizei." Herausgabe im Auftrage des RFSSu-
CdDPiRMdI. Berlin-Schoeneberg: Verlag Deutsche Kultur-Wacht, 1937. 
Schwarz, Dieter [pseud.]. Die Freimaurerei, Weltanschauung, Organisation und Poli-
tik. Berlin: Eher, 1938. Foreword by Heydrich and allegedly written pseu-
donymously by him. 
Schweder, Alfred. Politische Polizei: Wesen und Begriff der politischen Polizei im Met-
ternichschen System, in der Weimarer Republik und im nationalsozialistischen 
Staate. Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1937. 
Sonderegger, Rene (ed.). Moerdzentrale X: Enthuellungen und Dokumente ueber die 
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Miscellaneous clippings from Die Polizei and other police journals, aritcles from 
Voelkischer Beobachter, and clippings from other contemporary newspapers 
are found in the footnotes. 
Memoirs, Apologia, Inside Exposes 
The problems inherent in such sources are exaggerated by the natural sensa-
tionalism of police and security work, especially in the Third Reich. Nevertheless, 
no historian can afford to ignore such potentially valuable information. The rule 
is to check carefully the validity of such evidence in detail and to employ it with 
great caution. 
For this study, the books by Diels, Gisevius, Koehler, Orb, Peis (for Nau-
jocks), and Lina Heydrich have been the most significant. Diels and Gisevius 
can be tested not only against the documents, but against each other. Strangely, 
Diels, despite obvious minimizing of his involvement in actions he would con-
ceal, proves generally more accurate and reliable than Gisevius, a member of 
the resistance. It is mostly a matter of the difference in their positions. For two 
years, Diels was at the center of the development of the Gestapo; Gisevius was 
always on the periphery and, as a jealous opponent, had a jaundiced view. The 
ultimate value of all such self-justifying literature is its insight into the self-
images of the key personalities who wrote them. 
Alfred Naujock's memoirs, interpreted through Peis seem the most fic-
tionalized and overdramatized of the six. Again, their prime value is the projected 
self-image. Nevertheless, some of Naujock's memories of the early SD are cor-
roborated by other sources and are therefore worth quoting. 
The two most useful-and most troublesome-sources are the books written 
under the pen names Koehler and Orb. Orb's book has traditionally been ac-
cepted as a reliable inside source for many studies of the Gestapo and SD. 
Koehler's has generally been ignored. Yet on comparison, it is obvious that the 
authors were either the same man or that "Orb" used "Koehler" extensively as 
a source. Koehler is occasionally more accurate on details when compared with 
the documents. However, many of Koehler's stories of cloak-and-dagger ad-
venture, such as the Roehm purge, are contrary to most accepted and docu-
mented accounts and seem largely fictional. Both books appear to be the product 
of a man who was involved at some point directly in or with the Gestapo and 
the SD, who had extensive, detailed inside information and direct personal con-
tacts, yet who was not above fabricating impressive-seeming details when he 
had none. 
Gert Buchheit (Der deutsche Geheimdienst, p. 168) speculates that Koehler and 
Orb are the same, the former head of "Sonderbuero Stein" who fled Germany 
in 1935 after clashes with Himmler and Heydrich. Under the name Heinrich 
Pfeiffer, he worked for the Poles, then Hungary, and when war broke out moved 
to Switzerland, where the British declined his services "because he cost the Poles 
money and supplied only fraud." This could be accurate only if the Orb-Koehler 
descriptions of personal activities were largely fabricated for the period after 
early 1934, which may be the case; however, the Buchheit thesis is at odds with 
some of the apparently accurate passages in Orb and Koehler. With Koehler and 
Orb, the historian is torn between the almost certainly accurate inside infor-
mation, the obviously fictional accounts, and much that has yet to be tested. 
Her penchant for understatement is the least problem with Lina Heydrich's 
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memoirs. Most problems derive from her confusion of time sequences and a 
need to deny unpleasant realities. Nevertheless, there are some surprisingly 
frank revelations. Inconsistencies between her book and other versions of events 
she has given, to Aronson for instance, emphasize the need for carefully testing 
her every statement. Even so, she is valuable as the only intimate portrayal of 
Heydrich not simplistically negative. 
Whenever possible, I have, of course, researched the original language edi-
tions of such sources, but I have also cited the more readily available English 
translations when the texts were adequate. In this respect, the Schellenberg 
memoirs presented unique problems. The English version was published first, 
postumously from an unrefined manuscript. The subsequent German edition is 
superior is some respects but not always, especially since some of the original 
manuscript was lost. Consequently, references to both versions are employed, 
depending on which is the richest and apparently most accurate. The most 
reliable source would be the original manuscript reSiding in the Institut fuer 
Zeitgeschichte. 
To further complicate matters, many of these books appeared in several 
editions in the original language, each with different pagination. Over the years, 
I have used several of them; however, for the citations employed in this book, 
every effort was made to coordinate page references to the edition cited below. 
Diels, Rudolf. Lucife ante Portas: Es spricht der erste Chef der Gestapo. Zurich: In-
terverlag, 1950(?) (There was also a Stuttgart edition in 1950.) 
Dodd, Martha. Through Embassy Eyes. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1939. 
Dodd, William E., Jr., and Martha Dodd (ed.). Ambassodor Dodd's Diary, 1933-
1938. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1941. 
Frank, Hans. 1m Angesicht des Galgens. Munich: Friedrich Alfred Beck Verlag, 
1953. 
Friedensburg, Ferdinand. Die Weimarer Republik. Berlin: C. Habel, 1946. (Deputy 
Police President, Berlin, 1925-27.) 
Gisevius, Hans B. Bis zum bittern Ende. 2 vols. Hamburg: Classen & Goverts, 
1947. Trans. Richard and Clara Winston as To the Bitter End. Boston: Hough-
ton Mifflin, 1947. (First German-language edition Zurich, 1946; also in En-
glish, London, 1948.) 
---. Wo ist Nebe? Erinnerungen an Hitlers Kriminaldirektor. Zurich: Droemer, 
1966. 
Goebbels, Joseph. Die Tagebuecher von Joseph Goebbels. Saemtliche Fragement. Ed. 
Elke Froehlich. 4 vols. Munich: K.G. Sauer, 1987. 
Grezesinski, Albert. C. Inside Germany. Trans. Alexander S. Lipschitz. New York: 
E.P. Dutton, 1939. (SPD police president of Berlin, 1925-26 and 1930-32.) 
Heydrich, Lina. Leben mit einem Kriegsverbrecher. Pfaffenhofen: Verlag W. Lugwig, 
1976. (Wife of Reinhard Heydrich.) 
Hoettl, Wilhelm. The Secret Front; the Story of Nazi Political Espionage. Trans. R.H. 
Stevens. New York: Praeger, 1954. (Former member of the SD.) 
Kersten, Felix. The Kersten Memoirs, 1940-1945. Trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon 
and James Oliver. New York: Macmillan, 1957. (Himmler's masseur and 
confidant. ) 
Koehler, Hansjuergen [pseud.]. Inside the Gestapo. London: Pallas Publishing, 
1940. 
---. Inside Information. London: Pallas Publishing 1940. 
Leverkuehn, Paul. Der Geheime Nachrichtendienst der deutschen Wehrmacht im 
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Kriege. Frankfurt a.M.: Bernhard & Graefe, 1957. Trans. R.H. Stevens and 
Constantine Fitzgibbon as German Military Intelligence. London: Weidenfeld 
& Nicolson, 1954. (A former member of the Abwehr.) 
Orb, Heinrich [pseud.]. Nationalsozialismus, 13 Jahre Machtrausch. Olten, Switz-
erland: Verlag Otto Walter, 1945. 
Papen, Franz von. Memoirs. Trans. Brian Connell. New York: Dutton, 1953. 
---. Yom Scheitern einer Demokratie, 1930-1933. Mainz: v. Hase & Koehler 
Verlag, 1968. 
Peis, Guenter. The Man Who Started the War. London: Odhams, 1960. (Recollec-
tions of Alfred Naujocks, former member of the SD.) 
Pruck, Erich. "Die Geheimepolizei im totalitaren Regime." Politische Studien 10 
(May 1959): 313-19. (Former member of the Abwehr.) 
---. "Heydrichs SD: Die nationalsozialistische Geheimpolizei." Politische Stu-
dien 10 (July 1959): 442-48. 
Reile, Oskar. Geheime Ostfront: Die deutsche Abwehr im Osten 1921-1945. Munich: 
Verlag Welsermuehl, 1963. (Former member of the Abwehr.) 
--. Geheime Westfront: Die Abwehr, 1935-1945. Munich: Verlag Welsermuehl, 
1962. 
---. Macht und Ohnmacht der Geheimdienste. Munich: Verlag Welsermuehl, 
1968. 
Schaefer, Karl. 20 Jahr im Polizeidienst (1925-1945). Frankfurt a.M.: Decker & Wil-
helm, 1977. (Former member of the Gestapo.) 
Schellenberg, Walter. The Schellenberg Memoirs. Ed. and trans. Louis Hagen. Lon-
don: Andre Deutsch, 1956. Memoiren. Cologne: Verlag fuer Politik und Wirt-
schaft, 1959. (Also in English in abridged form as The Labyrinth.) 
Severing, Karl. Mein Lebensweg. 2 vols. Cologne: Greven Verlag, 1950. 
Personal Correspondence and Unpublished Materials 
by Participants 
As with memoirs, living sources confront the historian with a range of problems 
that are exaggerated by the nature of this subject. Former members of SS and 
police organizations are still subject to prosecution for crimes they might have 
committed. Nevertheless, their memories are invaluable sources that must be 
employed carefully. 
I have established few contacts personally and am grateful for the assistance 
of colleagues who have forwarded the results of their correspondence. This has 
made it unnecessary to trouble the few cooperative living sources with dupli-
cation of effort. 
d' AIquen, Gunter: 
Letters to the author, 14 June 1978 and 24 July 1978. 
Best, Werner: 
Materials made available through Shlomo Aronson: 
"Die deutsche Abwehrpolizei bis 1945." Unpublished manuscript. 
"Betr.: Adolf Hitler," 17 March 1949, 15 pp. 
"Betr.: Heinrich Himmler," 18 September 1949, 14 pp. 
"Betr.: Wilhelm Canaris," 10 April 1949, 9 pp. 
Beanwortung des (Aronson) Fragebogens. 
Beanwortung der Fragen in (Aronson) Schreiben von 3.12.1964. 
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Material made available through David Kahn: 
"Betr.: Auslandsnachrichtendienst des SD," 24.11.1974. 
Letters to the author, 2 April 1977, 28 May 1978, 21 July 1978, 10 August 
1980. 
Hoettl, Wilhelm: 
Material made available through Peter Black: 
Protokoll eines Interviews mit Herrn Dr. Wilhelm Hoett!, am 14. and 15. 
April 1977. 
Letter, 8 November 1977. 
Leffler, Paul: 
"Auszug aus einem Bericht des Dipl.-Ing. Paul Leffler ueber den SD." Made 
available by Best through Aronson. 
Mehlhorn, Herbert: 
"Antwort-Dr. Mehlhorn auf Fragebogen vom 20. November 1965." Made 
available by Aronson 
Neumann, Hans-Henrick: 
Letter to author, 9 December 1986. 
Patzig, Adm. Conrad: 
Notes of conversations, 24 and 25 August 1973. Made available by Kahn. 
Subsequent Literature 
With the exception of Hitler and the military, no other figures of Nazi Germany 
have produced more literature than the SS and police system, if its camps and 
their atrocities are included. Today, one can dismiss as journalistic and sensa-
tional the vast bulk of that which deals extensively with persons and organi-
zations in Sipo and SD. Even pioneer scholarship like Reitlinger's has become 
dated by the extensive subsequent work. 
Aside from the tangential insights in Reitlinger and the mass of literature 
on the fate of the Jews, English-speaking authors had published no books of 
value on the Gestapo and SD until recently. All serious scholarship in England 
and America had been limited entirely to unpublished dissertations, scholarly 
journals, or anthologies. The reading public had to rely on translations of Ger-
man- and French-language books. Unfortunately, the French-language literature 
also makes few valuable contributions of knowledge, and, like the general lit-
erature from Britain and America, is listed below purely for bibliographical in-
terest. 
Among German scholars, Zipfel and those, like Buchheim, associated with 
the Institut fuer Zeitgeschichte, removed the study of the Gestapo and SD from 
the realm of journalism. The work of the Institut scholars has culminated in The 
Anatomy of the SS State, while Zipfel, in addition to his own work, directed a 
dissertation that has been the most significant single contribution. This disser-
tation by Shlomo Aronson, an Israeli, matured into the seminal biography of 
Heydrich and history of the early Gestapo and SD. 
Aronson's thoroughly documented biography is the base for the analysis of 
Heydrich presented here. His book also provided significant leads for further 
research into the pre-1933 history of the SD and was indispensable on the analysis 
of the formation of the Bavarian Political Police. Beyond such specifics, the work 
of Aronson and my own have overlapped so extensively that it is impossible to 
determine where debt ends and originality begins. My doctoral dissertation was 
Selected Bibliography 325 
completed early in 1968, and research for this book was well underway before 
a copy of Aronson's became available. Aronson's work then became the scale 
for measuring what would be a contribution to knowledge. 
In an effort to distinguish between my debts and my contributions, the 
footnotes indicate where Aronson and others deserve credit for the initial dis-
covery of documents and for interpretations that I share. Where there are dif-
ferences in any way significant, the reader is asked to compare (d.) the views. 
Building from work like Aronson's and Buchheim's, Heinz Hoehne returned 
the effort to the realm of good popular literature. Although his book must be 
recognized as the best survey history of the SS in general, his efforts to condense 
our knowledge of Sipo and SD have frequently lost the fine edge of the scholars. 
Consequently, he has perpetuated, and even created, careless generalizations. 
Similar problems plague Deschner's biography of Heydrich, which, for the years 
covered by this book, adds little of significance beyond Aronson. Although 
Deschner maintained some of Aronson's modification of Heydrich's "evil ge-
nius" image, he returned him to the status of driving force behind Himmler and 
the focus of every development in Sipo and SD. Calic would carry us back to 
the even greater extremes, with Heydrich behind almost everything, including 
the Reichstag fire. Perhaps his book's only merit is that it requires the scholar 
to reconsider the extent to which Aronson and Deschner were convinced by the 
family's and wife's denials about Heydrich's basic convictions and the formative 
experiences that made him a Nazi at heart. Robert Koehl's long-awaited book 
on the SS has restored American scholarship to some prominence in this area. 
Written primarily for the scholar, it provides a survey of SS development that 
would lose most general readers, and it would have had more impact in the 
sixties, when first written. Today, it stands as a mix of many significant contri-
butions with some dated perspectives. 
At the level of more basic research, the first indication of movement in 
directions essential to further progress came from the staff of the Geheime Staat-
sarchiv Berlin-Dahlem. They commissioned a number of studies of local Gestapo 
posts, the only one to appear covering the area of Pommerania. Perhaps as an 
offshoot, two similar projects have appeared covering Frankfurt a.M. and 
Hessen-Nassau. This work, begun under Robert Thevoz, provided the first of 
the badly needed grassroots studies of the Gestapo, Kripo, and SD, of their 
operating procedures, and of their specific roles in major domestic and foreign 
actions and decisions. Most of all, we need analyses of their personnel. In this 
respect, the contributions of Boehnert and Ziegler provide quantitative and social 
analysis of the SS to compare with the more extensive work on the NS Movement 
in general and the SA. 
One work on a specific involvement of the SD requires mention-Ramme's 
study of its role in the occupation of Poland. Although relevant more to the 
period following this book, Ramme's introductory chapter makes contributions 
to the general history of the SD. Especially interesting is his critique of the extant 
literature. Unfortunately, his own analysis errs to the opposite extreme of that 
for which he criticizes the "bourgeois historians." In his zeal to establish the 
links between the SD and industry and high finance, he converts circumstantial 
relationships into concrete connections without substantial evidence. The error 
here is more a matter of loose methodology than ideological dogmatism, how-
ever, for support for the police state from industrial and financial circles is another 
area where research is badly needed to advance understanding of the devel-
opment and extent. As this book has indicated, regardless of their motives, 
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between 1933 and 1936 Himmler's supporters, both within and without the 
Movement, tipped the balance in his favor. Perhaps recruiting and channeling 
the involvement of business and industry at all levels is an area where the SD 
played a crucial role. 
The most recent major contribution has come, surprisingly, from the Inter-
nationallen Kimmittees zur Wissenschaftlichen Erforschung der Ursachen und 
Folgen des zweiten Weltkrieges-not from its unconvincing effort to expose 
Heydrich as responsible for the Reichstag fire, nor from Calic's journalism, but 
from the solid scholarship of Christoph Graf. His study of the evolution of the 
Prussian Political Police into the Gestapo appeared after this book was essentially 
completed. The independently developed parallels in analysis and in new in-
sights that exist between Graf's and this book make them mutually reinforcing 
on most points. As with Aronson, the author gives credit to Graf for discoveries 
not already made by the author and directs the reader to compare interpretations 
when differences exist. 
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V, Sipo, 233 
Beutel, Lothar, 111 
Bismarck, Otto von, 39 
black cabinet, 279 n 3 
blacks, as enemies, 164 
Black Shirts. See 55 
Blomberg, Werner von, 158, 179; and Ge-
stapo, 180; and Himmler, 176, 181, 202, 
247; and internal security, 224; opposes 
NS excesses, 141; supports military-Ab-
wehr-Gestapo cooperation, 176; sup-
ports Reich police force, 204-5, 248 
Blomberg-Fritsch purge, 186 
Boehme, Horst, 112 
Boergermoor concentration camp, 104, 
119 
Bohemia, 244 
Bolle, Fritz, 177 
Boltz, Wilhelm, 103 
Bonewald, Wilhelm, 95 
border police. See Gestapo; police 
Border Protection forces, 55, 172 
Bormann, Martin, 31, 88, 96, 206-7, 282 n 
34 
Brandenburg concentration camp, 84, 119 
Bredow, Ferdinand von, 176 
Bremen: Himmler becomes KPP in, 99, 
105-6, 110, 113,282 n 34; Kripo superior 
post in, 237; Nachrichtenstelle, 266 n 
15; police in, 40; SD in, 114, 282 n 34; 
Secret State Police, 105 
Breslau, 58, 154, 198 
Brown House, 27 
Brown Shirts. See SA 
Brunswick, 99-100; Himmler becomes KPP 
in, 99, 111-14; SD vs. Klagges, 94-97; 55 
Ie in, 29 
Buch, Walter, 95, 96, 279 n 3 
Buchheim, Hans: on 55 and police, 228, 
229-30 
Buelow-Schwanten, Karl von, 175-76, 293 
n 25 
Buerckel, Josef, 69, 198 
bunkers. See concentration camps 
bureaucracy: Frick's view of, 77; Himm-
ler's view of, 75, 157; Hitler's view of, 
77; NS view of, 114; and Roehm purge, 
147 
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camouflaged enemy, 295 n 12; definition 
of, 14; judicial view of, 214; as premise 
for establishment of police state, 73, 
168, 169, 170; within military, 173 
Canaris, Wilhelm: background of, 178; 
heads Abwehr, 178, 180; and Abwehr-
Gestapo cooperation, 180, 181, 298-99 n 
38; and Best, 183; and Heydrich, 178, 
179, 186, 298 n 31; and Himmler, 186 
Catholic Church, 73-74, 168, 214 
civil service: status for 55 men in Ge-
stapo, 86-87; in struggle for police 
power, 163, 201. See also bureaucracy 
Cologne-Aachen, 133 
Columbia House, 83, 119, 159, 195 
Comintern, 166, 190 
Communist Party (KPD): AM-Command 
concern for NS success in police, 266 n 
11; vs. Nazi Party and SA, 21, 259 n 4; 
perceived as greater. threat than NS, 41, 
48-49; and police, 41-43; threat as prem-
ise for establishment of police state, 51, 
59, 73, 164-65, 189-90 
concentration camps: early "wild" camps, 
54-55, 60, 104; atrocities in, 69, 73-74, 
104, 154, 155-56, 239; conservative op-
position to, 73-74, 136, 154-55, 192, 195, 
212-13; funding for, 77, 159; Gestapo 
control of, 60, 161, 210-13, 217, 239; 
number of, increased, 119; overcrowd-
ing in, 102, 244; Political Departinent 
in, 70; reform of, 69-70, 195; release of 
prisoners from, 119, 155, 293 n 25; 55 
control of, 67-69, 104, 119, 150-51, 
155-56, 159-61, 239; state control of 
Prussian, 82, 83, 84, 119-20, 150-51, 159-
61,239 
criminal behavior, biological school of, 
242. See also Himmler 
Criminal Investigation Police. See Kripo 
Criminal Law Commission, 188-89 
Czechoslovakia, 184, 299 n 44 
Dachau concentration camp: establish-
ment of, 68; as model, 68, 104; atrocities 
in, 69, 73-74, 154; reform of, 69-70; 
within Reich system, 188 
DAF. See German Workers' Front 
d' Alquen, Gunter, 169-70, 227 
Daluege, Kurt, 47, 112; aligns with Gisev-
ius and Nebe, 87; alleged misappropria-
tion of funds by, 96; creates own 
intelligence agency, 62; and Diels, 59-
60, 83, 87-88, 90, 121-23, 276 n 47, 277 n 
57; and Frick, 78-79, 203, 206, 222, 273 n 
7; fund raising, 79-81, 96; and Goering, 
53,61,79,90, 122; and Heydrich, 33, 
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Daluege, Kurt, (continued) 
62, 122,238; and Himmler, 61-62, 79, 
86-87, 90, 122-23, 125, 226-27, 276 n 47; 
and Hinkler, 88; and Hitler, 33; and 
Reich police force, 203, 206, 222, 225, 
226; removed from 55 command, 87, 
122; and 50 in Berlin, 33, 61-62, 122 
-offices held by: leader of 55 Group 
East, 33, 61-62, 87; commissioner for 
special duty in Prussia, 52-53; head of 
Police Division, Prussian Ministry of In-
terior, 61; lieutenant general of state po-
lice and Prussian police commander, 84; 
head of Police Division, Reich Ministry 
of Interior, 125; Himmler's deputy as 
chief of German Police, 226-27; chief of 
Order Police, 226, 231, 233 
Danzeisen, Emil, 261 n 39 
Darn~, Richard Walter, 15-16, 17 
Death's-Head Formations, 69-70, 144, 172 
Decree for the Protection of the German 
People, 53 
detectives, See Kripo 
Diels, Rudolf, 69, 156, 202, 231; back-
ground of, 55-56; strategy of, 84-85, 120; 
downfall of, 124, 126-27; and Abwehr-
police, 115-16, 174-75; anti-Communist 
sentiments of, 59; and auxiliary political 
police, 83-87, 98-99; and concentration 
camps, 60, 83, 119, 121; conservative 
opposition to, 121, 122-23; contribution 
to 55-police state, 247; and Daluege, 56, 
59, 60, 83, 86, 87-88, 120, 277 n 57; and 
Ernst, 120; establishes Gestapo, 57; on 
fear of communist rising, 59, 269 n 25; 
flight of, 88, 276 n 48; and foreign intel-
ligence, 175, 198; and Frick, 78; and 
Goering, 56, 86, 87, 88-89, 119-20, 138, 
275 n 41; and Himmler, 84-85, 116, 120-
23, 138; and Hitler, 119; lack of au-
thority with N5, 62; moves for indepen-
dence of Gestapo, 78; and police 
centralization, 79; raid on home, 87-88, 
276 n 47; recruits 55 into Gestapo, 83-
87, 98-99; regulates protective custody, 
123; and Roehm, 84-85, 120, 140; and 
5A, 89, 118, 140; and 5econd Revolu-
tion, 82-83; and 55, 83-84, 115, 118-19, 
120-23 
-offices held by: honorary 55 lieutenant 
colonel, 84; 55 colonel, 89; inspector of 
Gestapo and head of Gestapo office, 89-
90, 276 n 48; reinstated as head of Ge-
stapo, 88-89; Prussian provincial gover-
nor, 138 
Dietrich, "5epp," 98, 99, 121-22 
Dodd, Martha, 126, 275 n 41 
Dodd, William, Ambassador, 276 n 48 
Dohnanyi, Hans von, 173 
Dresden, 38 
Drews, Dr., 189, 195 
Duesseldorf, 152-53 
Du Moulin-Eckart zu Vertoldsheim, Karl 
Leon, Count, 22-23, 28, 29-31, 261 n 33 
Dunckern, Anton, 145 
Dusenschoen, 55 Lt., 104 
East Prussia, 198 
Eberstein, Karl von, Baron, 26 
Eichmann, Adolf, 243 
Eicke, Theodor, 69; and Dachau, 69-70; 
administers and reforms concentration 
camps, 69-70, 150-51, 155-56, 192, 195-
96, 239; in Roehm Purge, 142, 144; 
named inspector of KL and fuehrer of 
55 camp guards, 150; reorganizes Prus-
sian camps, 150-51; and Best, 211, 239; 
and Goering, 161; and Himmler, 69, 
161; in Roehm Purge, 142, 144. See also 
Death's-Head Formations 
Einsatzgruppen, 1, 146, 244 
Elbing, 198 
Epp, Franz Ritter von, 66; named Reich 
commissioner of Bavaria, 63; and pro-
tective custody, 72; supports conserva-
tives in Bavaria, 70, 72; and Himmler, 
123; and anti-church crusade, 188; at-
tempts to control BPP, 213, 286 n 24 
Ermittlungsdienst der Gauleitung Hamburg 
der NSDAP (Gau information service), 
100 
Ernst, Karl, 84, 85 
Essen, 46 
Esterwegen concentration camp, 119 
euthanasia, 244 
extermination camps, 243, 244 
Feldjaeger Corps. See 5A 
Final 50lution, 3-4, 243-44 
Foreign Countries Organization of the 
Party (Auslands-Organisation der 
N5DAP),174 
Foreign Ministry, 61, 134, 174, 182 
Foreign Office intelligence activities, 135 
Foreign Political Office, 88, 97, 174. See 
also NO 
Forschungsamt (Investigation Office), 60-
61, 135 
Four Year Plan, 166-67, 224, 248 
France, 39, 140 
Frank, Hans, 69-70, 295 n 15; and concen-
tration camps, 69, 74, 136, 154; and 
Himmler, 74, 188,202; and protective 
custody, 69, 123 
Franke, H., 22, 28, 259 n 9, 261 n 33 
Frankfurt, 58, 84 
Frantz, 74, 154 
Freemasons, viewed as threat, 14, 16, 157, 
168 
Freyberg, Alfred, Dr., 110 
Frick, Wilhelm: goals of, 6, 44-45, 54, 76-
79, 85-86, 109, 114, 118, 120-21, 137, 
201-7, 220-21, 234-35, 246, 248, 266 n 8; 
decline of, 114, 202, 213; attempts to 
control state governments, 51, 89; atti-
tude toward Jews, 167; on civil service, 
Nazification of, 76-77; and concentration 
camps, 136, 154, 161; and Daluege, 79, 
125, 206, 273 n 7; and Gestapo, 86, 89-
90, 136-38, 148-54, 160, 205, 211-13, 214-
15; and Goering, 51, 77-78, 81, 85-86, 
89-90, 117-18, 120-21, 123, 124-25, 129, 
136, 138, 148-49, 153, 160, 187, 193, 210, 
220; and Heydrich, 228; and Himmler, 
79,81, 99, 108-10, 117, 120-21, 124-26, 
129, 136-38, 148, 149-50, 162, 187-88, 
193-94, 201-4, 211, 212, 220-29; and 
Hinkler, 88; and Hitler, 77, 82, 120, 125, 
149, 201-2, 213, 220-21, 222-23, 224, 228-
29; and Lippes, 109-10; and military-Ab-
wehr-Gestapo cooperation, 176, 181; 
plan for Secret Reich Police, 109; plans 
to eliminate extraordinary political po-
lice, 125, 136-37, 149-54; and protective 
custody, 120, 123, 124-25, 136, 137, 188, 
193-94,213,285 n 2; and Prussi,m Ge-
stapo Law, 208-9, 211; and Reich crimi-
nal police, 203-4, 234-35; and Roehm 
purge, 147-48, 153; and RSD, 204, 207; 
and SA, 54, 81-82, 85, 118, 136; and SD, 
134, 148-49, 205; and Second Revolu-
tion, 81, 82, 136, 139; and 55, 118, 136, 
205; and Wuerttemberg, 108 
-offices held by: in Munich police, 44; 
Land minister of interior in Thuringia, 
44, 111; Prussian minister of interior, 
89, 123, 125; Reich minister of interior, 
50,125 
Frischauer, Willie, 17 
Fritsch, Werner von, Gen., 158, 173, 179, 
185 
Fuehrer. See Hitler 
Fuhlsbuettel concentration camp, 102, 104 
Funke, Ferdinand, 93-94, 102 
Gauleiter: in Bavarian power struggle, 70-
71; and ND, 21, 29, 32, 132-35, 258 n 2, 
261 n 30; and SD, 93-97, 114, 205; and 
Second Revolution, 81, 139; support 
Himmler, 114-15; vie for control of po-
lice, 45, 52, 58, 77 
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Gau Propaganda Command, 133, 259 n 9 
Gegnerforschung, 20 
Geheime Maechte (Nicolai), 16, 262 n 49 
Geheime Staatspolizei. See Gestapo 
genocide, 143, 243, 244, 248 
German Criminal Police Commission, 38 
German Nationalist Kampfring, 54 
German Workers' Front (DAF): Counter-
espionage Office, 135; and Gestapo, 
199; Information Office, 135, 199; purge 
of, 207; and SS, 147 
Geschke, Hans-Ulrich, 290 n 8 
GeStapa (Geheime Staats-Polizei-Amt, 
GPA),57 
Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei, Secret 
State Police): bibliography, 324-26; crea-
tion of, 51-52, 55-58, 269 n 17; growth 
of, 85, 123, 128-31, 233-34, 237; funding 
for, 129, 181, 182; need for, 211-12, 219; 
desired image of, 157-58; and Abwehr, 
174-82, 183-85, 298 n 33; Abwehr branch 
(Division IV), 116, 174-77, 182; agents 
and informers, 175, 182, 198; authority 
over "racial" crimes, 213-14; Auxiliary 
Troop (Hilfstruppe), 133; and border 
police, 128, 184, 299 n 44; and concen-
tration camps, 60, 119-20, 210-11; and 
court review of action, 194, 208-10, 214-
16, 305 n 48; and DAF, 199; Division II, 
Ill, 182, 233; Division IV (Treason and 
Espionage; see Abwehr branch, above; 
field posts (Stpoleitstellen), 58-59, 156, 
196-98, 216-17, 233-34; and foreign intel-
ligence, 174-75, 182, 184, 299 n 44; Himm-
ler's goals for, 157-59, 221; interroga-
tion, 234-35; and "Jewish Problem," 
243; and military, 134 (see also Abwehr 
above); recruitment from SS, 62, 83-87, 
119, 124, 156,275 n 43; responsiveness 
to Nazi Party, 199; in Roehm purge, 
144-45; SA in, 87; salary of, 129; supe-
rior field posts (Stapoleitstellen), 198, 233; 
and surveillance of military, 185-86; use 
of uniformed police, 215 
Gestapo Law: Nov. 30, 1933, 89-90, 194, 
216, 277 n 56; (Feb. 10, 1936), 208-12, 
214-17 
Gildisch, Kurt, 144,290 n 11 
Gisevius, Hans, 90, 321; on Best, 191; as 
camouflaged enemy, 173; and Diels, 87, 
121; on Dietrich, 121-22; on early Ge-
stapo, 86; on Frick, 109, 193, 301 n 22; 
and Frick, 125; on Goering, 85; and 
Himmler, 179-80, 193; on military-
Abwehr-Gestapo cooperation, 176; trans-
ferred to Criminal Police Office, 194 
Goebbels, Joseph: cooperates with Frick to 
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Goebbels, Joseph, (continued) 
curb hysteria of "lawlessness," 136; and 
Diels, 202; and Foreign Political Office, 
97; and Franke, 259 n 9; heads Reich 
Propaganda Office, 21, 259 n 9; and 
Heydrich, 202; and Himmler, 158; and 
NO of RPL, 22, 97, 259 n 9; and North-
ern Faction, 11; and G. Strasser, 29, 32 
Goering, Herbert, 301 n 23 
Goering, Hermann: goals of, 6, 51-53, 60-
61, 78-79, 90, 118, 266 n 8, 268 n 4; on 
Communist threat, 59; and Daluege, 53, 
61, 79, 90; and Diels, 57, 86, 88-89, 90, 
119-20, 126, 275 n 41, 276 n 48, 287 n 
32; establishes police state in Prussia, 
53-55; and Frick, 78-79, 81, 85-86, 89, 
117-18, 120-21, 123-24, 125, 129, 149, 
152, 208, 209, 210, 215, 216, 275 n 40; 
and Fritsch, 179; and Grauert, 121; and 
Heydrich, 117, 127, 146,270 n 31; and 
Himmler, 81, 83, 85, 90, 117, 118, 120, 
121, 124, 125, 129, 141, 146, 149, 151, 
156, 158, 159-62, 187, 188, 211, 214, 216, 
222, 280 n 8; and Hitler, 51, 57, 118, 
121, 127, 162, 202; and Pomme, 297 n 
19; and protective custody, 53-54, 123, 
156-57, 161-62, 193-94; relinquishes con-
trol of Gestapo to Himmler, 162; re-
treats from struggle for police, 126-27, 
161-62,212; and Roehm, 85, 89; and 
Roehm purge, 141, 142-43, 144; and SA, 
54-55, 79, 81-83, 85, 117, 118; and SD, 
94, 134; and Second Revolution, 81, 139; 
and G. Strasser, 29 
-offices held 1?y: minister without portfo-
lio, SO; Prussian provisional minister of 
interior, SO-51; prime minister of Prus-
sia, 56-57, 209; chief of Gestapo, 89, 
128, 208, 209, 216; Plenipotentiary for 
Four Year Plan, 224 
GPL (Gaupropagandaleitung, Gau Propa-
ganda Command), 133, 259 n 9 
Graf, Christoph, 326; on Daluege, 276 n 
47; on Daluege-Frick alignment, 273 n 7; 
on flight of Diels, 276 n 48; on Gestapo, 
83; on Goering, 268 n 4; on Goering's 
police purge, 268 n 6; on Hitler and SA, 
287 n 36; on police state, 6, 247, 255 n 
12 
Grauert, Ludwig, Dr., 80, 277 n 56; tradi-
tionalist attitude of, 128; named chief of 
Abteilung II, Ministry of Interior, 52; and 
auxiliary police, 62; and Gisevius, 87, 
121 
Great Britain, 166 
Grzesinski, Albert, 41 
Guertner, Franz, 202; and concentration 
camps, 136, 154, 195; and Frick, 195, 
196; and Gestapo, 209, 211-12; and 
Himmler, 211, 248; opposes Himmler, 
201; speech on "law and order," 219 
Gypsies, as "enemies," 38,164 
Haensch, Walter, Dr., 290 n 8 
Halle, 237 
Hamburg, 45; auxiliary police in, 101; con-
centration camps in, 102, 104, 150; Himm-
ler becomes KPP in, 99, 101-103; Nazi 
takeover of police in, 100-101; SA in, 
101; SD in, 93-94, 103, 114 
Hamburg Administrative Court, 214 
Hamburg State Police, 100-101 
Handschuch, 74 
Harster, Wilhelm, Dr., 108, 266-67 n 15 
Heines, Edmund, 58-59, 115, 145 
Held, Heinrich, 63 
Hellwig, Otto, 109 
Henschel, Ernst, 177 
Henze, Max, SS-Gen., 119 
Herrmann, Fritz, 120 
Hess, Rudolf, 88, 158; and black cabinet, 
279 n 3; and Brunswick affair, 94; cre-
ates Adolf Hitler Fund, 80; and Diels, 
126, 127; ends intelligence services of 
PartY, 134-35; and Himmler, 113, 127, 
225, 280 n 8; and Ley, 199; named 
deputy fuehrer, 81; and Roehm purge, 
146; and SA intelligence, 205, 206; and 
Schwarz, 203; and SD, 31-32, 95, 96-97, 
134, 207; and SD finances, 92, 277 n 4; 
and Second Revolution, 81, 96; and SS, 
92, 199 
Hessia, 111; Himmler becomes KPP in, 
99,110,113 
Hessian Political Police, 111 
Heydrich, Lina, 127,262-63 n 50,270 n 
31,321-22 
Heydrich, Reinhard Tristan Eugen: back-
ground and personality of, 24-27, 146; 
ideology of, 26, 168-69,241-42; reassess-
ment of overall role, 33-34, 47, 65, 197, 
245, 262-63 n 50; and Abwehr, 172, 174, 
175-77, 178, 179, 181; agent in Bavarian 
police, 30; and Brunswick affair, 95-96; 
and "camouflaged enemy," 168-69; and 
Canaris, 178-79, 186; and concentration 
camps, 70, 195,210-11,239; and Dal-
uege, 33, 62, 92, 96, 238; and Diels 126; 
and foreign agents, 175-76; and Frick, 
228; and Fritsch, 179, 186; and Goering, 
96, 152; and Himmler, 17, 65, 134, 141, 
158-59, 211; and Hitler, 166; and Jeck-
eln, 95, 113; and "Jewish stigma," 25-
26; and Nebe, 241; and Patzig, 177; and 
Pfundtner, 222; purges OAF, 207; raid 
on Diels' home, 276 n 47; and Reichstag 
fire, 270 n 31; and Roehm, 31; and 
Roehm purge, 141-45,290 n 11 
-offices held by: Ie officer on Himmler's 
staff, 24, 27-28; head of SS Ie division, 
29-31; head of Press and Information 
Service (PI or PID), 33; Stabsfuehrer of 
SO, 33, 47, 92-93; head of Political De-
partment VI, (Munich), 65; head of Ba-
varian political police, 72, 92; HimmIer's 
staff officer for special duties, 92; Chief 
of SO, 96; head of Zentralbuero of KPP, 
115; head of Gestapo office, 127-28; 
chief of Reich-wide Gestapo, 233-34; 
chief of Sipo, 1, 9, 227, 231; chief of 
Sipo and SO, 240-41; 
Hildebrandt, Friedrich, 104 
Hilfspolizei. See police: auxiliary 
Himmler, Heinrich: bibliography, 257 n 
11; background and personality of, 5, 
13-18, 167, 171, 187; abilities of, 17,245; 
goals of 6, 46, 64, 73-75, 79, 128, 157-58, 
163, 242-48; ideology of, 15-17, 157, 165, 
167-68, 170-72, 189-90, 219-20, 242-43; 
strategy, 64, 66-67, 68, 70, 72-75, 98-100, 
114-15, 127, 146, 165-166,238-39, 245-47; 
attitude toward churches, 170-71; atti-
tude toward crirriinality,. 190, 242-43; at-
titude toward Jews, 14, 16, 157, 167-68, 
187, 242, 257 n 16; attitude toward mili-
tary, 171-73, 179, 185; and Bremen, 282 
n 34; and Brunswick affair, 95-96; and 
Canaris, 179; and concentration camps, 
67-69, 150-151, 155, 159-60, 161, 209, 
210-11; and conservative opposition, 76, 
186-89, 195-96, 201, 208, 211-12, 218-22, 
246-48; and Oachau, 68-69, 74; and Oal-
uege, 61-62, 79, 96, 98, 99; delegates 
police work to Heydrich and Oaluege, 
231-33; and Diels, 84, 112, 116, 121, 126-
27; and Dietrich, 99; and Frank, 74; and 
Frick, 81, 109-10, 125, 129, 137, 150, 
194, 207, 212, 214-15, 219, 223, 224-26, 
227, 228; and Fritsch, 179, 185; and 
Goering, 81, 83, 96, 120, 121, 125, 127, 
129, 141, 152, 161, 215; and Hess, 32, 
99; and Heydrich, 26-27, 92, 117, 134, 
211; idea of State Protection Corps, 33-
34, 262 n 49; increasing power of, 64-69, 
72-73, 74, 90, 118, 121, 161-62, 182, 195, 
212-14; and intelligence operations, lim-
ited understanding of, 16, 23; and Kauf-
mann, 102, 103; and Klagges, 113; and 
Laue, 106; and Markert, 106, 282 n 34; 
memorandum on the "Communist 
movement," 189-91; and Nebe, 241; and 
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protective custody, 72, 161-62, 188; and 
Prussian Gestapo Law (1936), 208-9, 
210, 214-15; raid on Diels' home, al-
leged involvement in, 88, 276 n 47; re-
form of terrorist activities of SS and 
Gestapo, 155-58, 192-93, 195-96, 197-200; 
resists legislation covering police 
power, 189,239-40; and Roehm, 15, 19, 
31, 63-65, 69, 74, 75, 108, 127, 139-40, 
245, 246, 259-60 n 11, 271 n 16; and 
Roehm purge, 141-46; and rumors 
within Gestapo, 158-59; and SA Ie for-
gery matter, 259-60 n 11; and Second 
Revolution, 139, 140, 167; speech to 
Committee for Police Law, 240; speech 
to Gestapo Office, 157-59; and SS infil-
tration of police, 5-6, 43, 46-47, 72, 97, 
99-100; and Staatsschutzkorps (see State 
Protection Corps); and G. Strasser, 29, 
91, 277 n 3; support from outside Party, 
202-3 (see also Blomberg); use of office of 
Reichsfuehrer SS, 65-67, 150, 161; use of 
police auxiliaries, 66-67, 271 n 8; use of 
police offices, 72; and Wagner, 63-64, 
66-69, 71-72, 74-75 
-and Hitler, 18, 91-92, 99, 114, 127, 151, 
166, 188, 207, 213, 221, 224, 247, 281 n 
22; uses appearance of Hitler's support, 
99, 107, 280 n 8, 282 n 38 
-offices held by: deputy propaganda 
chief, 13, 257 n 19; second in command 
of SS (1927), 14; Reichsfuehrer SS, 18; 
provisional police chief (Munich), 63-64; 
provisional police chief (Nuremberg-
Fuerth), 64-65; leader of Political Auxil-
iary Police, Bavaria, 65; political section 
chief (Referent) for Bavaria, 66; KPP in 
Bavaria, 67; special commissioner for 
Gestapo SS Auxiliary Police, Prussia, 
87; KPP in Hamburg, 99, 100-103, 281 n 
22; KPP in Luebeck, 99, 104; KPP in 
Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 99, 104-5; KPP 
in Anhalt, 99, 110, 113; KPP in Baden, 
99,108, 113; KPP in Bremen, 99, 105-6, 
110, 113; KPP in Hessia, 99, 110, 113; 
KPP in Thuringia, 99, 110, 111; KPP in 
Wuerttemberg, 99, 106; KPP in Bruns-
wick, 112-14; KPP in Oldenburg, 111; 
KPP in Saxony, 111-13; deputy chief 
and inspector of Gestapo, 128; KPP of 
States and Inspector of Gestapo in 
Prussia, 131; Reichsfuehrer SS and chief 
of German Police, 222, 225-28; Reich 
and Prussian minister of interior, 228 
Hindenburg, Paul von, 50, 53, 63, 141, 
155 
Hinkler, Paul, 88-89, 269 n 24,276 n 48 
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Hitler, Adolf: characteristics of, 3, 5, 9-11, 
43, 140, 166, 202, 204; attitudes about 
police state, 19-20, 43-45, 121, 154, 165-
66, 202, 205-6, 213, 224, 245-48; behav-
ior of subordinates re his orders 3 12 
175, 223-24; and centralization of p~lic~, 
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